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JAPANESE DIPLOMACY AND EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1918–1931

Ryuji Hattori

Translated by Graham B. Leonard



Japanese Diplomacy and East Asian International Politics, 1918–1931

This book provides an overall picture of East Asian international politics during the early interwar period and examines the various foreign policy trends of the major powers involved, including Japan, China, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Based on extensive original research, it posits that East Asia experienced four waves of international change during the interwar period: the transition to the post-World War I international order; the appearance of Nationalist China and the Soviet Union as actors in East Asian international politics; the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; and Japanese implementation of the North China Buffer State Strategy. It considers the new challenges brought about by each of these waves, how the powers – particularly Japan, Britain, and the United States – were able to meet these challenges by working together, and how this became more difficult as time went on. It argues that the Washington System – the international order established at the 1921–1922 Washington Naval Conference – was not a break with the past, as is frequently argued, on account of new forms of foreign policy, including the ideological approaches of the United States and the Soviet Union, but that rather spheres of influence diplomacy continued as before. In addition, in discussing Japanese foreign policy, the book provides a comprehensive picture of the diversity of views towards China among Japanese actors and the ways these shifted over time.

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**Translated by
Graham B. Leonard**

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Preface

This is a translation of my book *Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankyō no Hendō to Nihon Gaikō 1918–1931*, which was published by Yūhikaku in 2001. There was no significant rewriting of the text during this translation (which was undertaken by Dr. Graham Leonard), although there were some minor additions and significant English-language quotations were checked against their original sources to ensure accuracy of the original language. A considerable amount of research relevant to this book's themes has been released in Japan over the past 20 years, and I would like to briefly introduce this research here for the benefit of the English-speaking audience.

Two symbols of the early interwar period were the creation of the League of Nations and the outlawing of war. The League has continued to be an active target of research, with notable works including: Shinohara Hatsue, *Kokusai Renmei* [The League of Nations] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shisha, 2010), Gotō Harumi, *Kokusai Shugi to no Kakutō – Nihon, Kokusai Renmei, Igrisu Teikoku* [The Struggle Against Internationalism: Japan, the League of Nations, and the British Empire] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2016), Harumi Goto-Shibata, *The League of Nations and the East Asian Imperial Order, 1920–1946* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), Obiya Shunsuke, *Kokusai Renmei – Kokusai Kikō no Fuhensei to Chiikisei* [The League of Nations: Regionality and the Universality of International Bodies] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2019), and Higuchi Mao, *Kokusai Renmei to Nihon Gaikō – Shūdan Anzen Hoshō no "Saihakken"* [The League of Nations and Japanese Foreign Policy: Rediscovering of Collective Security] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2021). Ikō Toshiya, *Kindai Nihon to Sensō Ihōka Taisei – Dai Ichiji Sekai Taisen kara Nicchū Sensō e* [Modern Japan and the System for the Outlawing of War: From World War I to the Second Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2002) and Mimaki Seiko, *Sensō Ihōka Undō no Jidai* [The Era of the Outlawing of War Movement] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2014) have also been published on the outlawing of war.

On the topic of the history of US-Japan relations, Izumi Hirobe, *Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), Minohara Toshihiro, *Hainichi Iminhō to Nichibei Kankei – "Uehara Shokan" no Shinsō*

to *Sono "Jūdai naru Kekka"* [US-Japan Relations and the Anti-Japanese Immigration Act: The "Hanihara Letter" and its "Grave Results"] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002), Minohara Toshihiro, *Kariforunia-shū no Hainichi Undō to Nichibei Kankei* [The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and US-Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2006) discuss the Anti-Japanese Immigration Act and the Anti-Japanese movement in the US. Takahara Shusuke, *Wiruson Gaikō to Nihon* [Wilsonian Diplomacy and Japan] (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2006) examines the Wilson administration and its relations with Japan. A more macroscopic view of the relationship between the two countries is found in Takamitsu Yoshie, *Amerika to Senkanki no Higashi Ajia – Ajia/Taiheiyō Kokusai Chitsujō Keisei to "Gurōbarizēshon"* [America and Interwar East Asia: "Globalization" and the Formation of the Asian-Pacific International Order] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2008), Mitani Taichirō, *Wōru Sutorī to to Kyokutō – Seiji ni okeru Kokusai Kinyū Shihon* [Wall Street and the Far East: International Capital in Politics] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2009), and Nakatani Tadashi, *Tsuyoi Amerika to Yowai Amerika no Hazama de – Dai Ichiji Sekai Taisen-go no Higashi Ajia Chitsujō o Meguru Nichibei Kankei* [In Between Strong and Weak America: US-Japan-UK Relations and the Post-World War I Order in East Asia] (Tokyo: Chikura Shobō, 2016).

On Sino-Japanese relations, Higuchi Hidemi, *Nihon Kaigun kara Mita Nicchū Kankeishi Kenkyū* [Research on the History of Sino-Japanese Relations as Seen by the Imperial Japanese Navy] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 2002) takes the naval perspective into account, and Kumamoto Fumio, *Taisenkankei no Taichū Bunka Gaikō – Gaimushō Kiroku ni miru Seisaku Kettei Katei* [Cultural Diplomacy Towards China in the Interwar Period: The Policy-making Process as Seen in Foreign Ministry Records] (Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2013) focuses on cultural policy. There is also Koike Seiichi, *Manshū Jihen to Taichūgoku Seisaku* [The Manchurian Incident and Policy Towards China] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), Kawashima Shin, *Chūgoku Kindai Gaikō no Keisei* [The Formation of Modern Chinese Foreign Policy] (Nagoya: Nagoya University Press, 2004), and Taneine Shuji, *Kindai Nihon Gaikō to "Shikatsuteki Rieki" – Dai Niji Shidehara Gaikō to Taiheiyō Sensō e no Jokyoku* [Modern Japanese Foreign Policy and "Vital Interests": The 2nd Era of Shidehara Diplomacy and the Prelude to the Pacific War] (Tokyo; Fuyō Shobō, 2014).

For research on the history of Anglo-Japanese relations, Gotō Harumi, *Shanghai o Meguru Nichiei Kankei 1925–1932-Nen – Nichiei Dōmei-go no Kyōchō to Taikō* [Anglo-Japanese Relations over Shanghai, 1925–1932: Collaboration and Confrontation after the End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006) was a further development of her earlier book *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–1932* (London: Macmillan Press, 1995). Tomita Takeshi, *Senkanki no Nisso Kankei 1917–1937* [Interwar Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1917–1937] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010) provides a comprehensive account of Soviet-Japanese relations. Also, Izaō Tomio, *Shoki Shiberia Shuppei no Kenkyū – "Atarashiki Kyūseigun" Kōsō no*

Tōjō to Tenkai [Research on the Early Siberian Expedition: The Rise and Development of the “New Army of Salvation” Concept] (Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 2003) and Asada Masafumi, *Shiberia Shuppei* [Siberian Expedition] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2016) are worth looking at for their discussions of the Siberian Expedition.

The following works look at developments in Japanese party politics, an element of domestic politics inseparable from the above foreign policies: Murai Ryōta, *Seitō Naikaku-sei no Seiritsu 1918–27-Nen* [The Establishment of the Party Cabinet System, 1918–1927] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 2005), Kobayashi Michihiko, *Seitō Naikaku no Hōkai to Manshū Jihen – 1918–1932* [The Destruction of Party Government and the Manchurian Incident: 1918–1932] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2010), and Koyama Toshiki, *Kensei Jōdō to Seitō Seiji – Kindai Nihon Ni Taiseitō-sei no Kōsō to Zasetu* [The Normal Course of Constitutional Government and Party Politics: The Idea of a Two-Party System in Modern Japan and its Collapse] (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 2012). The past 20 years have also been greatly marked by the advancement of research on politicians and diplomats. Itō Yukio, *Hara Takashi – Gaikō to Seiji no Risō* [Hara Takashi: His Diplomatic and Political Ideals] (Tokyo, Kōdansha, 2014), Itō Yukio, *Shinjitsu no Hara Takashi – Ishin o Koeta Saishō* [The True Hara Takashi: The Prime Minister who Surpassed the Restoration] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2020), Shimizu Yuichirō, *Hara Takashi* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2021), Naraoka Sōchi, *Katō Takaaki to Seiji Seitō – Ni Daiseitō-sei e no Michi* [Katō Takaaki and Party Politics: The Road to a Two-Party System] (Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 2006), Sakurai Ryōju, *Katō Takaaki – Shugi Shuchō o Maguruma* [Katō Takaaki: Don’t Waiver in Your Principles] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2013), and Kawada Minoru, *Hamaguchi Osachi – Tatoe Shinmyō o Ushinau tomo* [Hamaguchi Osachi: Even if I Lose My Life] (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobō, 2007) have been written on the prime ministers Hara Takashi, Katō Takaaki, and Hamaguchi Osachi.

Shidehara Kijūrō has been most focused on in research on diplomats, as seen in Taneine Shuji, *Shidehara Kijūrō* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2021), and Kumamoto Fumio, *Shidehara Kijūrō* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2021). There have also been books published on the important diplomats Komura Jutarō, Uchida Kōsai, Ishii Kikujirō, Debuchi Katsuji, and Ashida Hitoshi: Katayama Yoshitaka, *Komura Jutarō – Kindai Nihon Gaikō no Taigensha* [Komura Jutarō: The Embodiment of Modern Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 2011), Kobayashi Michihiko, et. al., eds., *Uchida Kōsai Kankei Shiryō Shūsei* [Compilation of Materials on Uchida Kōsai] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2012), Watanabe Kōta, *Ishii Kikujirō – Sensō no Jidai o Kakenuketa Gaikōkan no Shōgai* [Ishii Kikujirō: The Life of a Diplomat Who Made It Through an Age of War] (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2023), Takahashi Katsuhiko, ed., *Debuchi Katsuji Nikki* [The Diary of Debuchi Katsuji] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 2022), and Yajima Akira, *Ashida Hitoshi to Nihon Gaikō – Renmei Gaikō kara Nichibeī Dōmei e* [Ashida Hitoshi and Japanese Foreign Policy: From League Diplomacy to the US-Japan Alliance] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2019).

Many of these have not been translated into English. It is my hope that they one day will be, allowing for more international contributions to the research on modern Japanese history. While important in their own areas, these studies do not force significant changes in the interpretations provided in this book, which remains almost the only study that thoroughly discusses Japanese diplomacy in the 1920s. That does not mean, however, that this book has no shortcomings. If this book were to be written today, I would add two points.

The first is the transformation of diplomats' foreign conceptions. Although cooperation with the US and UK had been dominant in the Japanese foreign ministry's policy initiatives through the mid-1920s, arguments for Sino-Japanese partnership became influential from the late-1920s into the 1930s. The author has published the following studies on diplomats. Hattori Ryūji, ed., *Manshū Jihen to Shigemitsu Chūka Kōshi Hōkokusho – Gaimushō Kiroku “Shina no Taigai Seisaku Kankei Zassan ‘Kakumei Gaikō’” ni Yosete* [The Manchurian Incident and Envoy to China Shigemitsu's Report: The Foreign Ministry Records “Miscellaneous Articles Related to China's Foreign Policy: On ‘Revolutionary Diplomacy’”] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 2002), Hattori Ryūji, *Hirota Koki* (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha), Hattori Ryūji, ed., *Ōseitei Kaikoroku “Looking Back and Looking Forward”* [Wang Zhengting's Memoirs, “Looking Back and Looking Forward”] (Hachiōji: Chūō University Press, 2008), and Ryuji Hattori, *Japan at War and Peace: Shidehara Kijuro and the Making of Modern Diplomacy* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2021).

The second is public diplomacy. While this book describes diplomatic negotiations, it does not devote much space to public diplomacy. In reality, however, soft power and propaganda can significantly impact the worldview of countries in the long run and change the international environment for Japan. A typical example is the “Tanaka Memorial,” a forged document concerning Japanese strategic goals that China spread worldwide and widely came to be seen as authentic. The author discusses this in Hattori Ryūji, *Nicchu Rekishi Ninshiki: “Tanaka Josho Bun” o Meguru Sokoku, 1927–2010* [Japan-China Historical Recognition: Conflicts over the “Tanaka Memorial,” 1927–2010] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2010), and Ryuji Hattori, “The Tanaka Memorial and China-Japan Relations,” *Sogo Seisaku Kenkyu*, No. 31 (March 2023), pp. 47–53. I would like to translate *Hirota Koki* and *Nicchu Rekishi Ninshiki* into English in the future.

Last but not least, Dr. Leonard has translated and/or edited the following of my books: *Eisaku Satō, Japanese Prime Minister, 1964–72: Okinawa, Foreign Relations, Domestic Politics and the Nobel Prize* (London: Routledge, 2021), *China-Japan Rapprochement and the United States: In the Wake of Nixon's Visit to Beijing* (London: Routledge, 2022), *Japan and the Origins of the Asia-Pacific Order: Masayoshi Ohira's Diplomacy and Philosophy* (Singapore: Springer, 2022), and *Fighting Japan's Cold War: Prime Minister*

Yasuhiro Nakasone and His Times (London: Routledge, 2023). This book, his fifth translation into English, developed from my doctoral dissertation and involved research in Japanese, English, Chinese, Russian, and Korean. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude that this book, the writing of which involved many difficulties, will now be available in English.

Hattori Ryūji
June 30, 2023

Usage Notes

- Japanese names are listed family name first.
- With the exception of Chiang Kai-shek and Sun Yat-sen, Chinese names are romanized using Hanyu Pinyin. A list of name equivalencies has been included for some prominent Chinese figures.

Name Equivalencies

Cao Rulin	Tsao Ju-lin
Gu Weijun	Wellington Koo
Lu Zhengxiang	Lou Tseng-Tsiang
Shi Zhaoji	Alfred Sao-ke Sze
Wang Zhengting	Chengting T. Wang
Wu Chaoshu	C.C. Wu
Xu Shichang	Hsu Shih-chang
Yan Huiqing	W.W. Yen
Zhang Zuolin	Chang Tso-lin
Zhang Xueliang	Chang Hsueh-liang

Acronyms

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CER	Chinese Eastern Railway
KMT	Kuomintang
Mantetsu	South Manchurian Railway
NRA	National Revolutionary Army

Source Acronyms

AS	Academia Sinica, Taipei
AH	Academia Historica, Taipei
AVPRF	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow
CFR	Guoli Bianyiguan, ed., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Huibian</i> [Compilation of the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China], Vol. 1–15 (Taipei: Bohaitang Wenhua Gongsi, 1996)
CSFR	Cheng Daode, Zheng Yueming, Rao Geping, eds., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Ziliao Xuanbian, 1919–1931</i> [Selected Materials on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931] (Beijing: Peking University, 1985)
CSR	Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jindaishi Ziliao Bianjishi, ed., <i>Miji Lucun</i> [Secret Book Records] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1984)
DBFP	E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939</i> , Series 1–2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1946–1947)
DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vneshey politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign

- Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)
- FRUS Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
- JANA John Young, ed., *Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945* (Washington: Georgetown University, 1959)
- JDC Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho* [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
- JDR Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
- MOFA Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
- NDL Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
- NIDS Military Archives, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo
- PRO Public Records Office, London
- RD Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Shiliao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., *Geming Wenxian* [Revolutionary Diplomacy], Vol. 1–117 (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1957–1989)
- RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD
- RTsKhIDNI Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History, Moscow
- SJR Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., *Zhongri Guanxi Shiliao* [Records on Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987–1996)



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Introduction

Japanese Diplomacy and Interwar East Asia's “Four Waves of International Change”

Interwar East Asia – defined here as the roughly twenty-year period between the end of World War I and the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident – was characterized by four “waves of international change.”¹

The first wave of international change arrived in November 1918, immediately following the end of World War I. Although primarily a European war, World War I also brought about major changes in East Asian international politics and prompted Japan to reconsider its foreign policy, which had operated on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and secret agreements with Russia. Russo-Japanese secret agreements would no longer play a central role now that post-revolutionary Russia was subject to interventions by Japan, America, Britain, and France. And the drastic changes to Europe – namely the dissolutions of Germany and Russia – meant that the necessity of the other pillar of Japanese diplomacy, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, also came under question. In China, participation in the war had exacerbated domestic divisions and conflicts, and anti-foreign sentiment – primarily aimed at Japan and Britain – had begun to rise. And perhaps most significantly, the United States had taken the place of the European powers exhausted by the war, becoming a great power that could not be ignored in the formation of the postwar order.

The above changes created what could be called the “first wave of international change,” shaking the existing East Asian international order. Under Hara Takashi, the prime minister in power in the years initially following the end of the war, Japan abandoned its traditional diplomatic cornerstones and sought a new postwar diplomatic model that would both improve the country's foreign relations and expand its interests overseas. The Washington Naval Conference, held from 1921 to 1922, can be regarded as the final phase of this “first wave.”

Peace was restored to the international politics surrounding East Asia for the first time in years following the conclusion of the conference. But even so, new trends within China and the Soviet Union that could be considered a “second wave” of international change would gradually gain momentum from 1923 on. The Soviet Union made progress in its negotiations with China over the establishment of diplomatic relations and began making its presence known in international politics by increasing its influence over China. And

2 *Introduction*

while China had been content with a subordinate position within the new Washington System, the years following would see the formation of the Nationalist government in the south and the rise of political movements demanding the return of China's national rights. The treaty revision diplomacy of the Beiyang (Beijing) government and the revolutionary diplomacy of the Nationalist government that resulted from these developments exposed policy differences between Japan, America, and Britain. This would be the international environment faced by Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō and Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Tanaka Giichi.

The “third wave of international change” was brought about by the Manchurian Incident – the Japanese invasion of northeastern China. This event brought about the end of the Washington System as Japanese policy moved from maintaining the status quo to overthrowing it. This “third wave” was the greatest shock of the interwar period and can be characterized as demarcating the “early” and “late” halves of the period.

Despite the gravity of the Japanese invasion, the international politics of East Asia would begin to settle down after 1933, once the aftereffects of the Manchurian Incident came to an end with the conclusion of the Tanggu Truce and the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations. But this relative calm was not to last. In 1935, the Japanese army embarked on plans to create a protective buffer for Manchukuo in northern China, providing a new shock to the region and bringing about a “fourth wave” of international change. Then, in 1937, the interwar period in East Asia came to an end with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

I. An Overall Picture of “Interwar” East Asian International Politics

This book, which looks at the “early interwar period” from 1918 to 1931, generally has two goals: providing an overall picture of East Asian international politics during the period in question and examining the various trends that existed in the foreign policies of the involved countries from both intrinsic and pluralistic perspectives.

Examination of collaborative diplomacy – and the limits of that diplomacy – will be a consistent focus throughout this book, particularly where relations between China and the Soviet Union, and between Japan, America, and Britain are concerned. There are three reasons that this book focuses on China. First, wartime Japanese diplomacy towards China – as symbolized by the Twenty-One Demands and the Nishihara Loans provided to Duan Qirui – drew the distrust of the other major powers. Japan thus regarded moving away from its wartime diplomacy towards China as an urgent matter and the Western powers, now that the war had ended, took a vested interest in seeing this done.

The second reason involves the standing rules for modern Japanese diplomacy: to expand Japanese interests on the Asian continent and check Russian southern expansion from within a framework of great power cooperation. These rules survived World War I largely unchanged. In other words, the

underlying principle of Japanese foreign policy was maintaining a balance between three objectives: cooperating with the other great powers, particularly Britain and the US; expanding Japanese interests on the continent; and blocking Russian southern expansion. For most of the Meiji Period (1868–1912), this had been focused on the issue of Korea, but this gradually shifted to China (including Manchuria) in the mid-1900s, around the time of the Russo-Japanese War. For Japan, the issue of China (as it existed following World War I) was merely the reappearance of a proposition that had existed throughout its modern history: the question of how to balance these three foreign policy objectives. Following the war, Japanese policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia also became a significant element of its colonial administration, as this policy became a means through which to deal with the growing Korean independence movement. The importance of the China issue was thus only growing for Japan.

The third reason is China itself. The treaty revision diplomacy of the Beiyang government and the revolutionary diplomacy of the Nationalist government brought to light contradictions between the East Asian plans of Japan, America, and Britain. This also held true for Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the anti-foreign movement, both of which became more prominent from 1923 on. China has often been regarded merely as a stage for great power diplomacy, but a careful examination of Chinese diplomatic documents from across China and Taiwan will throw its role as an active actor in international politics into relief.

1. The International Politics of East Asia during the Paris Peace Conference

There are two major points of contention in the research on the international political history of interwar East Asia. The first concerns the situation around the time of the Paris Peace Conference, and the other how best to understand the Washington System.

(1) The Postwar Diplomatic Shift Theory

The arguments of Mitani Taichirō continue to be the most influential regarding the first of these points. In *The Formation of Japanese Party Politics: The Development of Hara Takashi's Political Leadership (Zōho Nihon Seitō Seiji no Keisei: Hara Takashi no Seiji Shidō no Tenkai)*, Mitani summarized his “basic hypothesis” as follows:

The post-World War I Seiyūkai government led by Hara Takashi corresponded to the “turning point” of the global hegemonic structure from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana. Its foreign policy established the framework for the party governments that followed by making cooperation with the United States a cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy for the first time and preparing the road to the Washington System, adjusting Japan's traditional China policy accordingly.

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Mitani's analysis of "Japan's international environment following World War I" covers a wide range of topics, but he places the heaviest emphasis on the Second China Consortium. According to him, "it was the Hara government's participation in the new loan consortium (which also included the United States) that most symbolizes its economist approach to China." This participation "meant that future diplomacy towards China would be conducted from within the framework of cooperation with the other participants, particularly the United States." But he also wrote in the same book that:

participation in the new loan consortium symbolized a new approach to diplomacy towards China, but the Hara government was forced to make the preservation of Japan's existing interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia an indispensable prerequisite for that participation. This was a legacy of Japan's traditional approach [to China] and should have been discarded.

He pointedly noted that this spoke "to the severity of the historical restrictions imposed upon the Hara government's diplomacy towards China and how difficult they would be to overcome."²

Mitani's work, which has served as the foundation for research into the political and diplomatic history of the period, emphasizes the degree to which Japanese diplomacy changed following World War I. It would therefore seem appropriate to refer to it as the "postwar diplomatic shift theory."

(2) The Continuation of Sphere of Influence Diplomacy Theory

That Hara Takashi attempted to make cooperation with the United States into a new cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy is without question. However, the postwar diplomatic shift theory overlooks some basic facts. First, the Hara government secretly expanded Japanese interests in the north and south of China, paying little attention to the agreements it had made with America, Britain, and France regarding the Second China Consortium. The existence of the consortium – which ultimately failed to secure even a single loan – was insufficient to adequately restrain Japan; the southern and northern expansion doctrines would continue to play a role in Japanese continental policy despite the consortium. It would therefore be difficult to conclude that the Wilson administration's attempts to curb Japanese continental expansion were particularly successful.

Second, it tends to overlook the deterioration of US-Japan relations. According to the postwar diplomatic shift theory, the Hara government's adoption of US-Japan cooperation as a diplomatic cornerstone helped prepare the way for the Washington System. But the Wilson administration's distrust of Japan actually increased during this time, as can be seen from its actions at the Paris Peace Conference and its withdrawal of forces from Siberia. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement shows that the US and Japan had been

open to compromising with one another during the war; things seem to have generally worsened after the war concluded.

The third problem is that, by going too far in embracing the idea of a “turning point” in the global hegemonic structure from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana, the theory underestimates the role played by Britain. The truth is, the Hara government sometimes showed great uneasiness towards the “New Diplomacy” advocated for by Wilson and turned to a policy of cooperation with Britain as a means of expanding Japanese interests. This is evident in the Japanese response to the Paris Peace Conference – the largest international conference of the era. The cooperative diplomacy between Japan and Britain at the conference, while partially due to wartime secret agreements, largely came about due to a shared belief in sphere of influence diplomacy. Additionally, Japan’s perception of Britain – namely, that it was one of the world’s foremost powers – had not been changed by the war. If the Paris Peace Conference has significance as a steppingstone towards the Washington System, it is to be found less in US-Japan relations than it is in the mediative role that Britain played between Japan and the United States.

The above facts strongly suggest that the hypothesis that Japan skillfully continued to engage in sphere of influence diplomacy is valid. The failure of Japan to move away from this approach is the fundamental reason why US-Japan relations would ultimately fail to improve and that the Sino-Japanese negotiations over the Shandong question would break down. This is the line of argument pursued in this book’s analysis, what I would like to call the “continuation of sphere of influence diplomacy” theory. While the postwar diplomatic shift theory holds that Hara was the creator of US-Japan cooperation, he is naturally evaluated differently when using this point of view. What Hara should be commended for is his skillful use of politics; he was, to a great extent, able to successfully reconcile the contradictory principles of expanding Japanese interests in China and cooperating with the United States and Britain, thereby harmonizing domestic and international demands.

2. The International Politics of East Asia under the Washington System

The second point of contention regarding macroscopic interpretations of the early interwar period of East Asian international politics concerns the Washington System. Akira Iriye and Hosoya Chihiro are the leading scholars on this topic.

(1) The Washington System as New Order Theory

According to Akira Iriye’s masterpiece *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931*:

Because the framework for Far East diplomacy had been radically transformed by the First World War, the great powers sought to redefine

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their relations at the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922). Under American leadership, they acknowledged the collapse of the old order and sought to build a new era, adopting “economic diplomacy” as the basis upon which interests would be reconciled and promoted.

Iriye also argued that:

The Washington Naval Conference brought about a revolution in Far East politics. Had this only involved Japan pulling back from its Great War period expansionism, this would have meant no more than a return to the prewar balance of power politics under the framework of the old diplomacy. In reality, however, the mechanisms for maintaining a balance among the great powers were destroyed and replaced by multilateral agreements that rejected expansionism. Imperialism did not disappear, of course. The conventional concepts and means through which the relations between empires had been regulated had merely been abandoned. This was the critical weakness of the “Washington System.”³

This argument was further developed by Hosoya Chihiro. According to Hosoya, the Washington System:

sought to reject the bilateral political associations that had existed prior to World War I – an imperialist means of diplomacy that attempted to establish spheres of influence and enable political and economic expansion at the expense of undeveloped peoples, typified by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japanese secret agreements – and create a new multilateral system of association. It can be seen as the realization of a new international political order in East Asia based on the replacement of the ‘Old Diplomacy’ with a ‘New Diplomacy.’

He lists Soviet “revolutionary diplomacy,” Chinese nationalism, and the presence of “anti-Washington System factions” in Japan as factors that destabilized the Washington System.⁴

Although their views did differ in some areas, such as the causes for the demise of the Washington System, both Iriye and Hosoya saw the essence of the system as the creation of a new order under American leadership that rejected the old style of diplomacy. This is what could be called the “Washington System as new order” theory.

(2) *The Washington System as Old Order Theory*

But was the Washington System really an America-led new order? This is a question that must be asked if one is to undertake a careful examination of the Washington Naval Conference and its aftermath.

Prior criticism of the Washington System as new order theory has primarily come from British diplomatic historians. This is because, as noted by Ian Nish, there are virtually no contemporary historical materials that indicate that Britain perceived the Washington System as an American-led new order. It is also difficult to believe that such a perception had taken root in China at the time. The term “Washington System” itself is gradually becoming established within Chinese academia, however. While the discriminatory treatment accorded to China is seen as problematic, there is a tendency in China to see the Versailles-Washington System as having restrained Japanese aggression towards China, albeit only temporarily.⁵ But that does not mean that these critics have provided a systematic explanation that can replace the Washington System as new order theory. And a given country’s perception of the outside world and the actual international order are completely different matters in any case.

In my opinion, the core agreement reached between Japan, the United States, and Britain at the Washington Naval Conference was to maintain the status quo regarding China. This agreement was first tacitly reached by Japan and Britain; this was followed by US Commissioner Plenipotentiary Elihu Root, who agreed in the interest of maintaining cooperation with Japan, and reluctantly accepted by US Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes. Accordingly, the actual reality of the agreement reached between the three countries – the fundamental basis for the Washington System – was not the prescription of a new order, but rather a general acceptance of the old order that took the continuation of sphere of influence diplomacy as a given. This followed the breakdown of the attempt by Wilson and Hughes to bring about a new order.

If there is anything from the negotiations on East Asian issues at the conference that can be regarded as being of revolutionary significance for the history of American diplomacy, it would be the emergence of John Van Antwerp MacMurray, Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs at the US State Department. Negotiations between Japan and China over the Shandong question – something that had been suspended since the Paris Peace Conference – were revived through what could be called the “MacMurray Initiative”: a policy of working-level cooperative diplomacy towards Japan. The progress made here stands in stark contrast with the Paris Peace Conference, where the Chinese delegation had ultimately been driven to refuse to sign.

There *was* a development at this time that was revolutionary in terms of the international order in East Asia, however it was one which occurred outside of the Washington System: the signing of equal treaties between China and the former great powers of Germany, the Soviet Union, and Austria. But, while this was a great milestone for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty, it did not pose an immediate threat to the Washington System. And – as symbolized by the joint management of the eastern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) – the Soviets had not completely abandoned the legacy of Imperial Russia.⁶ The power of Japan, America, and Britain clearly exceeded

that of Germany and the Soviet Union and, regardless of the policies of these former powers, the course of international politics in East Asia would be dependent on the degree to which these three countries could compromise and develop a mutual understanding between each other.

The newly created Washington System thus naturally contained problems, and it is easy to criticize its conservatism: its discrimination towards China, exclusion of the Soviet Union, and preservation of colonial empires. Nevertheless, given the cold logic of international politics, the above-mentioned tri-lateral agreement between Japan, the United States, and Britain would seem to have been an appropriate conclusion for those countries to reach. It is difficult to ensure a stable peace without giving the status quo major powers a sense of satisfaction commensurate with actual power relationships. The restructuring of the balance of power on naval issues complemented this agreement. And, while the Washington System was conservative, it was flexible enough that talented Chinese diplomats such as Shi Zhaoji (Alfred Sao-ke Sze) and Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo) saw a potential for reform within the system.

It is common for the existence of anti-Washington System factions in Japan to be listed alongside Soviet diplomacy and Chinese nationalism as a destabilizing factor for the Washington System. However, the presence of such critics does not immediately indicate that the system was fragile. It could even be said that the balanced existence of healthy critical forces in each country was a necessity, as all of one country's demands being met serves as an incentive for other countries to depart from a system. This is a difference between domestic and international politics and also a lesson to be taken from the Versailles System.

Accordingly, in order to show that the presence of factions opposed to the Washington System in Japan was a destabilizing factor for the system, it would be necessary to prove that there was comparatively little dissatisfaction in Britain and the United States. Such a premise does not seem to hold, however. The US State Department's China hands such as Paul S. Reinsch, Nelson T. Johnson, and Stanley K. Hornbeck were critical, and figures like MacMurray (who was sympathetic to Japan despite being well-versed enough on China to have edited a compilation of Sino-American treaties) and William R. Castle, the first under-secretary of state to have clear pro-Japanese leanings, were outside of the department's mainstream. Basic thinking within the State Department was to consider Japan in the context of Sino-American relations. While Japanese researchers have a tendency to view China in the context of US-Japan relations, this does not conform to the American view. While there was no clear division between pro-Chinese and pro-Japanese factions within the British foreign ministry, it was rare for more affinity to be shown towards China than Japan; Victor Wellesley, assistant under-secretary for foreign affairs, was greatly influential on East Asian policy, and his actions typified this stance.

This book views Chinese diplomacy as the most important destabilizing factor for the Washington System. "Chinese diplomacy" is not used synonymously with the term "Chinese nationalism," which has been used

ambiguously in prior research, but rather to indicate the Beiyang government's treaty revision diplomacy and the Nationalist government's revolutionary diplomacy. I would like to use the process through which those diplomatic efforts caused the policy differences between Japan, the United States, and Britain to come to the surface to demonstrate the "divergence of interpretations of the Washington System."

The first phase of divergence was brought about by the Beiyang government's treaty revision diplomacy. With the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, held in Beijing from 1925 to 1929, three views of the Washington System began to become intertwined: the "conventional view" of Foreign Minister Shidehara and US Minister to China MacMurray; the "pro-Chinese view" of US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and Chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs Nelson T. Johnson; and British Foreign Minister Joseph Austen Chamberlain's view that "the Washington System should be used as a means of maintaining order in China."

It was also Chinese diplomacy that brought about the second phase of divergence, although this time it was the revolutionary diplomacy of the Nationalist government. Britain initially sought to address this through cooperation with Japan in accordance with its "maintenance of public order theory," but it later abandoned this approach towards the end of the Tanaka Giichi government. During the negotiations over the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over tariffs at the time of the establishment of the Nationalist government, Kellogg pursued a "pro-Chinese" interpretation of the system, resulting in the isolation of Tanaka's foreign policy in two senses. The 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict triggered by China's attempt to recover the CER would also highlight the contradictions that existed in the East Asian plans of the countries participating in the system. As an unintended consequence of China's inept policy towards the Soviet Union, the fundamental conflict between the Japanese and American plans for East Asia – something that had existed since the Washington Naval Conference – was brought to light. The divergence in interpretations would continue despite the arrival of US Secretary of State Henry Lewis Stimson and the return of Shidehara Kijūrō as foreign minister, and sphere of influence diplomacy remained part of Japanese diplomatic thinking. Stimson's attempt to bring about a new order would fail, confirming that the Washington System was still part of the old order.

Chinese diplomacy thus became the driving force that brought the frictions that had existed between Japan and the United States since the Washington Naval Conference to the fore. The Nationalist government's revolutionary diplomacy in particular can be regarded as the greatest external factor behind the collapse of the Washington System following the Manchurian Incident.

The second destabilizing factor of the Washington System can be found in American diplomacy itself. Even though the secretaries of state during this period – Hughes, Kellogg, and Stimson – generally did not have the knowledge or experience necessary to take the lead on East Asian policy, they were still occasionally willing to make abrupt, unilateral changes in China policy

without relying on State Department officials. The actions of Kellogg, who put the “pro-Chinese view” into the practice, and Stimson, who tried and failed to apply the spirit of the Kellogg–Briand Pact to the Sino-Soviet conflict, showed that the United States had not abandoned attempts at bringing about a “New Diplomacy” even after Wilson and Hughes had left office.

The third destabilizing factor was the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of its position outside of the Washington System, Soviet relations with China prior to 1927 were carried out along four simultaneous lines: with the Beiyang government, the Fengtian regime in the northeast, the Kuomintang (KMT), and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Discussion of the “Soviet threat” spread within the Japanese army from about 1923, and the army leadership would successfully have a policy of advancing into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets incorporated into the Kiyoura government’s “Outline of China Policy” in the following year. This occurred in tandem with the development of anti-communist ideology within the Japanese foreign policy. The Soviet Union’s loss of the right to station troops in northern Manchuria also meant that its ability to deter Japan had been reduced.

There were three good opportunities for removing the Soviet Union as a destabilizing factor. The first was the American-led effort at the Washington Conference to strengthen the international management of the CER. Implementation of this plan was hindered by opposition from China and Japan, however, meaning that Manchuria and Inner Mongolia returned to its old state, subject to the balance of power between Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. The second opportunity came when the Soviet Union sought to resolve the Manchuria-Inner Mongolia railway issue following the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1925. However, this also failed as Shidehara had accepted the policy of advancing into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets that was advocated for by the Japanese army and the South Manchuria Railway (Mantetsu). The final opportunity was during the Tanaka government. With its influence over China rapidly declining, the Soviet Union proposed forming a non-aggression pact with Japan. But, having inherited the economist policy towards the Soviets that had characterized Japanese foreign policy since Shidehara’s first term as foreign minister and being personally overly sensitive to the ideological nature of the Soviet Union, Tanaka was unable to reduce the tensions between the two countries. Japan thus missed all three opportunities.

However, even if we advocate for the “Washington System as old order” theory as described above, we cannot simply state that the course of East Asian international politics in the 1920s is synonymous with the collapse of the Washington System. Certainly, the idea of sphere of influence diplomacy was deeply rooted on the Japanese side – even during the periods when Shidehara was foreign minister – and this frequently caused frictions with the United States. But Shidehara was also fully committed to cooperation with the United States and Britain (at least subjectively), as can be seen with the London Naval Conference and the negotiations over China’s foreign loans.

And the same holds true for Tanaka's foreign policy. Kellogg, who was sympathetic to China and overly willing to act unilaterally, had no intention of leaving the Washington System, and instead attempted to incorporate China into the system on a more equal basis. The possibility of a return to cooperative diplomacy was always present.

Which makes the Japanese move in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident to become a force that sought to break the status quo all the more foolish. Shidehara should have held to his long-held belief in non-interference and cooperation with the United States and Britain. That the Manchurian Incident occurred at a time when the leadership of the political parties in the diplomatic realm had not yet been institutionalized shows the tragic nature of Taishō Democracy. Advanced political skills were needed to harmonize domestic and international demands amidst the process of political democratization. But the shift from Hara to Shidehara as Japan's diplomatic leader brought about a reduction in political ability. It is truly regrettable that there was no outstanding conservative politician like Hara Takashi during the tumultuous period that led to the Manchurian Incident.

II. The Various Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Powers

The second task of this book is to consider the various trends present in the foreign policies of Japan, the United States, China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union from intrinsic and pluralistic perspectives. Especially in the Japanese case, while sphere of influence diplomacy generally continued to be pursued, the specific policies implemented were diverse. Research into the diplomatic history of the period tends to focus on comparing the diplomacy of Shidehara and Tanaka, however, with few studies discussing the consistency of their foreign policies with that of Hara. Similarly, research into the diplomacy of the Hara government is relatively weak when it comes to comparing it to that of the governments that followed. For this reason, I feel that the questions of how effective the prototype for postwar diplomacy established by the Hara government proved to be and how it changed afterwards have not been adequately investigated. I also feel that dualistic analytical views have become so entrenched – comparing the foreign policies of Shidehara and Tanaka, the dual-level foreign policies of the Japanese army and the foreign ministry, and the arguments within the foreign ministry over whether to cooperate with Britain and America or China – that there have not been enough attempts to gain a comprehensive grasp of the various policy trends present in Japanese diplomacy as a whole.⁷

It is necessary to present an explicit analytical framework in advance if the above points are to be overcome. Therefore, this book will attempt to grasp the differences between and changes in the positions of policymakers from a long-term perspective by defining and invoking the concept of “interference” in China – something that has frequently been a point of contention in research on this topic. China policy is used as the basis for classification because the leaders involved – Hara Takashi, Shidehara Kijūrō, and Tanaka

Giichi – had cooperation with Britain and the United States as their sole diplomatic cornerstone; foreign policy differences between them can be more easily found in their policies towards China than in their relations with the West.

In this book, “interference” refers to a foreign policy that falls under the category of “military interference” – the introduction/reorganization of military forces or threats made with the backing of military force – or “political interference” – the use of selective support to certain groups/leaders to secure certain objectives such as the expansion of Japan’s rights and interests or the adoption of pro-Japanese policies.

As shown in Table 0.1, four categories have been set to determine the presence and degree of military interference: “absolute non-interference” for when there was absolutely no such interference at all; “non-interference with reservations” for when there was no military interference in Guannei (the area within Shanhai Pass; that is, the area to the southwest of Manchuria sometimes contemporarily referred to as “China proper”) but such interference was possible in the Three Northeast Provinces (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang; i.e., Manchuria); “nationwide interference” when interference occurred both in the Three Northeast Provinces and Guannei; and the self-explanatory “occupation of Manchuria/Inner Mongolia.”

Four categories have also been set to determine political intervention on the basis of policies adopted towards Zhang Zuolin: “no support” for when no support was provided to Zhang and Japan was unconcerned about whether his control of the Three Northeast Provinces was threatened; “limited support” for when support was provided to Zhang only within the Three Northeast Provinces; “active support” for when support was provided even when the effects of such support extended beyond the Three Northeast Provinces into Guannei; and “elimination” for when the presence of Zhang was considered a hindrance and it was felt that military force should be used to remove him. I hope to make the model for postwar diplomacy and how it

Table 0.1 Axes of China Policy (1918–1928)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria/Inner Mongolia	Nation-wide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
				No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
				Limited Support of Zhang	
				Active Support of Zhang	
				Elimination of Zhang	

transformed and spread clear by using the above two axes to categorize and compare China policy over time.

As one of the key elements in this model – Zhang Zuolin – was absent during the period from his assassination to the Manchurian Incident, it will be impossible to directly apply the model to this period. It became apparent following Zhang's assassination that a rivalry existed over what Japan's diplomatic cornerstone should be. In other words, whether it should be cooperation with Britain and America (advocated for by Shidehara and the foreign ministry mainstream), partnership with China (represented by Shigemitsu Mamoru), or hegemony over China (advocated for by younger mid-level army officers, mainly those who had graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy from 1903 on). These points will be summarized in the conclusion.

III. International Political History as Method

The first task of this book – constructing an overall picture of the international politics of East Asia – and the second – giving consideration to the intrinsic pluralism of each country's foreign policy – are obviously at odds with one another. Methodologically, the former relies on the methods of international political history, while the latter requires political and diplomatic historical analysis. As such, this book's attempt may appear reckless. However, it is not impossible to pursue both tasks in parallel if one carefully compares diplomatic and personal documents from each country. Based on this premise, this book is intended to research international political history in the broad sense, attempting to present an overall picture of international politics in East Asia while also attempting to analyze the internal aspects of each country's foreign policy. This means that this book's analysis is based on the assumption of the supremacy of politics found in research into the history of international relations rather than analysis of economics or culture. Even if economic and cultural trends and the actions of non-state actors cannot be ignored, states remain the most important actors in international relations.

Such a method is not completely different from conventional multi-archival approaches. But, in actual practice, this has largely been applied to empirical research specializing in one or two countries or international political research mainly dependent upon Western interpretations.

As a result, interpretations of the Washington System are often reduced to discussions of US-Japan relations. Such a limited framework not only lacks Chinese and Soviet perspectives but also neglects British diplomacy. And yet, comparative examination of American and British historical materials from the interwar period shows that Britain played a role comparable to that of the United States.⁸ It is also important to recognize that contemporary Japanese governments continued to view Britain as a great power on par with the United States, with government documents generally referring to the two countries together: *beiei* – “America and Britain.” That explanations of the Washington System tend to be reduced to US-Japan relations may be the

result of the modern Japanese worldview being projected upon the past without any serious thought.

At the same time, research on Sino-Japanese relations during this period has steadily accumulated and, while still sparse, research into Japan-Soviet relations has also achieved a certain level of success.⁹ The problem is that there is a tendency to adopt bilateral relations as an analytical framework, and there is no systematic understanding of what the defining factors in the international politics of East Asia were at what times, and what the external factors that brought about changes in Japanese diplomacy were.

In order to overcome this problem, this book mainly attempts to grasp the overall picture of multilateral relations concerning China while tentatively focusing on Japanese foreign policy. The “four international fluctuations” discussed at the beginning of this chapter will serve as the framework.

In addition, I would like to place the Korean factor in East Asian international politics in its proper place and pay attention to the oft-ignored moves made regarding Korea. These have rarely been dealt with in studies of diplomatic history focusing on periods after the annexation of Korea. But that annexation did not mean that Korea as a nation disappeared. It is impossible to understand the Hara government’s reorganization of the Siberian Expedition and the way it approached Zhang Zuolin without grasping their relationship to the Korean independence movement and the Japanese administration of Korea. The formation of the Korean management system in eastern Manchuria and attempts to deal with the Korean communist movement would also be important concerns later on. An eye should be kept on the Korean factor when understanding the significance of Shidehara’s foreign policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and the Northeast Flag Replacement undertaken by Zhang Xueliang during the Tanaka government. I would like to reexamine the picture of international political history from this perspective, taking into consideration colonial documents and the Korean literature.¹⁰

Notes

- 1 This introduction is modeled after Hattori Ryūji, “‘Senkan Zenki’ Higashi Ajia Kokusai Seiji Kenkyū no Hōhōron-teki Oboegaki” [A Methodological Memo on Research in “Early Interwar” East Asian International Politics], *Seiji Keizai Shigaku* No. 396 (1999), 1–17.
- 2 Mitani Taichirō, *Zōho Nihon Seitō Seiji no Keisei – Hara Takashi no Seiji Shidō no Tenkai* [The Formation of Japanese Party Politics: The Development of Hara Takashi’s Political Leadership (Expanded Edition)] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1995), xi, 334–339, 343.
- 3 Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), 2–3, 20. For an investigation into the historiography of the interpretations of the Washington System, see: Koike Seiichi, “‘Washinton Taisei’ Rikai no Hensen – Sengo Nihon Kingendaishi no Shigakushi-teki Ichikōsatsu” [Changes in the Understanding of the “Washington System” – Historiological Considerations of Modern Postwar Japanese History], *Chūō Shigaku* No. 21 (1998), 47–71.

- 4 Hosoya Chihiro, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nihon Gaikō, 1914–1945* [Japanese Diplomacy between the Two World Wars, 1914–1945] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 75–78.
- 5 Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869–1942* (London: Routledge, 1977), 141–142. Ian Nish, “Japan in Britain’s View of the International System, 1919–37,” in Ian Nish, ed., *Anglo-Japanese Alienation, 1919–1952* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 31–32. Shi Yuanhua, *Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao-shi* [Diplomatic History of the Republic of China] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), 196. Liu Xiaolin, “Daiichiji Sekai Taisen to Kokusai Kyōchō Taiseika ni okeru Nicchū Kankei” [World War I and Sino-Japanese Relations under the System of International Cooperation], trans. Nakamura Motoya, in Chūō Daigaku Jinbunka Kagaku Kenkyūjo, ed., *Kokumin Zenki Chūgoku to Higashi Ajia no Hendō* (Tokyo: Chuo University, 1999), 125–150.
- 6 For research emphasizing this point, see: Bruce A. Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (Armonk: Routledge, 1997).
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1 The First Wave of International Change and Hara Diplomacy

September 1918 to November 1921 – The Hara Government

The November 1918 conclusion of World War I brought about major changes not just in Europe, the war's principal battlefield, but also for the international politics of East Asia. The European powers were exhausted, and Japan, the United States, Britain, and France all had forces stationed in post-revolutionary Russia. In China, the country's participation in the war had caused tensions between various groups, and the rights recovery movement was gaining momentum. Meanwhile, the United States, after controlling the course of World War I, seemed to have made a triumphant arrival to the global stage as a pillar of the new postwar order. These changes can be described as the "first wave of international change" in interwar East Asian international politics. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese secret agreements had served as the cornerstones for Japanese diplomacy, but the country now sought a new foundation appropriate to the new situation. It also pursued the creation of a model for postwar diplomacy that would allow it to expand its interests in China.

I. Expansionism Within Cooperation

1. The Second China Consortium and the Expansion of Japanese Interests in China

The Hara government's postwar foreign policy has traditionally been discussed in terms of its policy of cooperating with Britain and America (the latter especially). The contemporary negotiations over the Second China Consortium have been taken as a classic example of the Hara government's desire to cooperate with the West.¹

The roots of the Second China Consortium can be found in a July 10, 1918 proposal by US Secretary of State Robert Lansing to Japanese Ambassador to the US Ishii Kikujirō; by the time of the Hara government's formation in September, the Wilson administration had already begun fleshing out the idea.² The consortium was to serve as a clearinghouse for future business in China, overseeing all loans, and – in the minds of the US government – eliminate economic spheres of influence and preserve opportunities for American

expansion. The biggest point of contention during the negotiations over the consortium was whether southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia – the areas where Japanese interests were most concentrated – were to be generally excluded from the consortium’s scope, or whether the only areas to be excluded would be those where there were clear treaty grounds to do so.³

Following discussions on the issue at the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations and elsewhere, notes were exchanged between Thomas W. Lamont, the head of the US banks, and Kajiwara Nakaji, the head of the Japanese banks, in which an agreement was reached on the consortium’s scope. While Mantetsu, its subsidiary mines, and the various railways running from Jilin to Huining, Zhengjiatun to Taonan, Changchun to Taonan, Kaiyuan to Hailong to Jilin, Jilin to Changchun, Xinminfu to Mukden, and Sipingjie to Zhengjiatun would be excluded from the scope, the railway between Taonan and Rehe, and a route for that railway to a port would be included.⁴ In other words, the Japanese had accepted a reduction of their initial demand for a “general” exclusion of their special interests to a “delineated” list of exclusions.

It had taken nearly two years from the initial American proposal for the Second China Consortium to actually be established with the Lamont letter. During this time, Prime Minister Hara Takashi had played the role of mediator, holding to the principle of cooperation with America and Britain but also taking the position of hardliners like War Minister Tanaka Giichi into consideration. Hara was not the kind of political leader to openly proclaim his ideas and then force his way through any opposition; instead, he skillfully used foreign pressure to gradually move the Japanese position towards cooperation with the West.

Due to the above, the Second China Consortium – which ultimately included Japan, the United States, Britain, and France – has been viewed in the context of the Hara government’s overall policy of establishing a cooperative relationship with Britain and America. Similarly, the Wilson administration is considered to have succeeded in its goal of curbing Japanese continental expansion to a considerable extent. And that interpretation would certainly be appropriate in terms of the negotiations between the four countries over the exclusion of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from the consortium’s remit. This is because America and Britain did not accede to Japan’s desire for a general exclusion of the Manchuria-Inner Mongolia region; the Hara government ultimately accepted a delineated list of exclusions – the only areas excluded were those where there was a treaty basis for doing so. Lamont would go on to become friends with a series of Japanese ambassadors to the US, including Shidehara Kijūrō and Hanihara Masanao.⁵

But while the negotiations over the consortium can be seen as a model for the Hara government’s policy of cooperation with the US and Britain, it must be pointed out that there were large gaps between each participant’s expectations for the consortium. In particular, while it had been the Wilson administration who had proposed the consortium, it had failed at formalizing its policy goals towards Japan as part of it. This is clearly evident from the

American effort to establish a new consortium with Britain and France that excluded Japan. Secretary of State Lansing instructed US Ambassador to Britain John W. Davis and Minister to China Reinsch to obtain agreements from those countries for a consortium without Japan on August 27, 1919. British and French rejection of this proposal meant that the Wilson administration had to proceed with its original plan, however.⁶

Furthermore, the Pacific Development Corporation (an American company) independently issued a \$25 million loan to China on November 26, 1919, as the Second China Consortium negotiations were underway.⁷ The Wilson administration informed a surprised Japanese foreign ministry that, as the delay in the creation of the consortium had been due to Japan, the “American people are entitled to the full diplomatic support” of the US government in the matter.⁸ Despite the formation of the Hara government, which as the first true party government in Japanese history would seem to have been an opportune moment for US-Japan cooperation, the Americans were unwilling to fully devote themselves to cooperating with Japan. The Wilson administration’s policy towards Japan had a tendency to fluctuate, and it viewed containment as a viable option for restricting Japanese expansion. While there is much about Hara’s intention to cooperate with the United States and Britain that is worthy of praise, the reality of the situation is that a system of US-Japan cooperation was far from established.

The British, however, showed a relative understanding of Japan’s special interests. In a telegram dated October 24, 1919, British Foreign Secretary George N. Curzon told British Ambassador to the US Edward Gray that “rather than exclude Japan from the consortium, I would be inclined to concede the special position which she claims in South Manchuria.”⁹

For its part, the Beiyang government was skeptical of the Second China Consortium. Article 2 of the consortium’s charter, approved on October 15, 1920, authorized the consortium to issue loans to the Chinese national government, local governments, companies owned or managed by the government, and transactions guaranteed by the government.¹⁰ As such, Chinese participation would naturally be important to the ultimate success or failure of the consortium. But the Chinese showed a complete lack of interest; in fact, the Beiyang government had lodged a protest in July 1920 about the inclusion of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in the consortium.¹¹ While the Chinese foreign ministry was given notice of the consortium’s creation by the Japanese, American, British, and French ministers to China on September 28, it did not give a formal response.¹² On November 3, Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing told Japanese Minister to China Obata Torikichi that “I will not recognize the new loan consortium nor receive loans from it.”¹³

In January 1921, the participating countries’ ministers stationed in China sent formal notification of the consortium to the Beiyang government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the full text of the agreement, and the consortium’s documents were made public in April. The Beiyang government still failed to give a formal response, however.¹⁴ The Second China

Consortium would ultimately fail to issue a single joint loan to China, the result of the above differing expectations and internal Chinese conflicts.

There remain two fundamental questions concerning the Hara government's involvement in the consortium. First, did it adhere to the agreements it had reached with the United States, Britain, and France over the course of the negotiations over the consortium? That is, did it not seek to independently expand Japanese interests in China? The second question, which is closely related to the first, is whether the consortium symbolized a fundamental change in Japanese foreign policy. Had foreign pressure from America and Britain brought about an end to the continental policy that Japan had been pursuing since the Meiji period? Had the external pressure of Wilsonian New Diplomacy led Japan to embrace the principle of the Open Door and abandon sphere of influence diplomacy?

To start from the conclusion: the Hara government implemented policies to expand Japanese interests in China, focusing on railways in Manchuria and the provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian. The existing continental policy remained, albeit in a different form. However, all of these efforts to expand Japanese interests conflicted with the agreements reached over the consortium; the Hara government thus failed to adhere to its policy of engaging in cooperation with the West. It was not entirely committed to such cooperation in its relations with the consortium and carried out an independent railway policy towards the Nanxun, Sitao, and Chinese Eastern Railways in northern and southern China on the basis of sphere of influence diplomacy (see Figure 1.1).¹⁵ The reality of Japan's China policy is that the Second China Consortium – which failed to issue a single loan – was ultimately not strong enough to cause Japan to adhere to its agreements regarding the consortium's scope and restrain its expansion on the continent.

Below, I will reconsider the Hara government's relationship with the Second China Consortium by carrying out an analysis of the government's policies towards the Nanxun and Sitao Railways and tracing the continued influence of existing continental policy – the southern and northern expansion doctrines – in its expansion of Japanese interests in China.

(1) The Nanxun Railway

The plan to extend the Nanxun Railway from Nanchang in northern Jiangxi to Jiujiang can be considered part of the Hara government's efforts to expand Japanese interests in Jiangxi and Fujian provinces. The railway had been fully completed on February 3, 1915 (during the Ōkuma Shigenobu government)¹⁶ and occupied an important position as the only loan railway that Japan possessed in the Yangtze River Basin.¹⁷ The East Asian Industrial Promotion Company (Tōa Kōgyō Kaisha), the railway's creditor, had plans to expand the railway and had begun negotiations with Deputy Minister of Transport Ye Gongchuo in March 1918.¹⁸ At the center of these expansion plans was the construction of a Fuzhou Line from Nanchang to Fuzhou in Fujian and a Pingxiang Line from Nanchang to Pingxiang in western Jiangxi.




Figure 1.1 Chinese Railways in 1919

Source: Based on “Shina Testudō Zenzu” [A Complete Map of Chinese Railways], Railways Agency Transportation Bureau International Transportation (1919) and Kajima Institute of International Peace, ed., *Nihon Gaikōshi Bekkan 4 Chizu* (Kajima: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1974), Map 20.

These plans had the potential to damage relations with Britain, who had numerous vested interests in the Yangtze River Basin, something acknowledged in “An Overview of the Course of the Southern China Railway Issue,” a report compiled by the Japanese foreign ministry’s Asia Bureau.¹⁹ And the British had indeed been quite concerned about Japanese advances into the region since 1913.²⁰ This concern led the government of Terauchi Masatake to prioritize the Fuzhou Line, which was believed to have less potential to upset Britain. On June 7, 1918, Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei told East Asian Industrial Promotion Company President Furuichi Kōi that he would support the company in its negotiations for the Fuzhou Line on the basis of War Minister Ōshima Ken’ichi’s wishes.²¹ There was strong opposition to the loan within the Beiyang government, however, and the fate of the negotiations was left to the Hara government.

The Hara government would find that the Chinese continued to be reluctant to approve the loan for the extension of the Nanxun Railway. In an April 1, 1919 meeting with Minister Obata, Beiyang Government Transportation Minister Cao Rulin took a cautious stance towards the loan out of consideration of Britain, stating that it was necessary for “an appropriate understanding to be reached between Japan and the United Kingdom first.”²² At a meeting of the Second China Consortium held in New York in October 1920, the British banker group offered the rights it held to the Ningxiang Railway under their loan to the consortium as a joint undertaking.²³ This loan agreement had been reached between Britain and China on March 31, 1914 and called for the construction of a trunk railway from Nanjing to Changsha, with the line running through Nanchang and Pingxiang.²⁴ This meant that the Pingxiang Line that Japan was planning to build would fall under the jurisdiction of the consortium; it would now affect not just relations with China and Britain, but those with the consortium as well.

But Prime Minister Hara still intended to carry on with the plan to extend the Nanxun Railway that he had inherited from the Terauchi government. He met with Managing Director Shiraiwa Ryūhei of the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company and argued that “we need to try to get Japanese and Chinese businessmen to come closer together on this in actual fact, not just perfunctorily.”²⁵ Hara’s intention to carry on with the extension plan shows the part of him that was a proponent of the southern expansion doctrine, which called for advancing into the region stretching from Fujian to the Yangtze River Basin. When, on May 15, 1919, the wealthy Taiwanese businessman Guo Chunyang proposed carrying out “Confucian acts such as irrigation works and poverty relief efforts” in Fujian as a way of stimulating “Sino-Japanese goodwill,” Hara expressed approval, noting that “Fujian is within our sphere of influence.”²⁶

Despite Hara’s desires, however, the negotiations over the Nanxun loan would remain slow, even after the aftermath of the May Fourth Movement gradually subsided. After the power of the Anhui clique declined with its defeat in the Zhili-Anhui War in July 1920, the position of Nanxun Railway

President Li Shengduo (who had ties to the Anhui) became threatened, leading to conflicts within the company.²⁷ Japan continued to have great expectations for the negotiations, however. Thus, despite the negotiations stalling numerous times, an agreement for a ten-million-yen loan was finally concluded in absolute secrecy on May 16, 1922 while Takahashi Korekiyo was prime minister. Under the agreement, the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company and Nanxun Railway agreed to “extend a rail line between Nanchang and Pinxiang or some other appropriate course.”²⁸ It was also agreed that the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company would be allowed to recommend one technical and one accounting advisor who would be dispatched to the railway.²⁹

The Pingxiang Line laid out in the loan agreement was one of the planned lines that had been included in the Ningxiang Railway loan agreement that the British had turned over to the Second China Consortium 18 months earlier. Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya frankly acknowledged this fact in a telegram to Obata.³⁰ That the Japanese kept the consortium – which held priority rights for such a loan – in the dark is an undeniable example of Japan choosing expansion of its interests in China over cooperation with the West. The major players in the Nanxun loan agreement were the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company and the Hara government. The Hara government inherited the extension plan from the Terauchi government and chose to support the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company in its negotiations with the Chinese.³¹

Both the United States and Britain were suspicious of Japanese actions with the Nanxun Railway, and Foreign Secretary Curzon had issued a directive that “in order to prevent the line falling entirely into the hands of Japan, the Consortium should come to its assistance with a railway loan.” Despite the intelligence activities of the David Lloyd George government, however, the British were unable to ascertain that secret negotiations were being carried out between Japan and China.³² US Minister to China Reinsch also expressed concern that Jiangxi and Fujian “could develop into another Japanese rail zone like Manchuria.”³³

The Hara government’s plans for the Nanxun Railway extension can be considered an extension of the southern expansion doctrine, which itself was an offshoot of Japan’s continental policy that had existed since the Meiji period. The Japanese government first became involved with areas to the south in the 1870s, when it carried out the Taiwan Expedition and the Ryūkyū Disposition, the first times in modern history in which it had sent troops overseas. Japan then secured a foothold for continental involvement from the south, making Taiwan into a colony following the First Sino-Japanese War and forcing China to accept a noncession agreement for Fujian in April 1898, during the 3rd Itō government. Several of the Twenty-One Demands that Japan put forward to China during World War I were related to the southern expansion doctrine: Group Three concerned the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, Group Four involved the noncession of the Chinese coast, and Group Five covered the extension of the Nanxun Railway and Japanese interests in Fujian.³⁴ The Nanxun Railway extension plan inherited by the Hara government was nothing more than a

modified reproduction of the demand for such a railway in the Twenty-One Demands (this had been removed during the negotiations over the Demands). The legacy of the southern expansion doctrine remained alive and well during the Hara government.

(2) *Sitao Railway*

If we accept that there was a “southern expansion doctrine” that sought to expand Japanese influence from Taiwan to Fujian, Jiangxi, and the Yangtze River Basin, and that this doctrine held a minority position within the continental policy that had existed since the Meiji period, then there will likely be no objection to describing the “northern expansion doctrine” – which sought to have Japanese influence spread from Korea to Manchuria and Inner Mongolia – as the mainstream approach to continental policy. And it is well known that railway policy played a central role in these doctrines. With all that in mind, how should the Hara government’s railway policies be considered in the context of the Japanese policy of expanding its interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia that had existed from the time of the Russo-Japanese War?³⁵

The main issue facing Japanese railway policy at the time of the Hara government’s formation was that the construction of feeder lines was falling behind the construction of trunk lines like the one running from Jilin to Huining.³⁶ By the time of the Terauchi government, the only feeder line undergoing construction was the Sitao Railway’s Sizheng Line; while there were also plans for a Zhengtao Line running from Zhengjiatun to Taonan for the same railway, a loan agreement had not even been reached.³⁷ Accordingly, the task of negotiating Chinese approval for extending the Sizheng Line south to Taonan fell to the Hara government.

The start of this extension was a January 22, 1919 telegram from Mantetsu Chairman Kunisawa Shinbee to Foreign Minister Uchida. Mantetsu wanted to extend the Sizheng Line to Taonan and build a branch line (the Zhengtong Line) from Zhengjiatun to Tongliao. It therefore approached the Japanese foreign ministry to have it issue instructions to Minister Obata to open negotiations with the Beiyang government’s Ministry of Transportation.³⁸ Transportation Minister Cao Rulin viewed the extension plans favorably and told Obata that he would “dispatch negotiators and ask them to make a decision after they had discussed the matter.”³⁹

The negotiations hit a snag when a group within the Ministry of Transportation known as the “New Communications Clique” (and led by Cao) asked that five percent of the loan be given to them to cover “preliminary expenditures.”⁴⁰ Mantetsu sounded out the foreign ministry about whether it should do so. This was just as the Hara government was backing the Shanghai Peace Conference and carrying out negotiations over the Second China Consortium, and it had to be careful about unilaterally providing funds to any one clique in the Beiyang government. Uchida thus told Mantetsu that “it would be difficult to approve the provision of such funds to the Chinese.”⁴¹

Obata and Mantetsu disapproved of the foreign ministry's caution, however. Obata felt that the provision of the funds would remain secret, and that the ministry should seize the opportunity to support the Shizheng Line negotiations. Kawakami Toshitsune, a director of Mantetsu, expressed the same sentiment to Vice-Minister Shidehara Kijūrō.⁴² Uchida thus adjusted his position and told Mantetsu in mid-April that "the government would tacitly permit" the payment, but on the condition that no cash would be exchanged until the North-South peace issue had been resolved. This decision was also backed by Vice-Minister Shidehara and Political Affairs Bureau First Section Director Komura Kin'ichi, meaning that the extension – including the future secret payment to the New Communications Clique – had the approval of the foreign ministry leadership.⁴³

Kawakami thus entered into negotiations with Sizheng Railway Engineering Bureau Director Yu Yu (an official of the Ministry of Transportation) in Dalian in early May.⁴⁴ On June 10, the Hara government passed a cabinet decision to support Mantetsu's negotiations.⁴⁵ Ultimately, Mantetsu concluded a loan agreement for the Sitao Railway with Finance Minister Gong Xinzhan and Acting Minister of Transportation Zeng Yujun on September 17 and entered into a contract to construct the Zhengtao and Zhengtong Lines. The Japanese were given a great deal of control over the railway, as Article 16 of the contract stipulated that the chief technician in charge of railway construction and management, and the transportation supervisor who would be in charge of transportation once construction had been completed were to be Japanese.⁴⁶

As for the understanding that Mantetsu would provide funds to the New Communications Clique, this was left uncertain after Cao was dismissed as minister of transportation on June 10 in the wake of the May Fourth Movement.⁴⁷ But while the Hara government thus seemingly avoided backing any one clique of the Beiyang government, the loan agreement itself conflicted with the basic policy of the Hara government to work in concert with the West and not independently issue any loans to the Beiyang government until a North-South compromise had been reached.

The issue of whether to make an advance payment would continue to trouble the government even after the loan agreement had been reached. Article 4 of a document exchanged between Kawakami and Zeng held that an appropriate amount of funds would be provided to the railway superintendent appointed by the Beiyang government as an "advancement" prior to the issuance of government bonds.⁴⁸ Which is to say, the "preliminary expenditures" issue remained, albeit now in the form of an advancement. The provision for the advance payment, to say nothing of the existence of the loan agreement itself, was regarded as a matter of the greatest secrecy by Mantetsu and the foreign ministry. The foreign ministry leadership, most notably Foreign Minister Uchida, continued to be critical of any such payment as it would clearly be in violation of the aforementioned basic policy of the government.

But while the foreign ministry leadership was concerned about the West, Minister Obata took a different position in an October 2, 1919 telegram to

Uchida in which he advised that the foreign ministry should accept Mantetsu's negotiations, arguing that a secret advancement of about five million yen was a necessary evil for the promotion of Japan's railway policy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.⁴⁹ On October 3, President Xu Shichang dispatched former Minister of Transportation Cao Rulin to Obata to appeal for the funds, citing "the struggles and financial difficulties of the president."⁵⁰ Cao personally sounded out Major General Banzai Rihachirō (a military advisor in Beijing) about the advancement and received a favorable response from War Minister Tanaka.⁵¹ Acting Minister of Finance Li Sihao also met with Obata on October 22 to explain "the financial difficulties that would be caused by an inability to obtain the advancement and appeal to the Imperial Government to press for approval of the transfer."⁵²

In the face of the Chinese entreaties, Uchida changed his position and worked out a plan for payment of the advancement. He proposed at the November 7 cabinet meeting that "the Mantetsu advancement attached to the China loan be issued to the Chinese government with a rationale supplied," which Prime Minister Hara and the other cabinet members agreed to.⁵³ The cabinet decision allotted five million yen to be paid as an advancement: three million yen to be used for repayment of a short-term loan for the Sizheng Railway and two million yen to be used to prepare for the construction of the Zhengtao and Zhengtong Lines. The foreign ministry had Political Affairs Bureau Director Yoshizawa Kenkichi inform Mantetsu President Nomura Ryūtarō of the approval and also had Obata inform Cao.⁵⁴ Mantetsu then provided the advancement to the Ministry of Transportation under the terms indicated by the foreign ministry. The Beiyang government was not particularly concerned about complying with the conditions that had been attached to the advancement, however; the Ministry of Transportation repeatedly postponed repayment of the Sizheng loan.⁵⁵

Mantetsu began preparing for the extension of the Sizheng Line, reaching a short-term loan agreement with the Beiyang government on May 17, 1920 for the Sitao Railway that detailed the specifics of the loan for the Zhengtao and Zhengtong Lines.⁵⁶ It then applied to the foreign ministry for permission to construct the Zhengtong Line. However, construction of this line would potentially conflict with the agreements that Japan had made with the United States, Britain, and France during the negotiations for the Second China Consortium. The May 11, 1920 Kajiwara-Lamont Note outlined the agreements that had been reached and, while the Zhengtao Line was noted to be outside of the scope of the consortium, there was no mention of the Zhengtong Line. If the "delineation" principle were followed – that is, if all projects beyond the scope of the consortium had to have been specifically delineated during the consortium's initial negotiations – then construction of the line would have to be undertaken in consultation with the consortium. The Hara government was thus forced to make a final decision whether to adhere to the "delineation" principle and consult with the other countries on the Zhengtong Line or give Mantetsu the go ahead and expand Japanese interests in China.

The Hara government chose the latter course. On February 28, 1921, Foreign Minister Uchida – knowing that construction of the line would conflict with the agreement with the consortium – informed Minister Obata of his intention to approve construction of the Zhengtong Line on the grounds that it was inseparable from the Sitao Railway's main line (which ran from Sipingjie to Taonan, passing through Zhengjiatun).⁵⁷ Having received permission, Mantetsu began construction of the line in April, and it opened in November (although full-scale operations would not begin until January 1922). As for the Zhengtao Line, it was laid down in September 1922 during the government of Katō Tomosaburō following a lengthy selection process for its route. Temporary operation of the entire line began in November 1923, under the Yamamoto Gonbee government.⁵⁸

The above gives us a complete picture of the Sitao Railway: a main line running west from Sipingjie (which was also serviced by Mantetsu) to Taonan through Zhengjiatun, and a branch line from Zhengjiatun to Tongliao. The Sizheng and Zhengtao Lines (the two lines making up the main line) were the only lines to be constructed in accordance with the Manchuria-Mongolia Five Railway Agreement. The extension of the Sizheng Line should be regarded, alongside the extension of the Nanxun Railway, as one of the Hara government's major accomplishments in expanding Japanese interests in China. The Toang Railway (running from Taonan to Ang'angxi) would later be built by the Japanese under contract, and the Sitao Railway would be extended to reach it, making it a cornerstone in Japan's railway policy for Manchuria and Inner Mongolia – a key part of the post-World War I northern expansion doctrine.

It had been Mantetsu who had represented the Japanese in the negotiations with the Ministry of Transportation over the Sitao Railway. But the Hara government and Japanese foreign ministry had played an important role in the preliminary expenditures, advancement, and Zhengtong Line construction issues. Although the foreign ministry leadership had initially been critical of paying an advancement or for "preliminary expenditures," it later changed its mind and approved the payment by Mantetsu. The main reason for this were the repeated requests by Minister to China Obata, who was sympathetic towards Mantetsu's arguments, for Foreign Minister Uchida to change his mind. While the fact that the foreign ministry leadership was willing to repeatedly change its position on the basis of reports from local officials shows Uchida's "flexibility," his ability to gain the support of Prime Minister Hara and other cabinet ministers was also a major factor. Moreover, it was due to foreign ministry approval that work began on the Zhengtong Line despite it being within the scope of the Second China Consortium. The Hara government had no objection to the foreign ministry's actions.

It must therefore be said that the Hara government did not adhere to the "delineation" principle agreed upon during the negotiations on the consortium and instead chose to expand Japan's special interests in Manchuria. The failure of Japan to remove the Zhengtong Line from the consortium's

remit during these negotiations had been seen as an error even at the time, being referred to as the “forgotten Sizheng extension issue” by the *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*.⁵⁹ When Minister Obata returned to Japan in mid-May 1921, he frankly told reporters that it had been a “major blunder” by the foreign ministry and gave his sanction to the construction of the line as a case of diplomacy independent from Britain, France, and the US.⁶⁰

It is also necessary to remember that it was the Beiyang government who represented China during the Sitao Railway negotiations, not the Northeast (Fengtian) regime. Cao Rulin played a particularly important role in negotiations with Japan over issues like the advancement even after being dismissed as minister of transportation due to the May Fourth Movement. While Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian clique repeatedly attempted to gain control of the Sitao Railway, the right to manage the railway would essentially remain with the Beiyang government’s Ministry of Transportation.⁶¹ Construction of the railway also provided benefits to the Chinese, such as allowing the transportation of agricultural products and promoting the cultivation of farmland. It had a great impact on the development of eastern Inner Mongolia. Taonan, a city to the north of Zhengjiatun, increasingly served as a commercial center in the years following the opening of the Sitao Railway.⁶²

As discussed above, the Hara government used the Nanxun and Sitao Railways to expand Japanese interests in Jiangxi and Fujian and in the regions of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. What is important here is that it prioritized the expansion of Japanese interests in China over the agreements it had made with the United States, Britain, and France concerning the Second China Consortium.

On September 3, 1920, the Hara government decided to exclude the CER from the consortium’s scope.⁶³ This is because, when taken in connection with the CER and Japan’s relinquishment of a rail connection between Taonan and Rehe Province (the Taore Railway) to the consortium, the inclusion of the CER was held to “infringe upon the ‘urgent interests’ of the Empire,” and deemed “a reappearance of the Jinai Railway.” The Jinai Railway was a rail line between Jinzhou and Aihun that the Americans had proposed in 1909 as a means of breaking the Mantetsu monopoly. The Hara government thus attempted to expand application of its rationale for special rights and interests – which were said to apply to matters “strongly related to the national defense and economic survival of the Empire” – to the CER in northern Manchuria.⁶⁴ The Japanese delegation again opposed inclusion of the CER at the meeting of the consortium held in New York in October.⁶⁵ Successful in this effort, the Hara government adopted a policy of expanding into northern Manchuria by means of independent loans to the CER in a cabinet decision on May 18, 1921.⁶⁶

These efforts naturally earned the distrust of the other members of the consortium, and as early as August 1, 1920, British Minister to China Beilby

Alston wrote in a memorandum that “Japan is trying to find a way to annex the Chinese Eastern Railway just as it did the Shangdong Railway.”⁶⁷ In 1929, Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs John Thomas Pratt, an expert on China, questioned the usefulness of the consortium, arguing that “it would actually be more in Britain’s interests for the consortium to be dissolved.”⁶⁸

It would therefore be hard to describe the Wilson administration’s attempt to use the Second China Consortium to contain Japanese continental expansion as having been particularly successful. While the Hara government had cooperated with Britain and the US during the consortium’s negotiations, it was not content with the degree of expansion of Japanese interests in China that such cooperation permitted; instead, it chose to secretly pursue an independent railway policy. The thinking behind sphere of influence diplomacy continued to be very influential during the Hara government, and it pursued a strategy in its foreign policy that could be called “expansionism within cooperation.” Despite the arrival of the consortium, the legacy of the southern and northern expansion doctrines continued to hold sway in Japanese continental policy, albeit in different form. Combined with the lack of Chinese interest, it would thus be difficult to position the Second China Consortium as having helped pave the way for the Washington System. What makes the Hara government’s foreign policy stand out is not that it was a break with the past, but that Hara possessed the political expertise to harmonize domestic and international demands, allowing the expansion of Japanese interests in China to coexist with cooperation with the West to a considerable degree.

The Japanese policy of expanding its interests in China would run into difficulty from the mid-1920s on, but for a reason unrelated to the Second China Consortium. The rise of the political movement in China demanding the recovery of national rights would pose a greater threat to Japanese continental policy than the consortium ever had. The significance of the Nanxun Railway to the southern expansion doctrine was discussed in this chapter. This railway would be targeted by the rights recovery movement during the Tanaka government, which would also face the Northern Expedition. In that same period, the Nationalist government would attempt to seize control of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, a Sino-Japanese joint steel company headquartered in Shanghai, as part of its drive for self-sufficiency in steel.⁶⁹ Naturally, as the southern expansion doctrine – the secondary focus of Japanese continental policy – was brought to a standstill by the Chinese rights recovery movement, expectations toward the northern expansion doctrine – the primary focus – grew.

The northern expansion doctrine, however, would eventually face the same problems that had beset its counterpart. The Sitao Railway that had been fully developed over the course of the Hara government would ultimately serve as a steppingstone for the Chinese effort to encircle Mantetsu in Chinese-controlled rail lines.⁷⁰ Together with the Taoang Railway, which ran from Taonan to Ang’angxi, and the Datong Railway that would be later built by the Northeast regime from Dahushan to Tongliao, it became possible to bypass the Mantetsu main line to the west.

While Chinese management of the Sitao Railway had been primarily in the hands of the Beiyang Government's Ministry of Transportation, the Taoang Railway that would be built to connect to it was under the control of the Northeast regime. There would thus be no shared usage of the Taoang and Sitao tracks, despite discussions between the two railways and Mantetsu.⁷¹ Acting Zhengjiatun Consul Nakano Kōichi reported that there were extremely poor communications between the Taoang, Sitao, and Chinese Eastern Railways as late as March 1927 as they were under the respective control of the Northeast regime, Beiyang government, and Soviet Union.⁷²

But by the time of the Tanaka government, the fragmentary state of the Chinese-run railways had begun to come to an end. Chinese railway authorities began shared usage of the tracks of the Sitao and Taoang Railways on a limited basis on September 20, 1927, making it possible "to travel from Sipingjie to Qiqihar around the clock" without using Mantetsu lines.⁷³ And when the Northeast regime opened the Datong Railway in October of that year, the idea that Mantetsu would be encircled became a realistic possibility. This gradual development of the Chinese rail network came to be seen as a potential threat to Japan's special interests in the region. And with both branches of Japanese continental policy thus on the defensive, the way was being prepared for enthusiastic support for a more drastic solution to the issue of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

2. The Paris Peace Conference and the May Fourth Movement

In the previous section, which discussed the relationship between the Second China Consortium and the expansion of Japanese influence in China, I made clear that the Hara government acted independently to expand Japan's national interests and was not wholly committed to cooperating with Britain and the US. It also showed discomfort with Wilson's New Diplomacy and turned to cooperation with Britain as a means of expanding Japan's interests. This is clearly shown by its handling of the Paris Peace Conference, the most important international conference held during Hara's time in office. Despite this, Anglo-Japanese cooperation at the conference and the US-Japan frictions caused by Hara's foreign policy have not become completely settled points in previous research.⁷⁴ In addition to looking at these points, this section will also detail the events leading up to the Chinese refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles and examine how Britain and America's actions at the conference can be connected to the later establishment of the Washington System.

(1) The Paris Peace Conference

For the Japanese delegation to the conference, Hara appointed Saionji Kinmochi as chief plenipotentiary; the other members were Makino Nobuaki, Ambassador to Britain Chinda Sutemi, Ambassador to France Matsui Keishiro, and Ambassador to Italy Ijūin Hikokichi. As Saionji did

not arrive in Paris until midway through the conference, Makino acted as the de facto head of the delegation.⁷⁵

Wilson's Fourteen Points were widely expected to serve as the basis for the conference, and the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs (Gaikō Chōsakai) approved a statement on November 19, 1918 that expressed distrust of them. In addition to rejecting the Points' call for the abolition of secret diplomacy, the statement expressed concern that the creation of the League of Nations "risks causing serious disadvantages for the Empire." It held that Japan should limit its agenda to "the questions of Qingdao and the German islands in the South Pacific" and that "the Empire's representatives should act in concert with Britain so long as doing so does not run counter to the Empire's positions."⁷⁶

In late December 1918, Foreign Minister Uchida sent the governments' "three major peace policies" to Makino and Chinda with the permission of Prime Minister Hara. These stated: first, that Japan "demands the transfer of Germany's territorial rights [towards Qingdao and Pacific islands north of the equator] without compensation" and should "act in concert with [Britain's peace terms] as much as possible" regarding those islands south of the equator; second, that "there should be no interference unless particularly necessary" on "those matters in which the Empire has no vested interest"; and third, that the delegation should "consider the direction of the majority and act in concert with our allies as much as possible" on those "peace terms in which the Empire or its allies have a vested interest."⁷⁷ The Hara government thus adopted a policy of cooperating with Britain to gain control of Germany's former interests and accommodating the majority when it came to other issues. A similar argument for passivity can be found in Ambassador to Italy Ijūin's diary.⁷⁸

THE SHANDONG ISSUE

The chief point of contention between Japan and China at the peace conference was the Shandong issue. Importantly, there was a wartime agreement between the two nations on the issue: under Article 1 of the Sino-Japanese agreement on the Twenty-One Demands (signed on May 25, 1915), the Chinese government left the disposition of Germany's interests in Shandong up to Germany and Japan to decide. Notes were also exchanged on the Jiaozhou Bay Leased Territory. These stipulated that the territory would be returned to China, but on the condition that it be opened as a commercial port and that a Japanese exclusive settlement would be established. A further agreement was reached in September 1918 that railways would be built from Jinan to Shunde and from Gaomi to Xuzhou using Japanese loans.⁷⁹ Japan had also received assurances from Britain, France, Russia, and Italy in February and March 1917 that they would support the transfer of Germany's interests on the Shandong Peninsula and in the South Pacific to Japan to repay Japan for its participation in the war.⁸⁰

For these reasons, Makino sought the unconditional transfer of the former German interests to Japan at the January 27, 1919 morning meeting of the Council of Ten (composed of two delegates each from Japan, the United States, Britain, France, and Italy).⁸¹ This was vehemently opposed by the Chinese delegation to the conference, however, which was led by Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang, supported by Minister to the US Gu Weijun, Minister to Britain Shi Zaoji, and Wang Zhengting.

Gu Weijun had taken the lead on this issue at the Chinese plenipotentiary conference, and he was permitted to speak at the Council of Ten on January 28. Describing the wartime agreement over Shandong as “provisional and subject to revision by the Peace Conference,” he sought to have the Shandong interests returned directly to China.⁸² The views on the issue of Japan and China were completely irreconcilable, and the issue was shelved until late April as the conference concentrated on the establishment of the League of Nations. The Japanese foreign ministry had little interest in the League of Nations and was not fully prepared to discuss the topic. Vice Admiral Take-shita Isamu, deputy chief of the Naval General Staff, reported to Vice Admiral Tochiuchi Sōjirō, the naval vice-minister, that “those dealing with foreign affairs were completely overwhelmed by the paperwork.”⁸³

During the discussions on the League of Nations, Japan made an uncharacteristically strong push for the inclusion of a clause abolishing racial discrimination, which it hoped to use as a steppingstone for resolving the immigration issue. The Japanese had high hopes for the issue, and Konoe Fumimaro wrote in his famous article, “Rejecting Anglo-American-centered Pacificism”:

At the coming peace conference, the Americans and British must show deep regret for their past errors and change their arrogant and inhumane attitudes. In the name of justice and humanity, they must call for the amendment of all laws and regulations stipulating discriminatory treatment towards the yellow race. This naturally includes abolishing their immigration limits on the yellow race.⁸⁴

The Japanese delegation did not take an absolutist view on the abolition of racial discrimination, however, and accepted a compromise under which Japan’s position was included in the minutes of the meeting. At the same time, Shi Zhaoji and Gu Weijun both strongly urged British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour and President Wilson to support China on the Shandong issue and worked hard for Chinese membership in the League.⁸⁵

During this period, the Japanese delegation carried out informal negotiations with the US, Britain, and France on the racial discrimination clause and Shandong issue, receiving support from the British and French, but not the Americans. US Secretary of State Lansing put forward a proposal at the April 15, 1919 meeting of the Council of Five that a clause be added to the treaty “empowering the [Five Great Powers] forthwith to appoint Commissions to

determine without delay the fate of the territories so abandoned” and that the disposition of the Jiaozhou Bay leased territory and other areas be left to those commissions.⁸⁶ Lansing and others had already decided at the April 10 meeting of the American plenipotentiary commission that they would support returning the interests in Shandong to China.⁸⁷ Wilson, who had been informed of this, became even more critical of transferring the interests to Japan, and when he met with Makino and Chinda on April 21, he expressed concern over Japan taking over the interests in the Shandong Railway and backed Lansing’s proposal for a commission.⁸⁸

It was the British delegation under Foreign Secretary Balfour who mediated between the Japanese and Americans. Prime Minister Lloyd George had little knowledge of Sino-Japanese relations and relied on Balfour in this area.⁸⁹ On April 26, Balfour met with Makino and China, accompanied by Ronald Macleay, head of the Far Eastern Office. He had prepared a memo under which Japan would completely return sovereignty of Shandong to China and only take over the German economic privileges.⁹⁰ After discussing this memo at an April 29 meeting of the Council of Four, he put forward a compromise plan for the Shandong Railway Police (which had become a point of contention between Japan and the US) under which the police would exist “merely to give the owners of the railway security for traffic” and “such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the company.”⁹¹

Balfour also took on the role of persuading China to accept the Council of Four’s decision.⁹² Macleay also fervently attempted to pacify Wang Zhengting, who wanted to bring up the Twenty-One Demands.⁹³ In a letter Balfour wrote to Curzon, he said:

Macleay hates the Japanese, while I, on the other hand, am more moved by contempt for the Chinese over the way in which they left Japan to fight Germany for Shantung, and then were not content to get Shantung back without fighting for it, but tried to maintain that it was theirs as the legitimate spoils of a war in which they had not lost a man or spent a shilling.⁹⁴

Makino Nobuaki later recalled:

that Britain was our ally was a factor, but Britain and France had great sympathy for Japan in general; they owed Japan in this war and worked hard on the Shandong issue. Britain’s Plenipotentiary Balfour understood this well and mediated on our behalf. He was the one who put forward the memo that served as the basis for the agreement on the Shandong issue; Wilson finally compromised, and things calmed down.⁹⁵

The mediation by Britain played a decisive role in the compromise between Japan and the US.

Japan's position was made somewhat stronger by the departure of the Italian delegation from the conference on April 24 over the Fiume issue.⁹⁶ Chinda had already clearly stated that at an April 22 meeting of the Council of Four that Japan would be unable to sign the peace treaty unless its demands on the Shandong issue were accepted.⁹⁷ Faced with the possibility that the Japanese delegation would also leave, throwing the future of the League of Nations into jeopardy, Wilson had no choice but to compromise.

Japan's demands were ultimately approved at the April 30 meeting of the Council of Four and incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles as Articles 156 to 158.⁹⁸ Even so, Wilson stated at the meeting where the Shandong issue was effectively decided that the negotiations:

were based on the Notes of May 1915, and this exchange of Notes had its root in the negotiations connected with the Twenty-One Demands. In the view of [the US] Government, the less the present transactions were related to this incident, the better.⁹⁹

This was likely Wilson's harshest criticism of Japan since the second Bryan Note, which he had personally directed.

During this period, the Chinese delegation – which had not been allowed to participate in the Council of Four meetings – tried to have the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands annulled and looked for a way to have its peace terms accepted. When the Treaty of Versailles was adopted at the May 6 general meeting following the series of events described above, the Chinese tried to sign without accepting the Shandong clauses. When Lu Zhengxiang met with French Foreign Minister Stephen J.M. Pichon on May 26, he asserted that the Chinese “cannot sign except with reservations towards the Shandong clauses.”¹⁰⁰ French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, chairman of the conference, made clear at the June 25 meeting of the Group of Four that he had told the Chinese that reservations were not permitted, thus aligning himself with Lloyd George and Makino.¹⁰¹ Only Wilson, who had received advance notice of the dispute from Lansing, expressed sympathy for the Chinese, asserting that “any sovereign Power could make reservations in signing.” Pichon thus requested that the Chinese delegation provide an explanation for their reservation.¹⁰² He met with Gu Weijun on June 26 and 27 to try to persuade him to accept the treaty as it was, but Gu was not receptive, replying that “I have no doubt that, should we sign without reservations, the people will rise up and skewer the government.”¹⁰³ The Chinese delegation thus absented themselves from the June 28 signing ceremony.

THE MANDATE ISSUE

The Hara government was thus successful in taking over the former German rights and interests in Shandong by acting in cooperation with France and, particularly, Britain. It was also able to reap the benefits of Anglo-Japanese

cooperation in annexing Germany's former territories in the South Pacific.¹⁰⁴ During World War I, Britain and Japan occupied Germany's colonies in the area, dividing them along the equator with Japan taking those to the north and Britain those to the south. Britain, France, Italy, and Russia expressed their support for the Japanese annexation of these islands in February and March 1917, and Makino therefore sought to have the former German Pacific islands ceded to Japan at the January 27, 1919 meeting of the Council of Ten. Partly because the islands were located in between Hawaii and the Philippines, Wilson called for a League of Nation mandate be implemented to "safeguard [their people] against abuses as had occurred under German administration." The Wilson administration envisioned the League of Nations as entrusting guardianship to developed countries as a transitional measure, with the former colonies exercising their right of self-determination in the future.¹⁰⁵

It was once again the British who played a decisive role in bringing about a solution to the mandate issue. Lloyd George put forward a compromise at the January 30 meeting of the Council of Ten under which mandates would be divided into three categories based on demographic and geographic criteria.¹⁰⁶ Foreign Minister Uchida decided that the compromise offered by Britain (who shared interests with Japan) was advantageous and reaffirmed Japan's policy of cooperating with Britain.¹⁰⁷ The former German Pacific islands located north of the equator were entrusted to Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and, ultimately, effectively annexed by Japan.¹⁰⁸

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

While cooperation with the United Kingdom enabled the Hara government to make it through the Paris Peace Conference, the conference also caused severe deterioration of Japan's relations with China and the United States. The primary reason that the government had emphasized cooperation with Western Europe at the conference – particularly Britain – was the secret agreements over the Shandong interest and South Pacific islands that Japan had been able to secure during the war.

Hara told Foreign Minister Uchida on June 10, 1919 that "the Anglo-Japanese alliance should continue, even if the creation of the League of Nations will reduce its effectiveness. And should it continue, I would like to also bring about a US-Japan entente through some means."¹⁰⁹ Hara intended to cooperate with the United States in his foreign policy, as well, not just with Britain. Additionally, the strong discomfort with which the Hara government viewed the Wilson administration – which called for the creation of the League of Nations and the end of secret diplomacy – should not be ignored as a factor in the Japanese disregard for cooperation with the US at the conference. The Hara government was so aggressive in its pursuit of Japan's inheritance of the former German interests in concert with Britain that it

lacked the flexibility that would have been necessary to make concessions out of consideration of its relations with China and the US.

It is well known that the middle-ranking foreign ministry officials who participated – figures such as Arita Hachirō and Shigemitsu Mamoru – were critical of Japan’s diplomatic efforts at the conference; these men would go on to form the Foreign Ministry Reform Association (Gaimushō Kakushin Dōshikai). But what I would like to point out here is that the tendency for younger diplomats to be critical of the Hara government’s policies existed even before the peace conference. Political Affairs Bureau First Section Director Komura Kin’ichi called for “the abolition of extraterritorial rights,” “the abolition of leased territories and spheres of influence,” and “the withdrawal of our armed forces from China.” In order to reverse “the antipathy towards the Empire’s traditional policies of martial aggression,” Japan should “take the lead and advocate in the Empire for just what Britain and America are trying to do, and thereby cause the Japan of today to develop into one that criticizes the Japan of yesterday.”¹¹⁰ Komura’s opinion paper can be seen as providing a Japanese take on Wilson’s New Diplomacy. It indicates that the opinion that the policy of conforming to the majority was coming to be seen as inadequate by younger leaders of the foreign ministry. Even Makino himself also spoke in favor of the abolition of extraterritoriality and garrisons in China and backed the creation of the League of Nations at the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs before his departure for the conference.¹¹¹ Faced with opposition from Itō Miyoji and Tanaka Giichi at the council, however, he reluctantly followed Hara’s foreign policies – essentially sphere-of-influence diplomacy – at the conference.

The Hara government succeeded in inheriting the former German interests, but increased China and United States’ distrust of Japan in doing so. The Wilson administration accepted the Japanese demands because it chose to prioritize the creation of the League of Nation, but its wariness of Japan was never higher. The most scathing American criticism of the Shandong negotiations came from US Minister to China Reinsch. A leading member of the pro-China faction, he resigned in June 1919 in protest. In his June 7 resignation letter to Wilson, he expressed his pessimism about the situation: “The general outlook is indeed most discouraging, and it seems impossible to accomplish anything here at present or until the home governments are willing to face the situation and to act.”¹¹² The drama of Reinsch’s resignation symbolized the dilemma facing the Wilson administration, which had been unable to implement a pro-China policy even as its criticism of Japan increased. Willys R. Peck, the American consul in Qingdao, also told Reinsch and Lansing that he could not approve of the transfer of the Shandong interests to Japan.¹¹³

The course of the Paris Peace Conference highlighted the fact that there was a divergence in the foreign policy views of the US and Japan on the level of basic principles. While the Wilson administration made the creation of the League of Nations its primary objective, the Hara government was focused

exclusively on inheriting the former German interests. It concentrated on expanding its individual national interests and, suspicious of the idealism behind Wilsonian diplomacy, had no intention of proactively participating in the establishment of the League. Even the racial discrimination issue, which would seem to be a rare case of Japan making an idealistic argument, was largely intended to serve as a steppingstone towards resolving Japan's immigration problems and was readily abandoned in exchange for securing gains in Shandong.

Following the war, the Wilson administration not only persistently resisted the transfer of the former German interests in Shandong to Japan, but also became increasingly wary of Japan due to its actions with regards to the Second China Consortium and (as will be discussed later in this chapter) the Siberian Expedition. Generally speaking, US-Japan relations had become open to compromise during World War I, with the Lansing-Ishii Agreement being signed in 1917. It was only after the war that US-Japan relations became increasingly marked by friction. It would be difficult to describe US-Japan relations under the Hara government as helping lead to the Washington System.

If there is anything about the Paris Peace Conference that could be seen as tied to the Washington System, it would be the role of British diplomacy as a mediator between Japan and the US. That the Shandong and mandate issues were able to be resolved despite the contrasting stances of the United States and Japan owes much to the mediation of the Lloyd George government. Foreign Secretary Balfour in particular played a decisive role in eliciting compromises from the Americans. While the existence of the secret treaties also played a role, the primary reason that Japan and Britain were so effective in their cooperative diplomacy was that the two nations both believed in sphere-of-influence diplomacy. As will be discussed later, Curzon – foreign secretary from October 1919 – intended to renew the Anglo-Japanese alliance and wanted the formation of a new international order in East Asia that included Japan.

Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation submitted seven matters at the peace conference, including the return of tariff autonomy, the elimination of extra-territoriality, and the return of the foreign concessions, yet these were not even discussed. While, as noted by Shi Zhaoji, the wartime secret agreements between Japan and the European powers were the primary reason that the German interests in Shandong were not returned to China, inadequate communication between the Beiyang government and the Chinese delegation also harmed their efforts.¹¹⁴ According to Gu Weijun's recollections, the delegation was not even adequately appraised of the details of the various Sino-Japanese agreements on railways and war loans, and he had received the impression that the Beiyang government feared that the delegation would become fodder for political disputes.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, he continued to ask Wilson to make it possible for China to sign the treaty "without having to sacrifice its honor or pride as a nation."¹¹⁶ In the end, however, the Chinese delegation – which

had not even been allowed to participate in leadership meetings – would end up absenteeing itself from the signing ceremony for the Treaty of Versailles in protest of the transfer of the Shandong interests to the Japanese.

It was Wang Zhengting rather than Shi Zhaoji or Gu Weijun who spearheaded the Chinese refusal to sign. At a secret May 28 meeting of the Chinese delegation, Wang forcefully rebutted Wu Chaoshu and Hu Weide's insistence that China should sign to avoid diplomatic isolation by noting that "by refusing to sign, we can enflame popular opinion at home and promote the unification of the north and south."¹¹⁷ The Hara government may have secured the agreement of Britain, France, and the US to the transfer of the Shandong interests to Japan at the conference, it had been unable to negotiate the specifics with the Chinese, as they refused to discuss the matter. Having suffered a diplomatic defeat at the conference, the Chinese response was to secure domestic legitimacy by refusing to engage in any negotiations. A last resort, this could be called the "rejection diplomacy." Public relations diplomacy played a prominent role in the Chinese actions at the peace conference. Gu Weijun and Wang Zhengting helped shape pro-Chinese opinion in the United States and other countries by decrying the Lansing-Ishii Agreement as invalid to the American press corps.¹¹⁸ No one was more concerned about the impact of this than Japan, and the Japanese foreign ministry would set up a public information division in an attempt to counter the Chinese.¹¹⁹

The actions of the Chinese delegation at the peace conference reflect two characteristics of the Chinese foreign policymaking process under the Beiyang government. First, the foreign ministry had a high degree of autonomy, and it generally enjoyed the support of local warlords and other groups. Second, since on-site officials and delegations exercised considerable autonomy, there was significant room for individual diplomacy by talented diplomats like Gu Weijun and Shi Zhaoji.

Still, these characteristics primarily applied to negotiations outside of China, and the foreign ministry did not enjoy as much autonomy during diplomatic negotiations held at home. This is because of the third characteristic of Beiyang diplomacy: warlord diplomacy. Powerful warlords of the Beiyang clique had their own foreign policy structures and maintained contact with foreign military advisors and the military attaches at foreign legations. Zhang Zuolin carried out *de facto* diplomacy with the Japanese consulate in Fengtian and with the Fengtian Secret Service. The negotiations and intelligence gathering carried out by Mantetsu in response to Zhang's Fengtian clique cannot be overlooked.¹²⁰ And, as the careers of Kawakami Toshitsune, Matsuoka Yōsuke, Saitō Ryōe, Kimura Eiichi, and Uchida Yasuya show, personnel moved between the foreign ministry and Mantetsu. There were certainly regions of China in which the Beiyang government could not control diplomatic negotiations. This point will be discussed again in the second section of this chapter.

(2) *The May Fourth Movement*

On June 10, 1919, the Beiyang government dismissed three officials who had become targets for the May Fourth Movement: Minister of Transportation Cao Rulin, Minister to Japan Zhang Zongxiang, and Currency Bureau Director Lu Zongyu. Premier Qian Nengxun also took responsibility and resigned. Despite these measures, the boycott of Japanese goods would continue for nearly a year. As a popular movement critical of the Beiyang government, the May Fourth Movement was a moment of tremendous significance in Chinese history, with many considering the movement to be the starting point for modern Chinese history. According to Hu Shih, the Chinese delegation's refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles "opened the door to rectifying the Paris Peace Conference at the later Washington Naval Conference"¹²¹ Viewed from the perspective of diplomatic history, the May Fourth Movement can be said to have brought the downfall of the Beiyang government's pro-Japan faction and boosted the status of pro-America faction members like Shi Zhaoji and Gu Weijun.

But the significance of the movement seems to have been overlooked by Prime Minister Hara.¹²² Failing to understand that Japan's collusion with the pro-Japan faction was itself one of the sources of criticism, his government would resume its loans to the Beiyang government in the hopes of suppressing the anti-Japanese movement.¹²³ Hara's lack of perception here towards China stands in stark contrast to the agility he showed in his response to the March 1st Movement in Korea, where he had reformed the colonial government.

Public opinion in the United States tended to be favorable towards the May Fourth Movement.¹²⁴ The Chinese delegation's experiences at the Paris Peace Conference had deepened the impression that the US was the most pro-Chinese of the powers, and the Beiyang government hoped for American diplomatic support.¹²⁵ It should be noted that the British foreign ministry also had some concerns about Japanese continental expansion. This is clearly demonstrated by a September 1, 1920 memorandum, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Our Future Policy in the Far East," written by Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Victor Wellesley, an influential figure in British East Asian policy. The 26-page memorandum states that:

if we were eventually to succeed in substituting a multilateral treaty [for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance], Japan would find it much more difficult to pursue an active and aggressive policy under the restraining influence of Great Britain and the United States acting in unison [...] It cannot be too strongly emphasized that so long as [the Shandong Railway] remains in the hands of the Japanese it presents a real danger to the peace of the Far East, and Shantung can hardly fail to become a second Manchuria with infinitely more disastrous consequences.¹²⁶

Wellesley wished to reorganize the Anglo-Japanese alliance so as to incorporate the United States, allowing Anglo-American cooperation to exert pressure on Japanese policy towards China.

This belief within the British foreign ministry that Japan should be contained was not shared by cabinet officers like Balfour, Lloyd George, and Curzon, however. In July 1921, Curzon told Minister to Britain Gu Weijun that “Japanese policy towards China would have been even worse without our placcation.”¹²⁷ He thought it possible to cooperate with Japan and wanted to convince them to restrain themselves through dialogue.¹²⁸

The Fuzhou Incident of November 16, 1919, which occurred amidst already worsening relations between China and Japan, served to again highlight the mutual distrust between the two countries.¹²⁹ This incident involved the seizure of Japanese textiles under transport by Chinese students, resulting in a clash between Chinese and Japanese civilians with several casualties on both sides. The Beiyang foreign ministry dispatched Wang Shouchang to the location to negotiate, with Fujian Province Governor and Warlord Li Houji serving as mediator,¹³⁰ but Hara and Naval Minister Katō Tomosaburō¹³¹ decided to send the battleship *Saga* and two destroyers on November 20 due to “the unrest in Fuzhou.”¹³² According to Matsuoka Yōsuke, who was dispatched by the foreign ministry for a joint Sino-Japanese investigation, the Fuzhou Incident was actually a plan by Japanese residents of China to strike a blow against the anti-Japanese movement by triggering a confrontation. The textiles had been bait to catch the students.¹³³ Negotiations between Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing and Obata over the incident dragged on, but a settlement was finally reached on November 12, 1920. Under the settlement, both Yan and Obata expressed their regret for the incident, and the Japanese paid compensation to the injured Chinese.¹³⁴

Little progress was made during this period in the Sino-Japanese negotiations over the inheritance of the Shandong interests and the return of the Jiaozhou Bay lease territory. Given the level of anti-Japanese public opinion, the Beiyang government looked into appealing to the League of Nations on the matter. Gu Weijun attended the November 30, 1919 meeting of the League of Nations Union and proposed that the Treaty of Versailles’ Shandong clauses be corrected after the League began its operations.¹³⁵ Not much later, the Hara government passed a cabinet decision on January 14, 1920 to begin negotiations on the Shandong issue and had Obata request that such negotiations start.¹³⁶ On January 23, Lieutenant General Aoki Nobuzumi, a reserve officer serving as a military advisor to former president Li Yuanhong, submitted a written memo to President Xu Shichang with Obata’s consent seeking the opening of negotiations.¹³⁷ However, the Beiyang government held firm to its stance of “refusal diplomacy” even after it had judged that the League of Nations would not accept revision of the Shandong clauses, avoiding any negotiations over the issue. Yan and Obata met on August 12, 1921, and Yan frankly told Obata that the Chinese “intend to avoid direct negotiations until Japan puts forward a just and appropriate proposal on the

Shandong issue.”¹³⁸ The Beiyang government had already accepted an invitation to the Washington Naval Conference by the time of this meeting and intended to leave resolution of the issue to the conference.

II. Pursuit of a “Defense System for Korea and Manchuria” – International Politics and the Hara Government’s Policies towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia

The region frequently referred to as “Manchuria” or “Manchuria-Inner Mongolia” in modern history has long been a focal point for international politics. Considering just the period following World War I, the area saw the intricate intertwining of numerous political flashpoints: the Siberian Expedition, Chinese Eastern Railway, Korean independence movement, and the domination of the northeast by Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian clique. The intentions of each foreign power towards the Manchurian issue varied widely, and the policy foci of the Chinese were also multidimensional.

From the beginning of the Siberian Expedition, the Beiyang government devoted itself to gathering information through figures like Minister to the US Gu Weijun.¹³⁹ It also made the recovery of sovereignty over the CER a major priority. But the policies of the Beiyang government and Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian clique (which sought to control the Three Northeast Provinces) were not uniform. Their responses to the Siberian Expedition and the Korean independence movement brought to light the relationship between the central government and the Northeast regime, and the difference in their positions within the northeast. Making the multilayered structure of Chinese diplomacy over the Manchurian issue clear by analyzing the words and deeds of actors such as Foreign Minister Yan, Fengtian Governor and Warlord Zhang Zuolin, Jilin Governor Xu Nailin, and Heilongjian Warlord Bao Guiqing provides an indispensable perspective for the study of the history of northeastern China.

This is also closely related to the question of how to evaluate the Hara government. An internal analysis of the Chinese political situation is necessary to examine the question of whether Hara’s policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was forced upon him by historical conditions or if they were the result of larger policies and ideas. That the Hara government spent nearly two years negotiating over the Second China Consortium only to disregard it in its policy towards the Sitao Railway indicates how deeply entrenched the domestic demand for an independent policy towards Manchuria was. It frequently deviated from its policies of non-intervention and cooperating with Britain and the US in its Manchurian policy; it pursued independent policies not only with the Sitao Railway, but also with the Siberian Expedition and the CER.

The Siberian Expedition has not always been considered part of Manchurian policy. However, given the developments in northern Manchuria and the expedition’s connection to the CER, there are reasons to suggest that it would be more appropriate to refer to it as the “Siberian-North Manchurian

Expedition.” Particularly following the withdrawal of British, American, and French troops in 1919 and 1920, the Hara government’s management of the expedition increasingly became part of its Manchurian policy. The Wilson administration’s abrupt announcement at this time that it would be withdrawing from Siberia coincided with an attempt to strengthen international control of the CER. Ultimately the issue of the CER would be carried over to the Washington Naval Conference, however.

In the following sections, I would like to analyze the Siberian Expedition, CER, and Korean independence movement in the context of the aforementioned actors and the intricate relationships between them. I would also like to reconsider the relationship between the Hara government and Zhang Zuolin.

1. The “Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition” and the Chinese Eastern Railway

The first problems that the October Revolution introduced to the international politics of East Asia had to do with the deployment of forces to Russia and the management of the CER.¹⁴⁰

On December 12, 1917, the post-revolutionary government in Russia repudiated Dmitry L. Horvat, the director of the CER’s Management Bureau, and by the end of the year, the Beiyang government – acting in cooperation with Heilongjiang Warlord Bao Guiqing – largely had control of the CER lines.¹⁴¹ In May 1918, the Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Agreement was concluded by the Terauchi government, and it announced on August 2 that it would be jointly dispatching troops to northern Manchuria with the United States.¹⁴² It then deployed 72,400 over an area stretching from northern Manchuria to the Russian Far East. It also refused to allow any American troops to be stationed in northern Manchuria and excluded any American technical advisors from the management of the CER.¹⁴³ On September 6, it concluded an agreement with the Duan Qirui administration over the specifics of the Sino-Japanese Joint Defense Agreement that included the establishment of a joint Sino-Japanese organization to oversee transportation on the CER.¹⁴⁴

However, the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition was not the only matter unresolved at the end of World War I; there was also the internationalization of the management of the CER. In a November 16, 1918 telegram from Secretary of State Lansing to US Ambassador to Japan Roland S. Morris, Lansing stated that “the United States has viewed with surprise the presence of the very large number of Japanese troops now in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia” and proposed having the Russian Railway Service Corps (RRSC) under John F. Stevens assume control of the CER’s operations.¹⁴⁵ The Lloyd George government was aware of the expedition’s situation, including information it gained from America and France, and became more wary of Japan.¹⁴⁶

(1) The Logic Behind the Reorganization of the Expedition

At the time of the Hara government's formation in late September 1918, US-Japan relations were deteriorating due to the expedition and the CER issue. In an attempt to reduce tensions, the new government undertook two draw-downs that reduced the total troop presence to 26,000 and adopted a decision on October 15 stating that "the Imperial forces currently operating in the area east of Lake Baikal are not to advance any further west."¹⁴⁷ As if acting in concert with these efforts, Soviet Plenipotentiary Maxim Litvinov sent a notice to the Japanese, American, British, French, and Italian representatives in Sweden of his intention to carry out peace negotiations on December 23.¹⁴⁸

The Hara government also compromised on the internationalization of the CER. The Wilson administration had dispatched the RRSC and a mission headed by former Secretary of State Root to the Alexander Kerensky government in the summer of 1917. On October 25, 1918, Ambassador to Japan Morris visited the Japanese foreign ministry with Stevens and submitted a management plan for the CER and Trans-Siberian Railway.¹⁴⁹ Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Shidehara Kijūrō felt it would be beneficial for Japan to accept the American plan, but he faced opposition from Major General Hoshino Shōzaburō, head of the Army General Staff Office's 3rd Department.¹⁵⁰ Prime Minister Hara met with Foreign Minister Uchida and War Minister Tanaka on November 8 to discuss the issue and "decided to issue instructions to Ishii to ensure that there would be no misunderstanding on the part of the American government."¹⁵¹

The agreement that the two governments reached in early December was largely in line with the American goals. It created a Technical Board and Allied Military Transportation Board as suborganizations of the Inter-Allied Committee (which was led by a Russian), with Stevens being chosen to lead the Technical Board.¹⁵² An agreement over the supervision of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways was also reached on February 10, 1919.¹⁵³ Hara stands out from his predecessor here; the Terauchi government had received a similar proposal from the Lloyd George government but had been unable to overcome opposition from the army general staff over internationalization of the CER's operations.¹⁵⁴

Thus, from its creation into early 1919, the Hara government placed geographical limitations on the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition and strove to return to a cooperative relationship with the other powers (particularly the United States) over the CER. The February 1919 agreement was likely Hara's most significant accomplishment in US-Japan cooperation. On January 21, 1919, Lansing expressed his happiness over the agreement in a letter from the Paris Peace Conference, telling Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk that "the President in a letter received today approves of the plan as the best that can be obtained."¹⁵⁵ The Inter-Allied Railway Committee was formed on March 5 on the basis of the agreement, with Stevens as president of the Technical Board. The committee included representatives from Japan, the US, Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and China.¹⁵⁶

But while progress was being made on the railways, Wilson also stated at a January 21 Council of Five meeting at the Paris Peace Conference that, by having troops in Russia, “the Allies were making it possible for Bolsheviks to argue that Imperialistic and Capitalistic Governments were endeavoring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a reaction.”¹⁵⁷ From this point on, the Wilson administration would become increasingly skeptical of the expedition. Major General William S. Graves, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, Siberia, was also becoming increasingly frustrated not only with the Japanese military, but also Japanese newspaper reports that were “damaging the credibility of the US military.”¹⁵⁸ But the Hara government was almost entirely ignorant of the fact that the Americans were beginning to turn towards withdrawing from Siberia. The Americans withdrew in January 1920, shortly after the government of Alexander Kolchak – which had been expected to be a strong counter-revolutionary force – abandoned its capital of Omsk in November 1919, following in the steps of the British and French. The lack of any prior notice of the withdrawal left a strong impression in Japan that the United States had little regard for it. As the first notification of the withdrawal had been provided by Graves to General Ōi Shigemoto, commander of the Vladivostok Expeditionary Force, not even Ambassador to the US Shidehara had been given advance notice.¹⁵⁹

Shocked by the Wilson administration’s decision to withdraw, the Hara government made a major policy shift, choosing to reorganize the expedition by itself. This dashed the hopes of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian SFSR Georgy Chicherin, who had wanted peace with Japan.¹⁶⁰ In a February 24 cabinet decision, the Hara government laid out a new deployment plan for its forces, which were to be redeployed “along the Chinese Eastern Railway line from Manzhouli to Pogradichny, and in Primorskaya Oblast south of a line from Pogradichny to Suchan [Partizansk].” In other words, the government had decided not to join Britain, France, and the US in withdrawing under the pretext of “preventing extremist acts” in the Three Northeast Provinces and Korea.¹⁶¹

The government defended its actions in a March 31 statement in which it forcefully argued that “the Empire’s geographical relationship with Siberia is different from that of the other powers. In particular, the political situation in Far Eastern Siberia will directly affect the situation in the Korea-Manchurian region.”¹⁶² We can see here that the justification for the expedition had shifted to what could be called the “defense of Korea and Manchuria” rationale, the idea that the expedition was necessary to maintain order in Korea and Manchuria, and that the government was moving forward with the redeployment.

The Beiyang government’s foreign ministry objected to the statement’s treatment of the Three Northeast Provinces and Korea as the same, and a protest was lodged with Obata that “the decision to repeatedly list Manchuria and Korea alongside each other in your government’s statement is utterly incomprehensible.”¹⁶³ Acting Minister to Japan Zhuang Jingke sent a

telegram saying, “the Three Northeast Provinces are our territory, and Japan’s actions are a violation of our sovereignty.” British Minister to China Olston also told Obata that “the protection of the Czech army, Japan’s official reason for stationing forces in Siberia, has now effectively disappeared. It is possible to withdraw without losing face.”¹⁶⁴ The continued stationing of Japanese forces was naturally also severely criticized by the Far Eastern Republic, the Soviet buffer state in Siberia.¹⁶⁵ The Japanese occupation of northern Sakhalin following the Nikolayevsk Incident – a massacre by the Red Army – offended both the Soviets and the Wilson administration.¹⁶⁶

The plan to reorganize the expedition rather than withdraw was not something that Prime Minister Hara undertook due to pressure from the army; in fact, the first powerful politician to advocate for a withdrawal was Yamagata Aritomo. But when Yamagata advocated for a withdrawal from Vladivostok on December 8, 1920 on the grounds that “the attitudes of Britain and America have changed,” Hara countered that it would be necessary to station troops until the “extremist government” had become stable.¹⁶⁷ Yamagata’s position was put forward to War Minister Tanaka on the 10th, but he also opposed withdrawal, citing the Jiandao issue.¹⁶⁸ When the Kenseikai, the leading opposition party, demanded the withdrawal of troops in a January 1921 session of the House of Peers, Hara again opposed it.¹⁶⁹ Tanaka would become the first cabinet minister to support a full withdrawal on April 8, but while the cabinet endorsed a conditional withdrawal on May 13 (just before the Eastern Conference),¹⁷⁰ there was ultimately no withdrawal while Hara was prime minister.¹⁷¹ Rather than remain with the framework of non-intervention and cooperation with Britain and America, the Hara government decided to independently pursue a “defense system for Manchuria and Korea.”

(2) The Breakdown of the Plan to Alter the Southern Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway

The Hara government also abandoned cooperation with Britain and the US in its plans for the alteration of the southern branch of the CER, something that the Japanese government had been pursuing since the Ōkuma government.¹⁷² The war ministry’s eager support for the plan was an additional factor, and the Hara government stated in a February 5, 1919 cabinet decision that Japan would “take charge of the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway [running from Harbin to Changchun]” through Railways Agency Director Nagao Hanpei (a member of the Technical Board) and that “the Vladivostok-Manzhouli transversal line will become the joint responsibility of China and Japan.”¹⁷³ After Nagao negotiated the details of the international management of the CER with Stevens, it was decided that Japan would oversee about twenty-eight percent of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, primarily the southern branch that Japan had long coveted and the Amur Line.¹⁷⁴ The United States objected to the alteration of the

Harbin-Changchun section of the line in April, however, so the Hara government temporarily abandoned its plans to extend Japanese influence into northern Manchuria by converting the southern branch to standard gauge. It did this as continuing could, in the words of Foreign Minister Uchida, “produce unfortunate misunderstandings abroad.”¹⁷⁵

The Beiyang government had been critical of the Russo-Japanese negotiations over the transfer of the CER since World War I.¹⁷⁶ Assuming that international management of the CER would continue notwithstanding the withdrawal of the US military, it and Jilin Warlord Bao Guiqing increased their efforts aimed at recovering the CER. On January 26, 1919, the Beiyang foreign ministry sent a telegram to the American and Japanese legations in China stating that, given the inability of the Russian government to manage the CER, “China will naturally undertake such management itself based on the terms of the Chinese Eastern Railway contract, and third-party countries should not interfere.”¹⁷⁷ And, when the Kolchak government finally collapsed a year later, the foreign ministry informed the Japanese, British, American, and French ministers on January 26, 1920 that it rejected High Commission for the Far East Horvat’s claim to sovereignty over territory running along the CER lines.¹⁷⁸ In March, after forcing Horvat to step down and disarming the Russian troops, Jilin Warlord Bao declared that China rejected the sovereignty of any other countries over the CER’s territory. Bao had been appointed by Zhang Zuolin to replace Meng Enyuan following the Kuanchengzi Incident (a July 1919 clash between Chinese and Japanese forces near Changchun).¹⁷⁹

The Beiyang government next turned its efforts to recover the CER towards Japan. Based on reports from Bao, the foreign ministry protested to Obata on May 25, 1920 that “your nation’s forces along the Chinese Eastern Railway’s lines are engaging in maneuvers that significantly exceed the limits placed on them.”¹⁸⁰ A directive from the foreign and transportation ministries to Minister to the US Gu Weijun also shows that the government planned to prevent a Japanese “conspiracy to pillage” the CER through capital and technology transfers from Britain and the US.¹⁸¹ Once it had concluded an agreement with the Russo-Asiatic Bank on October 2, the government went farther, asserting that “the Chinese government will be the supreme manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway until China recognizes an official government of Russia and enters into talks with it.”¹⁸²

The Hara government, taking advice from Nagao, responded to these moves by clarifying its policy towards the CER in a May 18, 1921 cabinet decision: “We will independently offer a loan of approximately thirty million yen” to the CER and begin negotiations between Mantetsu and CER “to prevent rivalry between the powers.”¹⁸³ The primary income source for repaying the loan was to be “the beginning of direct passage of cars from [Mantetsu and the CER] between Chungchun and Harbin.”¹⁸⁴ Ironically, this attempt at siding with China failed because the Chinese rejected the loan. The Beiyang government said that the loan was unnecessary as “the economic state of the Chinese Eastern Railway is not in a remarkably dire situation

and, at this time, about five or six million yuan would be sufficient.”¹⁸⁵ The Beiyang government as it existed following the Zhili-Anhui War would no longer respond the way that the Duan Qirui administration had. Even Zhang Zuolin was opposed to Nagao’s proposal, and it was naturally criticized by Britain and the US.

2. The Korean Independence Movement and Sino-Japanese Relations

I would like to now examine the Hara government’s China policy from the perspective of how it related to the Korean independence movement and the Japanese rule of Korea. I would also like to discuss the intricate political situation that existed between the Beiyang government and the Fengtian clique. To discuss the role of the Korean issue in Sino-Japanese relations, it is necessary to go back to at least the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Although the focus of East Asian international politics shifted from Korea to Manchuria following the war, the Korean issue did not cease to be a concern for Japan; it remained closely tied to Japanese policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In particular, the fact that the Korean independence movement’s strongholds were located in eastern Manchuria and the Russian Far East meant that these issues were indelibly linked.

The prototype for the Korean independence movement predates the actual annexation of Korea by Japan. The New People’s Association (Shin-minhoe) was famously formed in Pyongyang in 1907 as a clandestine organization working for the restoration of Korean sovereignty. Around the time of the annexation, elements of this group moved to the Three Northeast Provinces of China, where they started establishing bases for the independence movement, including military bases in Liuhe County, Fengtian and Wangqing County, Jilin.¹⁸⁶ Eastern Manchuria came to hold a central position as a stronghold for the Korean independence movement after large-scale arrests were carried out of members of anti-Japanese organizations in 1911 and 1912. However, shortages of personnel and funds prevented the movement from achieving significant results.¹⁸⁷

World War I changed this situation utterly. Wilson’s promotion of national self-determination provided the Koreans with hope for independence,¹⁸⁸ and it was reported that “the recent actions of rebellious Koreans in the Jiandao and Hunchun regions dreaming of independence are becoming increasingly fierce, in part due to the dissemination of Russian extremist ideologies.”¹⁸⁹ Additionally, because Korean communities in eastern Manchuria had exported a large quantity of agricultural products (mainly soybeans) to Europe during the war, the economic conditions of local Koreans had improved remarkably, likewise improving the independence movement’s access to funds and weapons.¹⁹⁰ The conditions necessary for the awakening of the independence movement were falling into place.

(1) The March 1st Movement and the Jiandao Issue

When the March 1st Movement began in 1919, Prime Minister Hara dispatched Yoshizawa Kenkichi, part of the foreign ministry's Political Affairs Bureau, to investigate.¹⁹¹ He also summoned Inspector-General of Korea Yamagata Isaburō to Tokyo to question him. Hara keenly felt that reform of the colonial government system was necessary, and he:

privately voiced policies [to Yamagata] including changes to systems centered around the civil service, adopting a policy of equality between Koreans and Japanese in education, and changing from a military to a civilian system of policing. Which is to say, he directed to me that it was necessary to assimilate Korea by treating it as an extension of the mainland.¹⁹²

From this point on, Japanese rule of Korea shifted to a policy of assimilation along these lines.

While the independence movement inside Korea continued, with the Kang Woo-kyu Incident¹⁹³ being a notable example of its activities, the movement also gained unprecedented momentum in Jiandao, Vladivostok, and Shanghai in the wake of the March 1st Movement.¹⁹⁴ The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was founded in the French concession in Shanghai, with Syngman Rhee as president, Yi Donghwi as prime minister, Yi Dongnyeong as interior minister, Park Yongman as foreign minister, and Ahn Changho as labor minister.¹⁹⁵ Famous independence activists like Kim Gu and Jang Jirak (Kim San) also left Korea at this time to head for Shanghai.¹⁹⁶ However, when it became clear that, despite their high hopes, the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations would not bring independence, the movement in Shanghai suffered from internal conflicts and stagnated.

As such, the centers of the independence movement remained in eastern Manchuria (Jiandao) and the Russian Far East (Vladivostok) even into the 1920s. By the end of 1920, groups like the Korean Independence Army, Heroic Corps (Euiyeoldan), North Road Military Administration Office, Korean People's Association, Righteous Army Corps, and the New People's Association had been formed.¹⁹⁷ Spearheaded by Hong Beomdo's Korean Independence Army, the Korean independence forces began their long-awaited invasion of their homeland in about August 1919. According to historical materials from the Government-General of Korea, 24 advances were made into Korea between January and March 1920.¹⁹⁸ Also, according to a war report released by the Military Affairs Department of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea dated November 12, 1920, independence groups entered Korea and carried out sabotage against the Japanese authorities 32 times from March to June of that year.¹⁹⁹ The morale of the independence forces were raised by their victory in the Battle of Fengwudong on June 7.²⁰⁰

All this meant that the Hara government's policy toward Manchuria and Inner Mongolia needed to address the independence movement and help maintain Japanese rule in Korea. The Jiandao issue came front and center in that context. "Jiandao" refers to the region of the northern Tumen River centered on the city of Yanji. Ownership of the area had been disputed by Korea and China since the latter half of the 19th century.

During the time of the Office of the Resident-General of Korea, Japan established a branch of the office in Jiandao and cracked down on the anti-Japanese movement there in the name of "protecting Koreans."²⁰¹ After Japan seized control of Korea's diplomatic rights, it concluded the Jiandao Agreement with China in 1909. Under this agreement, it recognized Jiandao as a part of China and withdrew its branch office.²⁰² The Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia was reached in 1915 but led to a dispute as the Japanese held that the Jiandao Agreement was now null and void, while the Chinese insisted that it was still in force. Japan also attempted to gain consular jurisdiction over the Korean residents of Jiandao based on an expansive reading of Article 5 of the treaty.²⁰³ As Korean immigration to Jiandao had increased following the Japanese annexation of Korea, the region had become a stronghold of the Korean independence movement. Reports from Japanese residents claimed that the movement was being supplied with weapons by "Russian extremist groups" for the purpose of "gradually turning the area south of Russia communist."²⁰⁴ In an April 8, 1920 letter to General Uehara Yūsaku, chief of the Imperial Army General Staff, Governor-General Saitō expressed an urgent need for proactive measures to be taken.²⁰⁵

Akaike Atsushi, director of the Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau, Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka Masasuke, Colonel Saitō Hisashi, military advisor to Bao Guiqing, and Major Machino Takema, military advisor to Zhang Zuolin, met in Fengtian in May 1920 to put together a plan for cracking down on the independence movement with the permission of Fengtian Governor Zhang and Jilin Governor Xu. This would later be known as the First Fengtian Conference. Zhang endorsed the plan, and police advisors carried out searches and arrests in western Jiandao (which was part of Fengtian). Xu took his own measures in the part of Jiandao located in Jilin, however.²⁰⁶

A May 26, 1920 report to Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang shows the measures taken by Xu. According to the report, he had Hunchun County Governor Xiong Mengao prohibit recruitment by and donations to Korean independence forces and strengthened supervision of the Soviet border by stationing inspectors. But he also wrote:

Given that the Koreans are working towards the restoration of their homeland, we should act in accordance with justice and international norms. We should not intervene in a manner that would cause ethnic enmity and international criticism. Given the state of Sino-Japanese relations, however, it would also be undesirable to give the Japanese an

excuse [to intervene] by failing to strengthen our crackdown. I thus feel that we have no choice but to act in accordance with the requirements of the situation in approaching the crackdown on the Korean independence forces.²⁰⁷

Xu's crackdown was undertaken entirely out of consideration of the Japanese, and he was privately sympathetic to the Korean independence movement. Such attitudes did not go unnoticed by the Japanese. A report to Shinoda Jisaku, governor of South Heian Province in Korea, notified him of "suspicions that, with the increase in anti-Japanese sentiment due to the Shandong issue, there are some Chinese officials who are actually working to incite the Korean independence movement." Documents from the Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau also report that, while the Japanese had demanded a crackdown on the movement in western Jiandao, there were "suspicions that local officials are either protecting disloyal Koreans or accepting bribes to aid them."²⁰⁸

The Third Fengtian Conference was held on July 16, 1920. After deliberating on the matter, Major General Ōno Toyoshi, chief of staff for the Korean Army, Major General Kishi Yajirō, acting chief of staff for the Kwantung Army, Kunitomo Shōken, director of the Government-General of Korea's Police Section, Hiramatsu Aya, a staff officer for the Korean Army, Akatsuka, Colonel Saitō, and Machino decided to obtain permission from Zhang for a joint investigation into the independence forces and, if necessary, the deployment of Japanese troops. A week later, Zhang went so far as to tell Akatsuka that "Chinese forces will suppress them with [...] Colonel Saitō. If reinforcements are required, we will request Japanese forces." He also stated that Bao had given permission for the operation. When Saitō met with Major General Ōno in Seoul on August 15, they agreed to allow the Chinese to carry out the investigation and suppression of the Jiandao Koreans and to ask for a joint Sino-Japanese operation if this proved insufficient. Thus, as of August 15, Saitō's intention was to only supervise a Chinese crackdown.²⁰⁹

(2) The Hunchun Incidents and the Establishment of the Jiandao Management System

Japan's approach to Jiandao would harden following two incidents in Hunchun. First, the city of Hunchun was attacked by approximately 300 horse bandits on September 12, 1920. This would be followed by another raid on October 2, and it was this second incident that would serve as the direct trigger for the deployment of Japanese troops to Jiandao. On October 6, Governor-General Saitō sent a request to Foreign Minister Uchida for the dispatch of soldiers to Longjing and other locations.²¹⁰ The next day, the Hara government resolved that:

based on the proposal by Foreign Minister Uchida, soldiers (at least 3,000) will be dispatched from Korea to the Jiandao area. These will be

divided into three units and, as a show of force, they will pass through Korea on foot when they return from Khabarovsk.²¹¹

This cabinet decision sought immediate approval from the Chinese for the action, but from Zhang rather than the Beiyang government.²¹² As Zhang had already given Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka *de facto* approval for the dispatch of troops to Jiandao, the Hara government would maintain troops in Jiandao until May 1921, irrespective of a request from Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing to Obata for their immediate withdrawal. Yan's request was prompted by criticism of Japan in the State Council and the Heilongjiang provincial assembly.²¹³

The Jiandao Expedition would carry out full-scale operations until late November 1920, and the Battle of Qingshanli broke out in late October.²¹⁴ According to an investigation by the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, the expedition resulted in 3,469 deaths, 170 arrests, 3,209 burned homes, and 36 burned schools among other damage caused.²¹⁵ The severe damage suffered by the Chinese residents was also condemned by the Beiyang foreign ministry.²¹⁶ Even so, Hara argued before the House of Peers on January 24, 1921 that "if we were to not station forces in the Vladivostok area and just leave this strategic base for disloyal Koreans as it is [...] it will inevitably result in a close relationship between extremists and the disloyal Koreans."²¹⁷ His words here show his belief that the Jiandao Expedition had achieved the "defense of Korea and Manchuria" through a synergistic effect with the reorganization of the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition.

Once the Korean independence movement had largely been suppressed, the focus of Japan's policy towards Jiandao shifted to the creation of a management system that could maintain order in the region following the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The Beiyang government demanded (through Obata) the total withdrawal of Japanese forces in late December 1920, on the grounds that the Chinese army had been deployed and order restored.²¹⁸ Japan had actually already begun a gradual withdrawal following the tentative end of the crackdown in late November, and by early January 1921, only eight companies remained, including three in Longjing and two in Hunchun. Alongside this drawdown, the Japanese foreign ministry and Government-General of Korea hastened the reinforcement of local policy organizations.²¹⁹ Lieutenant General Ōba Jirō, commander of the Korean Army, met with Zhang on February 6 and reached an agreement under which the Northeast regime would send additional troops to the area and the Japanese would be allowed to leave ten liaison officers after its withdrawal. With this, the Jiandao management system was created, and the Japanese withdrawal finally completed on May 8, 1921.²²⁰

But as Japanese security actions in Jiandao proceeded apace, the negotiations between China and Japan to settle the second Hanchun incident failed to make progress. A November 30, 1920 Japanese cabinet decision envisioned the Chinese paying compensation for casualties and damages, and punishing

those responsible, with Zhang serving as the Chinese counterpart in the negotiations. But Zhang did not agree to Consul-General Akatsuka's request for negotiations, choosing to leave the responsibility for dealing with the incident to the Beiyang government so as to avoid criticism.²²¹ Similarly, Foreign Minister Yan held that the Northeast regime would be the more appropriate party and that negotiations should not begin as the Japanese withdrawal was still incomplete and the incident had not been adequately investigated.²²² The incident ultimately ended without any clear resolution as both Zhang and the Beiyang government sought to avoid becoming a party to the negotiations, and the Beiyang government countered with its own demands for compensation and the withdrawal of Japanese police.²²³

3. Formation of the Policy of "Limited Support of Zhang"

It was of vital importance to Japan in the years following World War I to have its policies towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia progress favorably, and for it to maintain good relations with the Fengtian clique. In addition to its importance in other areas, Hara Diplomacy also provided the prototype for the postwar foreign policy of building close relations with Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique.

(1) Increasingly Close Relations with Zhang

It was around the time of the Kuanchengzi Incident in July 1919, which Zhang Zuolin used as an opportunity to drive out Jilin Warlord Meng Enyuan and appoint Bao Guiqing and his confidante Sun Liechen as the warlords of Jilin and Heilongjian, that Zhang finally fulfilled his long-held dream of conquering the Three Northeast Provinces.²²⁴ The Zhili-Anhui War, a July 1920 conflict between military cliques, only further heightened his status. The Anhui clique had initially been ascendant in the conflict, but Zhang's "military support to the Zhili brought about a reversal of the situation."²²⁵ Having brought about the defeat of the Anhui, Zhang issued a joint statement with Cao Kun of the victorious Zhili to the governors and warlords of each province on July 21.²²⁶

There are three factors which need to be kept in mind regarding the increasingly close relationship between Zhang and the Hara government: the suppression of anti-Japanese groups, their joint crackdown on the Korean independence movement, and the stationing of troops along the CER line. Zhang's ban on boycotts of Japanese goods in the wake of the May Fourth Movement was a noteworthy act with regard to the first of these.²²⁷ From the latter half of 1919 into the following year, his attitude towards Japan was characterized by a clear tendency to align himself with the Japanese with regards to the Korean independence movement and the CER. On May 10, 1920, he extended the contract of Ueda Osamu, a police advisor who had played a central role in the crackdown on the Korean independence

movement, by two years. This was done in accordance with the wishes of Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka, but Zhang himself said that he had “absolutely no complaints” about Ueda’s work and informed Beiyang Foreign Minister Yu Zhengxiang of the action.²²⁸

On July 13, 1920, Zhang met with Major Generals Satō Yasunosuke and Kishi Yajirō and noted that the continued stationing of troops along the CER line was “beneficial for the Three Northeast Provinces” and that they “would be relieved if the decision was made to dismiss [Jilin Governor] Xu in the near future,” as he was “extremely unpopular with the Japanese, both in the Harbin area and in relation to the crackdown on disloyal Koreans.”²²⁹ According to Zhang, “during my meeting with Beiyang officials during my recent trip, it was informally decided to dismiss Xu and have Warlord Bao simultaneously hold the position of governor.”²³⁰ This soon came to pass. But after Bao joined with the Beiyang foreign ministry in working towards the return of control of the CER to China, Zhang became upset that CER policy was being carried out over his head. This, combined with Bao’s handling of the Korean independence and anti-Japanese movements, led him to dispatch his aide Yu Chonghan to Beijing to tell them that his confidante Sun Liechen, then governor and warlord of Heilongjiang, should be made governor and warlord of Jilin.²³¹ Bao was thus dismissed from his positions in March 1921 and, as desired by Zhang, replaced by Sun. There was a close connection between Zhang’s securing of control over the Three Northeast Provinces and his policies towards Japan.

While Zhang seems to have adopted a pro-Japanese attitude almost immediately after the formation of the Hara government, it was only after the defeat of the Anhui clique in July 1920 and the increase in Zhang’s influence over the Beiyang government that the Japanese began developing their policy of supporting him. On July 20, immediately after the Zhili victory, Major General Minami Jirō, commander of the China Expeditionary Army, told War Minister Tanaka and Uehara that it would be necessary to “win over Zhang Zuolin and intercede with him to see that Duan [Qirui] is given appropriate status” if Duan’s situation was to be prevented from becoming untenable.²³² The army’s motivation here came from their views on the United States. Minami predicted that, following the downfall of the Anhui clique, the Beiyang government would be “monopolized by the Zhili – that is, the pro-American faction” and might “engage in the unrestrained exercise of American-style diplomacy.”²³³ It is doubtful, however, that the Americans actually had that much enthusiasm for strengthening relations with China at that moment; contemporary American focus was on the upcoming presidential election rather than foreign policy.²³⁴ Moreover, ever since Reinsch’s time as minister, the US legation in China had taken care to not side with any particular political faction.²³⁵

On July 29, Major General Banzai reported to Lieutenant General Fukuda Masatarō, the army’s deputy chief of staff, that Zhang had told him that “our officials and people [should] proceed fully in the exercise of our existing

interests in Mantetsu, financial institutions, etc., and in our economic ventures, that there was absolutely no need to hold ourselves back.”²³⁶ According to “A Summary of Observations and Opinions on the Future of the Chinese Situation,” a mid-August report compiled by the Army General Staff’s 2nd Department, Major General Kishi Yajirō, head of the Fengtian secret service, and Lieutenant General Tachibana Koichirō, commander of the Kwantung Army, were largely in agreement that Zhang should be supported.²³⁷ The support for Zhang from army officers stationed in China was largely derived from a desire to oppose the “pro-American” Zhili government in Beijing. It would be considered “limited support of Zhang” and “nationwide intervention” under this book’s classification scheme.

The Hara government was several months behind the army in adopting a clear policy of support for Zhang; it only did so in early October 1920, after it approved the Jiandao Expedition. It was War Minister Tanaka who spearheaded the policy in the cabinet. He had met with State Councilor Yu Chonghan of the Fengtian clique, a member of Premier Jin Yunpeng’s cabinet.²³⁸ The Hara government’s rationale for improving relations with the Fengtian clique was that it would supplement its policies intended to defend Manchuria and Korea and manage Manchuria by allowing the establishment of the Jiandao management system and the continued stationing of Japanese forces along the CER’s lines. Which is to say, it was one facet of the government’s existing policies towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; it was by no means a policy of opposition towards the “pro-American” Zhili government as it was for the local army officers. The Hara government pursued a policy of limited support for Zhang, only assisting him in the Three Northeast Provinces, and considered this a means of reinforcing its existing policies. This policy would be formalized at the Eastern Conference in May 1921.

(2) *The Eastern Conference*

As the policy of assisting Zhang fundamentally contradicted the policies of non-intervention in China and cooperation with the United States and Britain, it was necessary to reconcile these policies from a broader perspective. The Eastern Conference – intended to produce a unified policy on a wide range of issues including the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition, CER, Jiandao, Zhang Zuolin, Shandong, and Korea – played a key role in this. In the lead up to the conference, Major Machino inquired as to Zhang’s opinion on these issues.²³⁹ As seen in a May 9 letter from Lieutenant General Satō Yasunosuke to War Minister Tanaka, Machino maintained close contact with Tanaka, Major General Kishi, and Satō as he found out Zhang’s intentions.²⁴⁰ In a May 13 cabinet decision, the government stated that “Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are geographically close to our territory, and [conditions there are] extremely closely related to our national defense and the economic survival of our people.” Therefore, “the basis of our policy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia” is “to foster our influence in these territories

with a focus on these two great interests.” While the Hara government also made sure to note the importance of “the Open Door and equality of opportunity in China, and the spirit of cooperation” in the decision, it also held that “the Empire’s status in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was clearly acknowledged for the first time” in the course of the negotiations over the Second China Consortium.²⁴¹

The Eastern Conference began in Tokyo on May 16. It was attended by Governor-General of Korea Saitō, Parliamentary Commissioner of the Government-General of Korea Mizuno Rentarō, Korean Army Commander Ōba Jirō, Governor-General of the Kwantung Leased Territory Yamagata Isaburō, Kwantung Army Commander Kawai Masao, Qindao Army Commander Yui Mitsue, Vladivostok Expeditionary Army Commander Tachibana Koichirō, Minister to China Obata, Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka, and various cabinet ministers. Prime Minister Hara opened the conference by announcing his intention to withdraw the Vladivostok and Shandong expeditionary armies and seeking opinions on the way this was to be done. Yui agreed to withdraw from Shandong and gather Japanese forces in Qingdao, and Kawai also accepted the withdrawal from Vladivostok. Ōba and Saitō argued that civilian policemen should be used along the Korean border rather than military police, albeit with troops able to be deployed if necessary.²⁴²

A cabinet decision was passed on the following morning in which the government outlined its policy towards Zhang Zuolin. It then submitted this decision to the Eastern Conference alongside the May 13 decision on Manchurian policy. But while this policy held that “the Empire should undertake direct and indirect assistance to Zhang Zuolin as he works to organize and strengthen the domestic affairs and military capabilities of the Three Northeast Provinces and establishes a strong force in the region,” it opposed any advance by Zhang towards Beijing, asserting that Japan “will not fulfill any request [by Zhang] for assistance from the Empire intended to satisfy any ambitions he may have towards the central government.” As for why Zhang was important to Japan, it noted that:

there are many areas in which Japan and China need to reach agreements, such as the Chinese Eastern Railway, policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the rule of and maintenance of public order in Korea, and the defense of the Russo-Chinese and Russo-Japanese border regions. And our immediate Chinese counterpart is Zhang.

Aid to Zhang was thus incorporated into Japan’s wider Manchurian policy, of which “promotion of the alteration of the southern line” of the CER was the priority. The government’s decision to follow a policy of what this book calls “limited support for Zhang” was thus made explicit.²⁴³

The remaining important issue on the conference’s agenda was the crack-down on Koreans in Manchuria. At the May 20 meeting, the participants sought to “gather the opinions of the relevant authorities at this time so that

the crackdown for the protection of Koreans living abroad so that concrete measures to be taken can be established.”²⁴⁴ The matter was discussed on the final day of the conference (the 25th), and Hara called for “placating the residents of those areas” as the “protection and aid” of Koreans was “a measure undertaken to guarantee our sphere of influence.”²⁴⁵ As shown above, the major issues of contention in Japanese policy towards China, as seen by the participants of the conference, were the withdrawal of the Vladivostok and Shandong expeditionary armies, the CER, the crackdown on Koreans, and deciding on a policy of limited support for Zhang Zuolin. The last of these was particularly closely related to the other concerns. Another important development was the division of responsibilities over policies aimed at Koreans living outside of Japan between the foreign ministry and the Government-General of Korea following the conference.²⁴⁶

The motives of nations towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in the years following World War I were complicated, interwoven with contentious issues such as the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition, CER, and the Korean independence movement. In addition to factors including the decline in Russian power and the intervention of Japan and the United States, the situation was further confused by the multi-layered nature of Chinese diplomacy.

The Hara government adopted a policy of non-intervention in China in cooperation with Britain and the United States as the basis for its foreign policy. From its formation in September 1918 through 1919, it strove to restore a sense of cooperative diplomacy to its policies towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. This can be seen in its adoption of geographical limitations on the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition, its reduction in the size of its forces stationed there, and its acceptance of international management of the CER. However, from 1920 on, it disregarded cooperation with Britain and the United States and abandoned non-intervention. This is evident from its decision to reorganize the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition rather than withdraw, its policies towards the CER and Jiandao, and its relationship with Zhang Zuolin. It sought to establish a system for the defense of Korea and Manchuria through its reorganization of the expedition and, having excluded the CER from the Second China Consortium, attempted to use Mantetsu to alter its southern line. It justified its abandonment of cooperation with America and Britain in these areas on the grounds of its “close and unique relationship” with China.

The Hara government’s attempts to promote closer ties between Mantetsu and the CER through assistance to the Beiyang government were frustrated by that government’s distrust of Japan and the rise of the rights recovery movement. The efforts by the Beiyang government and Heilongjiang Governor and Warlord Bao Guiqing to regain Chinese control of the CER should be seen as the starting point for the rights recovery movement. At the same time, the Americans still held strengthening of international control over the

CER as a goal, and the Washington Naval Conference would serve as the stage for this effort. The above context makes clear that the United States would face two sources of resistance here: the Japanese desire to exclude the US and the Beiyang government's attempts to recover its rights. The incoming administration of Warren G. Harding does not seem to have foreseen this, however.

The Jiandao Expedition undertaken by the Hara government was a military intervention carried out in the face of opposition from the Beiyang government. Its close connection to the preservation of order in Korea meant that Jiandao was not viewed as completely Chinese territory, to the extent that the possibility of purchasing the area was discussed in cabinet meetings.²⁴⁷ Zhang Zuolin's pro-Japanese attitudes served as an external factor that made the expedition possible. He had sided with Japanese interests during the joint investigation that preceded the intervention, and the Hara government decided that they had his tacit approval for the operation. While Zhang had insisted to the State Council that he would "absolutely force Japan to give up on the idea of dispatching troops" to Jiandao, the truth was that he consented to it.²⁴⁸

Similarly, while Zhang argued in a telegram to the State Council that the reinforcement of the Jiandao management system through an increased Japanese police presence was "a violation of our sovereignty," he again had tacitly accepted this.²⁴⁹

While Zhang's concerns about his relationship with the Beiyang government and anti-Japanese domestic opinion meant that no formal Sino-Japanese agreement or other arrangement was implemented to deal with the aftermath of the Hunchun incidents, the reinforcement of police organizations and placement of Japanese liaison officers – and thus, the establishment of the Jiandao management system – was done with his cooperation.²⁵⁰ While Jilin Governor Xu Nailin expressed sympathy for the Korean independence movement even as he clamped down on it, Jilin Warlord Bao was asked by Zhang to acquiesce to the Jiandao Expedition. Those on the Chinese side took different positions on issues like cooperation with Japan and the Korean independence movement, and these were intricately linked to the process of Zhang's conquest of the northeast.

In short, when developing policies on Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the Hara government did not limit itself to working within a framework of non-intervention and cooperation with the US and Britain. It independently pursued policies aimed at securing the defense of Manchuria and Korea and control over northern Manchuria in a way that went beyond merely responding to events. As such, Japanese policy towards Guannei, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia was based on incompatible diplomatic principles during the Hara government, something that allows us to see the duality of Hara's foreign policy. It is in this duality that we can see that the Hara government's policies towards Manchuria would serve as the prototype not for those of Shidehara, but for those of Tanaka.

At the same time, the rationale behind Hara and Uchida's policy of limited support for Zhang differed from that of the Japanese army officers in China who also supported him. They considered support for Zhang to be part of their larger policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and thus did not support him with regards to Guannei. This meant, for example, that a request from Zhang for weapons was rejected by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanihara Masanao and the foreign ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau; even after the Eastern Conference, the Hara government's actual support of Zhang was still limited.²⁵¹ This attitude exposed the contradiction in the increasingly close relationship between the Hara government and Zhang. Zhang's motivation for getting closer to Japan was that he believed it would aid his ambitions towards the central government; had he been content to merely maintain his status in the Three Northeast Provinces, he would not have needed Japanese support. The Hara government, however, drew closer to Zhang because they believed that, if they could preserve his position as a powerful figure in the northeast, it would help expand Japan's interests and enable the creation of a joint system of control over the Korean independence movement. While both saw a benefit in a closer relationship, they were working at cross purposes from the beginning. The Hara government wanted to restrain Zhang's moves towards the central government, while Zhang was preparing for the next clash between warlords.

III. Summary: The "Simplified International Environment" and the Transitional Nature of Hara's Policies

As was made clear by the earlier analysis of Japanese policies towards the Nanxun and Sitao Railways, the Hara government disregarded the agreements it had made with the United States, Britain, and France through the Second China Consortium and embarked on an independent policy of expanding Japanese interests in China. The legacy of the southern and northern expansion doctrines continued in Japan's continental policy, surviving the creation of the consortium. The Hara government also felt very uneasy with the Wilson administration at the Paris Peace Conference and used cooperation with Britain to secure inheritance of Germany's former interests in Shandong and the Pacific. In other words, even as the Hara government worked for the formation of a cooperative framework with Britain and the US, it also strove to independently expand Japanese interests in China in what could be summarized as a policy of "expansionism within cooperation."

Both China and the United States were dissatisfied with Japan's actions. Following the peace conference, Beiyang Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing held firm to his stance of "refusal diplomacy" and avoided entering into any negotiations with Japan over the Shandong issue. And the distrust that the Wilson administration had held towards Japan ever since the Twenty-One Demands became even stronger, causing it to turn heavily towards a policy of containing Japan. The Americans misunderstood the Hara government's

drive to inherit the former German interests as being driven by the Japanese military. And as it became increasingly convinced that the transfer of those interests needed to be prevented as a means of restraining the Japanese military, it overlooked the significance of the arrival of the first full-fledged party government in Japanese history. The Hara government should have been an ideal partner for the US.

The Wilson administration had surprisingly low regard for the Hara government and even saw Japan as a second Germany. This was, in a way, symbolized by the sudden withdrawal of American forces from Siberia. The US saw Hara's response to the Second China Consortium as slow and inadequate, and the Wilson administration even sounded out the British and French about excluding Japan from the consortium. The administration increased its pressure on Japan following the end of World War I and can even be said to have intended to restrain it through containment. In general, the developments surrounding the consortium and peace conference clearly show the divergence between the diplomatic methods of Japan and the United States, between the Open Door and sphere-of-influence diplomacy. It would be difficult to judge US-Japan relations during this period as serving as a forerunner for the Washington System.

The Wilson administration's aforementioned East Asian policy can also be considered the end of the Lansing Doctrine. Robert Lansing's vision for East Asia, exemplified by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, had advocated for the use of practical measures to reduce frictions with Japan. But there had been little effort made along these lines at the Second China Consortium and Paris Peace Conference. The views of Lansing – who was in poor health at the time of the conference – were no longer regarded as particularly important by Wilson, who had a different vision for foreign affairs. And Lansing's lack of enthusiasm for the League of Nations idea had actually caused him to advocate for an even more hardline approach on constraining Japan than Wilson.²⁵² But the more pro-Chinese policies advocated for by Reinsch were also frustrated by the adoption of compromise measures towards Japan at the peace conference and Reinsch's own resignation following the May Fourth Movement. Combined with the Congressional rejection of the policies that Wilson had intended to use to bring about a new order founded on the League of Nations, by the end of the Wilson administration, all three diplomatic visions had effectively come to a dead end, and it was no longer possible for the United States to put forward an effective East Asian policy.²⁵³

While the Hara government had intended to cooperate with Britain and the US, the actual result of its diplomatic efforts was an increase in US-Japan frictions in the postwar period. In that sense, it would be difficult to assess its cooperative efforts towards America and Britain highly. Britain, however, played an important role in mediating these frictions. In addition to rejecting Wilson's proposal to exclude Japan from the Second China Consortium, the Lloyd George government also acted brilliantly as a mediator between Japan and the United States on the Shandong and mandate issues at the Paris Peace

Conference. As such, if the diplomatic negotiations of this period have any significance as forerunners of the Washington System, it can be found in Britain's mediation diplomacy. The perception in Japan that "Anglo-American-centered pacificism" existed is deeply rooted, and even today there is a tendency to view the countries as one, the "Anglo-Saxons." In truth, however, there was no successful attempt to have the two countries work in tandem to apply pressure on Japan.

As seen from its decision to reorganize the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition rather than withdraw, its policies towards the CER, and its decision to carry out the Jiandao Expedition, the Hara government did not limit itself to a policy of non-intervention and cooperation with the United States and Britain when carrying out foreign policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Instead, it sought to independently establish a system for the defense of Korea and Manchuria. In that sense, Hara diplomacy followed a course of "non-intervention with reservations" under which there was no interference in Guannei but interference in the Three Northeast Provinces was accepted. It also developed a policy of providing limited assistance to Zhang Zuolin. Again, this assistance was only provided within the Three Northeast Provinces. As such, Hara's foreign policy can be classified as "non-intervention with reservations" and "limited support for Zhang" under this book's criteria. Hara Diplomacy skillfully used a policy of non-intervention and cooperation with the United States and Britain with regards to Guannei and a policy of intervention that disregarded such cooperation in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. This practice of applying different policies to different regions can be seen in his government's participation in the negotiations over the Second China Consortium even as it worked to expand Japanese interests in China. What makes Hara's foreign policy stand out is the political skill with which he was able to reconcile domestic and international demands and, to a considerable degree, simultaneously pursue these two contradictory principles.

This diplomatic approach drew criticism on two fronts. The first source of criticism was Japanese army officers in China who were entirely willing to support a policy of "nation-wide intervention" and "active support for Zhang" to resist the "pro-American" Zhili clique that had emerged victorious following the Anhui-Zhili War.

Another source was Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, part of Hara's cabinet. In his September 1920 opinion paper, "Personal Opinions on Domestic and Foreign Policy," Takahashi reviewed the China policy that the Twenty-One Demands had symbolized and boldly called for "pursuing the development of the [Chinese] mainland" without fixating on the "special circumstance" in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. He also boldly proposed that the army and navy general staffs be eliminated.²⁵⁴ He further clarified his views on the economic development of China and the nature of economic competition with the other powers in another paper, "Opinions on the Establishment of an East Asian Economic Power," in May 1921. In this, he held that Japan should join with China and its "infinite resources" and stand

against Britain and the United States, “establishing a third force in the world.” He also argued for a “fundamental reform of policy towards China” by withdrawing Japanese garrison and improving the nation’s policies towards Shandong, Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia.²⁵⁵ Takahashi was dissatisfied with the Hara government’s decisions to exempt Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from its policy of non-intervention in China and to support Zhang. He even went so far as to propose “resigning as finance minister and taking the less important position of minister to China so as to resolve the China issue.”²⁵⁶ But while Beiyang Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing learned of Takahashi’s argument for the creation of an “East Asian economic power,” he did not respond to it. With Hara dismissing Takahashi’s ideas as a mere “academic argument,” they did not result in any changes to the government’s foreign policy.²⁵⁷ The above positions are summarized in Table 1.1.

It goes without saying that it was largely due to Hara’s own ideas and political leadership that his foreign policy became the prototype for postwar Japanese diplomacy. At the same time, it is also true that all foreign policy is determined to no small degree by the international environment, something that plays out on a level beyond the capabilities of individual leaders. As discussed earlier, the international environment in which Japan found itself following World War I could be called the “first wave of international change.” Japan had reached secret agreements with Russia over the course of many years, but now that nation had suffered a revolution that saw Japan, Britain, the US, and France deploy troops to its territory. The Western European powers were exhausted by the war, and their influence in East Asia had been reduced. The North-South conflict in China was becoming more serious, and infighting within the Beiyang clique led to frequent changes of government in Beijing. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance no

Table 1.1 Patterns of China Policy (1918–1921)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria	Nationwide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
			Takahashi	No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
		Hara, Tanaka, Uchida		Limited Support of Zhang	
	Army officers stationed in China			Active Support of Zhang	
				Elimination of Zhang	

Source: Author

longer had the sense of solidarity that it once had; instead, the international standing of the United States had become dramatically higher.

In a sense, with the dismantling of Imperial Russia, the great powers of the world were limited to Japan, Britain, and the United States, and the international environment had been, for Japan, “simplified.” Due to this “simplified international environment,” Japan had little choice but to make cooperating with the United States and Britain the cornerstone of its foreign policy. In a postwar environment where the traditional touchstones of Japanese diplomacy – secret agreements with Russia and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance – had become things of the past, such cooperation was, to a considerable extent, inevitable.

But this “simplified” international environment also provides indications of the limitations placed on Hara’s diplomatic course. During the Hara government, the Soviet Union was in a transitional state with Japanese, American, British, and French troops stationed on its territory and the Far Eastern Republic as a buffer state on its eastern border. As such, Hara diplomacy did not include any thorough policy direction aimed at the Soviets. This naturally meant that, when the Soviets later emerged as an actor in the international politics of East Asia and began to make inroads towards China, Hara’s foreign policies were insufficient for responding to the situation. Similarly, the North-South division of China that existed during the Hara government was only temporary in a macroscopic sense. His policies towards China were destined to become incompatible as the nation entered a new era that saw the formation of the First United Front under Soviet influence, increased success by the Nationalists against the warlords, increased activity in the rights recovery movement, and threats to Zhang Zuolin’s control of the Three Northeastern Provinces. The simplified international environment was merely transitional, and so were the policies which Hara put together under that environment.

Source Acronyms

AS	Academia Sinica, Taipei
AVPRF	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow
CFR	Guoli Bianyiguan, ed., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Huibian</i> [Compilation of the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China], Vol. 1–15 (Taipei: Bohaitang Wenhua Gongsi, 1996)
DBFP	E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939</i> , Series 1–2 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1946–1947)
DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)

- FRUS Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
- JDC Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho* [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
- JDR Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., *Nihon Gaikō Bunsho* [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
- MOFA Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
- NDL Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
- PRO Public Records Office, London
- SJR Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., *Zhongri Guanxi Shiliao* [Records on Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987–1996)

Notes

- 1 For research on the Second China Consortium, see also: Mitani Taichirō, *Zōho Nihon Seitō Seiji no Keisei – Hara Takashi no Seiji Shidō no Tenkai* [The Formation of Japanese Party Politics: The Development of Hara Takashi's Political Leadership (Expanded Edition)] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1995), 334–344; Mitani Taichirō, “Wōru Sutorīto to Kyokutō – Washinton Taisei ni okeru Kokusai Kinyu Shihon no Yakuwari” [Wall Street and the Far East: The Role of International Capital under the Washington System], *Chūō Kōron* (September 1975), 157–181; Mitani Taichirō, “Kokusai Kinyu Shihon to Ajia no Sensō – Shūmatsuki ni okeru Taichū Shikoku Shakkandan” [International Capital and the Asian War: The Second China Consortium in its Terminal Stage], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū*, No. 2 (1980), 114–158; Burton F. Beers, *Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1962), 173–175; Roy Watson Curry, *Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913–1921* (New York: Octagon Books, 1968), 187–204; Wm. Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 28–35; Hirano Ken'ichirō, “Nishihara Shakkan kara Shin Shikoku Shakkandan e” [From the Nishihara Loans to the Second China Consortium], in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, eds., *Washinton Taisei to Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1978), 283–320; Akashi Iwao, “Shin Shikoku Shakkandan ni kan suru Ikkōsatsu – Washinton Kaigi ni itaru Rekkō to Chūgoku Minzoku Undō no Taikō” [Considerations on the Second China Consortium: The Confrontation between the Powers and the Chinese Nationalist Movement prior to the Washington Conference], *Nihonshi Kenkyū* No. 203 (1979), 1–29; Matsuda Takeshi, “Wiruson Seiken no Shin Shikoku Shakkandan Seisaku – Shin Amerika Ginkōdan no Kessei o Chūshin ni” [The Wilson Administration's Policy on the Second China Consortium: Centering on the Formation of the New American Bankers Group], *Shirin* 65:3 (1982), 1–30; Wang Gangling,

- Ouzhan Shiqi de Meiguo Duihua Zhengce* [American China Policy during the European War] (Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng Shuju, 1988), 127–177; Sakai Kazuomi, “Shin Shikoku Shakkandan to Kokusai Kinyuka – Kokusai Kōchōshugi no Rinri to Genkai” [The Second China Consortium and International Financiers: The Logic and Limits of Internationalism], *Shirin* 84:2 (2001), 104–133. Notable research on Hara Diplomacy includes: Seki Shizuo, *Nihon Gaikō no Kijiku to Tenkai* [The Cornerstones and Development of Japanese Foreign Policy] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 1990), 209–264; Jin Linbo, “Hara Naikaku ni okeru Taichūgoku Seisaku no Shintenkai – Nanboku Dakyō Mondai o Chūshin ni shite” [New Developments in China Policy under the Hara Government: Centering on the Issue of Reaching a North-South Compromise], *Hōsei Ronshū* Nos. 142, 144 (1992), 123–171, 355–399; Jin Linbo, “Hara Naikaku no Tai ‘Manmo’ Seisaku no Shintenkai” [New Developments in the Hara Government’s Manchuria/Inner Mongolia Policy], *Hōsei Ronshū* No. 145, 152, 153 (1993–1994), 175–221, 267–313, 221–268; Kawada Minoru, *Hara Takashi Tenkanki no Kōsō – Kokusai Shakai to Nihon* [Hara Takashi: Ideas at the Turning Point – Japan and the International Community] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1995), 20–156, 243–250. An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Kyōchō no Naka no Kakuchōsaku – Hara Naikaku no Zaika Ken’eki Kakuchōsaku to Shin Shikoku Shakkandan” [Expansionism within Cooperation: The Hara Government’s Policy of Expanding Interests in China and the Second China Consortium], *Shakai Bunka Kagaku Kenkyū* No. 2 (1998), 7–30.
- 2 Ishii to Lansing (July 17, 1918), *FRUS*, 1918, 179.
 - 3 The terms “southern Manchuria” and “eastern Mongolia” refers to Manchuria south of Changchun and eastern Inner Mongolia, i.e., Japan’s sphere of influence as established under its treaties with Russia. Japan’s position on Mantetsu and the Kwantung Leased Territory – the centerpieces of that sphere – was that their treaty basis had been renewed by the Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia (one of the agreements related to the Twenty-One Demands). JDC 1:406–407.
 - 4 JDC 1:511–512. Warren I. Cohen, *The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Greene, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Columbia University, 1978), 41–70 provides a relatively detailed study of Lamont. For the items provided to the consortium by each country, see Horikawa Takeo, *Kyokutō Kokusai Seijishi Josetsu – Nijūichi ka Jōyōkyū no Kenkyū* [Introduction to the History of Far Eastern International Politics: Research on the Twenty-One Demands] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1958), 360–365.
 - 5 Shidehara to Lamont (December 6, 1921), Folder 13, Box 186, Thomas William Lamont Papers, Barker Library, Harvard University. Hanihara to Lamont (February 20, 1923), Folder 15, Box 186, Lamont Papers.
 - 6 Lansing to Davis (August 27, 1919), *FRUS*, 1919, 1:480–481. Lansing to Reinsch (August 27, 1919), *FRUS*, 1919, 1:481–482. Hugh Campbell Wallace (US ambassador to France) to Lansing (September 16, 1919), *FRUS*, 1919, 1:487–488. Davis to Lansing (September 22, 1919), *FRUS*, 1919, 489.
 - 7 Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (November 26, 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.20.33.33.1, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (AS). Obata to Uchida (January 31, 1920), *JDR*, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:105–113.
 - 8 US Embassy in Japan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (December 27, 1919), *JDR*, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:184–186.
 - 9 *DBFP*, First Series, 6:797–799.
 - 10 The charter was valid for five years. See also: Shima Yoshizō (Deputy Head, Loan Section, Office of the President of Yokohama Specie Bank) to Yoshizawa Kenkichi (Director, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (November 17, 1920), *JDR*, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:418–437.

- 11 Obata to Uchida (July 7, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1995–1996.
- 12 Conversation between Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing and Acting British Minister to China R.H. Clive (September 29, 1920), Waijiao Dangan 03.20.31.31.1, AS. Caizheng Kexue Yanjiusuo, Second Historical Archives of China, eds., *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao* [Archival Materials on the Republic of China's Foreign Debt] (Nanjing: Dangan Chubanshe, 1990), 1:195–224. Fu Wenling, *Riben Hengbin Zhengjin Yinhang Zaihua Huodong Shiliao* [Historical Materials on the Yokohama Specie Bank's Activities in China] (Changchun: Zhongguo Jinrong Chubanshe, 1992), 531–533.
- 13 Obata to Uchida (November 5, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:407.
- 14 Uchida to Ambassador to Britain Hayashi (January 21, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 133–134. Obata to Uchida (January 27, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 137. Uchida to Obata (April 1, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 170.
- 15 For more on the CER, see the section “The Siberian Expedition” in this chapter.
- 16 Hankou Consul-General Segawa Asanoshin to Foreign Minister Katō Takaaki (February 16, 1915), JDR, 1915, Vol. 2, 366–368.
- 17 For the historical circumstances of the Nanxun Railway, see: Xiu Rucheng, *Diguozhuyi yu Zhongguo Zhilu – 1847–1949* [Imperialism and Chinese Railways, 1847–1949] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1980), 193–195; Akashi Iwao, “Ishii-Ranshingu Kyōtei no Zentei” [The Presumptions of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement], *Nara Shigaku* No. 4 (1986), 1–22; Murakami Katsuhiko, “Chōkō Ryūiki ni okeru Nihon Ken'eki – Nanjin Tetsuro Shakkan o Meguru Seiji Keizai-shi” [Japanese Interests in the Yangtze River Region: A History of the Political Economics of the Nanxun Railway Loan], in Andō Hikotarō, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku – Nicchū Kankei Ronshū* (Tokyo: Kyūkosho, 1989), 127–164. For discussion of the Nanxun Railway issue in connection to the May Fourth Movement in Jiangxi, see: Akashi Iwai, “Goshi Undō to Nanjin Tetsudō” [The May Fourth Movement and the Nanxun Railway], in Asao Naohiro Kyōju Taikan Kinenkai, ed., *Nihon Kokka no Shi-teki Tokushitsu – Kindai-Kin'yo* (Tokyo: Shibunkaku, 1995), 453–475. This section drew heavily on this article. There is also: Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Shina Tetsudō Mondai Shiryō Dai Hachi Nanjin Tetsudō Mondai Keika Gaiyō” [Materials on the Chinese Railway Issue Vol. 8 – Overview of the Progression of the Nanxun Railway Issue] (January 1921), Nanjin Tetsudo Kankei Ikken, Vol. 14, F.1.9.2.16, MOFA. Incidentally, the name “Nanxun” for the railway is derived from “Xun,” an alternate name for Juijiang.
- 18 East Asian Industrial Promotion Company President Furuichi Kōi to Political Affairs Bureau Director Obata Yūkichi (March 12, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 2, 1:446–447. For the contemporary staffing of the Nanxun Railway, see: Nanxun Zhilu Zonggongsi Dangan [Archives of the Nanxun Railway Company] (458.4.5,6,7), Second Historical Archives of China.
- 19 Asian Affairs Bureau, “Shina Tetsudō Mondai Shiryō Dai Nana - Nanshi Tetsudō Mondai Keika Gaiyō” [Materials on the Chinese Railway Issue Vol. 7 – Overview of the Progression of the South Chinese Railway Issue] (August 1922), Gaimushō Chōshorui, Ajia-kyoku 7, MOFA, 21–22.
- 20 Conversation between Deputy Foreign Minister Chen Lu and British Minister to China John N. Jordan (July 23, 1918), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.33.36.1, AS. See also: Chan Lau Kit-ching, *Anglo-Chinese Diplomacy in the Careers of Sir John Jordan and Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1906–1920* (Hong Kong, 1978), 78.
- 21 Obata to Gotō (May 30, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 2, 1:464–465. Gotō to Furuichi, (June 7, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 2, 1:465.
- 22 Obata to Uchida (April 2, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:478–479. The hesitance shown by Cao Rulin here differs somewhat from the stance taken by Deputy Transportation Minister Ye Gongchuo at the beginning of negotiations in 1918.

- Cao and Ye often came into conflict over personnel choices and railway policy. Cao Rulin, *Yisheng Zhi Huiyi* [Memories of a Lifetime] (Hong Kong: Chunqiu Zazhishe, 1966), 167–169, 204–206. Ye would be replaced by Ceng Yujuan on October 9, 1918.
- 23 For the records of the Second China Consortium's meetings, see: Shima to Yoshizawa (November 17, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 2:418–437. The name “Ningxiang” refers to Nanjing and Hunan.
 - 24 The plans for the construction of the Ningxiang Railway would never be carried out, partially due to World War I. Asian Affairs Bureau, “Shina Tetsudō Mondai Shiryō Dai Kyū Neshō Tetsudō Mondai Keika Gaiyō” [Materials on the Chinese Railway Issue Vol. 9 – An Overview of the Progression of the Ningxiang Railway Issue] (October 1921), Gaimushō Chōshorui Ajia-kyoku 36, MOFA.
 - 25 Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi Nikki* [The Diary of Hara Takashi] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), 5:149–150, dated October 1, 1919. For the role of Shiraiwa Ryūhei in the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company, see: Nakamura Tadashi, *Shiraiwa Ryūhei – Ajishugi Jitsugyōka no Shōgai* [Shiraiwa Ryūhei: The Life of a Pan-Asian Businessman] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1999), 157–169. Unfortunately, Shiraiwa's diary from the Taishō period is missing.
 - 26 Hara 5:92–94. It was decided in a May 20, 1919 cabinet decision to have Foreign Minister Uchida hold discussions with Guo Chunyang (*ibid.*, 97).
 - 27 Jiujiang Consul Aihara Kogorō to Uchida (August 28, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 2:645–647.
 - 28 The article “Shina ni okeru Rekkoku no Tetsudo Seiryoku” [The Powers' Railway Strategies in China] in the January 1922 issue of *Seiyū* listed a wide range of “unbuilt rail lines over which Japan holds construction rights,” including lines between Hankou-Jiujiang, Nanchang-Fuzhou, Nanchang-Chaozhou, and Nanchang-Longzhou.
 - 29 This loan agreement for the Nanxun Railway was called the Third Nanxun Railway Loan Agreement (as it was preceded by other agreements reached on July 8, 1912 and May 15, 1914). In Article 3 of the accompanying contract, it was written that the Nanxun Railway “should extend a rail line between Nanchang and Pinxiang or some other appropriate course.” See also: JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 404–408.
 - 30 Uchida to Obata (June 21, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 421.
 - 31 The Fuzhou Line would not actually be built until after the war, however. Work on the Pingxiang Line began in September 1937. See also: Jiang Mingqing, *Zhilu Shiliao* [Historical Materials on Railways] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1992), 678.
 - 32 Curzon to British Minister to China Beilby Francis Alston (January 27, 1922), 957/22/28, FO 228/2807, PRO.
 - 33 Trade Commissioner Paul P. Whitham to Reinsch (May 1, 1919), 5601/19/17, FO 228/2807, PRO.
 - 34 JDC, 1:185–186, 381–384.
 - 35 Research on railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia includes Ogata Yōichi, “Karahana Chūgoku Zaikin Jiki no Tōshō Tetsuro – 1923–1925 Nen” [Eastern Province Railways during the Period that Karahan was in China, 1923–1925], in Andō Hikotarō, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Chūgoku – Nicchū Kankei Ronshū* (Tokyo: Kyūkosho, 1989), 165–244; Inoue Yūichi, *Tetsudō Gejiji ga Kaeta Gendaishi – Ressha wa Kokka Kenryoku o Nosete Hashiru* [Modern History as Changed by Railway Gauges: National Strategies Ran on Trains] (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1990); Kaneko Fumio, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru Taimanshū Tōshi no Kenkyū* [Research on Modern Japanese Investment in Manchuria] (Tokyo: Kondō Shuppansha, 1991), 371–448; Tsukase Susumu, *Chūgoku Kindai Tōhoku Keizai-shi Kenkyū* [Research on the Modern Economic History of Northeast China] (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1993); Yoshii Ken'ichi, *Kan-Nihon Kai Chūiki*

Shakai no Hen'yō – “Manmo” “Kandō” to “Ura Nihon” [Changes in Pan-Sea of Japan Regional Society: “Manchuria/Inner Mongolia,” “Jiandao,” and “Japan Behind the Scenes”] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2000), 112–139. However, in my humble view, there have been no studies which adequately analyze the connection between the Sitao Railway and the Second China Consortium during the Hara government.

- 36 China and Japan reached two agreements over railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in the 1910s, prior to the formation of the Hara government. Under the “Manchuria-Mongolia Five Railway Agreement” concluded on October 5, 1913, Japan was granted the right to construct lines between Sipingjie-Zhengjiatun-Taonan, Kaiyuan-Hailong, and Changchun-Taonan and priority rights for the construction of lines between Taonan-Chengde (Rehe) and Jilin-Hailong. JDC 1:378. However, the only one of these that would actually be built was the Sizheng Line running west from Sipingjie (which was serviced by Mantetsu) to Zhengjiatun, which began provisional operations in January 1918. The “Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Agreement” was then concluded on September 24, 1918. This granted Japan the right to build rail lines between Kaiyuan-Hailong-Jilin, Changchun-Taonan, Taonan-Rehe, and from a point between Taonan and Rehe to the Yellow Sea. JDC 1:463. As the Sitao Railway running from Sipingjie to Taonan, passing through Zhengjiatun had already been partially constructed, it was not included in the agreement. The Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Agreement was an extension of the earlier five railway agreement (except for the exclusion of the Sitao Railway). The rights to the Taonan-Rehe line and the line to the Yellow Sea were yielded to the Second China Consortium during the Hara government, and no work would be done by the Japanese on the Kaiyuan-Hailong-Jilin and Changchun-Taonan lines after the end of the Hara government. Conversely, despite the Japanese claim that it was included in the four railway agreement, the Chinese began work on the Hailong-Jilin line in 1927, which began operations in 1929.
- 37 For an overview of the Sitao Railway, see also: Asian Affairs Bureau, “Shina Tetsudo Mondai Shiryo Dai Ni Manmo Shotetsudo Mondai Keika Gaiyo” [Materials on the Chinese Railway Issue Vol. 2 – Overview of the Progression of the Various Railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia] (October 1921); Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 5, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA, Manshikai, *Manshū Kaihatsu Yonjū Nenshi* [A Forty Year History of the Development of Manchuria] (Tokyo: Manshū Kaihatsu Yonjū Nenshi Kankōkai, 1964), 1:352–353.
- 38 Kunisawa to Uchida (January 22, 1919), JDR, 1919 Vol. 2, 1:488–489. As Bayisingtu was an old name for Tongliao, the Zhengtong Line was also known as the Zhengbai Line. The designation Bayisingtu is sometimes seen in Japanese records.
- 39 Cao Rulin to Obata (February 25, 1919), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 3, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA.
- 40 According to a November 24, 1919 article from the *Beijing Yadong Xinwen*, reproduced under the title “Comparison of Strength of the New and Old Communication Cliques” on pages 23 and 24 of *Chosa Jihō* No. 1 (1919), produced by the Investigation Section, General Affairs Department, South Manchuria Railway, the New Communication Clique was led by Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu, and Ceng Yujuan and had pro-Japanese leanings, while the Old Communication Clique had pro-American policies and was led by Liang Shitai, Zhou Zizhai, Zhu Qiqian, Ye Gongchuo, Xu Enyuan, Wang Jingchun, and Zhou Xuexi.
- 41 Uchida to Obata (March 3, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:489–490.
- 42 Obata to Uchida (March 3, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:490. Kawakami to Shidehara (March 3, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:490–492.
- 43 Uchida to Obata (April 15, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:494–495.

- 44 Mantetsu Director Tatsui Raizo to Foreign Ministry Political Affairs Bureau Director Hanihara Masanao (May 15, 1919), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA. Tatsui to Hanihara (May 20, 1919), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA. Tatsui to Hanihara (May 28, 1919), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA.
- 45 JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:507.
- 46 Obata to Uchida (September 20, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:511–517. The Sitao Railway loan agreement was dated September 8, 1919.
- 47 Obata to Uchida (October 4, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:525.
- 48 Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA. The date was September 8, 1919, the same as the loan agreement.
- 49 Obata to Uchida (October 2, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:522–524.
- 50 Obata to Uchida (October 3, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:524–525.
- 51 Obata to Uchida (October 9, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:527–528.
- 52 Obata to Uchida (October 22, 1919), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA.
- 53 Hara 5:167.
- 54 Yoshizawa to Nomura (November 12, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:536–537. Obata to Uchida (November 13, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:537.
- 55 Transportation Minister Cao Rulin to Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang (March 21, 1919), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 1, 379–381. Obata to Uchida (December 22, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:537–540. Transportation Minister Ceng Yujuan to Lu (December 27, 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.51.55.1, AS. Transportation Minister Ye Gongchuo to Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing (December 1, 1920), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.51.55.1, AS. Transportation Minister Zhang Zitan to Yan (November 31, 1921), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.51.55.1, AS. Obata to Uchida (November 9, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 2:674–675. Obata to Uchida (December 9, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 447–448. Ye Gongchuo to Sitao Railway Engineering Bureau Director Zhao Shixuan (December 6, 1920), Sitao Zhiluju Dangan, JD7–175, Liaoning Provincial Archives. Zhang Zhitan to Zhao (November 30, 1921), Sitao Zhiluju Dangan, JD7–175, Liaoning Provincial Archives.
- 56 Beiyang Government Transportation Ministry to the Foreign Ministry (May 11, 1920), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.45.49.2, AS. Mantetsu President Nomura Ryutarō to Uchida (June 9, 1920), Shitō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, Vol. 4, F.1.9.2.14, MOFA. This agreement was dated May 11, 1920 and was exchanged between Mantetsu Director Kawakami Toshitsune and Acting Finance Minister Li Sihao and Transportation Minister Ceng Yujuan.
- 57 Uchida to Obata (February 28, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 412–413.
- 58 While the Beiyang government pushed for a Zhengjiatun-Taonan line as in the original plan, Mantetsu tried to amend this to a Tongliao-Taonan line. Ultimately, a contract was reached in accordance with the original plan.
- 59 *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun*, Condensed Version (May 1921), Index, 5. Related articles were run on May 14 and 15.
- 60 *Ibid.*, (May 14, 1921).
- 61 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Transportation Ministry (June 5, 1922), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.45.49.2, AS. Zhengjiatun Consul Ikebe Masaji to Uchida (June 6, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 439. Ikebe to Uchida (June 7, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 442.
- 62 *Chōsa Jihō* 4:6 (June 1924), 131–132. *Chōsa Jihō* 4:10 (October 1924), 115–117. *Chōsa Jihō* 5:8 (August 1925), 144–149. Zhengjiatun Consul Yoshihara Taizō to Foreign Minister Ijūin Hikokichi (November 1, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 417–419.
- 63 JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:357–382. The public-facing rationale for this included the fact that the CER was originally a Russian-affiliated body rather than a company protected by the Chinese government.
- 64 Uchida to Kumasaki (October 14, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:397–404.

- 65 Uchida to Shidehara (September 4, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:382–391; Shima to Yoshizawa (November 17, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:418–434; Uchida to Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka Masasuke (December 6, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1229–1230.
- 66 JDR, 1921, Vol. 3, 2:1146–1147. See also the section “The Paris Peace Conference” in this chapter.
- 67 Memorandum by Beilby Alston (August 1, 1920), F 2308/199/23, FO 371/5361, PRO.
- 68 Pratt (Far Eastern Department), “Memorandum respecting the China Consortium” (August 21, 1929), File 65, Box 15, John Thomas Pratt Papers, Special Collections Reading Room, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, University of London.
- 69 See the section “The Appearance of Zhang Xueliang and the Nationalist Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy” in Chapter 4.
- 70 See the section “Japan-Soviet Relations and the Manchurian Issue” in Chapter 3 and “The Arrival of Zhang Xueliang and the Nationalist Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy” in Chapter 4.
- 71 Mantetsu Railway Department Director Fujine Jukichi to Taoang Railway Engineering Bureau Acting Director Yu Changfu (March 25, 1928), Sitao Zhiluju Dangan, JD7–413, Liaoning Provincial Archives. Fujine to Sitao Railway Engineering Bureau Director Lu Jinggui (March 31, 1928), Sitao Zhiluju Dangan, JD7–413, Liaoning Provincial Archives.
- 72 Acting Zhengjiatun Consul Nakano Kōichi to Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō (March 8, 1927), Tōgō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, F.1.9.2.6, MOFA.
- 73 Qiqihar Consul Shimizu Yaokazu to Foreign Minister Tanaka Giichi (September 24, 1927), Tōgō Tetsudō Kankei Ikken, F.1.9.2.6, MOFA.
- 74 On the Paris Peace Conference and the Shandong Issue, see also: Kobayashi Tatsuo, “Pari Heiwa Kaigi to Nihon no Gaikō” [The Paris Peace Conference and Japanese Diplomacy] in Ueda Toshio, ed., *Kindai Nihon Gaikō-shi no Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1956), 365–422; Beers 149–169; Ikei Masaru, “Pari Heiwa Kaigi to Jinshu Sabetsu Teppai Mondai” [The Paris Peace Conference and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Issue], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 23 (1963), 44–58; Ikei Masaru, “Santō Mondai, Go Shi Undō o Meguru Nicchū Kankei” [Sino-Japanese Relations and the Shandong Question and May Fourth Movement], *Hōgaku Kenkyū* 43:1 (1970), 215–234; Russel H. Fifield, *Woodrow Wilson and the Far East: The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), 3–336; Curry 249–284; Usui, *Nihon to Chūgoku*, 139–162; Ian Nish, *Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–1923* (London: The Athlone Press, 1972), 266–267, 272–276; Madeleine Chi, “China and Unequal Treaties at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,” *Asian Profile* 1:1 (1973), 49–61; Cheng Sanjing, “Lu Zhengxiang yu Bali Hehui” [Lu Zhengxiang and the Paris Peace Conference], *Lishi Xuebao*, No. 2 (1974), 1–15; Shimizu Hideko, “Santō Mondai” [The Shandong Question] *Kokusai Seiji* No. 56 (1977), 117–136; Hosoya Chihiro, *Nihon Gaikō no Zaiyō* [The Coordinates of Japanese Foreign Policy] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron-sha, 1979), 4–17; Pao-chin Chu, *V.K. Wellington Koo: A Case Study of China’s Diplomat and Diplomacy of Nationalism, 1912–1966* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1981), 13–32; Kasahara Tokushi, “Pari Kōwa Kaigi to Santō Shuken Kaishū Undō” [The Paris Peace Conference and the Shandong Sovereignty Recovery Movement], in Chūō Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, ed., *Goshi Undō Shizō no Saikentō* [A Reexamination of the Historical Image of the May Fourth Movement] (Tokyo: Chūō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 85–152; Wang 179–204; Nakanishi Hiroshi, “21-Seiki Kokusai Kankei no Shiten to shite no Pari Kōwa Kaigi – Wakaki Shidōsha-tachi no Kokusai Seiji-kan” [The Paris Peace Conference as the Starting Point for 21st Century International Relations: The Young Leaders’ Views of

- International Politics], *Hōgaku Ronsō* 128:2, 129:2 (1990–1991), 48–77, 39–63; Zhang Yongjin, *China in the International System, 1918–1920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 39–147; Zhang Chunlan, “Gu Weijun de Hehui Waijiao – Yishouhui Shandong Zhuquan Wenti Wei Zhongxin” [Gu Weijun’s Peace Conference Diplomacy – Centering on the Recovery of Shandong’s Sovereignty], *Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan* No. 23 (1994), 31–52; Baba Akira, “Pari Kōwa Kaigi to Makino Nobuaki” [Makino Nobuaki and the Paris Peace Conference], *Kokugakuin Daigaku Daigakuin Kiyō Bungaku Kenkyūka* No.26 (1995), 45–70; Li Junxi, “Ribei dui Shandong de Zhimin Jingyin 1914–1922” [Japan’s Colonial Management of Shandong, 1914–1922], Doctoral Dissertation, Department of History, National Chengchi University (1995); Nagata Akifumi, “Berusaiyu Kōwa Kaigi to Chōsen Mondai – Pari de no Kimu Gyushiku no Katsudō to Nichibei no Taiō” [Versailles Peace Conference and the Korean Question: Kim Kyu-sik’s Activities in Paris and the Japanese Response], *Hitobashi Ronsō* 115:2 (1996), 21–41; Stephen G. Craft, “John Bassett Moore, Robert Lansing, and the Shandong Question,” *Pacific Historical Review* 66:2 (1997), 231–249; Frederick R. Dickinson, *War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 204–237; Noriko Kawamura, *Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-US Relations during World War I* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 133–151. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Pari Kōwa Kaigi to Go Shi Undō” [The Paris Peace Conference and the May Fourth Movement], *Shakai Bunka Kagaku Kenkyū* No. 3 (1999), 3–25.
- 75 Hara Takashi wrote in a November 24, 1918 letter to Yamagata Aritomo: “I have sent a special envoy to Marquis Saionji in Kyoto in connection to having him serve as peace envoy. It would be difficult given the current state of his health, but if there are no abnormalities, he should leave by the middle of next month. Furthermore, in the discussions with Baron Makino Nobuaki, it was requested that he depart as soon as possible so as to accompany the Marquis.” Yamagata Aritomo Bunsho, Vol. 28, NDL.
- 76 JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 676–678.
- 77 Uchida to Chinda (December 26, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 666–667. The idea that Japan’s interests should serve as the basis for responding can also be seen in Political Affairs Bureau, “Kōwa Jōyaku ni Kitei Sererubeki Teikoku no Yōkyū Jōken” [The Empire’s Demands that Should be Stipulated in the Peace Treaty] (November 18, 1918), Makino Nobuaki Bunsho, 300, NDL.
- 78 Shōyū Kurabu, Hirose Yoshihiro, Sakurai Ryōju, eds., *Ijūin Hikokichi Kankei Bunsho* [Documents Related to Ijūin Hikokichi] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1997), Vol. 2, 477–478.
- 79 JDC, Vol. 1, 404–405, 463. CFR 1:392–394, 2:674–679, 685–686, 689–692.
- 80 Foreign Minister Motono Ichirō to Ambassador to the US Satō Aimaro, Ambassador to Russia Uchida Kōsai, Ambassador to France Matsui Keishirō, and Ambassador to Italy Ijūin Hikokichi (February 17, 1917), JDR, 1917, Vol. 3, 650. French Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry (March 1, 1917), JDR, 1917, Vol. 3, 656–657. Russian Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry (March 5, 1917), JDR, 1917, Vol. 3, 657. Ijūin to Motono (March 28, 1917), JDR, 1917, Vol. 3, 668.
- 81 Political Affairs Bureau, “1919–Nen Pari Kōwa Kaigi no Keika ni kan suru Chōsho” [Records Regarding the Course of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference] (February–July 1919), JDR, Pari Kōwa Kaigi Keika Gaiyō, 50–51. FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 3, 738–740.
- 82 CFR, Vol. 2, 810–822. See also: Disanci Zhongguo Quanquan Weiyuanhui Yilu [Minutes of the Third Meeting of Plenipotentiaries to China] (January 23, 1919), Waijiao Dangan, 03.37.12.12.1, AS; Diyisici Huiyilu (February 11, 1919),

- Waijiao Dangan, 03.37.12.12.1, AS; Diyiyluci Huiyilu (February 13, 1919), Waijiao Dangan, 03.37.12.12.1, AS.
- 83 Takeshita to Tochinai (February 7, 1919), Pari Heiwa Kaigi Bessatsu Takeshita Kaigun Chusho Hokokusho, 2.3.1.17, MOFA; For more on Takeshita during his time as deputy naval chief of staff, see: Hatano Masaru, Kurosawa Fumitaka, Saitō Seiji, Sakurai Ryōju, eds., *Kaigun no Gaikōkan Takeshita Isamu Nikki* [The Diary of Takeshita Isamu, Naval Diplomat] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1998), 53–57.
- 84 *Nihon oyobi Nihonjin* No. 746 (1918), 26. Shimazu Naoko raises three points as motivating the racial discrimination clause: domestic political demands, serving as a steppingstone towards resolution of the immigration issue, and considerations for Japan's unstable position as the only non-white great power. She finds the last of these to have been the decisive factor. Naoko Shimazu, *Japan, Race and Equality: The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919* (London: Routledge, 1998), 164–166.
- 85 Sao Ke Alfred Sze to Balfour (April 9, 1919), 634/1/7, FO 608/210, PRO; V.K. Wellington Koo to Wilson, Lansing, Colonel E.M. House (April 25, 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.37.22.22.4, AS.
- 86 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 4, 555–556.
- 87 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 11, 149–150.
- 88 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 5, 109–111. Matsui to Uchida (April 22, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 1:244–247.
- 89 David Lloyd George to Balfour (April 26, 1919), Vol. 10, Add. 49692, Arthur James Balfour Papers, Manuscript Reading Room, British Library.
- 90 Matsui to Uchida (April 28, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 1:263–267.
- 91 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 5, 327–335. For Balfour's communication of this to Makino, see: Balfour to Makino (April 30, 1919), Vol. 67, Add. 49749, Balfour Papers.
- 92 Council of Four, Conclusions (May 1, 1919), I.C.177.F., FO 374/30, PRO; Sao-ke Alfred Sze to Balfour (May 1, 1919), Vol. 68, Add. 49750, Balfour Papers.
- 93 Minute by Macleay (March 3, 1919), 634/1/4, FO 608/209, PRO.
- 94 Balfour to Curzon (September 20, 1919), Vol. 52, Add. 49734, Balfour Papers.
- 95 Makino Nobuaki, *Shōtō Kandan* (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1940), 217.
- 96 For more on the Italian departure, see: H. James Burgwyn, *The Legend of the Mutilated Victory: Italy, the Great War, and the Paris Peace Conference, 1915–1919* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 296–386.
- 97 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 5, 127.
- 98 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 13, 298–301. Council of Four, Conclusions (April 30, 1919), I.C.177.F., FO 374/30, PRO. JDC, Vol. 1, 491–493.
- 99 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 5, 364.
- 100 Chinese Delegation, “Provisions for Insertion in the Preliminaries of Peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary” (March 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.37.21.21.1, AS. Chinese Delegation, “The Claim of China” (April 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.37.21.21.1, AS.
- 101 Lu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (May 26, 1919), CSR, 212–213. The Chinese delegation made a similar point to Wilson. See: Chinese Delegation to Wilson (May 26, 1919), Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 43, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 102 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 6, 674–675. See also: Council of Four, Conclusions (June 26, 1919), C.F.93.A., FO 374/23, PRO; Matsui to Uchida (June 28, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 1:352–353.
- 103 Lu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (June 26, 1919), CSR, 221–222. Lu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (June 27, 1919), CSR, 222–223.
- 104 This is known as the “mandate issue,” as the League of Nations mandate system was applied to these former colonies. For more on the mandate issue, see: Okada

- Ryōichi, *Inin Tōchi no Honshitsu* [The True Nature of the Mandates] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1941); Wm. Roger Louis, *Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 117–160; Unno Yoshirō, *Kokusai Renmei to Nihon* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1972), 85–96.
- 105 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 3, 740–741.
- 106 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 3, 785–786. Political Affairs Bureau, “1919–Nen Pari Kōwa Kaigi no Keika ni kan suru Chōsho” (February–July 1919), JDR, Pari Kōwa Kaigi Keika Gaiyō, 64–70.
- 107 Uchida to Matsui (February 3, 1919), 1919, Vol. 3, 1:381–382.
- 108 JDC 1:493–500. The former German territories were known as Class C mandates.
- 109 Hara 5:105.
- 110 Komura Kin’ichi, “Kōwa Kaigi no Taisei ga Nihon no Shōrai ni oyobosu Eikyō oyobi no Kore ni Sho suru no Hōsaku” [The General Situation at the Peace Conference, The Influence on Japan’s Future, and Plans for This] (November 30, 1918), Makino Nobuaki Bunsho, 322.
- 111 For Makino’s statements to the Advisory Council for Foreign Affairs on December 2 and December 8, 1918, see: Kobayashi Tatsuo, ed., *Suiushō Nikki – Rinji Gaikō Chōsakai Kaigi Hikkitō* [The Suiushō Diary: Secretary at the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966), 326–328, 333–346.
- 112 Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* (New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922), 364. However, he also wrote in the same letter that familial circumstances were the primary reason for his resignation. See: Noel H. Pugach, *Paul S. Reinsch: Open Door Diplomat in Action* (New York: KTO Press, 1979), 263–265.
- 113 Peck to Reinsch (November 21, 1918), Box 3, Willys R. Peck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Peck to Lansing (February 5, 1919), Box 3, Peck Papers.
- 114 Sao-ke Alfred Sze to the British Delegation (April 24, 1919), Waijiao Dangan 03.37.22.22.2, AS.
- 115 5–3–9, Folder: Koo, Vol. 4, Box 2, Wellington Koo Loose Material, Chinese Oral History Collection, Rare and Manuscript Library, Columbia University; Wellington Koo, “The Wellington Koo Memoir,” Chinese Oral History Project of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1976, Vol. 2, Chapter C. Gu Weijun, *Gu Weijun Huiyilu* [Memoirs of Gu Weijun], trans. Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiyu (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 1:187–189, 209.
- 116 Koo to Wilson (June 27, 1919), Waijiao Dangan, 03.37.22.22.4, AS.
- 117 Zhongguo Daibiaotuan Mimi Huiyi [Secret Meeting of the Chinese Delegation] (May 28, 1919), Waijiao Dangan, 03.37.12.12.1, AS.
- 118 “Void Ishii-Lansing Deal, China Urges,” *New York Times* (February 8, 1919). Far Eastern Division, Section of Territorial Political and Economic Intelligence, American Commission to Negotiate Peace (February 24, 1919), Lansing Papers, Vol. 41. Yan Huiqing, *Yan Huiqing Ziyun* [Autobiography of Yan Huiqing], trans. Yao Songling (Taipei: Yunji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1973), 99–100.
- 119 On the establishment of the public information division, see: Matsumura Masayoshi, “Gaimushō Jōhōbu no Secchi to Ijūin Hatsudai Buchō” [The Establishment of the Foreign Ministry Public Information Division and Its First Director, Ijūin], *Kokusaihō Gaikō Zasshi* 70:2 (1971), 72–99.
- 120 For the information gathering by the Mantetsu Negotiations Department Materials Section, see: Mantetsu Kōshōbu Shiryōka, “Shōwa 5 Nendo Sōgō Shiryō (Kimura Rijiyō)” [1930 General Materials (For Director Kimura)] (June 6, 1931), Folder 1, Box 1, Kimura Eiichi Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Mantetsu Kōshōbu Shiryōka, “Shōwa 6 Nendo Sōgō Shiryō (Kimura Rijiyō)” [1931 General Materials (For Director Kimura)] (undated), Folder 2, Box 1, Kimura Papers. See also: Katō Kiyofumi, “Shidehara Gaikō ni okeru

- Manmo Seisaku no Genkai – Gaimushō to Mantetsu Kantokuken Mondai” [The Limits of Manchuria/Inner Mongolia Policy under Shidehara Diplomacy: The Foreign Ministry and the Issue of Mantetsu’s Control], *Waseda Daigaku Daigakuin Bungaku Kenkyūka Kiyō* No. 46 (2001), 47–58.
- 121 “Hu Shih’s Comment on the May 4th Movement” (October 25, 1958), Folder: Reminiscences of Hu Shih, 1st Draft, 1st Copy, Box 16, Hu Shih Office Files and Related Papers, Chinese Oral History Project, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
- 122 Hara 5:98–99, 109. For the Hara government’s perception of the May Fourth Movement, see: Fujimoto Hiroo, “Nihon Teikokushugi to Go Shi Undō” [Japanese Imperialism and the May Fourth Movement], in *Kyōto Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo Kyōdō Kenkyū Hōkoku “Go Shi Undō no Kenkyū”* (Kyoto: Dōhōsha, 1982), 1:73–108.
- 123 However, the loans that were actually provided did not lead to the assistance to the pro-Japanese faction that Hara had intended, partly due to external pressure from the United States and Britain. No few historians have cast doubt on the Hara government’s commitment to non-intervention in China and cooperation with Britain and the US on the basis of its restarting of loans to the Beiyang government (Imai Seiichi, “Taishō-ki ni okeru Gunbu no Seiji-teki Chii” [The Military’s Political Status During the Taisho Period] Part 2, *Shisō* No. 402 (1957), 110–111; Fujii Shōzō, *Son Bun no Kenkyū – Toku ni Minzokushugi Riron no Tenkai o Chūshin ni shite* [Research on Sun Yat-sen: Particularly Focusing on the Development of His Theory of Nationalism] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1966), 136–137; Seki 212–213, 243–245; Jin Linbo, “Hara Naikaku ni okeru Taichū-goku Seisaku no Shintenkai – Nanboku Dakyō Mondai o Chūshin ni shite” [New Developments in China Policy Under the Hara Government: Focusing on the North-South Compromise Issue], *Hōsei Ronshū* No. 144 (1992), 381–393). However, we should distinguish between Hara’s intentions and his actual policies towards aiding the pro-Japanese faction. In other words, according to the September 9, 1919 cabinet decision and the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations, the purpose of the loans was limited to the removal of political instability – preventing “turmoil or extremist infiltration and chaos” – and the cabinet decision on the 13th that put this into practice decided on a joint monthly loan of five million yen with Britain, France, and the United States. Additionally, it was held that an independent loan would only be undertaken as a last resort, out of consideration of Chinese public opinion. The actual policy undertaken by Prime Minister Hara and Foreign Minister Uchida was thus to move forward with the loan in cooperation with America, Britain, and France and limit the purpose of the loan to the Beiyang government as much as possible. JDC, Vol. 1, 503–506. Hara 5:141. JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:140–141. Political Affairs Bureau, “Taichū-goku Shakkan Mondai Toku ni Nihon no Tandoku Kashitsuke Mondai ni kan suru Seimukyoku Chōsho” [Political Affairs Bureau Record on the China Loan Issue, Particularly the Independent Japanese Loan Issue] (September 22, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:151–153. Uchida to Obata (September 27, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:149–151.

War Minister Tanaka judged that the loans to China provided a good opportunity for resolving the Shandong Question, arguing, “This will completely change our policy towards China, and I think it will become relatively easy to solve the Shandong Question.” Letter by Yamagata Aritomo (September 11, 1919), Yamagata Aritomo Bunsho, Vol. 31. Banzai Rihachirō and Aoki Nobuzumi also met with President Xu Shichang in mid-September and sought resolution of the Shandong Question and a crackdown on the anti-Japanese movement as conditions for assistance to the Beiyang government. Tanaka to Banzai (September 11, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:135–137. Banzai to Tanaka

(September 15, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:143–144. Obata to Uchida (September 16, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 1:144–145. Aoki became a reserve officer in August 1919. However, the Hara government went in the opposition direction of the army, opening discussions with the US, Britain, and France over loans to China, working particularly hard to coordinate its policies with Britain. The joint memorandum submitted to the Beiyang government by these countries on February 6, 1920 took both the Japanese and British views into account and read, “the Chinese government will begin to eliminate unnecessary troops in both the north and the south and will allot a portion of this loan [to that effect].” Obata to Uchida (February 3, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:117–118. Obata to Uchida (February 6, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:127–128. See also: Beiyang Finance Ministry to Foreign Ministry (February 7, 1920) Waijiao Dangan 03.20.13.13.2, AS.

Afterwards, the Hara government, acting at the request of Premier Jin Yunpeng and Finance Minister Li Sihao, explored putting forward a loan with the United States. However, as the American preparations were delayed, Japan signed an independent loan advancement of nine million yen on February 9, 1920 with American approval. Minister Obata explained at a meeting of the Japanese, American, British, and French ministers to China that an independent advancement had been unavoidable and asked for their understanding. Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanihara Masanao also asked for the understanding of Alston when he visited Japan on his way to take up his position as British minister to China. Obata to Uchida (February 10, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:128–130. Japanese Foreign Ministry to British Embassy (February 11, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:132–133. Obata to Uchida (February 12, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:138–139. Obata to Uchida (February 18, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:156. Obata to Uchida (February 19, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:157. Li Sihao to Jin Yunpeng (February 27, 1920), Waijiao Dangan, 03.20.13.13.2, AS.

The Hara government limited the purpose of the loan to the elimination of political instability, and while the loan ended up taking the form of an independent advancement, the government consistently acted in concert with the US, Britain, and France. The army’s desire to tie the loan to the resolution of the Shandong Question was reined in by Prime Minister Hara, Foreign Minister Uchida, and diplomats like Minister Obata. The most noteworthy independent loan to China during this period was likely the advancement provided during the negotiations over the Sitao Railway, as discussed in this chapter.

- 124 For more on contemporary Sino-American relations, see: Warren I. Cohen, “America and the May Fourth Movement: The Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1917–1921,” *Pacific Historical Review* 35:1 (1966), 83–100; Noel H. Pugach, “American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference,” *Journal of American History* 64:1 (1977), 67–86; Brian T. George, “The State Department and Sun Yat-sen: American Policy and the Revolutionary Disintegration of China, 1920–1924,” *Pacific Historical Review* 46:3 (1977), 387–408.
- 125 Koo Vol. 2, Chapter C; Gu 1:200, 203–204.
- 126 Victor Wellesley, “Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Our Future Policy in the Far East” (September 1, 1920), F 2200/199/23, FO 371/5361, PRO.
- 127 Curzon to Alston (July 9, 1921), 7199/21/1, FO 228/3538, PRO.
- 128 Curzon to Alston (July 18, 1919), 642/2/2, FO 608/211, PRO. See also: G.H. Bennett, *British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period, 1919–24* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 166–171.
- 129 On the Fuzhou Incident, see: Fujimoto 101–105; Tsukamoto Gen, “Fukushū Jiken to Chūnichi Kōshō – ‘Gunbatsu-ki’ Pekin Gaikōbu no Yakuwari no Ichirei” [The Fuzhou Incident and Sino-Japanese Negotiations: An Example of

- the Role of the “Warlord Era” Beijing Foreign Ministry], in Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, ed., *Disanjie Jinbainian Zhongri Guanxi Yantaohui Lunwenji* (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1996), 1:383–414.
- 130 Li Houji Fujian Dujun Shengzhang Gongshu Zhiling [Directive from the Office of Fujian Warlord and Governor Li Houji] (November 18, 1919), SJR, Pairi Wenti, 174–175.
- 131 Hara 5:173.
- 132 Katō to Uchida (November 20, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 2, 2:1054.
- 133 Acting Fuzhou Consul-General Mori Hiroshi to Uchida (January 25, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 2:713–715.
- 134 Yan-Obata Meeting (April 10, 1920), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.104.107.2, AS. Obata to Yan (November 12, 1920), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.104.107.3, AS. Yan to Obata (November 12, 1920), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.104.107.3, AS. Obata to Uchida (November 12, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 2:770–773.
- 135 Matsui to Uchida (December 10, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1041–1043. Gu Weijun’s draft resolution was rejected by the League of Nations Union at their meeting in Brussels. For more on the Shandong Question at the time of the creation of the League of Nations, see: Unno 30–35; Tang Qihua, *Beijing Zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng (1919–1928)* [The Beijing Government and the League of Nations (1919–1928)] (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi, 1998), 69–96.
- 136 Uchida to Obata (January 14, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 1:3–4. Conversation between Deputy Foreign Minister Chen Lu and Obata (January 19, 1920), SJR, Santō Mondai, 1:1–2. The Treaty of Versailles took effect on January 10, 1920.
- 137 Letter from Aoki Nobuzumi to Tanaka Giichi (January 28, 1920), Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 29, NDL.
- 138 Obata to Uchida (August 12, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 23–25.
- 139 Yan to the Beiyang Foreign Ministry (September 12, 1918), Waijiao Dangan, 03.12.7.7.8, AS. Notable research on the Siberian Expedition and the CER Issue includes: Hosoya Chihiro, *Shiberia Shuppei no Shi-teki Kenkyū* [Historical Research on the Siberian Expedition] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1955); Hosoya Chihiro, *Roshia Kakumei to Nihon* [The Russian Revolution and Japan] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1972); James William Morley, *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); Seki Hiroharu, *Gendai Higashi Ajia Kokusai Kankyō no Tanjō* [The Birth of the Modern East Asian International Environment] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1966), 23–194; Allen Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 197–202, 221–236; Hattori Eriko, “Shiberia Shuppei to Tōshi Tetsudō Kanri Mondai – 1921–1922 Nen o Chūshin ni” [The Siberian Expedition and the Chinese Eastern Railway Management Issue – Focusing on 1921–1922], in Hara Akira, ed., *Kindai Nihon no Keizai to Seiji* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppan-sha, 1986), 87–113; Hara Teruyuki, *Shiberia Shuppei – Kakumei to Kanshō 1917–1922* [The Siberian Expedition: Revolution and Intervention, 1917–1922] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1989); Xue Xiantian, *Zhongdong Zhilu Hulujun yu Dongbei Bianjiang Zhengju* [The Chinese Eastern Railway Guard Army and the Political Situation on the Northeast Border] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1993), 177–320; Georg Schild, *Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917–1921* (Westport: Praeger, 1995), 91–115; Kasahara Tokushi, “Pekin Seifu to Shiberia Shuppei – Dai Ichiji Taisen to Roshia Kakumei ga Motarashita Higashi Ajia Sekai no Hendō” [The Beijing Government and the Siberian Expedition: The Changes in East Asia Brought by World War I and the Russian Revolution], in Chūō Daigaku Jinbunka Kagaku Kenkyūjo, ed., *Minkoku Zenki Chūgoku to Higashi Ajia no Hendō* (Tokyo: Chuo University,

- 1999), 43–97; Takahara Shūsuke, “Wiruson Seiken to Shiberia Teppei Mondai” [The Wilson Administration and the Siberian Expedition Issue], in *Rokkōdai Ronshū Hōgaku Seijigaku-hen* 47:1 (2000), 155–178. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “‘Senman Bōei’ Taisei no Mosaku – Hara Naikaku no Taimanno Seisaku to Kokusai Seiji” [Pursuit of a “Korean and Manchurian Defense” System: International Politics and the Hara Government’s Manchuria/Inner Mongolia Policy], *Shakai Bunka Kagaku Kenkyū* No. 4 (2000), 39–68.
- 140 Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923* (London: Penguin, 1961), Vol. 3, 490–492.
- 141 However, disputes between the Beiyang government and the Three Northeast Provinces remained, such as over the appointment of CER personnel. See: Xue 212.
- 142 JDC 1:441–443, 462.
- 143 Uchida to Ishii (November 16, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 1, 1017–1019. For discussion of the expansion into northern Manchuria, see Saitō Ryū, *Gokuchū no Ki* [An Account of Jail] (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 1940), 306–309.
- 144 JDC 1:441–443, 462.
- 145 Lansing to Morris (November 16, 1918), FRUS, 1918, Russia 2, 433–435.
- 146 Colonel James Molesworth Blair (Vladivostok) to War Office (October 21, 1918), No.175477, FO 371/3238, PRO.
- 147 Hara Government Cabinet Decision (October 15, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 1, 1005–1006. Hara to Ishii (December 25, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 1, 1024–1026.
- 148 DVPS 1:626–627. This notice was sent based on a resolution passed at the 6th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in November 1918.
- 149 Wilson to the Provisional Government of Russia (May 14, 1917), Folder: Mission to Russia, 1917, Box 192, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Root, H.L. Scott, S.R. Bertron, James Duncan, Charles Edward Russell, John R. Mott, Cyrus H. McCormick, J.H. Glennon to Lansing (August 1917), Box 192, Root Papers. US Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry (October 25, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 420–423. See also: Hara Teruyuki 74–77.
- 150 JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 423–428.
- 151 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:35.
- 152 Uchida to Ishii (December 4, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 438–440. Morris to Lansing (December 3, 1918), FRUS, 1918, Russia 3, 288–290.
- 153 Ishii to Uchida (February 11, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1122–1123. Acting Secretary of State Frank Lyon Polk to Ishii (February 10, 1919), FRUS, 1919, Russia, 251–252. Polk to Davis (February 10, 1919), FRUS, 1919, Russia, 252–253. The Japanese referred to this as the “Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways Management Agreement.”
- 154 British Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry (September 18, 1918), JDR, 1918, Vol. 3, 392–393. Army General Staff Office, 3rd Department, “Shiberia Tetsudō Kanri Mondai ni kan suru Tōbu no Kenkyū” [This Department’s Research on the Siberian Railway Management Issue] (October 15, 1918), “Shiberia Oyobi Tōshi Tetsudo Kanri Ikken,” Vol. 2, 1.7.3.94, MOFA.
- 155 Lansing to Polk (January 21, 1919), FRUS, 1919, Russia, 243–244.
- 156 Political Affairs Department in Vladivostok Director Matsudaira to Uchida (March 5, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1137–1138. When Italy withdrew its troops in January 1920, it also left the committee. See: Matsudaira to Uchida (January 9, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1143.
- 157 FRUS, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference 3, 648. See also: Robert Lansing, “The Suggested Recognition of the Kolchak Government” (October 9, 1919), Reel 1, Lansing Papers; Robert Lansing, “Advisability of Withdrawing Our Troops from Siberia” (November 30, 1919), Reel 1, Lansing Papers. At the same time, Wilson was telling Lansing and Vance C. McCormick (an advisor at the peace

- conference) that “the Japanese attempt to seize Siberia should be made common knowledge at the conference.” McCormick Diary (January 30, 1919), Box 1, Vance C. McCormick Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- 158 Graves to Morris (March 5, 1919), Folder 4, Box 1, William S. Graves Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. See also: Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Eichelberger (general staff intelligence officer) to Graves (September 22), Folder 7, Box 1, Graves Papers.
- 159 Ambassador to the US Shidehara to Uchida (January 11, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 1, 2:840–846. Shidehara Kijūrō, *Gaikō Gojū Nen* [Fifty Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1987), 97–99. On the withdrawal issue, see: Momose Takashi, “Shiberia Teppei Seisaku no Keisei Katei – Taishō 9–Nen 12–Gatsu – 10–Nen 5–Gatsu” [The Policymaking Process for the Siberian Withdrawal: December 1920 to May 1921], *Nihon Rekishi* No. 428 (1984), 86–101; Takahashi Shūsuke, “Beikoku no Shiberia Teppei to Nihon (1919–1920–Nen) – Nichibei no Pāsepushon Gyappu no Ichijirei” [The American Withdrawal from Siberia and Japan (1919–1920): An Example of the US-Japan Perception Gap], *Gunji Shigaku* 36:3/4 (2001), 90–108.
- 160 List 2–3, Delo 1, Papka 2, Opis 3, Fond 146, AVPRF.
- 161 JDC 1:508. The same decision was reached in the March 2, 1920 cabinet decision and at the March 5 meeting of the Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs (JDC 1:510).
- 162 Gaimushō, ed., *Gaimushō Kōhyōshū, Taishō 8–Nen, Taishō 9–Nen* [Collection of Foreign Ministry Public Statements: 1919, 1920], No. 1, 199–202.
- 163 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Obata (May 17, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 2, 1166. Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Zhuang Jingke (May 17, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 2, 1164.
- 164 Alston to Curzon (June 17, 1920), F 1694/1694/23, FO 371/5365, PRO.
- 165 Foreign Minister of the Far Eastern Republic Aleksandr M. Krasnoshchekov to Uchida (January 18, 1921), List 1–6, Delo 1, Papka 3, Opis 4, Fond 146, AVPRF.
- 166 DVPS 2:405–406, 414–415, 496–498, 3:91–92, 484.
- 167 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:320.
- 168 *Ibid.*, 5:321.
- 169 Hara Takashi Zenshū Kankōkai, ed., *Hara Takashi Zenshū* [The Complete Hara Takashi] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1969), 2:551.
- 170 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:371. See also the “Formation of the Policy of ‘Limited Support of Zhang’” section in this chapter.
- 171 It is certain that Prime Minister Hara’s intention, towards the end of his time in office, was to withdraw troops if certain conditions were met. In a June 1 letter to Tanaka Giichi, he wrote that “I will pay a visit to Numazu [Imperial Villa] tomorrow and report privately to the Emperor. I believe that I will also privately report on the withdrawal from Vladivostok and Shandong at that time.” “Tanaka Giichi Bunsho,” Vol. 34. In his diary entry for the following day, he wrote that “I told the Emperor that we should withdraw from Siberia and Shandong if the appropriate conditions have been achieved.” Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:395.
- 172 February 14, 1916 Cabinet Decision, JDR, 1916, Vol. 1, 118–119. Russian Ambassador to Japan Vasilii N. Krupenskii to Foreign Minister Motono (December 18, 1916), JDR, 1916, Vol. 1, 181–182. Motono to Ambassador to Russia Uchida (November 22, 1917), JDR, 1917, Vol. 1, 150–151.
- 173 War Ministry Memorandum, “Tōshi oyobi Shiberia Ōdan Tetsudō Kantoku-an Jikkō ni kan suru Ken” [On Implementing the Plan for Oversight of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways], (January 30, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1117–1118. February 5 Cabinet Decision, JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1134–1135. Prime

- Minister Hara had, as of February 1, 1919, issued private instructions to Nagao Hanpei. See: Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:65.
- 174 Railway Ministry, Transportation Bureau, “Shiberia oyobi Tōshi Tetsudō Kanri Gaiyō” [Overview of Management of the Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways] (January 1920), “Shiberia oyobi Tōshi Tetsudō Kanri Ikken,” Bessatsu “Sankō”, 1.7.3.94.2, MOFA.
- 175 American Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry (April 26, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1148–1149. Uchida to Ishii (May 2, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1149–1150.
- 176 Lu Youxiang to Gu Weijun (September 17, 1918), Waijiao Dangan, 03.12.5.5.1, AS.
- 177 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Minister to Japan Zhang Zongxiang and Acting Minister to America Rong Kui (January 26, 1919), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 1, 285. See also: Major General Higashi (in Beijing) to Chief of the General Staff Uehara (January 27, 1919), JDR, 1919, Vol. 3, 2:1114–1115.
- 178 SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 2, 994–995. See also: Zhuang to Uchida (January 29, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1146–1147.
- 179 Bao to Xu, State Council, Defense Department, Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, Transportation Ministry (March 23, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 2, 1066. Acting Changchun Consul Sasaki to Uchida (March 16, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1166–1167; Sasaki to Uchida (March 17, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1167. Harbin Consul-General Matsushima to Uchida (March 17, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1167–1168.
- 180 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Obata (May 25, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, Vol. 2, 1202–1203.
- 181 Beiyang Foreign Ministry, Transportation Ministry to Minister to the US Gu Weijun (August 4, 1920), Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., *Zhongge Guanxi Shiliao*, Zhongdonglu yu Dongbei Bianfang, Minguo 9–Nian (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1969), 289–290.
- 182 Obata to Uchida (October 9, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1220–1221. See also: Obata to Uchida (October 4, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 3, 2:1210.
- 183 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:378–379, 386, 388.
- 184 May 18, 1921 Cabinet Decision, JDR, 1921, Vol. 3, 2:1146–1147.
- 185 Captain Iwamatsu (stationed in Beijing) to Major General Banzai (June 15, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 3, 2:1151.
- 186 For more on the New People’s Association, see: Kang Jae-eun, *Chōsen no Kaika Shisō* [Korean Progressive Thought] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1980), 381–454; Shin Yong-ha, *Hanguk Minjok Tongnip Undongsa Yongu* [Research on the History of the Korean Independence Movement] (Seoul: Ŭlyu Munhwasa, 1985), 13–140.
- 187 Shin 391.
- 188 Author unknown, *Ilbon Oemusong Tuksu Chosa Munso* [Japanese Foreign Ministry Special Investigation Documents] (Seoul: Soul Tukpyol-si, 1989), 12:19–28, 761–779. Park Eun-sik, *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Ketsushi* [The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement], trans. Gang Deog-sang (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1972), 1:130.
- 189 Acting Jiandao Consul-General Sakai Yosakichi to Governor-General Saitō Makoto (May 14, 1920), in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 27 Chōsen 3* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), 288–289.
- 190 Son Uhe, “Bukgando Daehangukminhoe ui Jojig Hyeongtae e Gwanhan Yeongu” [Research on the Formation of the Tax Organization of the North Jiandao “Korean People’s Association”], *Hanguk Minjok Undongsa Yongu* No. 1 (1986), 117–118.
- 191 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, *Yoshizawa Kenkichi Jiden* [The Autobiography of Yoshizawa Kenkichi], ed. Nakano Keishi (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1964), 79–82.

- 192 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:84. On Hara's theory of Korea as an extension of the mainland, see also: *ibid.*, 5:94.
- 193 An attempt to assassinate Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto was carried out by Kang Woo-kyu, a Korean independence activist affiliated with Yi Dong-hwi, in Seoul on September 2, 1919. See also: Government-General of Korea, *Shisei 25-Nenshi* [A History of 25 Years of Administration] (Seoul: Government-General of Korea, 1935), 334; Kuksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoe, ed., *Hanguk Tongnip Undongsa* [History of the Korean Independence Movement] (Seoul: Jeong-eum Munhwasa, 1968), 3:489–493; Kim Chong-ju, ed., *Chōsen Tōchi Shiryō* [Materials on the Administration of Korea] (Tokyo: Kankoku Shiryō Kenkyūjo, 1970), 5:809–814; Nagata Akifumi, “Nihon no Chōsen Tōchi ni okeru ‘Bunka Seiji’ no Dōnyū to Saitō Makoto” [The Introduction of “Cultural Politics” in the Administration of Korea and Saitō Makoto], *Jōchi Shigaku* No. 43 (1998), 29–58.
- 194 Gang Deog-sang, “Kaigai ni okeru Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō no Hatten” [The Development of the Korean Independence Movement Overseas], *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō* Vol 51 (1970), 42–50. For related research, see: Nagata Akifumi, “Chōsen Dokuritsu Undō to Kokusai Kankai – 1918–1922” [The Korean Independence Movement and International Politics, 1918–1922], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 122 (1999), 23–38; Nagata Akifumi, “Chōsen San-Ichi Dokuritsu Undō to Nihon Seikai – Undō e no Nihon no Taiō to Chōsen Tōchi no ‘Kaikaku’ o meguru Seijiriki-gaku” [The Korean March 1st Independence Movement and the Japanese Political World: Japan's Response and the Political Dynamics of “Reform” of the Administration of Korea], *Jōchi Shigaku* No. 44 (1999), 55–88.
- 195 Kuksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoe, ed., *Hanguk Tongnip Undongsa*, 3:327–335.
- 196 Kim Gu, *Hakubon Isshi*, trans. Kajimura Hideki (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1973), 223, 237–238. Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution* (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1973), 107–112.
- 197 To give one example, the Heroic Corps under Kim Won-bong was formed in November 1919 in Jilin and repeatedly committed sabotage against targets like police stations and the Government-General in Korea. On the Heroic Corps and Kim Won-bong, see: Kajimura Hideki, *Chōsen-shi no Wakugumi to Shisō* [The Frameworks and Ideologies of Korean History] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1982), 201–243; Kajima Setsuko, “Chōsen Giyūtai no Seiritsu to Katsudō – Kin Genhō no Dōkō o Chūshin ni” [The Formation and Activities of the Korean Heroic Corps: Focusing on Kim Won-bong's Actions], *Chōsen Dokuritsu Undōshi Kenkyū* No. 4 (1987), 45–68; Kim Chang-su, *Hanguk Minjok Undongsa Yongu* [Research on the History of the Korean Nationalist Movement] (Seoul: Eobusa 1995), 123–180.
- 198 “Taishō 9–Nen ji 1–Gatsu shi 3–Gatsu Taigan Futei Senjin no Kōgan Shinnyū Jōkyō Ichiranhyō” [A List of Riverbank Intrusions by Disloyal Koreans from January to March 1920], in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 27 Chōsen 3* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), 647–648. On Hong Beom-do, see: Pak Yong-sok, *Chaeman Hanin Tongnip Undongsa Yongu* [Research on the History of the Korean Independence Movement in Manchuria] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1988), 222–247; Han Jun-guang, “Kantō (Kantō) ni okeru Kō Hanzu Shōgun” [General Hong Beom-do in Jiandao], trans. Morikawa Nobuaki, *Chōsen Minzoku Undōshi Kenkyū* No. 6 (1989), 7–38.
- 199 *Tongnip Sinmun* (December 25, 1920).
- 200 *Tongnip Sinmun* (June 22, 24, 1920); Sakai to Uchida (June 10, 1920), in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 27 Chōsen 3* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), 607. Sakai to Uchida (June 15, 1920), in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 27 Chōsen 3* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1970), 608.
- 201 Shinoda Jisaku, *Tōkanfu Jidai ni okeru Kantō Kanmin Hogo ni kan suru Shisetsu* [Facilities for the Protection of Koreans in Jiandao during the Residency-

- General Period] (Seoul: Chōsen Sōtoku Kanbō Bunshoka, 1930, Gakushūin Daigaku Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Yūhō Bunko 5189/9), Section 3.
- 202 JDC 1:324–325. See also: Hayashi Masakazu, “Kantō Mondai ni kan suru Nishin Kōshō no Kei” [The Course of the Japan-Qing Negotiations over the Jiandao Issue], *Sundai Shigaku* No. 10 (196), 181–199. Otherwise, the most comprehensive research on the Jiandao Question is Lee Sang-gyun, *Kindai Higashi Ajia no Seijiriki-gaku – Kanto o Meguru Nicchūkan Kankei no Shiteki Tenkai* [Political Dynamics of Modern East Asia: The Historical Development of Sino-Japanese-Korean Relations over Jiandao] (Tokyo: Kinseisha, 1991).
- 203 JDC 1:406–407. The Japanese position was that, as Koreans had become Japanese with the Japanese annexation of Korea, the treaty should also be applied to them. For more on this point, see: Inoue Manabu, “Nihon Teikokushugi to Kantō Mondai” [Japanese Imperialism and the Jiandao Issue], *Chōsen-shi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* No. 10 (1973), 36–45.
- 204 Jiandao Longjing Japanese Association to War Minister Tanaka (May 1920), in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28 Chōsen 4* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1972), 63–64.
- 205 Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 29.
- 206 Korean Army Headquarters, “Kantō Shuppei-shi” [History of the Jiandao Expedition], in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28 Chōsen 4*, 1–60, 64–65. Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku Kankōkai, *Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku* (Tokyo: Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku Kankōkai, 1961), 134–139. Western Jiandao refers to southern Fengtian on the border with North Pyongan.
- 207 SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 2:1236–1237.
- 208 Suematsu Yoshitsugu to Shinoda (May 15, 1919), Folder 2, Box 1, Shinoda Jisaku Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Government-General of Korea, Police Affairs Bureau, “Nishi Kantō ni okeru Futei Senjin Dantai no Jōkyō” [The State of Disloyal Korean Groups in West Jiandao] (November 1920), Folder 8, Box 4, Shinoda Papers.
- 209 Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28 Chōsen 4* [Modern Historical Materials, Vol. 28: Korea 4], 65–67, 75–116. Even as late as January 1931, the Chinese did not have a firm grasp on the number of Korean residents in northeast China. Investigations by the Japanese foreign ministry, colonial ministry, and Government-General of Korea preceded Chinese efforts. Chinese Consulate-General in Korea, “Dongbei Xianqiao ji Luwai Xianren zhi Gaishu” [The Approximate Number of Koreans in the Northeast and Overseas] (January 9, 1931), *Nanjing Guomin Zhengfu Waijiaobu Gongbao* 3:10 (February 1931). See also: Shi Yuanhua, Li Fuwen, eds., *Chungguk Namgyong Kungmin Chongbu Oegyobu Kongbo Taehan Minguk Kwallyon Saryo* [Bulletin of the Nanjing Nationalist Government Foreign Ministry: Historical Materials Related to the Republic of Korea] (Seoul: Koguryo, 1995), 1:71–75.
- 210 Hunchun Branch Supervisor Akitsu Ikusaburō to Uchida (October 2, 1920) in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28 Chōsen 4*, 308–309. Saitō to Uchida (October 6, 1920) in Gang Deog-sang, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 28 Chōsen 4*, 334–335. On the Hunchun Incident, see also: Higashio Kazuko, “Konshun Jiken to Kantō Shuppei” [The Hunchun Incident and the Jiandao Expedition], *Chōsen-shi Kenkyūkai Ronbunshū* No. 14 (1977), 59–85; Sasaki Harutaka, “Konshun Jiken’ Kangae” [Thoughts on the “Hunchun Incident”], *Bōei Daigakkō Kiyō* Nos. 39–41 (1979–1980), 293–332, 233–275, 361–388.
- 211 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:291.
- 212 Hara Cabinet Decision (October 7, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 525–527.
- 213 Akatsuka to Uchida (October 11, 1920), JDR, 1920, Vol. 2, 531–532. Yan to Obata (October 11, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1465. Conversation between Yan and Obata (October 15, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1475–1477. Yan to

- Obata (October 22, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1485. State Council to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (October 23, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1487. Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Obata (October 29, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1497. Heilongjiang Provincial Assembly (October 30, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1497–1498.
- 214 On the Battle of Qingshanli, see: Sasaki Harutaka, “Kankoku Dokuritsu Undōshi-jō no ‘Seizanri Taisen’ Kangae” [Thoughts on the “Battle of Qingshanli” in the History of the Korean Independence Movement], *Gunji Shigaku* 15:3 (1979), 22–34; Shin Yong-ha 389–514; Kim Jung-Mi, “Chōsen Dokuritsu Undōshi-jō ni okeru 1920–Nen 10–Gatsu – Seizanri Sentō no Rekishi-teki Imi o Motomete” [October 1920 in the History of the Korean Independence Movement: Seeking the Historical Meaning of the Battle of Qingshanli], *Chōsen Minzoku Undō-shi Kenkyū* No. 3 (1986), 105–200.
- 215 *Tongnip Sinmun* (December 18, 1920). Hayashi Masakazu, “Konshun Jiken no Keika” [The Course of the Hunchun Incident], *Sundai Shigaku* No. 19 (1966), 114 gives the figures as 375 shot, 177 arrested, 1558 surrendered, 285 burned dwellings, 5 burned schools, 13 burned barracks, 413 seized firearms, 22,490 seized rounds of ammunition, etc.
- 216 Beiyang foreign ministry to Obata (July 13, 1922), Waijiao Dangan 03.33.17.19.1, AS.
- 217 *Hara Takashi Zenshū* 2:562–563.
- 218 Beiyang foreign ministry to Obata (December 27, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1581–1582. See also: Beiyang foreign ministry to Zhang, Bao (November 10, 1920), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1514.
- 219 Obata to Beiyang foreign ministry (January 6, 1921), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1589–1590. Uchida to Shidehara (January 14, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 557–558.
- 220 Akatsuka to Uchida (February 7, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 567. Sakai to Uchida (May 8, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 588. Jilin Warlord Sun Liechen to State Council (May 5, 1921), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.24.26.2, AS. State Council to Foreign Ministry (June 8, 1921), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.24.26.3, AS. *Ilbon Oemusong Tuksu Chosa Munso* 14:195–205.
- 221 Kwantung Army General Staff to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanihara Masanao (January 14, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 558–561. Zhang to Beiyang foreign ministry (January 15, 1921), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1613–1614.
- 222 First Secretary, Japanese Legation in China Tokugawa Iemasa to Beiyang foreign ministry (January 14, 1921), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1611. Meeting between Yan and Tokugawa (January 18, 1921), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1633–1634. Meeting between Yan and Obata (January 24, 1921), SJR, Dongbei Wenti, 3:1650–1652. Obata to Uchida (January 14, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 556–557. Obata to Uchida (January 21, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 562–563. Obata to Uchida (January 28, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 564–565. Akatsuka to Uchida (March 11, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 569. Akatasuka to Uchida (March 12, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 570.
- 223 Acting Minister to China Yoshida Isaburō to Uchida (May 16, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 588. Obata to Uchida (August 23, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 594–596. Obata to Yan (July 29, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.33.29.31.1, AS.
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- 242 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:391.
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- 244 Foreign Minister Uchida to Vladivostok Political Affairs Department Director Kikuchi, Acting Minister to China Yoshida, Ambassador to US Shidehara, Ambassador to France Ishii (May 20, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 1, 832–835. A reference to the same can be found in Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:389.
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2 The Creation of the Washington System and the Second Wave of International Change

November 1921 to January 1924 – The Takahashi, Katō Tomosaburō, and Yamamoto Governments

In America and Japanese academic circles, the East Asian international politics of the 1920s are customarily discussed in terms of the “Washington System,” a system of cooperative diplomacy between Japan, the United States, and Britain. China was relegated to a subordinate position with the system, while the Soviet Union was excluded entirely.¹ As reflected in the name, the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922 is designated as the starting point for this system.

I. Far Eastern Questions at the Washington Conference

While a great amount of research has been conducted on the Washington Conference, numerous unresolved issues remain. First, what was the nature of the agreement between Japan, Britain, and the United States that served as the basis for their cooperative diplomacy at the conference? What did it cover, how far did it extend, and how was it reached? Of particular concern is US-Japan relations and China policy. Did the US grant recognition to Japan’s special interests in Manchuria at the conference? Or, conversely, did its East Asia policy instead force a change in Japan’s sphere of influence diplomacy?

Previous studies have failed to reach a consensus on these points. According to the pioneering research of Asada Sadao, the United States granted tacit acceptance of (and made concession to) Japan’s special interests in Manchuria via Root’s “Four Principles.” Thomas H. Buckley has responded by arguing that there is no historical evidence that the US ever intended to recognize those interests.² Akira Iriye has said that “the Japanese government realized that it needed to reexamine the basic concepts underlying the management of its foreign policy” and that it “had no choice but to redefine its basic foreign policy” with its participation in the Nine-Power Treaty.³ At the same time, as mentioned in the introduction, British diplomatic historians have been skeptical of the very concept of a “Washington System.” It is thus necessary to reexamine the true nature of the agreements between the three nations, including how Britain’s place should be viewed.

Second, what were the ongoing trends in American East Asia policy at the time of the conference? There seems to be a lack of research examining the Harding administration's East Asia policy on its own terms, including the degree to which it was consistent with that of the previous Wilson administration.⁴ Perhaps due to this, the divisions over East Asia policy that existed among the American policymakers attending the conference is not well known. The role played by Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs MacMurray in particular seems to have largely gone unappreciated.⁵

Third, if the Chinese position within the Washington System was a subordinate one, then why was this accepted by the Beiyang government? Its reasons need to be analyzed, but there have been few studies making comprehensive use of Chinese diplomatic documents.⁶

The fourth issue involves the connection between the conference and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's exclusion from the Washington System would seem to be self-evident; as is well-known, the US and USSR would not establish diplomatic relations until 1933, and the Soviets were not even invited to participate. As early as July 19, 1921, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Republic Chicherin had already issued memoranda to the British, French, Italian, American, Chinese, and Japanese governments condemning the conference.⁷ During this same period, Sun Yat-sen sent a letter to Vladimir Lenin via Chicherin. Despite never having met or corresponded with Sun, Lenin told Chicherin that a messenger should be dispatched to Guangdong to strengthen relations with Sun's government.⁸ What I would like to call attention to regarding the Soviet Union is the fact that, despite issues fundamentally related to Soviet policy being discussed at the conference, no agreements over such policy were ever reached between the participants. This calls for in-depth analysis.

Keeping these questions in mind, this chapter will first provide an outline of the state of US-Japan-China relations prior to the beginning of the conference and then attempt to ascertain the true nature of the agreements reached between the United States, Japan, and Britain. In doing so, it will focus on Shi Zhaoji's Ten Principles, Root's Four Principles, and the amendment offered by US Secretary of State Hughes. Next, it will discuss the Shandong Question with a focus on the "MacMurray Initiative." This study will attempt to understand the trends present within American Far Eastern policy by comparing Hughes and Root's visions for East Asia and highlighting the role of MacMurray at the conference. Finally, I hope to explain the failure of the participants to reach any agreements concerning the Soviet Union by focusing on the issue of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). As contemporary Chinese diplomatic records have been made almost completely public, another goal of this chapter will be to use these to trace Chinese diplomatic efforts at the conference.⁹

1. The Road to the Washington Naval Conference

From July to September 1921, the Harding administration proposed holding an international conference to the Japanese, British, French, Italian, Belgian,

Dutch, and Portuguese governments.¹⁰ The inclusion of not only restrictions on naval armaments on the conference's proposed agenda, but also Far Eastern and Pacific questions gave Japan pause, however. In a July 13 telegram to Ambassador to the US Shidehara Kijūrō, Foreign Minister Uchida expressed concern that the conference "would create an opportunity for the scrutiny of the great powers to be turned to everything, going as far as our policies towards China and Siberia."¹¹ On July 18, Prime Minister Hara told Shibusawa Eiichi and Kaneko Kentarō that "At present, there are some who are nearly overwhelmed with panic, arguing that this conference is a national crisis, a matter of life and death [...] It is a serious matter, but not something worth causing an uproar over."¹² European and American Affairs Bureau, 2nd Section Director Horiuchi Kensuke would later recall that:

there were heated debates in Japan as to what exactly was meant by 'Pacific and Far Eastern questions.' Japan had made fairly strong demands of China in the past, such as the Twenty-One Demands, and there was increasing criticism within the United States as to Japan's goals. I was therefore worried that this time they would try to bind Japan's hands or drag us into the defendant's dock.¹³

On July 22, the Hara government passed a cabinet decision stating that:

We have no objection to the placement of general issues on the agenda, matters such as the issues of mutual respect for territory and the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity; on the contrary, the best policy, broadly speaking, would be for us to be the ones proposing these things.

However,

the Empire cannot easily accept the submission of already established facts and issues only concerning particular nations to a joint discussion among the powers [...] issues such as the Shandong Question should naturally be excluded from the agenda for the time being.¹⁴

In other words, the basic approach adopted was that, while the principles of American foreign policy should be readily accepted, Japan's vested interests needed to be protected and specific standing issues such as the Shandong Question should, to the greatest extent possible, be excluded from the agenda. This was the very course that British Ambassador to Japan Charles N.E. Eliot had predicted that the Hara government would take in a private message to Foreign Secretary Curzon a day earlier.¹⁵

The Hara government had been calling on the Beiyang government to open negotiations on the Shandong Question since January 1920, but the Chinese had held firm in their refusals. From late 1921 on, Ambassador to the US

Shidehara had repeatedly requested that Hughes urge the Chinese to begin such negotiations prior to the beginning of the conference.¹⁶ When Hughes consequently recommended that the Chinese enter into direct negotiations with the Japanese, Shi Zhaoji answered on August 11 that “it would be extremely beneficial if the United States could act as an intermediary and obtain satisfactory terms from the Japanese.” Hughes was not familiar enough with East Asia policy to put forward a compromise plan, however.¹⁷

The Beiyang government thus held firm to their policy of leaving the Shandong Question to the Washington Conference in the hope of receiving diplomatic support from Britain and the US. Sun Yat-sen and other members of the South were critical of the Beiyang government’s announcement that it would be participating in the conference. Sun, who was president of the second Guangzhou government at the time, argued that Beiyang President Xu Shichang had “neither the moral nor legal standing to speak on Chinese issues, must less to send a delegation,” given that he had been prime minister at the time of the Twenty-One Demands.¹⁸

Despite the Beiyang government’s hopes, however, there was no guarantee that the Shandong Question would be brought up at the conference. The draft agenda circulated by the Harding administration in mid-September made no reference to it. Notably, however, international management of the CER *was* included in this American draft: “Railway development, including a plan for the Chinese Eastern Railway.”¹⁹ When Hughes showed the draft to Shidehara on September 8, he stated that “we [...] have no choice but to act as trustees for Russia until such time as a legitimate Russian government has been established.”²⁰

Even as this draft was being shown, the Americans were already negotiating with Japan with the goal of strengthening international management of the CER prior to the conference. The State Department’s intention was to increase the authority of the CER Technical Board led by Stevens and for international management of the railway to continue even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops (the last forces stationed along the railway).²¹ Wary of allowing the United States to extend its influence into northern Manchuria, however, the Hara government opposed the American proposal, nominally because it was a violation of Chinese and Soviet sovereignty over the CER.²² As such, resolution of the CER was, alongside the Shandong Question, to be left to the Washington Conference.

While the Japanese foreign ministry had agreed in principle to the American proposed agenda for the conference, it also worked with the war and naval ministries on countermeasures. Meeting of major ministry leaders including Vice-Minister Hanihara Masanao, Treaties Bureau Director Yamakawa Tadao, Asian Affairs Bureau Director Yoshizawa Kenkichi, and European and American Affairs Bureau Director Matsudaira Tsuneo were held in preparation.²³ Naval Minister Katō Tomosaburō was named chief plenipotentiary in accordance with Prime Minister Hara’s firm wishes. The other Japanese plenipotentiaries were Ambassador to the US Shidehara Kijūrō,

President of the House of Peers Tokugawa Iesato, and Vice-Minister Hanihara.

The Hara government's instructions to the delegation were summarized in an October 13 cabinet decision. The "main focus" of the conference was to be "the limitation of armaments," and Far Eastern and Pacific issues were not to be given priority. While the diplomatic principles of "territorial integrity, the Open Door, and equality of opportunity" were to be "respected" and "asserted," it would be "difficult to accept" the abolition of extraterritoriality and recognition of Chinese tariff autonomy in the absence of "certain conditions and guarantees." And the Shandong Question, the validity of the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands, the status of the Kwantung Leased Territory, and the neutralization or return to China of Mantetsu were "matters upon which no change was to be permitted." Japan had "no objection to joint support" for the international management of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, but it was "opposed to joint management by the powers through any means that ignored the rights of Russia." And, as a conference with the Far Eastern Republic was underway in Dalian, the matters of the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Siberia and northern Manchuria were "not to be subject to [the conference's] decisions."²⁴ In other words, while this cabinet decision actively accepted the diplomatic principles advocated for by the United States, it effectively held to the same policies adopted during the early days of the Hara government. It viewed matters through the lens of sphere of influence diplomacy and sought to limit any proposals regarding Far Eastern questions as much as possible.

The Sino-Japanese deadlock over the Shandong Question and the US-Japan argument over the CER remained unresolved as the conference began. Thus, while the conference offered a great opportunity for the establishment of a new international order in East Asia, it also provided a venue for exposing the policy differences between the United States, Japan, and China.

2. Root's Four Principles and the Nine-Power Treaty

(1) Root's Four Principles

When the Washington Conference opened on November 12, only a week had passed since Prime Minister Hara Takashi's assassination. Hughes' proposal for naval disarmament, offered immediately upon the conference's opening, shocked the other countries' delegations. Amō Eiji, director of the European and American Affairs Bureau's 2nd Section, wrote in his diary that Hughes' "proposal came like a bolt from the blue."²⁵ The first meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions was held on November 16, with Hughes serving as chairman.

At the committee's first meeting, Minister to the US Shi Zhaoji, chief plenipotentiary for the Chinese delegation, proposed a set of general principles for the committee's deliberations on the grounds that China had the most at

stake in Far Eastern issues. This proposal, which came to be known as Shi Zhaoji's Ten Principles, included guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China (principle 1), adherence to the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity (principle 2), an agreement not to conclude treaties relating to China without Chinese participation (principle 3), the nullification of each country's special rights and interests in China for which the basis had not been disclosed (principle 4), and that all limitations on China's political, jurisdictional, and administrative freedom of action were to be eliminated immediately (principle 5).²⁶

A November 15 telegram from Shi to the Beiyang foreign ministry shows that these principles had been drawn up by the members of the Chinese delegation (primarily Shi) on their own initiative shortly before the meeting.²⁷ They hoped to undermine each power's special interests in China by invoking the diplomatic principles underpinning American policy towards East Asia. The Japanese delegation was wary of Shi's principles, deeming them "utter propaganda" intended to "turn the situation to [China's] advantage" by reciting "phrases intended to resonate with American popular opinion."²⁸ China's decision to begin its diplomatic efforts by invoking general principles stood in stark contrast to Japanese ideas of diplomacy, which tended to focus exclusively on individual issues.

Japan was not the only one wary of China's effort. Plenipotentiary Root told Chandler P. Anderson, a State Department legal advisor, that, while there was "nothing [in Shi's principles] that Japan would be unable to agree with, the situation will be made difficult if they attempt to put them into actual practice. This could become the greatest barrier to consensus."²⁹ Root had served as Secretary of State in the Theodore Roosevelt administration and had been Secretary of War in the McKinley administration when Secretary of State John Hay had first put forward the principle of the Open Door. Now, he sought an opportunity to present an alternative plan to Shi's principles.

It was a sarcastic question from French Plenipotentiary Aristide Briand on the geographical extent of China – "What is China?" – at the November 19 meeting of the committee that provided that opportunity.³⁰ Root followed up on Briand by suggesting that the principles for Far Eastern questions should be geographically limited to "China proper." Former British Foreign Secretary Balfour agreed with the proposal and suggested that Root be asked to draft such a set of principles.³¹ Chinese Plenipotentiary and Minister to Britain Gu Weijun countered that the territory of China was clearly defined in the Chinese constitution and could not be modified. Balfour, showing a strong dislike of Gu, replied by noting that such a position could develop into a discussion of the possession of Tibet.³² Hughes, acting as chairman, then entrusted Root with drafting a set of principles for the discussion of Far Eastern questions.

Root presented a draft of four principles to the committee on November 21: respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China; support for the establishment of stable governance

in China; maintaining equality of opportunity for all nations in Chinese territory; and refraining from acts that would abridge the rights of or infringe upon the security of friendly states. When Plenipotentiary Katō asked for clarification on the meaning of “administrative integrity,” Root clearly stated that it “certainly did not affect any privileges accorded by valid or effective grants.” Balfour expressed his support for the basic meaning of the principles and noted in reference to extraterritoriality and customs that the committee “was not barred from making changes, nor required to make them.”³³ Gu then reluctantly expressed approval of the draft, commenting that it “was not intended to maintain and still less to perpetuate the existing conditions, and would in no way preclude the possibility of removing certain limitations now existing which impaired the enjoyment of full sovereignty and administrative integrity of China.”³⁴

As such, the American proposal that Root submitted was adopted essentially unchanged that same day. This was effectively an endorsement of Root’s interpretation that each country agreed in principle to the continuation of each other’s vested interests in China and did not assume any obligation to discuss the unequal treaties in the future. Notably, the fourth principle was essentially identical to the phrasing found in the secret protocol to the November 2, 1917 Lansing-Ishii Agreement.³⁵ MacMurray told Saburi Sadao that “the clauses as formulated by Mr. Root meant that no country was to seek special rights and privileges that could erode any existing interests.”³⁶

Therefore, while Japan’s special status in Manchuria was not generally recognized by the committee as a whole, it *had* been agreed that the status quo would be maintained in relation to vested rights with clear treaty grounds. The Japanese special interests accepted through these deliberations on Root’s Four Principles were essentially the same as the special interests in southern Manchuria that had been delineated and recognized during the negotiations over the Second China Consortium. But the policy intent that lay behind Root’s principles and the Wilson administration’s negotiations over the consortium differed greatly. The Wilson administration had relied on the principle of the Open Door and sought to have Japan give up some of its vested interests, while Root’s approach was largely meant to maintain the status quo. It sought to enable the coexistence of American diplomatic interests with Japan’s belief in special interests.

(2) *Hughes’ Draft Resolution and the Nine-Power Treaty*

But it is important to keep in mind when looking at this that Root’s policy position – his desire to cooperate with Japan to maintain the status quo – did not enjoy a consensus among the American representatives, and it would be none other than Secretary of State Hughes who began pursuing a different policy line. As is shown most clearly by the draft resolution that he put forward at the January 16, 1922 meeting of the committee, Hughes wanted to go beyond the status quo policy laid out in Root’s Four Principles and redefine the Open Door principle:

With a view to applying more effectively the principle of the open door or equality of opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations, the Powers represented in this Conference agree not to seek or to support their nationals in asserting any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of the territories of China, or which might seek to create any such monopoly or preference as would exclude other nationals from undertaking any legitimate trade or industry or from participating with the Chinese Government in any category of public enterprise.³⁷

He went even further the following day, submitting a draft resolution for the creation of a “Board of Reference” – a body to investigate and report on matters related to the Open Door. Under this draft, should any country represented at the conference (including China) judge another party’s privileges to infringe upon the Open Door, it could refer the matter to the Board for investigation. While Root’s Four Principles had shelved the issue of the application of the Open Door to countries’ vested interests, Hughes’ resolution had the potential to reignite it.³⁸ The Open Door principle advocated for by Hughes was uncompromising towards Japan and more specific and wide-ranging than desired by Root. His goal of building an international order in East Asia based on proactive application of the Open Door principle was an idea far more to China’s potential benefit than Japan’s.

It should therefore come as no surprise that Shi Zhaoji welcomed Hughes’ draft resolution at the committee’s meeting on the 18th. But Shidehara objected to the idea of even vested interests being made subject to investigation by the Board of Reference and called for the resolution to “be amended so as to only allow investigation of privileges granted by China moving forward.” As the British, French, and Italian delegations voiced similar objections, the clause extending the Board’s authority to vested interests was deleted. Also, as the Board of Reference’s decision were non-binding, the adoption of Hughes’ resolution on the Open Door had little concrete effect. This has to be regarded as a *de facto*, albeit reluctant, acknowledgment of Japan’s “delineated” special privileges in southern Manchuria.³⁹

According to a telegram from the Japanese delegation to Foreign Minister Uchida, Hughes’ resolution “complements the ‘Root resolution’ and thus – as pledged in Clause Four of that resolution – does not presume to act in a way that would endanger any friendly nation’s ‘security.’”⁴⁰ In other words, the Japanese delegation approved of Hughes’ draft resolution because it judged that it did nothing to change the stipulation to maintain the status quo found in Root’s Four Principles. Hughes’ idea of making vested interests subject to the principle of the Open Door had been forced to retreat in the face of unified Japanese, British, French, and Italian agreement that the status quo should be maintained for vested interests.

In the meantime, the deliberations over Chinese custom tariffs resulted in the signing of a treaty on February 6, 1922. The treaty's provisions included an immediate increase in custom duties to 5% (Article I), a special conference on the abolition of *likin* (a toll tax imposed by local governments) to be held within three months to provide for the levying of surtaxes (Article II), and the levying of a 2.5% surtax on dutiable imports at said conference (Article III).⁴¹ While no agreement was reached over the restoration of Chinese tariff autonomy, years later, Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing would describe the 2.5% surtax as the foremost example of "goodwill shown to our nation by the powers."⁴²

Article 3 of the Nine-Power Treaty passed on February 6, 1922 provided for the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity in China.⁴³ As acceptance of these principles had been standing Japanese and British policy even before the Washington Conference, this did not become an issue. The Japanese foreign ministry leadership, led by Komura Kin'ichi, had called for active acceptance of the principles, and a draft that Balfour had submitted to Hughes just before the beginning of the conference had included language concerning equality of opportunity.⁴⁴ Shidehara also stressed that "the Open Door and equality of opportunity are important principles governing China's foreign relations that our nation has consistently upheld since the formation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. They are also frequently referenced in the various treaties related to China that have been reached between the Empire and the Powers."⁴⁵

The real point of dispute was how strictly those principles were to be interpreted and whether they were to be applied toward each countries' vested interests. As shown by the incorporation of Root's Four Principles into the Nine-Power Treaty as its first article, the treaty did not seek to make radical changes to the existing interests of each country. The Japanese accepted the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity on the premise that its already delineated special privileges in southern Manchuria would be strictly maintained. The British were similarly interested in the protection of their vested interests. British Foreign Secretary Curzon had already told Minister to Britain Gu Weijun prior to the conference that it would be wiser "to allow the Japanese to expand, under reasonable conditions, in that direction [Manchuria], rather than to bring them down upon the main body of China."⁴⁶ As shown by the deliberation process over his draft resolution, even Hughes was forced to tacitly accept the Anglo-Japanese agreement to protect their vested interests. In a lengthy 1935 memorandum, MacMurray described the guarantee for the territorial and administrative integrity of China in the first clause of Article 1 of the Nine-Power Treaty as being "of a completely passive nature and doing nothing more than call for self-restraint."⁴⁷ As such, the incorporation of the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity into the Nine-Power Treaty does not represent an American diplomatic victory. Sphere of influence diplomatic thinking was deeply rooted among Japanese leaders – including Shidehara – and the United States had by no means forced a change in Japanese foreign policy.

3. The Shandong Question and the Treaties Related to the Twenty-One Demands

(1) The Shandong Question and the MacMurray Initiative

The Shandong Question was the primary focal point of Far Eastern discussions at the Washington Conference. The Japanese government had sought to resolve this issue in direct negotiations with the Chinese and was of the opinion that it should not be on the conference's agenda. Foreign Minister Uchida met with Zhou Ziqi, a diplomatic advisor to the Beiyang Government, in Tokyo on October 31, 1921 while Zhou was on his way to the United States. He told Zhou that "should [the Shandong Question] be raised at the Washington Conference, [...] it would be extremely difficult for Japan to permit this matter to be submitted to a vote at the conference."⁴⁸ But while the Beiyang government wanted to avoid direct negotiations at all costs, Hughes, Balfour, and MacMurray worked to bring about such negotiations between Katō Tomosaburō and Shi Zhaoji.⁴⁹ After being persuaded by Shi, Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing accepted the British and American recommendation on the ground that they were the "most important countries" at the conference.⁵⁰ Deliberations over the Shandong Question thus began on December 1 in the form of direct negotiations. Hughes, MacMurray, and former Acting Ambassador to Japan Edward Bell participated as observers for the United States and Balfour, former Minister to China John N. Jordan, and Miles Lampson as observers for Britain.⁵¹

Prior to the beginning of negotiations, the Beiyang government telegraphed instructions to its delegation that they were not to accept any inheritance of former German interests by Japan. These instructions were then made public.⁵² Hughes viewed Wang Chonghui's uncompromising attitude as "restricting [Shi Zhaoji and Gu Weijun's] freedom of movement," and his goodwill towards China gradually faded.⁵³ Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing and President Xu Shichang distrusted the conference, partly due to disagreements with the Chinese delegation. Yan, who was in contact with hardliners from the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and elsewhere, told US Minister to China Jacob Gould Schurman that the Shandong Question could not be resolved until the Shandong Railway was completely returned.⁵⁴

The Japanese initially demanded that the Shandong Railway be made into a joint Sino-Japanese venture, but not only did they fail to secure Chinese agreement to this, neither Britain nor the United States viewed the idea favorably, either. They then put forward a compromise under which it would become a loan railway, with Japanese appointed to leadership positions for the duration of the loan. The Chinese, however, held firm to a plan under which they would purchase the railway, issuing treasury bonds to repay the Japanese for the value of the railway's assets.⁵⁵ The Japanese delegation warned Uchida that "China has embarked on a policy of making Japan shoulder responsibility for the conference's failure."⁵⁶

It was MacMurray and Lampson who broke this deadlock in the Sino-Japanese negotiations. Lampson first met privately with Hanihara and MacMurray on January 7, 1922 and put forward three tentative proposals. Under these, the Japanese government would sell all rights to the Shandong Railway to the Chinese, but a Japanese would be appointed as the railway's chief engineer (Proposal 1); Japan would be repaid for the railway's assets over a period of 12 years, during which time a Japanese would be invited to serve as chief engineer (Proposal 2); or the Chinese government would purchase the railway, but Japanese would be appointed to the positions of traffic manager and chief accountant for a five year period (Proposal 3). Hanihara met with the two men again on the morning of the 9th and told them that, while Proposal 2 was the most preferable of the three, he had additional requirements. MacMurray and Lampson then put forward a fourth proposal later that day under which Japan would be repaid for the railway's assets over a period of 12 years using national bonds, and Japanese would be appointed as the railway's chiefs of transportation and accounting.⁵⁷

The two Americans also presented these four proposals to the Chinese.⁵⁸ MacMurray and Lampson treated Proposal 4 (which strongly reflected Japan's desires) as a compromise, and it naturally drew a favorable response from Uchida, who noted that "while it nominally involves national bonds, in actual practice, it does not differ significantly from our position."⁵⁹

Following up on MacMurray and Lampson's efforts, Hughes and Balfour prepared a revised version of Proposal 4 that was even more favorable to Japan, extending the repayment period to 15 years. Hughes and Balfour met with Shidehara and Hanihara on January 10. Shidehara and Hanihara reported to Uchida afterwards that the two had "listened to our position with an entirely sympathetic ear and had intimated that they would apply a fair amount of pressure to the Chinese on this matter. This was true not just of Balfour, but of Hughes as well."⁶⁰ After showing the proposal to the Chinese, Hughes and Balfour informed their ministers to China that "these conditions are as far as the Japanese delegation are willing to accept."⁶¹ When presented with the proposal, Foreign Minister Yan had no choice but to accept it even as he noted that it "does not fully satisfy the wishes of the people."⁶²

Under the terms of the treaty signed on February 4, Japan was to be repaid for the assets of the Shandong Railway through 15-year national bonds, and Japanese nationals were to be appointed to the positions of traffic manager and chief accountant for the duration of the bonds. Mining operations were also to be carried out under joint Sino-Japanese management.⁶³ How much of a concession did this treaty represent for Japan? The Hara government had laid out Japan's positions for the conference in a cabinet resolution adopted shortly before it opened: First, Chinese demands for the unconditional return of the Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory were in violation of international law, as Germany had lost all ability to return its former interests to China in the Treaty of Versailles; Second, the joint Sino-Japanese management of railways was based on an understanding between China and Japan and unrelated to

Chinese entry into the war against Germany. And third, China should not monopolize railways and mining assets, and others – including foreign countries – should be repaid fairly for these.⁶⁴ Thus, while Japan had made a concession in that it had accepted being compensated for the Shandong Railway through bonds and appointments, its positions had largely been accepted.

It was the intervention of the United States and Britain that made this possible. Not only did they work to see that the Shandong Question was addressed through direct negotiations rather than brought up at the conference itself, but it was the compromise plan put forward by MacMurray and Lampson that played the decisive role in its resolution. According to Shidehara's memoirs, China had been "determined to have the talks over the Shandong Question break down," but it "changed its attitude completely once it saw that the odds were against them."⁶⁵ Resolution of the Shandong Question was also made smoother by the return of the Weihaiwei Leased Territory, an effort spearheaded by Balfour for that purpose. He stated at the December 3, 1921 meeting of the committee that the return had been carried out "to assist in securing a settlement of the question of Shandong."⁶⁶ Conversely, China's initially uncompromising attitude and the aforementioned lack of unity among its officials destroyed the favorable atmosphere that it had enjoyed at the beginning of the conference.

The Shandong Question had been the most serious pending issue in the Far East, and it had been MacMurray and Lampson who had done the most to bring about its resolution. MacMurray in particular pursued a different course from Hughes – whose effort to extend the principle of the Open Door to country's vested interests in China earned him Japanese opposition – and Root, whose protection of such interests and policy of maintaining the status quo had invited Chinese distrust. He served as a skillful diplomatic negotiator, acting as a fair mediator between China and Japan and proposing a compromise even as he emphasized Japanese interests. Given the importance of the Shandong Question, his efforts should be described as the "MacMurray Initiative." Once Hughes and Balfour took up the basis for negotiations that MacMurray and Lampson had built, the Chinese had no choice but to abandon the policy of "refusal diplomacy" that they had pursued since the Paris Peace Conference. Combined with British support, MacMurray was able to finally bring about a solution to a difficult problem that had existed since World War I by engaging in working-level diplomatic cooperation with Japan.

(2) The Issue of the Treaties Related to the Twenty-One Demands

In the meanwhile, Gu Weijun's December 3, 1921 proposal that leased territories be abolished had led to discussions over the Kwantung Leased Territory, which Japan had acquired from Russia in 1905. Gu had sought the territories' return on the grounds that:

the existence of such leased territories had greatly prejudiced China's territorial and administrative integrity because they were all situated along the Chinese littoral. Furthermore, these foreign leaseholds had hampered her work of national defense by constituting in China a virtual *imperium in imperio*, i.e., an empire within the same empire.

Britain and France had agreed to the return of Weihaiwei and Guangzhouwan, but the Japanese delegation held firm to its position that its control of the Kwantung Leased Territory had been extended to a term of 99 years in the Treaty Respecting Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. Plenipotentiary Hanihara stated that:

the territory in question forms a part of Manchuria – a region where, by reason of its close propinquity to Japan's territory, more than anything else, she has vital interests in which relate to her economic life and national safety. We cannot give it up. This fact was recognized and assurance was given by the American, British and French Governments at the time of the formation of the International Consortium that these vital interests of Japan in the region in question shall be safeguarded. I believe it would also violate the spirit of the Root Resolution.

Balfour was sympathetic to the Japanese position, backing Hanihara's assertions by likening Kwantung to Kowloon (which was under British control).⁶⁷

Nonetheless, Plenipotentiary Wang Chonghui demanded on December 14 that all treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands be nullified, stating that "our signature was extorted through a Japanese ultimatum."⁶⁸ But Japan was not the only one critical of this effort; Britain and the United States were also unreceptive to the Chinese proposal. The British delegation backed the Japanese position, holding that it would be absurd to argue over the validity of existing treaties. And Hughes chose to postpone the matter until after the Shandong negotiations had been completed on the grounds that the two issues were closely related.⁶⁹ Hanihara held a private meeting with Root on January 17, 1922, and told him that Japan had no intention of invalidating the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands. He reported that Root "replied that '[the Japanese position] simplifies the matter as far as the Conference is concerned,' hinting that we should not change our position."⁷⁰ Root's attitude here was another example of his consistently held position in favor of maintaining the status quo and cooperating with Japan.

It was thus not until the penultimate meeting of the committee on February 2 that the issue of "the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915" was discussed for the first time. Speaking for Japan, Shidehara criticized the Chinese assertions and stated that Japan "cannot agree to the cancellation of international agreements which China entered into as a free and independent state." He further argued that Japan had already made three sets of concessions: yielding its priority loan rights in southern Manchuria and eastern Inner

Mongolia to the Second China Consortium with the exception of its delineated special interests in southern Manchuria; giving up its preferential rights concerning the engagement of Japanese advisors and instructors in southern Manchuria; and withdrawing its reservation postponing negotiation of Group V of the Twenty-One Demands.⁷¹ There were all merely pro forma concessions that the Japanese had expected to make; the Hara government's October 13, 1921 cabinet decision had foreseen that "it would be necessary to show the spirit of compromise to some extent."⁷²

Quoting the "Bryan Note," Wang Chonghui criticized the Japanese position on the following day, saying that "the Chinese Delegation greatly regrets that the Government of Japan should not have been led to renounce the other claims predicated upon the Treaties and Notes of 1915."⁷³ The "Bryan Note" was a message issued to the Japanese government by US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan on May 11, 1915, at the time of the Twenty-One Demands. It stated that the American government would not grant recognition to any agreements that were contrary to the principles of the Open Door and territorial integrity.⁷⁴ By invoking the Note, the Chinese delegation no doubt expected to receive American support. But while Hughes held that the spirit of the Bryan Note had been reaffirmed in the Nine-Power Treaty, he avoided getting drawn into the issue of the Twenty-One Demands.⁷⁵ According to Shidehara's recollections, those in the chamber during the discussion "were so bored that some were asleep," and the matter was quickly brought to a close.⁷⁶ As analyzed by the *New York Times*, Japan's "astute concessions" had been sufficient to close off discussion of the issue.⁷⁷

The Chinese were left dissatisfied by the treatment of the Shandong Question and the Twenty-One Demands at the Washington Conference. Conversely, having secured the cooperation of the United States and Britain, Japan had been able to lead matters to a favorable conclusion. Wanting to bring the conference to a successful conclusion, Hughes and Balfour had been able to go along with the excessive Chinese demands that could potentially have ground the conference to a halt. Hughes in particular backtracked significantly from the pro-Chinese stance evident in his initial draft resolution, ultimately tacitly endorsing Japan's position.

4. The Issues of the Siberian Expedition and the Chinese Eastern Railway

(1) The Siberian Expedition

The discussions of Far Eastern issues at the conference also extended to the Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). According to Shidehara's recollections, Hughes explained to him at a private meeting that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia had been placed on the conference agenda because the American public held "suspicions" that Japan had "aggressive ambitions" in the region.⁷⁸ At the January 23, 1922 meeting of the committee, Shidehara explained that many Japanese lived in Siberia, that

“it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan,” and that the actions of the Japanese military in Siberia had been “confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals.” He also argued that Japan was already negotiating the withdrawal of its troops from Primorskaya Oblast with the Far Eastern Republic in Dalian.⁷⁹ Acting as chairman, Hughes closed the issue at the following day’s meeting after simply stating that he hoped the withdrawal of troops would be carried out as stated in Shidehara’s speech.

(2) The Chinese Eastern Railway

The future of the CER was an important unresolved issue going into the Washington Conference, one that went to the core of the participants’ policies towards the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, the Harding administration had attempted to enter into negotiations with Japan prior to the conference over continuing international management of the CER and expanding the authority of the CER Technical Board (which was led by Stevens, an American). When the Hara government rejected this, the Harding administration decided to bring the matter to the Washington Conference. At the January 18, 1922 meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, Hughes proposed the formation of a Subcommittee of Technical Advisers on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and this was agreed to by the participants.⁸⁰

When the subcommittee met on the 20th, US State Department Division of Russian Affairs Director DeWitt Poole proposed the establishment of a finance committee in Harbin. This would be composed of representatives of the conference’s participants and replace the existing management system for the CER, overseeing its finances and police. The Japanese (Matsudaira Tsuneo), British, and French members agreed to the American proposal, but it was opposed by the Chinese on the grounds that security for the railway was already being enforced by Chinese police.⁸¹ The position of the Beiyang government was that the CER was an issue between China and the Soviet Union, and it had informed its delegation prior to the conference that the CER was “entirely commercial in nature” and something in which “third parties had no right to involve themselves.”⁸² This view was shared by Zhang Zuolin, and the Beiyang government’s decision to hold firm to this position meant that the subcommittee’s negotiations made little progress.⁸³ In an attempt to break the deadlock, the subcommittee decided to elevate the matter to the Subcommittee of Delegates on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

At the January 31 meeting of that subcommittee, Hanihara and French Plenipotentiary Albert Sarraut notably expressed sympathy for the Chinese position. Then, on February 2, they submitted a compromise proposal with Gu Weijun. This Japanese-French-Chinese plan strongly reflected Chinese desires towards the CER and included neither the creation of a finance committee nor any strengthening of the Technical Board. It thus represented a de

facto rejection of the American efforts to reinforce the management system for the CER. Chairman Root criticized the proposal as “resulting in the exclusion of Stevens but unlikely to produce any improvements above the present state of affairs.” However, despite his strong dissatisfaction, Root made no attempt to push on with the American proposal. As can be seen from his Four Principles, Root’s fundamental stance was to maintain the status quo on Far Eastern affairs, and he had told Hanihara in advance of the February 2 subcommittee meeting that he would “work to see that the discussion does not go against Japan’s legitimate interests.”⁸⁴ As a result of these efforts, the Washington Conference ended without any real efforts put into place to strengthen the management system of the CER.⁸⁵

Thus, the American policy of strengthening the CER management system met unexpected difficulties. The effort also suffered from inadequate communication between Washington and Stevens.⁸⁶ Wary of increased American influence in Manchuria, Japan would not allow the creation of a new order in the region, instead choosing to side with the Chinese to avoid cooperating with the United States. On this one point, Japan and China momentarily joined forces to foreclose any American intervention in Manchuria.

The later Katō Tomasaburō government would decide to withdraw Japan’s troops from Siberia in June 1922, and international management of the CER came to an end in August of that year.⁸⁷ The system had been in place for three and a half years, and with its end agency over the CER moved to China and the Soviet Union. The railway came under joint Chinese-Soviet management following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries in 1924. The CER had been key to Imperial Russia’s East Asia policy, and this would continue to hold true for the Soviets. While Japan had been able to successfully prevent the expansion of American influence in Manchuria, it had done so at the expense of providing a stronghold for Soviet policy in East Asia. Had Japanese-American control of management of the CER become entrenched, it could have provided a basis for collaborative diplomacy towards the Soviets. Instead, the US-Japan rivalry prevented the formation of a consensus over a matter central to Soviet policy, and the Soviets would remain a destabilizing factor for the Washington System.

So, how should each country’s diplomacy towards Far Eastern issues at the Washington Conference be appraised? First, the Japanese positions on the Siberian Expedition and the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands were accepted for the most part. And, with the exception of the concessions on the railway, the Shandong Question was also resolved generally in line with Japanese demands, and this resolution was carried out through direct Sino-Japanese negotiations, the Japanese preferred approach. The success they had dealing with major Far Eastern issues through cooperation with Britain and the United States made a strong impression on the Japanese, showing them the profitable nature of such collaboration.⁸⁸ Japan was also

able to block the American-desired strengthening of the management system for the CER. Generally speaking, many of Japan's demands were accepted, even if this acceptance was cloaked in aspects of American diplomacy and its invocation of universal values. The country had been able to manage Far Eastern issues at the Washington Conference by applying Hara's policy of maintaining cooperation with Britain and the US while expanding Japanese interests in China. The ideas of sphere of influence diplomacy were deeply rooted among the Japanese policymakers – including Shidehara – and it would be difficult to say that the Washington Conference brought about any major shift in Japanese foreign policy.

An external factor behind the Japanese success was that British diplomatic views, as represented by Curzon and Balfour, were consistent with the Japanese belief in spheres of influence. Under the initial plan drafted by Balfour while he traveled to the United States, the powers were to hold in-depth discussions on protecting their rights and interests in China. These British intentions can be considered to have been incorporated into the Nine-Power Treaty.⁸⁹ It is possible that Japan would have been unable to persevere with its sphere of influence diplomatic approach in the absence of an ideologically similar partner in Britain. The United Kingdom played a major role as a lubricant between the often-differing positions of Japan and America. At least as late as 1930, the British Foreign Office held the view that “cooperation, not competition, should be the dominant principle in the policies of the great powers towards China.”⁹⁰

The naval arms limitation treaty promoted by the United States also served Japanese interests as it reduced naval spending to a scale suitable to the nation's finances. To borrow the words of Katō Tomosaburō, “just carrying out the Eight-Eight Fleet Plan is causing Japan great financial difficulty.” Should a shipbuilding race develop, Japan “will be unable to respond in any way, no matter how much the United States expands” its fleet.⁹¹

Shidehara's activities at the conference provided him with the idea of linking Japan's economic advancement into China to ideological aspects of American diplomacy like the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity. The conference thus also served as a starting point for Shidehara Diplomacy. To use the words Shidehara spoke to Hughes before the conference:

Our nation has no need to claim exclusive rights in China. [...] For Japanese economic development in China to be dependent on such preferential or exclusive rights would make it no better than a plant grown in a greenhouse. I do not believe Japanese commerce to be so weak as that. Thus, no external protection is necessary. Adopting an open and honest position and competing fairly is enough.⁹²

This approach to Japanese economic development outside of Manchuria exhibited more confidence than had been shown by Prime Minister Hara. Shidehara's view that Japan did not need to rely on political or military

strength in order to not fall behind in economic competition also shows that he belonged to a new generation of leaders who did not perceive Japan as a minor power.

On the other hand, American policies on Far Eastern issues tended to fluctuate, reflecting the diversity of views on East Asia held among its policymakers. Of the American delegation, Root was the member to show the most sympathy for Japan's position. As shown by his Four Principles and the deliberations over the CER, Root's policy was to maintain the status quo and respect Japan's vested interests.

Root's policy here stood in stark contrast to that of Hughes. While Root saw maintaining the status quo with regards to vested interests as only natural, Hughes envisioned an East Asian policy that would see even the powers' vested interests in China made subject to diplomatic principles like the Open Door. This could be clearly seen in the draft resolution he presented to the committee. In that sense, Hughes was more understanding of the Chinese position than that of Japan. He had also joined the Wilson administration in strongly criticizing the Japanese occupation of northern Sakhalin.⁹³ His approach was intended to curb Japanese continental expansion by relying on diplomatic ideals and was, in a sense, a *de facto* continuation of Wilson's position. Gu Weijun's conclusion that Hughes "was sympathetic to China" while "Root showed far more understanding towards Japan than China" was not inaccurate.⁹⁴

It was with the *de facto* rejection of Hughes' resolution that the Washington System was effectively established. Once Hughes had reluctantly assented to the agreement between Britain, Japan, and Root to maintain the status quo over China, the three-nation agreement that would serve as the basis for the system was established. And this included a tacit acceptance of Japan's delineated special interests in southern Manchuria.

The Nine-Power Treaty concluded at the Washington Conference meant that the diplomatic principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity, things that America had advocated for since the end of the 19th century, had been acknowledged at an international conference of the highest importance, and the significance of that should not be underestimated. However, the treaty also incorporated stipulations that maintained the status quo, including Root's Four Principles. In an uneasy compromise between the policies of Hughes and Root, the treaty only went so far as recognizing traditional diplomatic principles; it did not represent a new course based on American East Asian policy. Japan and Britain had already extended recognition to the various principles included in the treaty, and as such, they were never a true point of contention.

Instead, the landmark significance for American diplomacy can be found in the creation of the MacMurray doctrine that led to the resolution to the Shandong Question, the most significant outstanding Far Eastern issue at the conference. While conducting himself as a fair mediator, MacMurray produced a policy of cooperation with Japan through his adept negotiation skills.

He thus brought about one of the extremely rare cases of American diplomacy leading to the resolution of a serious longstanding issue between China and Japan, something that both Bryan and Lansing had previously attempted with little to show for it. Without MacMurray's steady efforts, the negotiations between China and Japan would likely have continued to be fruitless. That his approach of working-level diplomatic cooperation with Japan was able to gain the support of Hughes and the British was of decisive importance for the establishment of the Washington System with China incorporated as a subordinate.

MacMurray would continue to be involved in US East Asian policy throughout the 1920s, serving as Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State, and minister to China. Hughes, however, would not again assume a proactive diplomatic posture on East Asian affairs following the conference as he had with his draft resolution, and he did not seek the abolition of the unequal treaties that the Chinese desperately hoped for. As such, the difference between Wilson and Hughes' East Asian policies was more quantitative than qualitative. In other words, while Wilson had maintained an interest in East Asia policy from the time of the Twenty-One Demands through the Paris Peace Conference and tenaciously sought to restrain Japanese continental expansion, Hughes reduced his involvement in East Asia following the Washington Conference. He would continue as Secretary of State until March 1925, but the United States never took the lead on East Asian policy during that time. As a result, MacMurray's policies would also lack an environment in which to demonstrate their capabilities.

China, who saw Shi Zhaoji's Ten Principles rejected in favor of Root's Four Principles at the opening of the conference, failed to accomplish its goals of the direct return of Germany's former interests in Shandong to China and drastic revisions to the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands. Its actual gains at the conference were the Japanese concessions on Shandong and an increase in custom duties to 5%. Each country's privileges and interests in China were fundamentally preserved, and no agreement was reached over revising or abolishing the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands. China's reluctant acceptance of MacMurray and Lampson's proposed resolution to the Shandong Question owes much to those two men's efforts. Despite having strong reservations about issuing government bonds and the appointment of Japanese officials, Foreign Minister Yan Huiqing had no choice but to accept Shi Zhaoji and Gu Weijun's assertions that there was little point in resisting what Japan, Britain, and the United States had agreed upon.⁹⁵

In that sense, the uncompromising and radical policies pursued by Yan and Wang Chonghui can be said to have given way to those supported by Shi Zhaoji and Gu Weijun, who sought to achieve results more gradually through cooperation with the United States and Britain. Following the conference, Shi and Gu sent MacMurray a commemorative vase accompanied by a letter in which they wrote, "Your collaboration as Mr. Hughes' representative in the conversations between the Chinese and Japanese Delegations, which led to

the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty here in Washington, was of invaluable help.”⁹⁶ In the context of Chinese diplomatic history, the establishment of the Washington System involved the suppression of Yan and Wang’s policies by Shi and Gu. It also meant the abandonment of the “refusal diplomacy” promoted by Shi and Gu at the Paris Peace Conference.

China, which had been given a subordinate position within the Washington System, had no choice but to accept the partial concessions it had extracted and leave the issues of the unequal treaties and the Twenty-One Demands for the future. The collaborative diplomacy between Japan, Britain, and America under the MacMurray doctrine meant that China had to turn away from the “refusal diplomacy” it had engaged in since the Paris Peace Conference and instead accept the gradual diplomacy of the Washington Conference. The Sino-Japanese negotiations over the Shandong Question that China had long refused to engage in were carried out under pressure from Britain and America.

The most bitter criticism of this restoration of Sino-Japanese diplomacy came from the Beiyang government’s rivals in the south. Sun Yat-sen argued that “the terms of the agreement reached between Japan and the false delegation dispatched by Xu Shichang forfeits our rights and makes them a common enemy of the people.”⁹⁷ Foreign Minister Uchida wrote that “the results of the Washington Conference tend to further strengthen Japan’s position in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia,” but he was concerned that Zhang Zuolin “fearing future Japanese expansion in those regions, may conspire with Sun Yat-sen and others from the South to argue against the so-called ‘Twenty-One Demands,’ thereby increasing anti-Japanese sentiment throughout China.”⁹⁸

At the same time, the exclusion of the Soviets from the conference meant the continued existence of a destabilizing factor for the Washington System.⁹⁹ It is also important to note that Japanese diplomacy brought about the end of the international management system for the CER, producing a situation where leadership of the railway in northern Manchuria passed to the Soviets. The Japanese delegation, including Shidehara, took the role of sphere of influence diplomacy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as self-evident and sought to eliminate any involvement by third parties. This came into conflict with Hughes’ efforts to promote an Open Door policy based on multilateral diplomacy; this resulted in the Soviets being provided with room in which to expand their influence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. This pattern would repeat with the dispute between Foreign Minister Shidehara and Secretary of State Stimson during the 1929 Fengtian-Soviet War. The fundamental conflict between the United States and Japan over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was never resolved, and the greatest opportunity for reaching an agreement on policy towards the Soviets was lost. For that reason, once the Soviets began making their presence known in East Asian international politics, the Washington System would gradually lose its ability as an international order to adapt.

Had the United States and Japan each taken a small step closer to one another and reached a higher level of mutual understanding, subsequent developments in East Asia may have been very different.

II. Increased Adherence to the Policy of Non-Interference and the “Second Wave of International Change”

Japanese diplomacy following the Washington Conference was characterized by two courses of action: increased adherence to the policy of non-interference towards China in accordance with the spirit of that conference and a reexamination of the country’s existing foreign policy in response to new trends in China and the Soviet Union. I would like to first analyze the First Fengtian-Zhili War, the withdrawal of Japanese forces from northern Manchuria and Siberia, and Japanese cultural efforts towards China as examples of the former, leaving the latter for later in this chapter.

1. Strengthening of the Policy of Non-Interference

(1) The First Fengtian-Zhili War

In November 1921, as the Washington Conference was beginning, Zhang Zuolin was becoming increasingly involved in the Beiyang government, traveling to Beijing and meeting with President Xu Shichang and Cao Kun of the Zhili clique. In December, he arranged to have Liang Shiyi replace Jin Yunpeng as premier. As Liang had close ties to the Fengtian clique, the Zhili clique was critical of this change.¹⁰⁰ Under the Liang government, the Fengtian clique became increasingly influential, leading to heightened tensions with the Zhili and a backlash from members of that clique like Wu Peifu.¹⁰¹ President Xu made attempts through Zhang Jinghui to improve the relationship between Zhang Zuolin and Wu, but he was unable to help the two to reconcile.¹⁰²

In an attempt to counter the Zhili, Zhang Zuolin repeatedly dispatched his Japanese advisors Machino Takema and Honjō Shigeru and his confidante Yu Chonghan to request assistance from Japanese Minister to China Obata Yūkichi and Fengtian Consul-General Akatsuka Masasuke.¹⁰³ Unlike during the earlier Anhui-Zhili War, Japanese officials in China were divided on whether or not Zhang should be granted support. Obata opposed any support, taking the position that the Eastern Conference’s resolution should be adhered to. Lt. General Banzai Rihachirō likewise told Army Chief of Staff Uehara Yūsaku that, in the absence of any decision by Japan to “take proactive action to reorganize China,” Zhang should be told to exercise self-restraint.¹⁰⁴ However, there was also a faction in favor of providing assistance. Akatsuka, Maj. General Higashi Otohiko (military attaché to the Japanese embassy), Fengtian Secret Service Director Kishi Yajirō, and Kwantung Army Commander Kawai Masao shared the belief that the “anti-Japanese Zhili clique” would “join with Britain and America and act to benefit them”

(Akatsuka's words), that "smashing the Anglo-American conspiracy" would be "an act of legitimate self-defense" (Higashi's words), and that Japan could not merely stand by and watch as its "policy towards China, particularly its policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia," was "overthrown" (Kawai's words).¹⁰⁵ Ever since the Anhui-Zhili War, there had been a common belief among Japanese officers in China that Japan should resist the "pro-American" Zhili clique, and these arguments in favor of supporting Zhang were an extension of this. While Zhang's advisor Machino was also in favor of Zhang's calls for a showdown against the Zhili, his other advisor Honjō and Fengtian Army Chief of Staff Yang Yuting were opposed.¹⁰⁶

Foreign Minister Uchida (now serving in the government of Takahashi Korekiyo) held firm to the position that no weapons should be provided to Zhang as he did not "recognize any need to make changes to the Empire's existing policy" of "neutrality and non-interference in [Chinese] domestic politics."¹⁰⁷ He also instructed Obata to discuss the matter of the Zhili clique's ties to the United States and Britain with Ministers to China Schurman and Alston.¹⁰⁸ But Zhang began preparing for an attack in late February, continuing to appeal for Japanese assistance and reportedly "steadily forming alliances with Duan, Sun Yat-sen, and others."¹⁰⁹ The foreign ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau confirmed its "doctrine of absolute non-interference" and "neutrality" and maintained its position that the provision of Japanese arms to Zhang should be prevented and the spirit of the Washington Conference adhered to.¹¹⁰ Acting Minister to China Yoshida Isaburō discussed creating a demilitarized zone between Beijing and Fengtian with his American, British, and French counterparts, and the war ministry Military Affairs Bureau came to the conclusion that Japan should not support any invasion of Guannei by Zhang.¹¹¹ The army general staff did not make any noteworthy moves on the matter.¹¹² As such, the opinions of the war and foreign ministry leaderships (with the exception of Akatsuka) were essentially unified in the belief that no support should be provided to Zhang's advance into Guannei.

The First Fengtian-Zhili War began on April 27, and it had already become clear by May 5 that the Fengtian had lost.¹¹³ According to Machino's memoirs, Zhang was still calling for continued resistance at that point but was ultimately convinced by Honjō to carry out an early withdrawal.¹¹⁴ In his December 22, 1922 instructions to Akatsuka, Uchida made clear that Japan would support Zhang, but only as long as he remained with the Three Northeast Provinces, and that it could not provide weapons or financial support in accordance with its "promises to other nations."¹¹⁵ The declaration of independence for the Three Northeast Provinces that Zhang issued after his defeat was in line with the policy that Japan had held since the time of the Hara government that Zhang should devote himself to ruling those provinces.

Uchida believed that Japan's policy of non-interference in China was not only "the touchstone of international good faith," but a precondition for "our peaceful expansion on the continent."¹¹⁶ That the war and foreign ministry leaderships had been united behind non-intervention in the First Fengtian-

Zhili War was also in alignment with Prime Minister Takahashi's ideals. While Hara had seen non-interference through the lens of cooperation with the United States and Britain, both Takahashi's theory of an "East Asian economic power" and Uchida's belief in "peaceful expansion on the continent" saw it as intrinsically valuable to China policy. The Japanese preoccupation with economic expansion in China during this period, and their awareness of the reliance of such expansion on non-interference, was one factor behind their increasing commitment to the policy of non-interference.¹¹⁷

However, while Japan may have held to its non-interference policy during the First Fengtian-Zhili, that would not necessarily have been the case had Zhang's control of the Three Northeast Provinces been threatened. The war ministry Military Affairs Bureau, in reviewing its policy towards Zhang in the aftermath of the war, stated that, had fighting occurred in the Kwantung Leased Territory or near the Mantetsu lines, "following consultations with the Kwantung governor and the commander of the Kwantung Army, the necessary amount of force would have been deployed under their authority to protect the population."¹¹⁸ The policy of providing support to Zhang was ultimately not abandoned and would resurface in the mid-1920s as an element of Japanese policy towards the Soviet Union.

(2) The Withdrawal from Siberia and Northern Manchuria and the Stagnation of the Korean Independence Movement

The increased commitment to non-interference seen during the First Fengtian-Zhili War can also be seen in the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Siberia and northern Manchuria. This period also saw the beginning of the final phase of the Siberian and Northern Manchurian Expedition, one of the Hara government's deviations from its policy of non-interference and cooperation with the West.

At the Dalian Conference that began on August 26, 1921, Vladivostok Expeditionary Force Political Affairs Department Director Matsushima Hajime negotiated the conditional withdrawal of Japanese troops from Primorskaya Oblast and northern Manchuria with the Far Eastern Republic. Far Eastern Republic Deputy Foreign Minister Yakov Yanson, located in the republic's capital of Chita, judged Japan to be sincere in the negotiations and sought support from Chicherin in reaching a compromise.¹¹⁹ On September 6, Far Eastern Republic Deputy Prime Minister F.N. Prtrov, who had taken over the negotiations in Dalian from Foreign Minister Ignatii Yurin, submitted a twenty-nine-article draft agreement to Matsushima. Article 22 concerned the rapid withdrawal of Japanese troops.¹²⁰

The seventeen-article counterproposal offered by the Japanese on the 26th did not include a stipulation for the withdrawal of troops. Instead, it held that Japan's forces would be "voluntarily" withdrawn following the conclusion of the agreement once "threats to Korea and causes of concern about the safety of residents and transportation" had been eliminated.¹²¹ In a December 6

memorandum from the Republic to the Japanese delegation, it adopted a conciliatory stance, stating that:

Following the complete withdrawal of the Japanese army from the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, the Republic – in accordance with its constitution – will look favorably on the provision to Japanese entrepreneurs of industrial rights in northern Sakhalin and forestry rights on the mainland.¹²²

However, the Takahashi government brought the Dalian Conference to a close on April 16, 1922 on the grounds that it was impossible to specify a date for the withdrawal of Japanese forces.¹²³

However, the failure to reach an agreement at the Dalian Conference did not mean that the Takahashi government intended to continue stationing troops.¹²⁴ In an April 4, 1922 cabinet decision, the government resolved to “withdraw our forces as soon as possible,” even in the absence of an agreement with the Far Eastern Republic.¹²⁵ And shortly after the Katō Tomosaburō government was formed on June 23, it resolved to have completed the withdrawal by the end of October. While the immediate reason for this decision was the preliminary negotiations for the Changchun Conference with the Far Eastern Republic, the actual reason was that “the Imperial government’s position will become increasingly difficult should a foreign country issue a demand that we withdraw our forces or something similar.”¹²⁶

Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan and Yanson expressed satisfaction with this in a July 15 statement and showed a strong desire for further negotiations.¹²⁷ Even though the occupation of northern Sakhalin would continue until May 1925, after the completion of the withdrawal in late October, the points of contention in Siberia and northern Manchuria would shift to the dissolution of the Far Eastern Republic and Sino-Soviet relations over the CER.¹²⁸ Thus, the withdrawal that the Hara government had been unable to accomplish had finally been accomplished, although this had less to do with relations with the Far Eastern Republic than it did with cooperation with the West. The withdrawal meant the end of the international management system for the CER, and the conclusion of Japan’s postwar measures.

1922, the year in which the withdrawal was carried out, was marked by increasing Japanese domestic criticism of the military and calls for reductions in its size.¹²⁹ Such criticism had also existed during the Hara government, but only from minor parties like the Kokumintō. From the time of the Takahashi government it would truly become a serious issue, however. Both the Kenseikai, the primary opposition party, and the Seiyūkai, the government party, criticized the military during the 45th session of the Imperial Diet. Unusually, even the Katō government harshly criticized the army for its “extreme two-level diplomacy” in a July 26, 1922 cabinet decision.¹³⁰

These political trends and popular demands for reduction in the military culminated in the “Yamanashi Disarmament” in 1922 and 1923 and the abolishment of the Census Office (Kokuseiin). It also led to increased domestic support for non-interference in China.¹³¹ In a 1923 speech before the 48th Imperial Diet, Foreign Minister Ijūin Hikokichi of the Yamamoto Gonbee government stated that “the peaceful unification of China and the improvement of that country’s state of affairs should primarily be brought about through the awakening of and efforts by the Chinese people themselves,” thus showing that the Yamamoto government was carrying on the previous government’s policy of thorough non-interference.¹³²

During this same period, the Korean independence movement showed signs of stagnation, partly due to the effects of the Jiandao Expedition and the creation of the Korean management system.¹³³ According to the Government-General of Korea’s *A History of 25 Years of Administration* (published in 1935), “bandits embedded within border and coastal regions like southern Manchuria and Jiandao” had “frequently entered Korea, committing wanton acts of violence in collusion with [Korean independence activists].” However, the “damage caused by bandits in the border regions [...] reached its peak in 1920 and gradually decreased from 1923 on.”¹³⁴

Internal divisions over the proper course for the independence movement had also become apparent within the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. While President Syngman Rhee advocated for cooperation with the United States and was supported by many Christians and intellectuals, Prime Minister Yi Donghwi – who had extensive experience fighting against the Japanese and was followed by many resistance fighters in Manchuria and Siberia – showed increasingly pro-communist leanings and emphasized relations with the Soviet Union. According to the recollections of another independence activist, Kim San, the relationship between the two men had become so hostile by this point that there was no chance of mending it.¹³⁵ *A History of 25 Years of Administration* described the situation as follows:

The financial resources of the pretender government in Shanghai had completely dried up by 1920, and it had split into two competing factions: a civilian faction led by Syngman Rhee who wanted to rely upon America, and an armed faction under Yi Donghwi who wanted to rely upon Russia (the Third International). Even in Hawaii, there was a split into independence and mandate factions. The situation had become essentially unmanageable, and the government was on the brink of destruction.¹³⁶

Because of this stagnation on the part of the Korean independence movement, there was no pressure on the Japanese government to carry out any “armed interventions” comparable to the Hara government’s Jiandao Expedition.

But while the Korean independence movement had temporarily stagnated, the cause of independence itself had certainly not been abandoned. To give one example, Kim Iksang, O Seongryun, and Lee Seonghwa of the Heroic

Corps attempted to assassinate General Tanaka Giichi on March 28, 1922 as he visited Shanghai.¹³⁷ And there were ongoing preparations by part of the provisional government's forces and pro-independence groups in southern Manchuria to launch new efforts during this period. These were carefully watched by the Japanese. "Basic Research Concerning Rebellious Koreans," a June 1, 1924 report compiled by the headquarters of the Korean Army, noted that, while the Tumen River region had been stabilized by the Jiandao Expedition, the Yalu River region was becoming a new stronghold of the independence movement and that the forces of Yi Donghwi, backed by the Third International, were working to strengthen their solidarity with Korean workers and farmers.¹³⁸

The withdrawal of Japanese forces from Siberia and northern Manchuria and the hands-off approach to the Korean independence movement shows that the principles of non-interference and cooperation with the West had come to be applied even to Manchuria policy during this period. While the earlier Hara government had tended to disregard international cooperation when it came to Manchuria policy, the principle of non-interference was now applied more consistently. This is another way in which the Japanese government's increasing commitment to non-interference can be seen in its contemporary China policy.

(3) Attempts at Cultural Diplomacy

The peak of Chinese studying in Japan came in 1906, when there were 7,283 Chinese students in Japan. Symbolizing the cultural effects of the contemporary chill in Sino-Japanese relations, this number fell to only two to three thousand a year following World War I.¹³⁹ At the turn of the century, the American government had used part of the Boxer Rebellion reparations to create a fund for Chinese students to study in the United States, and by the late 1910s, America had become the country of choice for Chinese seeking to study abroad. It was under these circumstances that the Japanese undertook "cultural efforts aimed at China" (*taishi bunka jigyō*). In addition to reflecting a new cultural approach to its China policy, these efforts can also be seen as part of its commitment to non-interference.¹⁴⁰

The idea of returning the Boxer Rebellion reparations to China in the form of cultural efforts had been present in Japan ever since the Terauchi government had granted China a five-year moratorium on the payments in December 1917. Foreign Minister Gotō Shinpei unofficially communicated Japan's intention to waive the reparations to Chinese Minister to Japan Zhang Zongxiang on September 21, 1918.¹⁴¹ Hara Takashi also recognized that "the number of Chinese students studying here has declined remarkably from years past" and provided support to the Japan-China Association (Nikka Gakkai), an organization that facilitated such studies.¹⁴² After Foreign Minister Yan requested a two-year extension on repayment of the reparations through Minister Obata on June 19, 1922,¹⁴³ the Japanese government began taking

concrete steps towards the cultural efforts concept. It enacted a special account law to serve as their basis on March 30, 1923 and – after dispatching Okabe Nagakage of the foreign ministry China Cultural Affairs Bureau and University of Tokyo Professor Irisawa Tatsukichi to China to observe local conditions¹⁴⁴ – established research institutes and libraries, encouraged more Chinese students to study in Japan, and supported the activities of the East Asia Common Culture Association (Tōa Dōbunkai) to provide education in China.

The Japanese perception of the outside world that provided the background for these activities was marked by two characteristics. First, there was a shared sense of frustration that Japan's cultural efforts were becoming weak compared to those of the West, particularly the United States. In a December 26, 1923 telegram from Minister to China Yoshizawa to Foreign Minister Ijūin, Yoshizawa noted that “I have heard directly from those who studied in Japan that they have come under pressure in recent years due to the presence of those who studied in the West” and argued that “because American influence over China will likely greatly increase in the coming years, should we fail to make greater efforts in the field of education ourselves, Japan's status in China in the future will obviously be greatly affected.”¹⁴⁵

Second, the Japanese felt a sense of mission due to their cultural affinity with China. Okabe, now director of the foreign ministry Asian Affairs Bureau Cultural Activities Department, said that “it goes without saying that, as neighbors, China and Japan have had a special and intimate relationship in various ways stretching back to ancient times. History clearly states that, particularly in spiritual and cultural aspects, we have had the closest of connections.” He argued that “China and Japan should cooperate in the pursuit and exaltation of an entirely East Asian culture. This would be to the benefit of global culture.”¹⁴⁶

However, not only did these cultural efforts fail to improve Sino-Japanese relations, they also ironically confirmed China's deep-seated distrust of Japan. Jiangxi Board of Education Chairman Zhu Nianzu, who had been dispatched by the Beiyang government, argued emphatically to the Japanese in April 1923 that they should emphasize “universal and permanent” projects like libraries and museums, and that the education of the Chinese people by Japan in accordance with Japanese standards was “actually extremely troublesome for the Chinese.” Zhu believed that this should instead be left entirely to a government bureau composed of an equal number of Chinese and Japanese members that would have the goal of fostering “students on the basis of entirely Chinese standards.”¹⁴⁷ He met with Foreign Minister Uchida, Prime Minister Katō, Osaka Governor Inoue Kōsai, Gotō Shinpei, and Shibusawa Eiichi and was indignant to find that they all held to “one-sided opinions” and that “not a single one [of my assertions] have been accepted.”¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Asian Affairs Bureau Director Debuchi Katsuji would be appointed to the additional position of head of the China Cultural Affairs Bureau and take the lead on cultural activities (despite worsening relations with Foreign Minister Ijūin).¹⁴⁹

Zhu returned to Japan in December 1923 and negotiated with Debuchi alongside Minister to Japan Wang Rongbao, the results of which were compiled into a memorandum on February 6, 1924. Under the memorandum, a library and humanities research institute would be established in Beijing and a natural sciences research institute in Shanghai. The establishment of a museum, medical university, and hospital would also be explored, and a council consisting of an equal number of Chinese and Japanese members with a Chinese chair was agreed to. The contents of the memorandum strongly reflected the desires of the Chinese.¹⁵⁰

Despite these improvements, the Chinese would come to view Japan's "cultural efforts towards China" as cultural aggression as the Recovery of Educational Rights Movement grew in strength, primarily in the Three Northeast Provinces. The Chinese members of the aforementioned council would withdraw in 1928 following the Jinan Incident. Wang renounced the memorandum that he himself had signed on December 26, 1929 and sought to have the Boxer Rebellion reparations returned to China. Ultimately, despite a Japanese desire to continue cultural efforts, the gap between the two sides had still not been overcome by the time of the Manchurian Incident.¹⁵¹ Chinese student groups in Japan also increased their criticism, calling on President Li Yuanhong and Foreign Minister Gu Weijun to sever economic relations with Japan during the movement for the recovery of Port Arthur and Dalian.¹⁵²

To summarize the above, Japanese diplomacy in the years 1922 and 1923 should be seen as showing an increased commitment to the policy of non-interference in China. First, Japan provided no real support to Zhang Zuolin and watched as he was defeated in the First Fengtian-Zhili War. Second, the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia and northern Manchuria – something that Hara had been unable to realize – was completed, and no military interventions comparable to the Jiandao Expedition were carried out. Third, Japan adopted a cultural approach to improve relations with China, using the Boxer Rebellion reparations to fund "cultural projects." While there was constant friction with the Chinese over these projects, they still deserve a degree of praise as an unprecedented attempt by Japan at using cultural exchanges as policy.

In addition to increasing domestic criticism of the military, the ideology of Japan's political leaders was also a major factor behind the contemporary rejection of interference in China. While Hara Takashi's policy "non-interference with reservations" had been a means of cooperating with Britain and the United States, both Takahashi Korekiyo's concept of an "East Asian economic power" and Uchida Kōsai's belief in peaceful expansion on the continent saw non-interference as having inherent value as China policy.

2. *The Second Wave of International Change*

In the international environment surrounding Japan immediately following the end of World War I, the only other great powers were Britain and the United States. The Soviet Union was subject to an ongoing military intervention by Japan, America, Britain, and France, and China was undergoing a series of conflicts between rival governments in the north and south. This environment was only transitional, however, and the model of Japanese postwar diplomacy formed within it – Hara Diplomacy – was unable to adjust to the new trends that arose in China and the Soviet Union: the establishment of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, the Rights Recovery Movement, and the Chinese Nationalist Revolution and First United Front. This “second wave of international change,” characterized by the arrival of the Soviet Union and the rise of Chinese nationalism, began to make itself known in 1923, just before Shidehara Kijūrō took the helm of Japanese foreign policy, and immediately pushed Japan to reconsider its diplomatic efforts.

(1) The Arrival of the Soviets

The “second wave” manifested in three forms. First, the Soviets developed closer relations with China and made its status as an actor in the international politics of East Asia known. The starting point for post-World War I Sino-Soviet relations were the two Karakhan manifestos.¹⁵³

The first Karakhan Manifesto was issued by Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lev Karakhan on July 15, 1919. It stated that, as the “Chinese Eastern Railway and leased mines, mountains, forests, and other industries” had been stolen by “the Imperial government, Kerensky government, Horvat, Semyonov, Kolchak, and other bandits, former Russian military offices, merchants, and capitalists,” they were all “to be unconditionally returned to China with absolutely no compensation sought.”¹⁵⁴ The Soviet position stood in stark contrast to the cold reception that China had received from the West at the Paris Peace Conference, and it caused a great stir when it was published in the May 1920 issue of the Chinese magazine *Xin Qingnian*.¹⁵⁵ However, Chinese and Soviet views of this manifesto differed as, according to Soviet records, the actual text had never contained any reference to the free return of the CER and other assets.¹⁵⁶

Instead, Article 8 of the second Karakhan Manifesto (issued on September 27, 1920), held that:

The governments of Russia and China have agreed to conclude a special treaty on regulations for the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway so as to meet the needs of the Russian Republic. In addition to China and Russia, the Far Eastern Republic will also be a signatory to this treaty.

This document made no mention of Russian renunciation of the CER without compensation.¹⁵⁷ The Soviets sent Adolf Joffe and Diplomatic Representative for the Far Eastern Republic Yurin to China afterwards.

However, these negotiations were hindered by the issues of the CER and the withdrawal of the Soviets from Mongolia, as well as the feud between Wang Zhengting and Gu Weijun.¹⁵⁸ The establishment of Sino-Soviet relations would require a suitable moment. Chicherin had already told the Mongolian People's Republic in August 1921 that "the Soviet army is present [in Mongolia] to diminish our common enemies for the purpose of guaranteeing the free development and ethnic self-determination of an autonomous Mongolia and to eliminate the constant danger threatening Soviet territory."¹⁵⁹

It was only after Karakhan was placed in charge of negotiations with China in August 1923, after the dissolution of the Far Eastern Republic, that the establishment of relations became a realistic possibility. Following negotiations with Wang Zhengting, Karakhan and Foreign Minister Gu Weijun signed the agreement establishing relations on May 31, 1924. While this agreement (known as the Treaty of Peking) included language stating that "the Government of the Soviet Union recognizes that Outer Mongolia is wholly part of the Republic of China and agrees to respect Chinese sovereignty within its territory" (Article 5), separate negotiations over the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Mongolia were still ongoing. The treaty also eliminated Russia's unequal treaties with China: "the Government of the Soviet Union agrees to the abolition of extraterritoriality and consular courts" (Article 12).¹⁶⁰ And, while the issue of the CER remained unresolved, Karakhan also concluded a provisional management agreement for the railway at this time.¹⁶¹

The Treaty of Peking did not bring about an end to the fundamental points of conflict between the two countries: the issues of the CER and Mongolia. The government of the Russian Soviet Republic had already secretly signed a treaty establishing relations with the Mongolian government on November 5, 1921, recognizing it as the "sole legal government" in Mongolia (Article 1).¹⁶² This clearly contradicted Article 5 of the Treaty of Peking. Additionally, as effective control of the CER was in the hands of the Northeast regime, the Soviets would also need to conclude an agreement with it as well.

Karakhan opened negotiations with the Northeast regime, reaching an agreement known as the Treaty of Fengtian on September 20, 1924. Article 1 of this treaty included a clause concerning joint Sino-Soviet management of the CER.¹⁶³ The Soviet Union had thus successfully regained joint management of the centerpiece of its East Asian policy. The Soviets also dispatched advisors to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT), working to strengthen its influence over both groups. The Soviet Union took advantage of its status as an outsider to the Washington System to carry out its China policy on four levels, working with the Beiyang government, Northeast regime, CCP, and KMT.

How were these Soviet actions towards China seen by Japan? Contemporary Soviet military strength was extremely weak, and even the Imperial Defense

Policy (Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin) adopted in 1923 held that the USSR was preoccupied with economic recovery and domestic unification and did not have the strength to wage a war against Japan.¹⁶⁴ The Japanese military thus viewed potential operations against the United States or China as a higher priority than operations against the Soviets.¹⁶⁵ However, while the USSR may have been weak militarily, that does not mean that Japan's traditional foreign policy concerns about a threat from the north had entirely disappeared. Particularly once the Soviet Union established relations with China and began making inroads with the CCP and KMT, the perception of a Soviet threat spread among Japanese military officers stationed in China.

These officers were particularly interested in Karakhan's negotiations with China. Writing on CER policy on August 18, 1923, Lt. General Kishi Yajirō, director of the Fengtian Secret Service, argued that "'K' is colluding with Zhang Zuolin, hoping to use him to wipe out the Whites."¹⁶⁶ Maj. General Matsui Iwane, director of the Harbin Secret Service, expressed a similar view on the 22nd that the Soviets would enter into "an agreement with Zhang Zuolin to wipe out the White Russians of the China Eastern Railway and place management of the railway into the hands of workers and famers." According to Matsui, "in light of the Empire's special status in the Three Northeast Provinces, we should first issue suitable warning to Zhang Zuolin [...] and provide proper guidance in various matters so as to accommodate our mutual interests, particularly in the Three Northeast Provinces." Rather than the "protective policy of the past that was aimed at placing [Zhang] in our debt," it would be necessary to show "an always gallant attitude, carried out with both benevolence and strictness."¹⁶⁷ Matsui's argument here for adopting a "proper guidance" approach to Zhang can be considered a predecessor for the later theory that support should be given to Zhang as a means of countering the Soviets. One can see the devotion to Zhang that his advisor Col. Machino Takema held from his later recollection that "our fate was one."¹⁶⁸

Mantetsu also shared a policy of strengthening its relationship with Zhang. With the construction of its feeder lines stagnating, it embarked on an aggressive construction policy in February 1923. It carried out the negotiations over the lines itself, with an emphasis on having Zhang act as their counterpart in the negotiations.¹⁶⁹ In January 1923, Capt. Hashimoto Kingorō, director of the Manzhouli Secret Service, reported that the Soviet Union was planning to use the CER as a northern Manchurian base for turning the Far East "red." In September of that year, Kwantung Army Chief of Staff Kawada Akiharu sought to have Japan's intelligence network in northern Manchuria expanded because "the leaders of the Zhili clique are skillfully attempting to check Zhang and the Fengtian clique in the north by having 'Karakhan,' the envoy of the workers and farmers, cause disturbances along the northern CER line."¹⁷⁰

In summary, the arrival of the Soviet Union in the international politics of East Asia led to a perception among some – primarily Japanese army officers

stationed in China – that there was a “Soviet threat,” i.e., that the Soviet Union would use the CER, Beiyang clique, CCP, and KMT as tools for expanding its influence and turning East Asia communist. As Japan, Britain, and the United States had failed to come to an agreement over the CER and Soviet policy at the time of the formation of the Washington System, the arrival of the Soviet threat meant that cooperation with Britain and the US – the basis for the Hara government’s foreign policy – was becoming less persuasive.

Representatives of Zhang visited Fengtian Consul-General Funatsu Tat-suichirō on August 21 to privately sound him out about Japan’s intentions with regard to Zhang’s negotiations with Karakhan over the CER.¹⁷¹ Zhang also invited Funatsu, Kishi, Honjō, and Machino to see him and, after showing them Karakhan’s memorandum, asked, “Should the frontiers of the Three Northeast Provinces come under threat, would the Japanese government be likely to come to my aid?”¹⁷² The demands of Soviet policy led to both Zhang and local Japanese army officers in China to begin seeking stronger relations with each other.

The foreign ministry leadership took a different stance. According to “Thoughts on Chinese Eastern Railway Policy,” a report prepared by the European and American Affairs Bureau 1st Section in November 1923, while it would be undesirable for the Soviets to forcibly gain control of the CER, Chinese recovery of the railway would also have negative effects on Mantetsu. Therefore, a compromise between the two countries was welcome. However, as actively mediating between them would arise antipathy from one or both as well as arouse the suspicion of other countries, Japan should remain an “observer” for the time being. Mantetsu should also carry out negotiations over the Taonan-Qiqihar line and strive to improve its operations south of Harbin as a check for the CER. Asian Affairs Bureau Director Debuchi Katsuji called for resolving the CER issue through negotiations with the Soviets; with regards to the Taoqi Railway, he felt that upgrades should be promoted in southern Manchuria rather than the north as he had concluded that relations with the Second China Consortium should be prioritized.¹⁷³

The difference in opinion between Japanese army officers in China and the foreign ministry leadership can be summarized in four points. First, while the officers emphasized improving relations with Zhang, the foreign ministry felt that the Soviets were the preferable negotiating partners on the CER issue. Second, the officers’ views were based on the Soviet threat theory, but the ministry was also worried about the rights recovery movement in China. Third, while the officers were beginning to favor expansion into northern Manchuria, the ministry called for improving the Japanese presence in southern Manchuria. And fourth, while the officers were considering the situation from within the framework of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan, the ministry was prioritizing the cooperative diplomacy of the Washington System.

There was also deep-seated hostility towards the idea of conducting China policy in collaboration with Britain and the United States in the army leadership. This is evident in the reactions to the May 1923 Lincheng Outrage, an incident in which a train from Pukou to Tianjin was attacked by bandits and many passengers (including foreigners) abducted. Military Affairs Bureau Director Hata Eitarō argued at the time that “the position of the army is that, from the point of view of the defense of the Empire, [Japan should] absolutely avoid any measures intended to lead China towards international management.”¹⁷⁴ That is, Hata was critical of those seeking to have China’s railways placed under international management because he felt this would negatively impact the defense of Japan. This confrontation between the army and the foreign ministry over policy would become apparent during the decision-making process for the “Outline of China Policy” during the Kiyoura government.

With the emergence of the “Soviet threat,” it had essentially become necessary for the cooperative diplomacy between Japan, Britain, and the United States to be rebuilt to take it into account. However, no agreement over Soviet policy had ever existed within the Washington System, and the United States was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan’s continued occupation of northern Sakhalin.¹⁷⁵

(2) The Chinese Rights Recovery Movement

The second characteristic of the second wave of international change was the anti-foreigner rights recovery movement in China. Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who was appointed Minister to China in June 1923, recalled that “the anti-Japanese movement had spread throughout China at that time and, prior to my departure from Tokyo, a meeting of officials from the foreign and war ministries was convened to work out a detailed plan for addressing it.”¹⁷⁶ “Rights recovery movement” is an umbrella term for a number of more specific movements, the most prominent of which were the Recovery of Port Arthur and Dalian Movement, the Recovery of Educational Rights Movement, the Recovery of Leased Land Movement, the Recovery of Railways Movement, the Anti-Japanese Textiles Movement, and the Revision of the Unequal Treaties Movement.

The frictions between China and Japan were particularly highlighted by the Recovery of Port Arthur and Dalian Movement. On January 19, 1923, the Beiyang government’s Legislation Court unanimously passed a bill invalidating the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands (the bill had already been passed by the House of Representatives), and the Japanese were informed of this act on March 10.¹⁷⁷ This notification – which was immediately rejected by the Japanese government – meant that the lease on the Kwantung Leased Territory would come to an end on March 26.¹⁷⁸ The Japanese had already decided prior to World War I that the Kwantung Leased Territory was “the foundation for our interests in the Manchuria-Inner Mongolia area” and that

they were “determined to never leave” – even should the lease expire.¹⁷⁹ Anti-Japanese boycotts and demonstrations spread throughout China in the wake of the Japanese rejection of the demand for the return of Port Arthur and Dalian.¹⁸⁰ When protestors prevented Japanese goods from being offloaded in Changsha, a landing force from the battleship *Fushimi* opened fire, killing two Chinese.¹⁸¹ Minister Yoshizawa repeatedly urged Foreign Minister Gu Weijun to suppress the anti-Japanese movement, but he was unable to prevent a drastic decrease in Japanese exports to China.¹⁸² It would only be in September 1923, after the Great Kanto Earthquake, that the anti-Japanese boycotts died down.¹⁸³

The Recovery of Educational Rights Movement was likely the next most important element of the rights recovery movement.¹⁸⁴ The Japanese education of Chinese in Manchuria had begun with the Russo-Japanese War; those in the Kwantung Leased Territory were placed under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Kwantung Governor-General (Kantō-to Tokufu; from 1919, the Kwantung Agency), while those in areas connected to railways were under the jurisdiction of Mantetsu. Gotō Shinpei, Mantetsu’s first president, emphasized colonization, hospitals, surveys, and education, arguing that “the secret to governance lies in taking advantage of the weaknesses of human life.”¹⁸⁵ He referred to this as “military preparedness in civilian clothing” (*bunsōteki bubu*) and made it his policy for managing Manchuria.¹⁸⁶ Japanese education would increasingly come under criticism from 1924 on, however, and the Recovery of Educational Rights Movement began in the Three Northeast Provinces. Changchun Consul Nishi Haruhiko would later recall that:

the anti-Japanese movement in China, particularly in Manchuria, came to a head again in April 1924, when the Education Rights Recovery Movement began to rise in the territories under Mantetsu Control. This was right after Mr. Akatsuka was appointed minister to Vienna and replaced by Funatsu Tatsuichirō.¹⁸⁷

The movement became more organized under the leadership of education authorities in the Three Northeast Provinces, and it would ultimately achieve its goals under the influence of the Nationalist government following the Northeast Flag Replacement in 1928. The cultural friction brought about by the Japanese education of Chinese in Manchuria, combined with the Recovery of Port Arthur and Dalian Movement, posed a significant problem for the Japanese management of southern Manchuria.

The Recovery of the Leased Land Movement was also ongoing in Fengtian and Jilin.¹⁸⁸ The Recovery of Leased Land Movement was also active in Fengtian and Jilin at this time. Article 2 of the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia included a clause stating that “Japanese subjects [...] may lease land as necessary,” and the Japanese interpreted this as meaning a right to possess land.¹⁸⁹ The Chinese resisted this interpretation, regarding it as invasive, and Fengtian Governor Wang

Yongjiang issued an order banning such leases in 1923.¹⁹⁰ This made it increasingly difficult for the Japanese to manage land. In 1929, a Chinese railway crossing leased land was forcibly removed in the Sakakibara Farm Incident, and the right to lease land was also an indirect cause of the Wanpaoshan Incident in 1931. The right of Japanese to lease land in southern Manchuria became “nearly or entirely unable to carried out.”¹⁹¹

The Recovery of Railways Movement had the potential to threaten the core of Japanese interests in Manchuria.¹⁹² In 1921, the Northeast regime began construction on part of a railway between Dahushan and Tongliao, and in 1924 the regime established the Three Northeast Provinces Transportation Committee to carry out an independent railway policy for the region. This railway policy, which Fengtian Governor Wang played a central role in, was in some respects an application of the rights recovery movement against Mantetsu, and before long the Japanese began to speak of a “Mantetsu Crisis” and a Chinese plan to encircle the company’s rail lines. While Zhang Zuolin had established closer relations with Japan during the Hara government, he increasingly devoted himself to the administration of the Three Northeast Provinces in the wake of his defeat in the First Fengtian-Zhili War, and the Northeast itself would more and more become an economic competitor for Japan.

In summary, the rights recovery and anti-foreign goods movements had the potential to greatly upset Japanese interests in China, and Japan took note of the “threat of the anti-Japanese movement.” In discussing the significance of this threat, I would like to compare it to the May Fourth Movement which, in connection to the Shandong Question, was the largest anti-Japanese movement during the Hara government. But Japanese interests in Shandong were only something that Japan had recently obtained through wartime opportunism, and the May Fourth Movement was unsuccessful in overturning these gains. In contrast, this later threat targeted Japan’s special interests and privileges in south Manchuria and its textile industry in China, both of which were at the very center of Japanese national interests. And it had already achieved some success, as the Beiyang government had unilaterally annulled the treaty grounds for the Kwantung Leased Territory.

Another significant difference is that, during the May Fourth Movement, Zhang had acted to suppress the anti-Japanese movement in the Three Northeast Provinces. But now the Northeast regime itself was acting against Japanese interests in its railway policy and position on the leased land issue. And while the Shandong Question had been resolved to Japan’s advantage through a framework of cooperation with the United States and Britain at the Washington Conference, this cooperative diplomacy was essentially a non-factor in addressed the new threat. All this meant that the “threat of the anti-Japanese movement” was an incomparably more serious matter than had faced the Hara government. And it would be part of the international environment that would face Shidehara as foreign minister.

(3) The First United Front and the Chinese Nationalist Revolution

The third characteristic of the second wave of international change was the development of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution and the formation of the First United Front under Soviet influence.¹⁹³ In 1922, Sun Yat-sen began corresponding with Lenin and Joffe, seeking to collaborate with Zhang Zuolin on the reunification of China. Joffe also provided Sun with confidential information on the progress of the negotiations over establishing diplomatic ties between China and the Soviet Union, something that Sun was concerned about.¹⁹⁴

Sun issued a joint declaration with Joffe on January 26, 1923 in which they laid out a plan for national unification with Soviet support.¹⁹⁵ The third Guangzhou government was then formed in March and increasingly followed a course of cooperation with the Soviets. In a September 16 letter to Karakhan (which was negotiating over diplomatic relations in Beijing), Sun wrote that:

It is in the true interests of both China and the Soviet Union for us to carry out policies together. By doing so, we will be able to gain equal status to the great powers and escape from the political and economic pressure of international imperialism.¹⁹⁶

In November, the reorganization of the KMT was announced under the influence of special advisor Mikhail Borodin.¹⁹⁷

After receiving instructions from the Comintern Executive Committee in January 1923,¹⁹⁸ the CCP began looking into forming a united front with the KMT under the guidance of Comintern representative Henk Sneevliet.¹⁹⁹ The party increased its criticism of the warlords following Wu Peifu's use of force to suppress a strike at the Jinghan Railway on February 7, and it officially resolved to work with the KMT at its 3rd Party Congress in June.²⁰⁰ On January 30, 1924, the final day of the KMT's 1st National Congress, numerous CCP members were chosen for KMT leadership positions. Li Dazhao was selected to the Beijing Central Executive Committee, and Mao Zedong and Qu Qiubai became candidates for the Shanghai Central Executive Committee.²⁰¹

However, it needs to be remembered that there was deep-seated resistance within both parties to the formation of a united front under Soviet influence. Notably, while the first general secretary of the CCP, Chen Duxiu, had been unable to resist the Comintern's plans for a united front, he continued to seek its dissolution.²⁰² Chiang Kai-shek initially had high expectations towards the Soviets, referring to them as "China's sole comrades" and visiting the USSR in the autumn of 1923.²⁰³ But in a March 14, 1924 letter to Liao Zhongkai, written after his return to China, Chiang wrote that "the Soviet Communist Party's only policy towards China is emphasizing the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party; it has no long-term intention of having our party and the CCP work together to achieve mutual success."²⁰⁴ However, as became apparent after Chiang's diary entries from this period became public, it would

not be until the time of the Northern Expedition that he was unable to disavow Sun's policy of working with the Soviets and accepting the CCP.²⁰⁵ Even after he was appointed commandant of the newly-established Whampoa Military Academy in June 1924, the school still included CCP members on the staff such as Ye Jianying as an instructor and Zhou Enlai as deputy director of the school's political department.²⁰⁶

With the First United Front thus formed, the KMT began moving towards the Northern Expedition. After Cao Kun secured the Beiyang presidency through bribery in October 1923, Sun asked the foreign legations not to recognize his administration.²⁰⁷ In Sun's "Statement on My Departure for the North," written in November 1924, he stated that "the purpose of the Northern Expedition is not merely the defeat of Cao Kun and Wu Peifu but ensuring that they never have any successors. In other words, the purpose of the Northern Expedition is not merely to defeat the warlords but to destroy the imperialism they rely upon."²⁰⁸

A notable incident in the relations between foreign nations and the KMT government in the south came in July 1923, when the Guangzhou government demanded the distribution of Guangdong's maritime customs. This was something that other countries could not ignore.²⁰⁹ Guangzhou Foreign Minister Wu Chaoshu petitioned Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service Francis Aglen and Guangzhou Consul-General Amō Eiji to have surplus customs revenue distributed to the government and submitted an official memorandum to this effect in September.²¹⁰ After Amō informed Foreign Minister Ijūin of Sun Yat-sen's "plan to seize maritime customs," Japan, Britain, the United States, France, and Italy responded by dispatching warships in a show of force in December.²¹¹ In a January 23, 1924 declaration at the 1st KMT National Congress, the party then declared that, not only would it be taking over the management of maritime customs, but it was also abolishing all unequal treaties related to the leased territories and consular courts.²¹²

Japan tended to see these new developments – the First United Front and the Chinese Nationalist Revolution – as disruptive to the existing order, and they were perceived as a threat, "the threat of the Nationalist Revolution." The naval show of force by Western governments showed the limits of the foreign policy that had resulted from Hara Diplomacy. Neither increasingly close KMT-CCP relations nor a Chinese nationalist revolution were developments that had been foreseen during the Hara government, and the model for foreign relations he had laid down thus lacked countermeasures against these new trends.

The arrival of the Soviet Union in the international politics of East Asia and the rise of Chinese nationalism – both of which occurred around 1923 – brought about major changes in those politics, sufficiently so to be considered a second wave of international change. For Japan, this "second wave" meant the appearance of three "threats": the threat of the Soviet Union, the threat of the anti-

Japanese movement, and the threat of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. Its existing foreign policy was insufficient for dealing with this new international environment, as Hara Diplomacy had been formulated during a “simplified” international environment and lacked any means of addressing these three threats. The limits of the postwar Japanese diplomatic model had been exposed, and from 1924 on, Japan was forced to look for new alternative policies that *were* capable of responding.

III. Summary: From the “Simplified International Environment” to the “Three Threats”

Hara Takashi, the politician who laid down the model for Japan’s postwar diplomacy, was assassinated on November 4, 1921. Japanese governments changed at a dizzying pace in the roughly two years following his death, going from Takahashi Korekiyo to Katō Tomosaburō to Yamamoto Gonbee. While Hara was assassinated immediately prior to the opening of the Washington Conference, it had been his government that had formulated Japan’s basic strategy for the conference. As such, the period from July to October 1921 during which his government worked out its plan for the conference reveals the final phase of Hara Diplomacy.

The first wave of international change, which was characterized by the rise of the United States to great power status, reached its climax at the Washington Conference. Carefully examining the details of that conference, however, we can understand that Japan and Britain did not permit America to take the initiative; this is most clearly represented by the fate of Hughes’ draft resolution. Japan was able to manage the conference by applying the Hara doctrine of cooperating with Britain and the US on Far Eastern questions only so long as reservations were made for Japanese interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. That Japan was able to manage the postwar situation to its advantage by cooperating with Britain and the US on the Shandong Question, the Twenty-One Demands issue, and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Siberia and northern Manchuria made a strong impression on the Japanese as to the utility of such cooperation. The *de facto* consent to maintaining each country’s vested interests – suggested by the respective deliberations over Root’s Four Principles and Hughes’ draft resolution – made it easy for Japan to accept the Washington System. But the system did not extend to an agreement over Soviet policy, and Chinese and Japanese opposition to the American plan to strengthen international management over the CER effectively handed the Soviet Union a foothold for its East Asian policy.

But Japan did not merely continue in Hara’s footsteps following the Washington Conference. The years following the conference saw no clear deviations from the policy of non-interference in China comparable to the Jiandao Expedition or Hara’s reorganization of Japanese troops in northern Manchuria and Siberia. Japan even provided little in the way of support to Zhang Zuolin, as is clearly seen in its response to the First Fengtian-Zhili

War. And following Japan’s voluntary withdrawal of its troops from Siberia and northern Manchuria (something that Hara had been unable to accomplish), the country saw increased domestic criticism of the military.

As such, China policy during this period effectively shifted from (in the terminology of this book) one of “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang” to one of “absolute non-interference” and “no support of Zhang.” Ideologically as well, Japanese leaders went from seeing non-interference in China as a means of cooperation with the West, as had been the case under Hara, to hoping for Sino-Japanese cooperation. This is evident in Prime Minister Takahashi and Foreign Minister Uchida’s ideas for economic expansion on the continent and Japan’s adoption of “cultural activities in China” as a cultural means of closer ties. In that sense, an increased commitment to non-interference is evident in the Japanese diplomacy of this period. These positions are summarized in Table 2.1.

At the same time, the second wave – characterized by the arrival of the Soviets and the rise of Chinese nationalism – introduced three “threats” to Japan: the threat of the Soviet Union, the threat of the anti-Japanese movement, and the threat of the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. These new trends brought with them novel situations that Hara Diplomacy, having been formulated under the previous “simplified” international environment, had been unable to foresee. Japan was thus forced to look for new visions capable of dealing with these

Table 2.1 Patterns of China Policy (1922–1923)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria	Nation-wide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
			Takahashi, Katō Tomosaburō, Obata, Yoshida Isaburō	No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
		Banzai, Honjō, War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau	Uchida	Limited Support of Zhang	
	Akatsuka, Higashi, Kishi, Kawai, Machino			Active Support of Zhang	
				Elimination of Zhang	

Source: Author

threats. Meanwhile, while the conference on Chinese customs approved at the Washington Conference should have provided an opportunity for reconfirming the collaborative diplomacy between Japan, America, and Britain and stabilizing the finances of the Beiyang government, the holding of the conference ran into difficulties. The Second China Consortium also approached the expiration of its term in July 1924 without having ever issued a loan. While its term was extended indefinitely, it effectively existed in name only.

It seems reasonable to suggest that the leaders of Japan, Britain, and the United States should have spent this period seriously discussing how to respond to the second wave and explored ways of further developing the cooperative diplomacy that existed within the Washington System.

Source Acronyms

AS	Academia Sinica, Taipei
AVPRF	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow
CSFR	Cheng Daode, Zheng Yueming, Rao Geping, eds., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Ziliao Xuanbian, 1919–1931</i> [Selected Materials on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931] (Beijing: Peking University, 1985)
CSR	Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jindaishi Ziliao Bianjishi, ed., <i>Miji Lucun</i> [Secret Book Records] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1984)
DBFP	E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Series 1–2</i> (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1946–1947)
DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)
FRUS	Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., <i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
JDC	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho</i> [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
JDR	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Bunsho</i> [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)

MOFA	Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
NDL	Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
NIDS	Military Archives, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo
PRO	Public Records Office, London
RD	Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Shiliao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., <i>Geming Wenxian</i> [Revolutionary Diplomacy], Vol. 1–117 (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1957–1989)
RG 59	General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD
SJR	Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., <i>Zhongri Guanxi Shiliao</i> [Records on Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987–1996)

Notes

- 1 Notable research on the Washington System includes: Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), 16–22, 57–88; Hosoya Chihiro, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nihon Gaikō, 1914–1945* [Japanese Diplomacy between the Great Wars, 1914–1945] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1988), 75–114. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Washinton Kaigi to Kyokutō Mondai – 1921–1922” [The Washington Conference and Far Eastern Questions, 1921–1922], *Shigaku Zasshi* 108:2 (1999), 1–33.
- 2 Sadao Asada, “Japan’s ‘Special Interests’ and the Washington Conference, 1921–22,” *American Historical Review* 67:1 (1961), 62–70. Asada Sadao, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nichibei Kankei – Kaigun to Seisaku Kentei Katei* [US-Japanese Relations in the Interwar Period: The Navy and the Policymaking Process] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1993), 130–131. Thomas H. Buckley, *The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921–1922* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1970), 153.
- 3 Iriye 16, 19.
- 4 It is, of course, not the case that there have been absolutely no attempts. Asada Sadao said that “Japanese diplomacy moved from the ‘old diplomacy’ of the World War I period to the ‘new diplomacy’ of Shidehara, while American diplomacy reverted from Wilsonian ‘new diplomacy’ to the ‘old diplomacy’ of Theodore Roosevelt. We can concisely state that the creation of the Washington System occurred as these two movements crossed one another” (Asada, *Ryōtaisenkan no Nichibei Kankei*, 138–139). Also, Mitani Taichirō, mainly based on secondary sources, argued that, while a “Hughes-MacMurray group” emphasizing stronger relations with Japan was formed during the Harding administration, this was later replaced by a “Kellogg-Johnson group” that focused on relations with China. Mitani Taichirō, “Taishō Demokurashī to Washinton Taisei 1915–1930” [Taishō Democracy and the Washington System, 1915–1930], in Hosoya Chihiro, ed., *Nichibei Kankei Tsūshi* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1995), 94–99.
- 5 MacMurray was appointed as an “expert assistant” on November 3, 1921. Charles Evans Hughes to MacMurray (November 3, 1921), Box 23, John Van

- Antwerp MacMurray Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Notable research on MacMurray include: Thomas Buckley, "John Van Antwerp MacMurray: The Diplomacy of an American Mandarin," in Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, eds., *Diplomats in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1919-1941* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1974), 27-48; Janet Sue Colleston, "JVA MacMurray, American Minister to China, 1925-1929: The Failure of a Mission," Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1977; Arthur Waldron, ed., *How the Peace Was Lost* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1992), 1-56. However, as has been pointed out by Kitaoka Shin'ichi, there is a tendency to minimize MacMurray's role at the Washington Conference. See: Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "Washinton Taisei to 'Kokusai Kyōchō' no Seishin - Makumari Memorandumu (1935) ni Yosete" [The Washington System and the Spirit of "International Cooperation": On the Makumari Memorandum], *Rikkyō Hōgaku* No. 23 (1984), 78.
- 6 Notable research on the actions of the Chinese include: Wunsz King, *China at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922* (New York: St. John's University Press, 1963); Stanley J. Grant, "Chinese Participation at the Washington Conference, 1921-1922," Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1969; Fujii Shōzō, "Washinton Kaigi to Chūgoku no Minzoku Undō" [The Washington Conference and China's Nationalist Movement], *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō* No. 50 (1970), 203-253; Fujii Shōzō, 'Heiwa' kara no Kaihō - Chūgoku" [China: Release from "Peace"], *Nenpō Seijigaku* (1970), 53-98; Pao-chin Chu, *V.K. Wellington Koo: A Case Study of China's Diplomat and Diplomacy of Nationalism, 1912-1966* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1981), 33-76; Kawashima Shin, "Huashengdun Huiyu yu Beijing Zhengfu de Choubei - Yi Duiwai Tongyi Wei Zhongxin" [The Washington Conference and the Beijing Government's Preparations: Centering on External Efforts for Unification], *Minguo Yanjiu* (1995:2), 113-133; Kawashima Shin, "1921-Nen Washinton Kaigi Sanka o Meguru Chūgoku Tōitsu Rongi - Minkoku Pekin Seifu Gaikōbu ni yoru Gaikō Shutai Hyōgen to Seitōsei no Iji" [The Chinese Unification Debate over Participation in the 1921 Washington Conference: the Beijing Government Foreign Ministry's Preservation of Legitimacy and its Expressions as a Diplomatic Actor], *Shichō* No. 45 (1999), 115-136; Kawashima Shin, "Washinton Kaigi ni okeru Chūka Minkoku Zenken Daihyōdan Hensei Katei" [The Formation of the Republic of China Delegation for The Washington Conference], *Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū* 50:2 (1999), 193-233; Stephen G. Craft, "Nationalism, Imperialism and Sino-American Relations: V.K. Wellington Koo and China's Quest for International Autonomy and Power, 1912-1949," Doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997, 119-131. While the Second Historical Archives of China does hold some relevant records like "Chinese representative Shi Zhaoji attended the first session of the Pacific and Far East committee and proposed ten principles for the political situation in the Far East" (Beiyang Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan, 1039.87), most of the major Chinese diplomatic documents related to the Washington Conference are held at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.
- 7 DVPS 4:224-226. There has been some research on the Soviet Union and the Washington Conference, such as Asano Toyomi, "Washinton Taisei to Nihon no Soren Shōnin" [The Washington System and Japan's Recognition of the Soviet Union], *Kokusai Kankei-ron Kenkyū* No. 7 (1989), 71-73; and Ozawa Haruko, "Washinton Kaigi to Sobieto Gaikō - Kyokutō Kyōwakoku no Yakuwari o Chūshin ni" [The Washington Conference and Soviet Diplomacy: Focusing on the Role of the Far Eastern Republic], *Seiji Keizai Shigaku* No. 307 (1992), 1-21. However, these do not discuss the failure of the participants to reach an agreement over policy towards the Soviets in the same manner as this chapter.

- 8 Chicherin to Lenin (November 6, 1921), Rossiyskiy tsentr khraneniya i izucheniya dokumentov noveishey istorii, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka Rossiyskoy akademii nauk, Vostochnoaziatskiy seminar svobodnogo universiteta Berlina, eds., *VKP(b), Komintern i natsional'no-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Kitae: dokumenty* (Moscow, 1994), 1:64. Lenin to Chicherin, (November 7, 1921), *ibid.*, 65.
- 9 Existing research not already mentioned includes: Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co, 1938), 2:445–466; Russell H. Fifield, “Secretary Hughes and the Shantung Question,” *Pacific Historical Review* 23:4 (1954), 373–385; Sadao Asada, “Japan and the United States, 1915–1925,” Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1963; Asada Sadao, “Amerika no Tainichi-kan to ‘Washinton Taisei’” [America’s View of Japan and the “Washington System”], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 34 (1967), 36–57; Asada Sadao, “Washinton Kaigi” [The Washington Conference], in Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan, *Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten Hensan linkai*, eds., *Shinpan Nihon Gaikōshi Jiten* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992), 1093–1097; Asada Sadao, “Washinton Taisei”, *ibid.*, 1098–1102; Betty Glad, *Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence: A Study in American Diplomacy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), 281–303; Aruga Tadashi, “Kyōchō ni yoru Yokusei – Amerika” [Containment Through Collaboration: America], *Nenpō Seijigaku* (1970), 1–52; Wm. Roger Louis, *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919–1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 79–108; Noel H. Pugach, “American Friendship for China and the Shantung Question at the Washington Conference,” *Journal of American History* 64:1 (1977), 67–86; Wu Canghai, *Shandong Xuanan Jiejur zhi Jingwei* [How the Pending Issue of Shandong was Resolved] (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwuyin Shuguan, 1987); Ōbata Tokushirō, *Nihon Gaikō no Hatten to Chōsei – Nihon Gaikōshi Kenkyū Dai Ni Kan* [The Development and Adjustment of Japanese Diplomacy: Research into Japanese Diplomacy Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Seibundō, 1989), 147–181; Satō Seizaburō, “*Shi no Chōyaku*” o Koete – *Seiyō no Shōgeki to Nihon* [Overcoming the “Jump of Death”: The Western Shock and Japan] (Tokyo: Tōshi Shuppan, 1992), 239–323; Erik Goldstein, John Maurer, eds., *The Washington Conference, 1921–22: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor* (Portland: Frank Cass, 1994).
- 10 For Hughes’ recollections regarding the climate within the US favoring arms limitations, see: David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 238–248.
- 11 JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 1:16–17.
- 12 Hara Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi Nikki* [The Diary of Hara Takashi] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), 5:413.
- 13 Horiuchi Kensuke, *Horiuchi Kensuke Kaikoroku – Nihon Gaikō 50-Nen no Rimenshi* [The Memoirs of Horiuchi Kensuke: An Inner Account of 50 Years of Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun, 1979), 29. Ishii Itarō, who was 3rd Secretary at the Japanese embassy in the US at the time, made similar remarks on page 95 of his memoirs, *Gaikōkan no Isshō* [The Life of a Diplomat] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1986).
- 14 JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 1:39–42.
- 15 Eliot to Curzon (July 21, 1921), Mss Eur F 112/291B, George Nathaniel Curzon Papers, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library.
- 16 Memorandum by Hughes of a Conversation with Shidehara (July 21, 1921), FRUS, 1921, 1:613–615. Shidehara to Uchida (July 21, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 17–19. Shidehara to Uchida (August 18, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 25–27. Shidehara to Uchida (September 9, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 2, 49–52.
- 17 Memorandum by Hughes of a Conversation with Sze (August 11, 1921), FRUS, 1921, 1:615.

- 18 *Guangdong Qunbao* (September 6, 1921), in Zhongshan Daxue Lishi xi Sun Zhongshan Yanjiushi ta, ed., *Sun Zhongshan Quanji* [Sun Yat-sen's Complete Works] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1985, 5:595–596). The Beiyang government stated that it would be participating in the Washington Conference on August 16, 1921 (CSFR 100). See also: Sun Yat-sen to Harding (September 16, 1921), 793.94/1238, RG 59.
- 19 Acting US Ambassador to Japan Bell to Uchida (September 12, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 1:154–156. US Minister to China Schurman to Beiyang foreign ministry (September 12, 1921), CSFR, 100–101. Memorandum by the Department of State (November 5, 1921), 500.A4/258, RG 59.
- 20 Shidehara to Uchida (September 12, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 1:150–153.
- 21 Memorandum by the Department of State (January 13, 1921), FRUS, 1921, 1:564–566. The American embassy in Japan informed the Japanese foreign ministry of this on August 4, 1921 (JDR, 1921, Vol 3, 2:1165–1167). See also: “Memoranda by Stevens in connection with a suggested plan for the international control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, submitted at the request of the Department of State (Undated),” Reel 124, Charles Evans Hughes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. For the Japanese view that, under Article 5 of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways Management Agreement, international management of the railways would end once all military forces had been withdrawn, see “The ‘Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition’ and the Chinese Eastern Railway” in Chapter 1.
- 22 Hara Government Cabinet Decision (October 21, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 3, 2:1175–1176. Charles Beecher Warren (US Ambassador to Japan) to Hughes (October 29, 1921), FRUS, 1921, 1:608–610.
- 23 Horiuchi 31–33. Matsudaira was officially appointed director of the European and American Affairs Bureau on November 13, 1921; Asian Affairs Bureau Director Yoshizawa had simultaneously held that position until that date.
- 24 JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 1:181–218. This cabinet decision was based on an October 12, 1921 Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs decision.
- 25 Amō Eiji Nikki/Shiryōshū Kankōkai, ed., *Amō Eiji Nikki/Shiryōshū* [The Diary and Works of Amō Eiji] (Tokyo: Amō Eiji Nikki/Shiryōshū Kankōkai, 1984), 1:1065.
- 26 CSFR 102–104.
- 27 Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.24.24.2, AS.
- 28 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (November 22, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, 2:7–8.
- 29 Chandler Parsons Anderson Diary (November 18, 1921), Box 2, Chandler Parsons Anderson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Even prior to the conference, Root had told Stanley Washburn that “Japan is the biggest problem.” Reminiscences by Stanley Washburn, 1950, p. 139, Oral History Project, Columbia University. The Japanese had a high opinion of Root prior to the conference, as can be seen from Shidehara nominating him to serve on the Permanent Court of International Justice. This was politely turned down by Root, however. Shidehara to Root (August 6, 1921), Folder: General Correspondence, S, 1921, Box 139, Root Papers; Root to Shidehara, August 9, Box 139, Elihu Root Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 30 European and American Affairs Bureau, 3rd Section Consular Assistant Miura Takemi, “Washinton Kaigi Keika Dai Nibu Taiheyō Oyobi Kyokutō ni kan suru Mondai” [The Course of the Washington Conference, Part 2: Pacific and Far Eastern Questions] (May 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi Kyokutō Mondai, 56. The same views can be seen in a November 8, 1921 letter from French Ambassador to Japan Paul Claudel to Briand. Paul Claudel, *Kodokuna Teikoku - Nihon no 1920 Nendai* [An Isolated Empire: Japan in the 1920s], trans. Nara

- Michiko (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1999), 28. Claudel would continue to argue for closer French relations with Japan afterwards on the grounds that, with Japan becoming increasingly isolated due to Anglo-American cooperation, maintaining friendly relations with Japan could increase French influence in Asia. *Ibid.*, 57–58, 182–186, 298–302, 360–362.
- 31 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (November 20, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 10–12. See also: Anderson Diary (November 20, 1921), Box 2, Anderson Papers.
- 32 Balfour to F.O. (November 19, 1921), 12391/21/108, FO 228/3538, PRO. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (November 20, 1921), CSR, 404–405.
- 33 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (November 26, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 16–18. Anderson Diary (December 5, 1921), Box 2, Anderson Papers.
- 34 Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (November 24, 1921), CSR 407–408.
- 35 JDC 1:440. However, Lansing himself stated regarding the agreement that “there was absolutely no intention of accepting the gaining of preferential status and interests not possessed by other countries by Japan.” Robert Lansing, “Lansing-Ishii Agreement” (October 3, 1921), Reel 1, Robert Lansing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. See also: Robert Lansing, *War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of States* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935), 305–306. No similar stipulation is found in John Van Antwerp MacMurray, ed., *Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1884–1919* (New York: H. Fertig, 1973), 2:1394–1397.
- 36 MacMurray to Hughes (November 21, 1921), Reel 124, Hughes Papers.
- 37 Balfour to FO (January 18, 1922), 561/22/49, FO 228/3539, PRO. Miura, “Washinton Kaigi Keika Dai Ni Bu Taiheiyō Oyobi Kyokutō ni kan suru Mondai,” 247–248. This resolution was drafted at the same time that Hughes and others were formulating the Nine-Power Treaty. See also: Anderson Diary (January 14, 17, 1922), Box 2, Anderson Papers.
- 38 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 21, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 134–136. For glimpses into Hughes’ belief in the principle of the Open Door, see: Charles E. Hughes, “Some Aspects of Our Foreign Policy” (December 29, 1922), 29–33, 500.A4/508, RG 59; Charles E. Hughes, *The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1923), 4–5, Box 6, Leland Harrison Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 39 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 23, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 136–139. Balfour to FO (January 19, 1922), 619/22/53, FO 228/3539, PRO. Resolution Establishing a Board of Reference for Far Eastern Questions (February 4, 1922), FRUS, 1922, 1:289. See also: Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (February 4, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.24.24.3, AS.
- 40 Chinese Delegation to Uchida (January 26, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 144–147.
- 41 JDC 2:12–15. FRUS, 1922, 1:282–287. CSFR 125–128.
- 42 Yan Huiqing, *Yan Huiqing Zizhuan* [The Autobiography of Yan Huiqing], trans. Yao Songling (Taipei: Zhuanji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1973), 111.
- 43 JDC 2:15–19. FRUS, 1922, 1:276–281. CSFR 122–125.
- 44 Horiuchi 35. Draft Handed to Hughes by Balfour During their Conversation of November 11, 1921, FRUS, 1922, 1: 271–272. Memorandum by Maurice Hankey Respecting Balfour’s Interview with Hughes (November 11, 1921), DBFP, First Series, 14:470–471.
- 45 Shidehara Kijūrō, “Washinton Kaigi no Rimen-kan Sonota” [An Inside View of the Washington Conference, etc.] (February 1939), in *Shidehara Heiwa Bunko*, Vol. 11, NDL. Similar statements can be found in Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, ed., *Shidehara Kijūrō* (Tokyo: Shidehara Heiwa Zaidan, 1955), 224–225, and

- Shidehara Kijūrō, *Gaikō 50-Nen* [50 Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1987), 93–94.
- 46 Curzon to Alston (October 24, 1921), DBFP, First Series, 14:451–452.
- 47 John Van Antwerp MacMurray, “Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East” (November 1, 1935), Waldron 63.
- 48 Uchida to Japanese Delegation (November 19, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 423–425. Zhou Ziqi communicated this in a letter to Yan. Yan Huiqing, See: *Yan Huiqing Riji* [The Diary of Yan Huiqing], trans. Shanghaishi Dangan-guan (Beijing: Zhongguo Dangan Chubanshe, 1996), 2:88.
- 49 Balfour to Curzon (November 25, 1921), DBFP, First Series, 14:511. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (November 25, 1921), CSFR 409–410. Shi to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (November 27, 1921), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:345–346. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (November 30, 1921), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:346–347. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (November 27, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 1, 439–440.
- 50 Meeting between Yan and British Minister to China Alston (November 30, 1921), Waijiao Dangan 03.39.17.17.1 AS. Yan Huiqing sent a telegram to Shi Zhaoji on November 28 allowing negotiations outside of the conference. See: Yan, *Yan Huiqing Riji*, 2:93.
- 51 Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (December 1, 1921), CSR, 471–472. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 4, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 444–446. See also: Anderson Diary (February 6, 1922), Box 2, Anderson Papers.
- 52 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Chinese Delegation (November 28, 1921), CSFR, Shandong Wenti, 1:346. Beiyang Government Statement (December 11, 1921), *Waijiao Gongbao* No. 7 (January 1922), in Shen Yunlong, ed., *Jindai Zhongguo Shiliao Congkan Sanbian Di Sansiji* [Modern Chinese Historical Materials, Vol. 3 No. 34] (Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1987), 1–2.
- 53 Hughes to US Minister to China Schurman (December 7, 1921), FRUS, 1922 1, 274–275. See also: Anderson Diary (December 27, 1921), Box 2, Anderson Papers.
- 54 Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce to Xu Shichang, State Council, Foreign Ministry (September 29, 1921), Waijiao Dangan 03.39.21.21.3, AS. Yan, *Yan Huiqing Riji*, 2:97. Schurman to Hughes (December 11, 1921), FRUS, 1922 1, 275–276.
- 55 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 17, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 476–478. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (December 21, 1921), CSR, 480. When Shidehara asked at the December 17, 1921 meeting what was meant by “national bonds,” Gu answered that “what is written on the bonds does not have any deep significance, they are ultimately a bond of debt after all.” See: Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 20, 1921), JDR, Washinton, Vol. 2, 493–495.
- 56 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 20, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 496–497.
- 57 Balfour to Alston (January 10, 1922), 345/22/42, FO 228/3539, PRO. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 11, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 542–544. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 12, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 544–545. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 10, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 546. As seen from the fifth clause of an August 29, 1921 memorandum given to Hughes, MacMurray was already looking for concrete steps to take towards the resolution of the Shandong Question. See: MacMurray to Hughes (August 29, 1921), Box 3, Harrison Papers. MacMurray to Hughes (November 25, 1921), Reel 124, Hughes Papers. MacMurray, “Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Minister Mr. Alfred Sze” (December 15, 1921), Reel 126, Hughes Papers.

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- 58 Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (January 9, 1922), CSR, 468–487. Balfour to E. Crowe (January 10, 1922), DBFP, First Series, 14:592–593.
- 59 Uchida to Japanese Delegations (January 12, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 548–550.
- 60 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 29, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 583–586.
- 61 Balfour to Alston (January 22, 1922), 815/22/64, FO 228/3539, PRO. See also: Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (January 19, 1922), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:414; Hughes to Schurman (January 22, 1922), FRUS, 1922 1, 941–943; Balfour to Curzon (January 24, 1922), DBFP, First Series, 14:621–622; Hughes to MacMurray (January 26, 1922), 793.94/1265, RG 59.
- 62 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Chinese Delegation (January 26, 1922), CSR 497–498. See also: Meeting between Yan and Schurman (January 18, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.17.17.3, AS; Lampson to Hughes (February 2, 1922), Reel 126, Hughes Papers.
- 63 JDC 2:3–8; FRUS, 1922 1, 948–956. CSFR 109–114. Restitution for public assets within the concession and the Kiautschou Bay Leased Territory, and the withdrawal of Japanese forces were also explicitly laid out.
- 64 Hara Government Cabinet Decision (October 21, 1921), JDC 1:530–532.
- 65 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50-Nen*, 84, 88.
- 66 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 8, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 70–73. See also: Balfour to Curzon (November 27, 1921), DBFP, First Series, 14:516–517; Balfour to Curzon (December 19, 1921), DBFP, First Series, 14:565–566; Balfour to Lloyd George (February 4, 1922), DBFP, First Series, 14:636–640. The British Foreign Office had been actively discussing returning Weihaiwei since the Paris Peace Conference. See: FO to Jordan (February 8, 1919), Jordan to FO (February 11, 1919), 634/1/2, FO 608/209, PRO; Memorandum by Wellesley (August 22, 1921), F 3102/833/10, FO 228/3538, PRO.
- 67 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 8, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 70–73. See also: Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (December 7, 1921), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.26.26.3, AS. Weihaiwei and Guangzhouwan would be returned in 1930 and 1946, respectively. For the process of Weihaiwei's return, see: Zhengzhi Huiyi Mishuchu, ed., “Zhengzhi Huiyi Baogao” [Political Council Report] (November 12, 1930), Zhongguo Guomindang Dangan, 00.1/13, Zhongguo Guomindang Wenhua Yunbo Weiyuanhui Dangshiguan, 13–16.
- 68 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (December 18, 1921), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 115–116.
- 69 Shi Zhaoji to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (December 24, 1921), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.22.22.2, AS. Miura, “Washinton Kaigi Keika Dai Nibu Taiheiyō Oyobi Kyokutō ni kan suru Mondai” (May 1922), 301.
- 70 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 24, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 142–144.
- 71 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (February 6, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 190–195. The first two concerned Group 2, Article 5, and Group 2, Article 6 of the Twenty-One Demands.
- 72 JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 1, 193–194.
- 73 CSFR 116–118. Wang Chonghui expressed his dissatisfaction with the conference's discussion of the treaties related to the Twenty-One Demands at the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce on January 10, 1922 and argued that China should seek their total abolition at a later opportunity. See: Wang Chonghui, “Taipingyang Huiyi zhi Jingguo,” *Dongfan Zazhi* 19:4 (1922), 112–115.
- 74 For recent leading research on the Twenty-One Demands issue, see: Takahara Shūsuke, “Wiruson Seiken to ‘Taika Nijū Ikka Jō’ Mondai,” *Rokkōdai Ronshū Hōgaku Seijigaku-hen* 43:3 (1997), 105–131; Lu Shenhua, “Yuan Shikai Zhengfu

- yu Zhongri Ershiyi Tiao Jiaoshe,” Master’s Thesis, History Department, National Chung Hsing University (2000).
- 75 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (February 12, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 224–229.
- 76 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50-Nen*, 92.
- 77 *New York Times* (February 3, 1922), 1.
- 78 Shidehara, *Gaikō 50-Nen*, 95.
- 79 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 28, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 346–355.
- 80 Balfour to Curzon (January 19, 1922), DBFP, First Series, 14:613–614. Miura, “Washinton Kaigi Keika Dai Nibu Taiheiyō Oyobi Kyokutō ni kan suru Mondai,” (May 1922), 437. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (January 20, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.16.16.1, AS. In parallel to its actions at the conference, the United States was also informally negotiating with Zhang Zuolin to prevent expansion of Japanese influence over the CER. See: Hughes to Schurman (December 24, 1921), 893.00/4168, RG 59. Schurman later visited Fengtian and received a warm welcome. See: Chang Tso-lin to Schurman (April 15, 1922), Reel 4, Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University; Schurman to Chang (April 23, 1922), Reel 4, Schurman Papers.
- 81 Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (January 20, 1922), CSR, 469. Japanese Delegation to Uchida (January 27, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 398–399. For Poole’s memos on contemporary policy towards the Soviet Union, see: Folder 9–30, Box 7, DeWitt Clinton Poole Papers, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.
- 82 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Chinese Delegation (October 27, 1921), CSR, 389–391.
- 83 Schurman to Hughes (January 2, 1922), FRUS, 1922 1, 877–878. Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Chinese Delegation (January 24, 1922), CSR, 470. Alston to the British Delegation (January 25, 1922), 660/22/52, FO 228/2778, PRO. Zhang Zhoulin to Yan, Transportation Minister Ye Gongchuo (January 28, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.16.16.1, AS.
- 84 Japanese Delegation to Uchida (February 5, 1922), JDR, Washinton Kaigi, Vol. 2, 414–416. Hughes to Warren, Schurman, US Shanghai Consul General Cunningham (February 3, 1922), FRUS, 1922 1, 883–884. Balfour to Lloyd George (February 4, 1922), DBFP, First Series, 14:634–636.
- 85 Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Government (February 3, 1922), Waijiao Dangan, 03.39.16.16.1, AS.
- 86 Memorandum by Stevens (January 28, 1931), Folder 1, Box 1, John Frank Stevens Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. According to a letter from Stevens to Hughes, the Americans had failed to establish sufficient trust on the issue even with the British, the group they were closest to. Stevens to Hughes (March 16, 1923), Folder 4: East Asia-Correspondence from JFS, 1923, Box 2, John Frank Stevens Papers, Special Collections Division, Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University.
- 87 Katō Government Cabinet Decision (August 8, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 1, 774–775.
- 88 To give one example, Ishii Itarō, 3rd Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in the US, wrote that “given my sense that a national crisis was coming, it was easier to work than to worry.” Ishii 108.
- 89 Balfour to Lloyd George (November 11, 1921), F/61/1/1, D. Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office. There is no sign that Lloyd George provided timely responses to Balfour’s requests for instructions; judging from the small number of notes on the telegrams, it seems that Lloyd George did not personally exercise strong leadership on East Asian policy.
- 90 FO Memorandum (January 8, 1930), DBFP, Second Series, 8:4.

- 91 Katō to Naval Vice-Minister Ide Kenji (December 27, 1921), in Inaba Masao, Kobayashi Tatsuo, Shimada Toshihiko, Tsunota Jun, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi, Shiryō-hen* [The Road to the Pacific War: Materials Volume] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1963), 3–7. Building the 8–8 fleet, the navy’s traditional policy goal, would have required 600 million yen in ordinary expenses alone, a massive burden given the contemporary national budget of approximately 1.5 billion yen.
- 92 Shidehara Kijūrō, “Washinton Kaigi no Hanashi (Zoku)” [Discussion of the Washington Conference (Continued)] (undated), dictated to Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, Shidehara Heiwa Bunko, Vol. 38.
- 93 Memorandum Handed by Hughes to Shidehara (June 3, 1921), FRUS, 1921 2, 702–705. The Lloyd George government also made attempts to secure north Sakhalin’s coal. See: Alston to Curzon (December 7, 1920), F 713/26/23, FO 371/6671, PRO.
- 94 Koo, Vol. 2, Chapter D.
- 95 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Chinese Delegation (January 12, 1922), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:395. Meeting between Yan and Schurman (January 16, 1922), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:407–408. Chinese Delegation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (January 18, 1922), SJR, Shandong Wenti, 1:412.
- 96 Sze, Koo to MacMurray (February 27, 1922), Box 22, MacMurray Papers.
- 97 *Minguo Ribao* (February 21, 1922), in *Sun Zhongshan Quanji* 6:87.
- 98 Uchida to Obata (January 6, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 265–266.
- 99 The source that most comprehensively conveys the public diplomacy of the Far Eastern Republic (which was closely tied to the Soviet Union) is: Special Delegation of the Far Eastern Republic, “To the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments” (January 5, 1922), Reel 126, Hughes Papers. For a Russian version, see DVPS 5:21–44.
- 100 According to Yan Huiqing’s recollections. De Chunhe, Lin Binsheng, Qiu Quanli, eds., *Beiyang Junfa Shiliao Xuanji* [Selected Materials of the Beiyang Clique] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1981), 2:216. Technically, Yan served as prime minister for less than a week between the Jin and Liang governments. For more on the 1st Fengtian-Zhili War, see: Ikei Masaru, “Dai Ichiji Hōchoku Sensō to Nihon” [The 1st Fengtian-Zhili War and Japan] in Kurihara Takeshi, ed., *Taimannō Seisaku-shi no Ichimen* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966), 163–191.
- 101 Teranishi Hidetake, “Hōchoku Ryōha Seisō ni Kan suru Yosoku” [Predictions Regarding the Political Dispute Between the Fengtian and Zhili Cliques] (January 17, 1922), attached to letter dated January 18 from Teranishi to War Ministry Political Affairs Bureau Director Sugano Hisaichi, Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 34, NDL.
- 102 Shen Yunlong, *Xu Shichang Pingyun* [A Critical Biography of Xu Shichang] (Taipei: Yunji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1979), 696–700.
- 103 Obata to Uchida (January 14, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 269–272. Akatsuka to Uchida (January 14, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 268. Kwantung Army Commander Kawai Misao to Deputy Chief of Staff Kikuchi Shinnosuke (January 16, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 275–276.
- 104 Obata to Uchida (January 14, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 269–272. Banzai Riha-chirō to Uehara (January 14, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 266–267.
- 105 Akatsuka to Uchida (January 14, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 268–269. Higashi to Vice-Minister of War Ono Minobu (January 17, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 276. Kishi to Kikuchi (January 19, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 276–277. Kawai to Kikuchi (January 20, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 277–278. Akatsuka to Uchida (January 25, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 280–283.

- 106 Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku Kankōkai, *Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku* (Tokyo: Aizu Shikon Fūun-Roku Kankōkai, 1961), 147.
- 107 Uchida to Akatsuka (January 20, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 212–213.
- 108 Uchida to Akatsuka (January 24, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 214–215. The same telegram was also forwarded to Obata.
- 109 Akatsuka to Uchida (February 28, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 291–292. Schurman to Hughes (March 25, 1922), FRUS 1922 1, 689–690.
- 110 Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section, “Hōchoku Sentō ni yori Shō shitaru Shina Jikyoku ni tai suru Hōshin” [Policy Towards the Situation in China Produced by the Fengtian-Zhili Fighting] (April 22, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 306–307.
- 111 Yoshida to Uchida (April 22, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 310–311. Yoshida to Uchida (April 23, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 311–312. Yoshida to Uchida (April 25, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 313–314. Yoshida to Uchida (April 29, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 315–316; War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau, “Chō Sakurin ni tai suru Rikugunshō Gunmukyoku no Iken” [Opinion of the War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau towards Zhang Zuolin] (April 23, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 307–308. Schurman to Hughes (April 24, 1922), FRUS 1922 1, 692–693. Schurman to Hughes (April 29, 1922), FRUS 1922 1, 696.
- 112 Letter from Banzai to Nishihara Kamezō (June 10, 1922), in Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Banzai Rihachirō Shokan-Hōkokushū* [The Letters and Reports of Banzai Rihachirō] (Tokyo: Tōsui Shobō, 1989), 230–231.
- 113 Yoshida to Uchida (May 6, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 327–328.
- 114 Aizu Shikon Fūun Kankōkai 148.
- 115 JDC 2:31–32. See also: Uchida to Akatsuka (May 20, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 351; Uchida to Akatsuka (July 17, 1922), 387–388. The May 20, 1922 orders from War Minister Yamanashi to Kwantung Army Commander Ono indicate that the army leadership’s “existing basic policy towards domestic interference in China” did not change following the war. JDR 1922, Vol. 2, 353–354.
- 116 Uchida to Kwantung Governor Yamagata Isaburō (May 18, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 342–343.
- 117 With Hara’s assassination and the appearance of presidential-style cabinets, Takahashi’s ideas became entrenched in early 1922 as the China policy of the Seiyūkai’s presidential faction (Takahashi, Yokota Sennosuke, etc.). The Seiyūkai would come to emphasize advancing into northern Manchuria after Tanaka Giichi became party president in April 1925 and would shift to favoring domestic intervention in China following the Guo Songling Incident in late 1925. For more on this, see: Banno Junji, *Kindai Nihon no Gaikō to Seiji* [Modern Japanese Diplomacy and Politics] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1985), 168; Itō Yukio, *Taishō Demokurashī to Seitō Seiji* [Taishō Democracy and Party Politics] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1987), 69–73, 203–204.
- 118 War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau, “Chō Sakurin ni tai suru Taidō” [Attitude towards Zhang Zuolin] (May 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 2, 343–344.
- 119 Vladivostok Expeditionary Force Political Affairs Bureau Director Matsushima Hajime to Uchida (August 26, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 1, 2:909–910. Yanson to Chicherin (September 2, 1921), List 13–14, Delo 8, Papka 3, Opis 4, Fond 146, AVPRF. See also: Kobayashi Yukio, *Nisso Seiji Gaikō-shi – Roshia Kakumei to Chian Iji-hō* [A History of Soviet-Japanese Political Diplomacy: The Russian Revolution and the Peace Preservation Law] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1985), 94–156.
- 120 Matsushima to Uchida (September 6, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 1, 2:928–932.
- 121 Matsushima to Uchida (September 26, 1921), JDR, 1921, Vol. 1, 2:961–963.
- 122 DVPS 4:561–562.
- 123 Uchida to Matsushima (April 16, 1922), JDR, 1922, Vol. 1, 520–521.

- 124 The draft of the prime minister's speech written on January 21, 1922 included the language "Regarding Western Siberia, the Imperial government earnestly desires to be able to announce as soon as possible that the political situation has been stabilized and order restored, and that we will be withdrawing all of our garrisons. At present, consultations are being held in Dalian on trade and other issues at the request of the 'Chita' government." Takahashi Korekiyo Bunsho, 125, NDL.
- 125 April 4, 1922 Cabinet Decision, JDR, 1922, Vol. 1, 492–493. JDC 2:21–22.
- 126 June 24, 1922 Cabinet Decision, JDR, 1922, Vol. 1, 541–542. JDC 2:23–24.
- 127 List 12–13, Delo 1, Papka 4, Opis 5, Fond 146, AVPRF.
- 128 Adolf A. Joffe to Lev M. Karakhan (September 21, 1922), List 131–132, Delo 6, Papka 4, Opis 5, Fond 146, AVPRF. British Consul to Vladivostok George Pearson Paton to British Ambassador to Japan Charles N.E. Eliot (November 6, 1922), 197/22, FO 262/1571, PRO.
- 129 For more on the criticism of the military and reduction of the military, see: Kisaka Jun'ichirō, "Gunbu to Demokurashī – Nihon ni okeru Kokka Sōryokusen Junbi to Gunbu Hihan o Megutte" [The Military and Democracy: Preparations for Total War and Criticism of the Military in Japan], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 38 (1969), 1–41; Kōketsu Atsushi, *Sōryokusen Taisei Kenkyū* [Research on the Total War System] (Tokyo: San-Ichi Shobō, 1981), 73–100; Takahashi Hide-nao, "Rikugun Gunshuku no Zaisei to Seiji – Seitō Seiji Taisei Kakuritsuki no Seigun Kankei" [The Finances and Politics of the Reduction of the Army: Political-Military Relations during the Time of the Establishment of Party Politics], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* No. 8 (1986), 143–183.
- 130 JDC 2:25.
- 131 However, even if popular opinion was generally in favor of disarmament, there were still those who sought to have military units remain stationed locally, as this was a matter of economic life or death for certain regions. For detailed information on this, see: Tsuchida Hiroshige, "Rikugun Gunshuku-ji ni okeru Butai Haishi Mondai ni tsuite" [On the Abolition of Units Issue during the Reduction of the Army], *Nihon Rekishi* No. 569 (1995), 70–85.
- 132 Ijūin Hikokichi Bunsho, 46, NDL.
- 133 British Acting Consul-General to Seoul Wilfred Bertram Cunningham to Counsellor at the British Embassy in Japan Charles Michael Palairret (August 2, 1923), F 2697/154/23, FO 371/9227, PRO.
- 134 Government-General of Korea, *Shisei 25-Nen* [A History of 25 Years of Administration] (Seoul: Government-General of Korea, 1935), 334.
- 135 Nym Wales and Kim San, *Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution* (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1973), 113.
- 136 Government-General of Korea 333.
- 137 Kuksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoe, ed., *Hanguk Tongnip Undongsa* [A History of the Korean Independence Movement] (Seoul: Jeong-eum Munhwasa, 1968), 4:47–49.
- 138 Park Kyong-sik, ed., *Chōsen Mondai Shiryō Sōsho Dai Rokkan 1920–30 Nendai Minzoku Undō* [Materials on the Korean Issue, Vol. 6: The Nationalist Movement of the 1920s and 1930s] (Tokyo: Ajia Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1982), 25, 49.
- 139 Abe Hiroshi, *Chūgoku no Kindai Kyōiku to Meiji Nihon* [Modern Education in China and Meiji Japan] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1990), 130–133, 222–241.
- 140 For research on the "cultural efforts towards China," see: Abe Hiroshi, "Taishi Bunka Jigyō' no Seiritsu Katei" [The Process Behind the Creation of "Cultural Efforts Towards China"], *Nihon no Kyōiku Shigaku* No. 21 (1978), 38–53; Abe Hiroshi, "Nihon no 'Taishi Bunka Jigyō' to Chūgoku Kyōiku Bunkakai – 1920 Nendai Kōhanki o Chūshin toshite" [Japan's "Cultural Efforts Towards China" and the Chinese Educational and Cultural Communities: Focusing on the Late 1920s], in Uno Seiichi, ed., *Higashi Ajia no Shisō to Bunka* (Tokyo: Tosho Bunken Sentā, 1980), 222–287; Abe Hiroshi, "Senzen Nihon no Chūgoku ni

- okeru Bunka Jigyō – ‘Taishi Bunka Jigyō’ no Tenkai to Zassetsu o megutte” [Prewar Japan’s Cultural Efforts in China: On the Development and Collapse of “Cultural Efforts Towards China”], in Iwahashi Bunkichi, ed., *Kokusaika Jidai ni okeru Ningen Keisei* (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1982), 65–87; Abe Hiroshi, “Senzen ni okeru Nicchū Ryōkokkan no Gakujutsu Bunka Kōryū to Masatsu – Shanhai Shizen Kagaku Kenkyūjo no Baai” [Academic and Cultural Exchange between Prewar Japan and China: The Case of the Shanghai Institute of Natural Sciences], in Saitō Makoto, Sugiyama Yasushi, Banba Nobuya, Hirano Ken’ichi, eds., *Kokusai Kankei ni okeru Bunka Kōryū* (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 1984), 139–170; Huang Fuqing, *Jindai Riben Zaihua Wenhua ji Shehui Shiye zhi Yanjiu* [Research on Modern Japanese Cultural and Social Efforts in China] (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1982), 113–207; Kawamura Kazuo, *Kindai Nicchū Kankeishi no Shomondai* [Various Issues in the History of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Nansōsha, 1983), 116–138; Baba Akira, *Nicchū Kankei to Gaisei Kikō no Kenkyū – Taishō/ Shōwa-ki* [Research on Sino-Japanese Relations and the Foreign Policy Machinery: The Taisho and Shōwa Periods] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1983), 67–88, 168–197; Ōbata Tokushirō, “‘Taishi Bunka Jigyō’ to Nicchū Kankei” [“Cultural Efforts Towards China” and Sino-Japanese Relations], *Kenkyū Shirizu* No. 35 (1997), 19–56; See Heng Teow, *Japan’s Cultural Policy toward China, 1918–1931: A Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Kumamoto Fumio, “Gaimushō ‘Taishi Bunka Jigyō’ no Sōshutsu Keii – ‘Seishin-teki Teikokushugi’ no Kigen” [The Creation of the Foreign Ministry’s “Cultural Efforts Towards China”: The Origins of “Spiritual Imperialism”], *Hisutoria* No. 173 (2001), 231–256.
- 141 Asian Affairs Bureau 2nd Section, “Danpi Baishōkin no ‘Seikyūken Hōki’ ni kan suru Kaishaku” [Interpretation of the “Relinquishing of Claims” for Bandit Compensation] (unfinished, undated manuscript), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 431–435. Also, under the Terauchi government, the foreign ministry decided in May 1918 to provide funds for the education of Chinese in China in response to a request from the East Asia Common Culture Association. See: Abe Hiroshi, “Tōa Dōbunkai no Chūgokujin Kyōiku Jigyō – 1920 Nendai Zenhanki in okeru Chūgoku Nashonarizumu to no Taiō o megutte” [The East Asia Common Culture Association’s Education of Chinese: The Response to Chinese Nationalism in the Early 1920s], in Abe Hiroshi, *Nicchū Kankei to Bunka Masatsu* (Tokyo: Gannandō, 1982), 10–16.
- 142 Hara, *Hara Takashi Nikki*, 5:379. The Japan-China Association was founded in April 1918 with support from the education and foreign ministries.
- 143 Foreign Minister Yan to Minister Obata (June 21, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 433.
- 144 Okabe Nagakage, “Shina Shucchō Fukumeisho” [Report on Trip to China] (November 7, 1923), Tōhō Bunka Jigyō Kankei Zakken, H.0.0.0.1, Vol. 1, MOFA; Draft of Report by Okabe Nagakage on Local Conditions (undated), in Shōyū Kurabu, ed., *Okabe Nagakage Nikki – Shōwa Hatsuki Kazoku Kanryō no Kiroku* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1993), 523–590.
- 145 Yoshizawa to Ijūin (December 26, 1923), in Tōhō Bunka Jigyō Kankei Zakken, H.0.0.0.1, Vol. 1, MOFA.
- 146 Okabe Nagakage, “Taishi Bunka Jigyō no Shimei” [The Mission of Cultural Efforts Towards China] (May 15, 1925), *Gaikō Jihō* No. 492 (1925), 54–63.
- 147 Shu Nensu Tokushi Raidan Yōryō [Summary of Meeting with Special Envoy Zhu Nianzu] (April 4, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 435–437. Osaka Governor Inoue Kōsai to Uchida (April 27, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 437–438.
- 148 Zhu Nianzu, Chin Enrei Fukumeisho [Report of Chen Yanling] (April 20, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 439–440.

- 149 Diary of Debuchi Katsuji (October 15, 1923), in Takahashi Katsuhiro, ed., “Debuchi Katsuji Nikki 2 – Taishō 12-Nen – 15-Nen” [The Diary of Debuchi Katsuji (2): 1923–1926], *Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka Kenkyūjo Yōin* No. 85 (2000), 377–378.
- 150 “Nisshi Kyōdō Iinkai Kankei Ikken Ō-Debuchi Kyōtei” [Related to the Sino-Japanese Joint Committee: The Debuchi-Wang Agreement], H.2.2.0.1–1, MOFA. the Debuchi-Wang Memorandum is also sometimes referred to as the Debuchi-Wang Agreement, but it was only an unofficial statement of agreement rather than anything formal.
- 151 “Taishi Bunka Jigyō ni kan suru Shina Kōshi Mōshide no Ken” [On the Chinese Envoy’s Proposals regarding Cultural Efforts Towards China] (December 26, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki 1, Dai Ichibu, Vol. 4, 1046–1047; Meeting between Asian Affairs Bureau Director Arita Hachirō and Minister Wang (April 15, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki 1, Dai Ichibu, Vol. 4, 1050.
- 152 Zhonghua Liuri Xuesheng Luda Shouhui Houyuanhui to President Li Yuanhong, Premier Zhang Shaozeng, Foreign Minister Gu Weijun (June 6, 1923), Waijiao Dangan 03.33.182.186.2, AS.
- 153 On the Karakhan Manifesto and the establishment of relations between China and the Soviet Union, see: Allen Whiting, *Soviet Policies in China, 1917–1924* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Nishimura Fumio, “Tōshi Tetsudō o meguru Soveto Gaikō – 1919-Nen no Karahan Sengen to Tōshi Tetsudō Shori Mondai” [Soviet Diplomacy over the Chinese Eastern Railway: the 1919 Karakhan Manifesto and the CER Management Issue], *Kyōsanken Mondai* 10:10 (1966), 61–83; Fujii Shōzō, “Chūgoku Kakumei to Dai Ichiji Karahan Sengen” [The Chinese Revolution and the 1st Karakhan Manifesto], *Ajia Keizai* 10:10 (1969), 21–36; Wang Yujun, *Zhongsu Waijiao de Xumu – Youlin dao Yuefei* [The Beginning of Sino-Soviet Diplomacy: From Youlin to Yuefei] (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1978); Li Jiagu, “Sue Di Yici Duihua Xuanyan Wenben Wenti” [Questions Concerning the Text of the Soviet Union’s First Declaration to China], *Beijing Dangan Shiliao* No. 4 (1991), 59–66; Li Jiagu, *Zhongsu Guanxi (1917–1926)* [Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1926] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1996); Bruce A Elleman, *Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917–1927* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997).
- 154 Bi Xiantian, Huang Jilian, Li Jiagu, Li Yuzhen, eds., *Zhongsu Guojia Guanxi Shiziliao Huibian (1917–1924)* [Collection of Materials on the History of Sino-Soviet Relations (1917–1924)] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1993), 56–58. This document was first formally sent to the Beiyang government on March 26, 1920.
- 155 “Duiyu Eluosi Laonong Zhengfu Tonggao de Yulun” [Public Opinion on the Announcement by the Russian Workers and Farmers Government], *Xin Qingnian* 7:6 (1920), 1–29.
- 156 List 1–3, Delo 1, Papka 1, Opis 2, Fond 08, AVPRF; DVPS 2:221–223. See also: Hattori Ryūji, *Genkindai Tōhoku Ajia Chiiki-shi Kenkyūkai Nyūzuretā* [Newsletter of the Research Group on the Local History of Modern Northeast Asia], No. 11 (1999), 13–17.
- 157 DVDPS 3:213–216.
- 158 C. Martin Wilbur’s interview with Wellington Koo (December 14, 1972), Folder: Interviews and Correspondence with Wellington Koo Concerning the First Decades of his Diplomatic Career: 1912–1932 (Vols. 2 and 3), Box 3, Wellington Koo Loose Material, Chinese Oral History Collection, Rare and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

- 159 Chicherin to the Mongolian government (August 10, 1921), in S.D. Duilkov, et al. eds., *Sovetsko-Mongol'skie Otnosheniya, 1921–1966* [Soviet-Mongolian Relations, 1921–1966] (Moscow: 1966), 8–9.
- 160 DVPS 7:331–335. *Zhongsu Guojia Guanxi Shiziliao Huibian*, 270–272.
- 161 DVPS 7:342–345. *Zhongsu Guojia Guanxi Shiziliao Huibian*, 272–274.
- 162 DVPS 4:476–480.
- 163 DVPS 7:459–464. *Zhongsu Guojia Guanxi Shiziliao Huibian*, 317–320.
- 164 Shimanuki Takeharu, ed., “Dai Ichiji Sekai Taisen Ikō no Kokubō Hōshin, Shoyō Heiryoku, Yōhei Kōryō no Hensen” [Changes in the Imperial Defense Policy, Estimate of Required Armaments, and the Outline of Strategy after the First World War], *Gunji Shigaku* 9:1 (1973), 2:66.
- 165 Defense Agency, National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Office, *Senshi Sōsho Daihon'ei Rikugunbu 1* [War History Series: Imperial Headquarters Army Department I] (Tokyo:Asagumo Shinbun-sha, 1967), 258–260. For research on the second revision to the Imperial Defense Policy, see: Kurano Taeru, *Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin no Kenkyū – Rikukaigun Kokubō Shisō no Tenkai to Tokuchō* [Research on the Imperial Defense Policy: The Development and Characteristics of Army and Navy Thinking on National Defense] (Tokyo: Sōwasha, 2000), 197–244.
- 166 Itō Takeo, Ogiwara Kiwamu, Fujii Masuo, ed., *Gendaishi Shiryō 31 – Mantetsu I* [Modern Historical Materials 31: Mantetsu I] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1966), 264–265.
- 167 *Ibid.*, 265–267.
- 168 Machino Takema, “Chō Sakurin to iu Otoko” [The Man Zhang Zuolin], in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Sensō Gen'in Kenkyūbu, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1963), Vol. 1 Appendix, 2. Machino was moved to the reserve in October 1923.
- 169 Mantetsu, “Manmō Shakkan Tetsudō no Kansei ni kan shi Seifu Nami ni Ginkōdan ni tai suru Iken Teishutsu oyobi Kōshō Hōshin Kettei no Ken” [On the Determination of Negotiation Policy and the Submission of Opinions to the Government and Bankers over the Completion of Manchurian/Inner Mongolian Loan Railways] (February 27, 1923), Taishō Makki ni okeru Shina ni kan suru Shomondai (Morishima Jimukan Sankō Shiryō), 1.1.2.97, MOFA.
- 170 Hashimoto Kingorō, “Tōshi Ensen ni okeru Rōnō Rokoku no Seiryoku” [Worker Farmer Russian Strength along the CER Lines] (January 14, 1924), Mitsudai Nikki, 1924, Vol. 5, NIDS. Kawada to Vice-Minister of War Tsuno Kazusuke, “Jikyoku ni Kangami Hokuman Chōhō Kikan Kakuchō ni kan suru Iken” [Opinion on the Expansion of the North Manchurian Intelligence Network in Light of the Contemporary Situation] (September 24, 1924), Mitsudai Nikki, 1924, Vol. 4, NIDS.
- 171 Funatsu to Uchida (August 21, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 1, 533–534.
- 172 Fengtian Public Office Director Kamata Yasuke to Consul Matsuoka (September 12, 1923), *Gendaishi Shiryō 31 – Mantetsu I*, 269–271.
- 173 European and American Affairs Bureau 1st Section, “Taitōshi Tetsudō Hōsaku Kōan” [Thoughts on Policy towards the Chinese Eastern Railway] (November 27, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 1, 543–548.
- 174 Hata to Military Attache to the Japanese Legation in China Hayashi Yasakichi (May 19, 1923), JDR, 1923, Vol. 2, 469. For more on the Lincheng Outrage, see: Baba Akira 89–134.
- 175 State Department Division of Russian Affairs Chief D.C. Poole to Undersecretary of State William Phillips (September 26, 1922), FRUS, 1923 2, 801.
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3 New Movements in China and the Soviet Union and the First Era of Shidehara Diplomacy

January 1924 to April 1927 – The Kiyoura, Katō Takaaki, and Wakatsuki Governments

In the aftermath of World War I, Japanese diplomacy had been tasked with dealing with several ongoing issues stemming from the war: the Shandong Question, the Twenty-One Demands, the Siberian and North Manchurian Expedition, and Japan's support for the Duan Qirui administration. By the time that Kiyoura Keigo became prime minister in January 1924, all of these had been at least tentatively resolved. Nevertheless, Chinese issues remained of undiminished importance for the international politics of East Asia.

Indeed, from 1923, new trends in China and the Soviet Union arose, forming a “second wave” of international change that forced Japan to reexamine its China policy. It needed to reconsider its existing policy towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia with an eye towards managing the Chinese Nationalist Revolution and the Soviet Union's East Asia strategy. And the rising rights recovery movement in China would serve as a touchstone for the Washington System's collaborative diplomacy. From 1924 on, Japanese diplomacy would search for new policies capable of handling this second wave even as it sought to restructure the collaborative diplomacy of the Washington System. In a sense, this period saw the reemergence of what had been one of Japan's traditional diplomatic challenges ever since the Meiji Era: finding a way to expand on the continent while remaining within the framework of great power cooperation and dealing with the southern expansion of Russian influence.

I. Japan-Soviet Relations and Chinese Treaty Revision Diplomacy

1. Japan-Soviet Relations and the Manchurian Issue

While the Soviet Union had once been forced to submit to having Japanese, American, British, and French troops stationed in its territory, it had now returned to the stage of East Asian international politics by establishing diplomatic relations with China. There were three different Japanese responses to this development. First, there was a faction in favor of working with Soviets that notably included Gotō Shinpei, the navy, and the Satsuma faction. The Black Dragon Society (Kokuryūkai) and Gen'yōsha also played a certain role

in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR.¹ Next, there was the army, who began demanding that Zhang Zuolin be provided with strong guidance as a means of resisting the Soviets. Finally, there was the foreign ministry, who opposed the use of Japanese expansion in northern Manchurian as a means of countering the Soviets (largely out of consideration of relations with the United States and Britain).

The “Outline of China Policy” and Mantetsu Director Matsuoka Yōsuke

The policy disagreements between the army and foreign ministry were made apparent by the “Outline of China Policy” (Taishi Seisaku Kōryō), a policy document written shortly after the formation of the Kiyoura government in January 1924 in response to Finance Minister Shōda Kazue’s call for the new government to establish its China policy. The document’s contents were largely the result of deliberations between Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau Director Debuchi Katsuji, War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau Director Hata Eitarō, Naval Ministry Military Affairs Bureau Director Kobayashi Seizō, and Finance Minister Financial Bureau Director Tomita Yūtarō.²

In a late February opinion paper, Debuchi held that Japan should hold to a policy of non-interference and adherence to the Washington System’s collaborative diplomacy, but that it should also “not yield a single step” to the “rights recovery movement” in areas where Japan’s rights were “legitimately held by treaty conventions.”³ Regarding railway policy in Manchuria, he believed that Japan should move forward with the construction of the Kaiyuan-Hailong-Jilin, Jilin-Dunhua, and Changchun-Taonan lines but that the Taonan-Qiqihar line “should be left as an issue for another day in light of the likely reaction from the Russians” given that it was not “reserved to Japan.” Japan should keep an eye out for an opportunity to reach an agreement with the Beiyang government over these lines, with Zhang Zuolin serving as their counterpart in negotiations. And rather than have the Bank of Korea, Industrial Bank of Japan, and Bank of Taiwan serve as the Japanese parties in these negotiations as was traditional, he felt that Mantetsu should play this role.⁴ The three rail lines advocated for by Debuchi had all been recognized as being outside of the Second China Consortium’s remit during the negotiations over the consortium. The line that Debuchi wanted postponed – the Taoqi Railway – had once been part of the proposed Jinai Railway and had *not* been recognized as a special Japanese interest during those negotiations as it was located in eastern Inner Mongolia. It also crossed the CER at Ang’angxi and – by extending all the way to Qiqihar – was part of the proposed expansion into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets.⁵ It should be unsurprising that Debuchi, always an advocate for “respecting the spirit of the treaties signed with the Chinese government,”⁶ would oppose construction of the Taoqi Railway.

For his part, Hata proposed in mid-March that the “focus of our China policy” be “securing the survival and development of our race” through a Sino-

Japanese “partnership.” Japan should not “succumb to pointless internationalism” but rather strike an “independent attitude,” make the “Chinese people look up to the Empire as the leading power,” provide support to Zhang Zuolin “without adhering to the principle of non-interference in [Chinese] domestic matters,” and have the Three Northeast Provinces “produce results as our economic territory.”⁷ In stark contrast to Debuchi, Hata’s plan called for Japan to oppose the powers through a Japanese-led “partnership” with China and carry out development of the Three Northeast Provinces through support to Zhang. The difference between the two positions was most clearly evident in their views on railway policy. While Debuchi had wanted to postpone construction of the Taoqi Railway, the Military Affairs Bureau viewed its construction as a priority, as it was a means of “opposing the Chinese Eastern Railway and securing a superior foothold in northern Manchuria.”⁸

The “Outline of China Policy,” agreed to by the foreign, war, naval, and finance ministries on May 30, largely reflected the army’s views. That is, while it made collaborative diplomacy within the Washington System a principle, it also held that it was necessary to “take opportune measures with an always independent attitude [...] in light of the special relationship between Japan and China.” And while Japan should, in principle, adhere to international agreements on the provision of arms to China, it also needed to take “the security of transportation and other [situations] impacting the interests of the Empire” into consideration. Clause 8, which concerned Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, also clearly stated that Japan would “open up new routes in northern Manchuria, where our facilities have hitherto been scarce.” Japan was also to “provide appropriate guidance” to Zhang Zuolin to “make him aware that his real power comes from the fact that he is backed by the strength of the Empire so that he always approaches our country with a favorable attitude.” The outline also included language stating that, as “maintaining order” in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was important for Japan’s rule of Korea, “opportune measures will be taken when deemed necessary for self-defense”; Japan’s management of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not to be limited to the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas adjacent to Mantetsu’s lines. It would partner with Mantetsu to “promote the construction of its railway network” so as to “expand further into the interior.” The CER issue was also to be settled to Japan’s advantage.⁹

Recalling the Hara government’s efforts to independently expand Japanese interests in both the north and south of China, however, we can understand that this was not the first time that Japan deviated from its privileges that had been delineated in the Second China Consortium negotiations. The significance of the “Outline of China Policy” lies in its reorientation of Japanese policy towards railways and the Fengtian clique into a means of advancing into northern Manchuria to oppose the Soviets. In doing so, it undeniably increased the trend towards independent Japanese diplomacy. In particular, the inclusion of the idea that Zhang should be “guided” and backed by “the strength of the Empire” for the purpose of expanding into northern

Manchuria meant that the views of army officers stationed in China were (through the army leadership) becoming government policy. Conversely, the absence of any agreement on Soviet policy within the Washington System was a factor behind the group's failure to adopt Debuchi's positions.

Negotiations between the Northeast regime and Mantetsu over the Taoqi Railway began in April 1924, with Mantetsu Director Matsuoka Yōsuke taking the lead.¹⁰ In exchange for allowing Japan to build the railway, Zhang and Fengtian Governor Wang Yongjiang wanted Japan to give up its loan rights for a railway between Kaiyuan and Hailong (which it had gained under the Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Agreement). The Northeast regime would then construct its planned railway from Fengtian to Hailong using its own capital. The regime established the Three Northeast Provinces Transportation Committee in May, reinforcing its railway policy.¹¹

While it is not widely known, Matsuoka had already secured the early completion of the Zhengtao Railway in 1923, negotiating with the Beiyang government on the basis of the Hara government's loan agreement for the Sitao Railway.¹² After concluding his negotiations with the Northeast regime, he returned to Tokyo in August 1924 with a construction agreement for the Taoang Railway, a slightly shortened Taoqi Railway. Matsuoka was aided in his negotiations by the army's shared desire to resist the Soviet Union, and he also called for active support of Zhang on these grounds.¹³ In response to a proposal from Matsuoka, the Katō Takaaki government adopted a new cabinet resolution on railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia on August 28.¹⁴ This resolution endorsed the results of Matsuoka's negotiations; it relinquished Japan's loan rights on the Kaihai Railway and approved construction of the Fenghai Railway by the Northeast regime in exchange for the right to construct the Taoang Railway. Matsuoka and the Northeast regime concluded the Taoang Railway construction agreement on September 8, and construction began in 1925. The railway began operations the following year.¹⁵ Through Matsuoka's efforts, the Japanese government Manchurian rail policy that had existed since the Hara government now extended into northern Manchuria. Matsuoka had clearly played a more prominent role here than Mantetsu leaders had in the company's relationship with the foreign ministry under Hara; it was also now more closely aligned to the army than the foreign ministry.

The arrival of Shidehara Kijūrō as foreign minister in the Katō government did not bring with it any major changes to the policy of expanding into northern Manchuria as a means of countering the Soviets. On September 18, 1924, Shidehara and Finance Minister Hamaguchi Osachi directed Mantetsu President Yasuhiro Ban'ichirō (who was aligned with the Kenseikai) to inform the consortium that an agreement had been reached on the construction of the Taoang Railway as "the notes which the Imperial government had exchanged with the British and American governments at the time of the creation of the Second China Consortium needed to be taken into consideration."¹⁶ But while Shidehara took the collaborative diplomacy of the

Washington System into account, he also accepted Japanese expansion into northern Manchuria, something that Debuchi had opposed. It should also be noted that neither Shidehara nor Debuchi were at all influenced by Matsuo-ka's theories concerning the "communization of China."¹⁷

Soviet-Japanese Relations after the Establishment of Relations

On April 23, 1925, Minister to China Yoshizawa (who had taken the lead in the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union) advised Shidehara that "negotiating with Russia would be the best policy" for the "Taoqi and Chinese Eastern Lines." Shidehara did not take this advice, however. He told Soviet Ambassador to Japan Victor Kopp – who was opposed to construction of the Taoang Railway – on May 22 that the railway was "in no way an extension of the Mantetsu lines." Rather, construction of the railway was being done by Mantetsu at Zhang Zuolin's request; Japan had merely accepted the contract. He then went further, explaining that, while "spheres of influence" had existed during the period "following the Russo-Japanese War," "the powers have not recognized that doctrine since the resolutions of the Washington Conference" and "we are no longer in an era that permits agreements on spheres of influence."¹⁸ The arrival of Shidehara Diplomacy did not stop Japanese expansion into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets, and the establishment of relations on January 20, 1925 did not result in an easing of the tensions between the two countries.

As is evident from the records of a meeting between Chicherin and Special Plenipotentiary Minister to the Soviet Union Li Jiajing, the Soviet government was concerned that construction of the Taoang Railway would cause Heilongjiang agricultural products to flow to Dalian, threatening the status of the CER.¹⁹ During a brief return to the USSR, Karakhan proposed to Ambassador to the Soviet Union Tanaka Tokichi on January 13, 1925 that joint Japan-China-USSR talks be held, as "some kind of agreement is necessary to avoid useless competition in Manchuria."²⁰ The Soviets thus sought to resolve the Manchurian railway issue through dialogue and thereby improve Soviet-Japanese relations.²¹ But the Japanese (primarily the army and Mantetsu) continued their plans for expansion in northern Manchuria, with the army general staff laying out an outline for its Manchurian railway policy in November of that year. This was intended to serve as the basis for operations against the Soviet Union and centered around the Taonan-Solun, Changchun-Anda, and Hoeryong-Ningguta-Hailin rail lines. Of these, the Taonan-Solun and part of the Hoeryong-Ningguta-Hailin lines would be included in a railway agreement between Mantetsu President Yamamoto Jōtarō and Zhang Zuolin concluded during the later Tanaka government.²²

While the foreign ministry also felt that some kind of accord needed to be reached between the competing CER and Mantetsu, it was not enthusiastic about entering into negotiations with the USSR over the railway issue. Shidehara and Debuchi were more interested in concluding agreements over

fishing and trade and were wary when the Soviets proposed a non-aggression pact.²³ In a January 31, 1926 letter to Gotō Shinpei, Qiqihar Consul Amō Eiji referenced CER General Manager A.N. Ivanov's policy of actively competing with Mantetsu in his argument that "the true [Soviet] intention is to recover Russia's former influence in northern Manchuria as well, and the Chinese Eastern Railway truly lies at the center of these efforts."²⁴ Chicherin felt a sense of urgency about maintaining the status of the CER, the centerpiece of Soviet East Asia policy, and he complained to Ambassador Tanaka that "our status in the Chinese Eastern Railway is based on treaties, and we have the right to demand that those treaties not be violated."²⁵

But Soviet attempts at easing tensions bore no fruit. The Japanese army and Mantetsu held firm to their policy of expanding into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets, a policy rooted in their perception of a "Soviet threat." The Japanese felt a deep-seated sense of abhorrence towards the ideological nature of the Soviet Union, something symbolized in Article 5 of the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty, which prohibited each party from taking any actions which disrupted public order in the other's territory. Ambassador Kopp repeatedly lodged protests with Shidehara that the activities of Soviet citizens were being unduly restricted in Japan.²⁶ And, as shown by a July 25, 1925 memorandum that Chicherin sent to the Japanese embassy, disputes between the two countries over fishing continued.²⁷ The Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs also submitted a memorandum to the embassy expressing concern about Japanese exploitation of resources in northern Sakhalin.²⁸

Generally speaking, while Japan was also facing the restrictions of the Washington System and the Chinese rights recovery movement, it regarded dealing with the "Soviet threat" as the most pressing matter. The chances of Japan and the Soviet Union coming to an accord over the two countries' interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were therefore extremely slim. As such, the argument for a Sino-Soviet-Japanese partnership advanced by Gotō Shinpei during this period was seen as heretical by both the pro-Western Shidehara and the expansionistic army. Years earlier, while Mantetsu president, Gotō had called for such a partnership based upon his theory of a "confrontation between the new and old continents," but the international situation had changed completely since then.²⁹

The Cost of Expansion

It cannot be overlooked that the policy of expansion into northern Manchuria represented by the Taoang Railway brought about a large cost for the Japanese: the "Mantetsu Encirclement Rail Network." The Japanese had accepted the Northeast regime building the Fenghai Railway as a condition for construction of the Taoang Railway, and it began such construction in 1925. In 1928, the railway began operations. Then, in 1927, the Jilin provincial assembly and Warlord Zhang Zuoxiang began construction on the Jihai Railway connecting the Fenghai Railway to Jilin in response to various

sectors of the economy. This was done in the face of Japanese criticism that Japan held the financing rights to such a railway under the Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Agreement. The railway was completed in 1929.³⁰

And while the Taoang Railway had been constructed as part of Japan's northern Manchurian expansion policy, the railway itself was also not without cost. What the Japanese had secured during the negotiations over the railway was only the contract to construct the railway. While Mantetsu had advanced the funds for the railway's construction and also carried this out itself, the railway would only be converted into a loan railway in the event that the Chinese were unable to repay these costs after completion. The Japanese thus had a relatively low level of control compared to its existing loan railways; the construction contract was ultimately never converted into a loan agreement. The Taoang Railway itself was operated by the Chinese and could potentially become part of the Mantetsu Encirclement Rail Network.³¹

The other railways constructed in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in the 1920s also largely followed this pattern. The 1925 contract for the Jilin-Dunhua Railway and the later Yamamoto-Zhang Railway Agreement were both only agreements on construction contracts. The Sitao and Taoang Railways began shared usage of their tracks at Taonan in September 1927, and the Northeast regime opened the Datong Railway running from Dahushan to Tongliao in the following month. With these developments, it became possible to bypass the Mantetsu mainline to the west by travelling along the Taoang, Sitao, and Datong Railways.³²

The rail network that the Japanese would later criticize as "encircling" Mantetsu was thus gradually being established, with Japan itself having provided permission for some of its construction. Chinese railways used the same gauge as Japan's and were capable of becoming a competitor to Mantetsu. In other words, the cost of the feeder lines to support Japanese expansion into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets was that those same lines would later transform into a rail network encircling Mantetsu. Mantetsu would suffer the greatest decline in revenue in the company's history in 1930 and then effectively go into the red in 1931. While this economic downturn occurred in the wake of the Great Depression, it was accompanied by a widening perception among the Japanese that the "Mantetsu crisis" was being caused by the aforementioned "encircling rail network" and that Japan's special interests in Manchuria were under threat.

Among the underlying causes for Mantetsu's misfortunes were the costs incurred by the northern Manchurian expansion policy that was already well underway by the mid-1920s.³³ A draft of the August 1924 cabinet decision on Manchurian railways shows a clear underestimation of Chinese railways policies, arguing that the Northeast regime's conditions for construction of the Taoang Railway were "no cause for concern."³⁴ Japan placed excessive importance on the "Soviet threat," and its erroneous projections for the "threat of the anti-Japanese movement" stemming from the Northeast

regime's railway policies effectively produced one of the causes for the "Mantetsu Crisis" that threatened the core of its special interests.

2. Divergence of the Washington System – Chinese Treaty Revision Diplomacy and Japan, Britain, and the United States

The first era of Shidehara Diplomacy lasted for three years, from 1924 to 1927, a period that saw the frequent events capable of shaping the course of the Washington System. The Immigration Act of 1924, passed by the US Congress in May of that year, caused anxiety about the future of US-Japan relations.³⁵ The law stirred up popular anger in Japan, leading to anti-American demonstrations to be held nationwide on July 1, the day the law took effect. Capt. Ishiwaru Kanji, who was studying in Berlin at the time, wrote in a July 18, 1924 letter to his wife that:

I received a newspaper today, the first in quite a while. I read about the US-Japan issue and other topics with a fair amount of interest. Several people here feel that it is a national disaster and have gotten quite excited about it. Even here, there are always damn Westerners who ask about a potential US-Japan war, every time quite boastfully. It is truly a time of terrible hardship. We should welcome boycotts of American films and the like for the good of popular thought.³⁶

Secretary of State Hughes later recalled, "all prospects for good relations with Japan all came to nought with the Congressional outrage that was the 1924 Immigration Act."³⁷

The situation in China was becoming even more serious than the situation with the Immigration Act, however. The issues posed by the May Thirtieth Movement, the movement against the unequal treaties, the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, and the Northern Expedition would truly serve as a touchstone for the Washington System. Foreign Minister Shidehara was faced with the heavy responsibility of dealing with the rise of Chinese nationalism even as he sought to restructure the international order that depended on collaborative diplomacy between Japan, Britain, and the United States. In the US, Assistant Secretary of State MacMurray, who had been supportive of American cooperation with Japan ever since the Washington Conference, was appointed Minister to China in mid-1925. As he left Washington, the newly appointed Secretary of State Kellogg and Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs Johnson began looking to move away from his policies.

There was still distrust of Japan in the British Foreign Office as well. In a June 24, 1924 memorandum, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Victor Wellesley expressed the view that "while we had our hands tied in Europe, [Japan] created a very dangerous situation in the Far East, viz. the famous twenty-one demands and the Shantung question." Unless Japan

underwent a change not merely “of method but of objective also, it may ultimately become an even more dangerous and difficult thing to deal with than an open militarist policy.”³⁸ It was with these views in mind that Well-lesley told Ray Atherton, First Secretary at the US Embassy in London, on February 24, 1925 that “there must be cooperation with Japan insofar as possible and a perfectly open policy to allay her very suspicious nature.”³⁹

The situation in China was further complicated by the expanding influence of the communist forces of the Soviet Union and the CCP. UK Shanghai Consul-General Pratt began reporting on the actions of prominent communists like Chen Duxiu from December 1924. According to a letter from US Minister to China Schurman to President Calvin Coolidge, “The Bolsheviks have been extraordinarily skillful in combining with this anti-foreign propaganda an attack on Christian missions in China. [...] And as America has more missionaries here than any other nation, this attack falls primarily on us.”⁴⁰

When Japan’s major textile mills in China suffered strikes beginning in early February 1925, Shanghai Consul-General Yada Shichitarō pointed to involvement by Moscow and Chen Duxiu, saying that “the Socialist Youth League and Communist Party are at the center of this movement.” He responded by having 30,000 anti-communist leaflets distributed.⁴¹ The strikes spread to mills in Qingdao, and 2,500 workers at Dainippon Spinning went on strike demanding higher wages and better working conditions on April 19.⁴² The Japanese demanded that Beiyang Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin suppress the strikes, and two destroyers were dispatched as a show of force at Qingdao Consul-General Horiuchi Kensuke’s request. Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi also advised Fengtian Consul-General Funatsu Tatsui-chirō to request that the Fengtian clique forcibly intervene. Zhang Zuolin agreed, and Shandong Warlord Zhang Zongchang, a member of the clique, cracked down on the strikes.⁴³

Given these circumstances, the Beiyang government – which had already concluded equal treaties with Germany and the Soviet Union⁴⁴ and successfully negotiated reparations from Germany (the first in Chinese diplomatic history)⁴⁵ – saw an opportunity to launch a diplomatic effort towards the great powers with the aim of revising or eliminating the unequal treaties.

In a narrow sense, this treaty revision diplomacy only sought to have the unequal treaties revised or discarded upon their expiration. I would like to refer to this as “expired treaty revision diplomacy” in this book. In a broader sense, treaty revision diplomacy included all of the Beiyang government’s diplomatic efforts to undo the unequal treaties from 1912. The term will be used here in an intermediate sense, referring only to the period from the aftermath of the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925 to the fall of the Beiyang government in 1928, a time which saw heightened momentum for revising the treaties. The treaty revision diplomacy of this period went beyond the aforementioned expired treaty revision diplomacy to include “conference treaty revision diplomacy” – efforts to revise the treaties through international conferences.

With the exception of the pioneering work of Tang Qihua, there has been little research that has used the Chinese diplomatic archives to examine the treaty revision diplomacy of the late Beiyang government period.⁴⁶ Diplomatic historical research on this period in China often focuses on the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff and has a tendency to treat China as only a stage for great power diplomacy.⁴⁷ However, the increasing assertiveness of the Beiyang government, which had previously accepted subservient status within the Washington System, is a significant characteristic of the East Asian international politics of this period; the special conference was only one event in this process. This section will make use of Chinese diplomatic archives to closely analyze the Beiyang government's vision for treaty revision diplomacy and examine the effects this actually had on the Washington System.

(1) From the May Thirtieth Movement to Treaty Revision Diplomacy

THE MAY THIRTIETH MOVEMENT

The impetus for treaty revision diplomacy came in the unexpected form of the May Thirtieth Movement, which had been sparked by a May 1925 incident in which the (primarily British) Shanghai Municipal Police fired on anti-foreign protestors, killing and wounding several of them.⁴⁸

CCP Central Committee Member Qu Qiubai, who led the strike at Naigai Textile with Li Lisan and Deng Zhongxia, wrote that:

The movement to revive labor unions among railway workers in the north, the establishment of the All-China Federation of Railway Workers' Unions, strikes at textile mills in Qingdao and Shanghai, the uprising of the workers at the Beijing Printing Company and Hankou Tobacco Factory, the 2nd All-China Congress of Labor and establishment of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in May... these gave a new energy to the entire nationalist revolutionary movement and, in turn, sparked a counteroffensive of suppression by the imperialists.⁴⁹

Large-scale strikes, demonstrations, and boycotts of foreign goods occurred in major cities throughout China in June. 5,000 students demonstrated in Nanjing on June 4, demanding the closure of the foreign concessions and the elimination of consular courts.⁵⁰ Minister Yoshizawa recalled that "the Japanese goods boycott movement was very ferocious in Central China. It was also fairly active in Shanghai and Qingdao, mostly taking the form of riots."⁵¹

Beiyang Foreign Minister Shen met with a delegation of foreign ministers to China three times, beginning on June 1, to demand the release of arrested students and that steps be taken to prevent a reoccurrence of the shooting by the Shanghai police.⁵² On June 24, the Beiyang foreign ministry also proposed to the foreign legations that improvements be made to the international

concessions and consular courts on the grounds that the unequal treaties were hindering friendly relations between China and the West, had been one of the causes of the May Thirtieth Movement, and that, as things stood, China's international status was inferior to that of the defeated nations of World War I.⁵³ Chief Executive Duan Qirui, who had been returned to office through the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Japanese army, met with Yoshizawa on July 10 to tell him that "it would be difficult to control the situation" until "the legitimate demands of the Chinese people" were accepted.⁵⁴

The CCP and KMT held similar views on this point, and the CCP Central Executive Committee demanded "the complete denunciation of the unequal treaties and the overturning of all imperialist special privileges in China."⁵⁵ Guangzhou Foreign Minister Hu Hanmin told Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations William Borah, a confidante of Kellogg's, that "if there are to be eternally friendly relations between China and the powers, all the unequal treaties must be revoked."⁵⁶ The May Thirtieth Movement thus developed into the revision of the unequal treaties issue.

Chinese public opinion at the time of the May Thirtieth Movement was most critical of Britain, which was at the forefront of the crackdown.⁵⁷ Foreign Minister Shen pushed to have Britain "show friendship [to China] by using the Boxer Rebellion reparations the way that the United States has" and, of course, by revising the unequal treaties.⁵⁸ Immediately after the rise of the May Thirtieth Movement, Minister to the US Shi Zhaoji also sounded out Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew about requesting that the British government "avoid extreme measures."⁵⁹

Shidehara instructed Yoshizawa on June 12 that, while there were those in both Japan and China hoping to keep the brunt of the student movement focused on the British, Japan could not allow itself to be "rashly drawn into a movement to divide Japan and Great Britain."⁶⁰ Then, on June 29, he laid out a basic policy to Yoshizawa under which, rather than becoming involved in deliberating revision of the unequal treaties, as it was not directly related, "Japan, Britain, and the United States, who have the most closely shared interests and influence," would cooperate to prioritize the resolution of the May Thirtieth Incident itself by punishing those police officers responsible and assisting the victims.⁶¹

On July 1, the foreign legations discussed the matters to be negotiated with the Chinese, working from the results of a commission that had been dispatched to Shanghai. They decided to request that the Shanghai Municipal Council dismiss the British police chief and revise its police regulations.⁶² This was rejected by the council, however, on the grounds that the foreign legations had no authority to make such demands.⁶³

British Foreign Secretary Chamberlain called in the Japanese, American, and French ambassadors on the 16th to propose a legal investigation be carried out by justices from the four countries and that the Shanghai Municipal Council be asked to revise its police regulations.⁶⁴ Chamberlain's plan was an attempt to reconcile the feud between the foreign legations and the council

and downplay the issue of responsibility (on which the legations had already made their decision). While Shidehara approved of this plan in principle, he put forward an amended version under which, aside from the legal investigation, the legations would also carry out negotiations with the Beiyang government, and the chief of police would voluntarily agree to step down.⁶⁵ These negotiations by the legations made no progress, however.

What *did* make progress were the local negotiations in Shanghai. Xu Yu, who had been dispatched to the city by the Beiyang government, visited Consul-General Yada's home on July 16 and began negotiations on the ending of the strikes. After discussing terms like the recognition of labor unions in accordance with the Trade Union Law, pay during strikes, wage increases, and no dismissals without cause, an agreement was reached between Yada and Xu on August 12. British Shanghai Consul-General Sidney Barton was furious when informed of the agreement by Yada, as it meant that the Japanese textile mills would get a head start in restarting their operations. But the French, Italian, and American consulates in Shanghai welcomed the agreement as bringing a positive change to the situation in the city.⁶⁶ It was clear that Chamberlain was becoming isolated diplomatically.

REVISION OF THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

But when the Beiyang government put forward a plan for revising the unequal treaties on June 24, it was the American government that showed the most sympathy. Acting US Minister to China Ferdinand Meyer went against the opinion of many of the ministers by arguing the following day that the plan was nothing more than an accommodation "necessitated by domestic affairs" and represented China's "national aspirations."⁶⁷ After sounding out President Coolidge on the idea, Secretary of State Kellogg told Mayer that a commission should be immediately sent to investigate the extraterritoriality issue.⁶⁸

The Beiyang government's diplomatic efforts were being closely coordinated with Minister Shi in Washington, and this was partially responsible for the positive American response. Kellogg had only recently become Secretary of State and, as shown by a June 30 meeting between Kellogg, Johnson, and Shi, the Chinese had begun to be successful at eliciting a pro-Chinese response from him.⁶⁹ At the meeting, Shi conveyed a message from Shen to Kellogg that:

Just as John Hay once restrained the selfish, aggressive policies of the great powers towards China, your strong support for the recovery of Chinese sovereignty [...] symbolizes America's friendship towards China. It is my earnest hope that the Chinese people will remember you both.⁷⁰

Conversely, newly appointed Minister to China MacMurray passionately advocated for a policy in direct conflict with Kellogg's. According to MacMurray, "it would be wiser to adhere literally to the provisions of the

Washington Conference and let any developments therefrom be recommended by the Special Conference rather than anticipate them at this time.”⁷¹ Similarly, the Stanley Baldwin government in Britain had become increasingly wary of the Chinese anti-foreign movement and calls for treaty revision. Foreign Secretary Chamberlain took a hardline stance in mid-July, stating that “there would be no room for discussing any reform, let alone revisions to any treaty” until order was restored in China and the anti-foreign movement suppressed.⁷²

It is worth taking note of Shidehara’s position in light of the sizeable gap between Britain and America over revision of the unequal treaties. He reported at the time that “the attitudes of Britain and the United States are at two extremes” and were irreconcilable.⁷³ In an August 11 conversation with Acting US Ambassador to Japan Edwin Neville, Shidehara stated that, while he did not believe that China’s judiciary could be improved to the extent that the United States was proposing, he was unable to agree with the British position of rejecting the abolition of extraterritoriality as an ultimate goal. But Shidehara also said that he could not agree with the American proposed discussions on the return of tariff autonomy to China, as there had been no major changes in the Chinese situation since the Washington Conference.⁷⁴

In that sense, Shidehara’s response differed from both that of Kellogg – who was actively looking to approve treaty revisions – and that of Chamberlain – who demanded the curbing of the anti-foreign movement as a precondition for any such revisions. Shidehara believed that the Chinese domestic environment needed to be right for treaty revision and worked to reconcile the “two extremes” of the United States and Britain. The Beiyang foreign ministry also held some hope for Japanese action, feeling that “if the administrative of justice is improved, the Japanese government will likely aid us in obtaining the cooperation of other countries” as “Japan itself also suffered under extraterritoriality in the past.”⁷⁵ On September 4, the foreign ministers to China gave a joint answer to Shen on the treaty revision issue, and it ultimately led to deliberations on the tariffs and consular courts.⁷⁶ As of this point, Shidehara had been the most faithful to the collaborative diplomacy of the Washington System, and his views had come close to those of MacMurray and British Ambassador to Japan Elliot.⁷⁷

Problems still remained, however. First, the Washington System had tacitly accepted the unequal treaties and the powers’ vested interests in China. But holding firm to that existing framework threatened to damage relations with the United States and, of course, China. This is most evident from the British diplomatic line. The Chinese rights recovery movement had made great strides since the Washington Conference, and even the Beiyang government – which was backed by pro-Japanese figures like Zhang Zuolin and Duan Qirui – was beginning to align itself with the movement. And yet, Shidehara’s basic approach was to try to remain with the framework of the Washington Conference’s resolutions. Second, policy divergences were beginning to become apparent between the United States, Britain, and Japan, and this trend was only being accelerated by China’s treaty revision diplomacy.

Shidehara devoted himself to acting as an intermediary between the two other countries, but, given each of the nation's relative reliance on trade with China, it was Japan for whom the tariff autonomy issue had the greatest potential impact. There was still a possibility that Japan would become a uniting force for the Washington System.

These issues would be brought to the fore by the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff that began in October 1925.

(2) The Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff

THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON THE CHINESE CUSTOMS TARIFF

The Treaty Relating to the Chinese Customs Tariff, signed at the 7th plenary session of the Washington Conference on February 6, 1922, had held that: Chinese customs duties would be raised to 5% as soon as possible (Article I); a special conference would be held within three months for the speedy abolition of likin (a toll tax imposed by local governments) (Article II); and steps would be taken at that conference for the levying of a 2.5% surtax (Article III).⁷⁸ In other words, the plan was to approve a total tax of 7.5%. But while customs duties were increased to 5% following the Conference, the special conference was never held due to France's delayed ratification of the treaty.

After France finally ratified the treaty in August 1925, the Beiyang foreign ministry contacted the signatories to make arrangements to hold the customs conference in October.⁷⁹ Finance Minister Li Sihao worked from August to September 1925 to abolish likin, and he informed Yoshizawa that China intended to request a surtax of at least 2.5% and recognition of Chinese autonomy over tariffs.⁸⁰ The Beiyang government's political base was weak, and it was hoping that a successful conference would help it secure more financing and increase its legitimacy. In an August 7 telegram to Shi, Shen indicated his intention to have the notes that China had exchanged with foreign powers involving spheres of influence – symbolized by the April 1898 note with Japan over the noncession of Fujian – rejected “in the spirit of the Nine-Power Treaty.”⁸¹ Believing that “the other governments will follow American leadership,” Shi told Grew on August 27 that the delegates to the conference should have plenipotentiary powers.⁸² Grew had actually already spoken on the necessity of Kellogg granting him such full authority in a meeting with Johnson the day before.⁸³

Chinese domestic expectations for the conference grew, and the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce pressed the Beiyang finance ministry to use it as an opportunity for a fundamental reform of the tax system. Li passed this on to the foreign ministry.⁸⁴ Shen then told MacMurray that domestic adjustments were being made to prepare the way for tax reform.⁸⁵

While MacMurray described conditions in China as ones of “overweening nationalism” in a letter to Hughes,⁸⁶ the State Department leadership had begun preparations for full revision of the treaties. It was from around this

time that Kellogg and Grew began criticizing the Baldwin government's view that no revision should take place until order had been restored to China.⁸⁷ Kellogg in particular was dissatisfied with Japanese opposition to expanding the agenda of the conference, telling Japanese Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo that the issue of tariff autonomy needed to be discussed at the conference.⁸⁸ Johnson, who was supportive of Kellogg's East Asia policy, also viewed revising the unequal treaties favorably; the State Department leadership was beginning to prioritize the bilateral Sino-American relationship over collaborating with Japan and Britain within the Washington System.

But Shidehara did not agree with Kellogg's policies. He had met with MacMurray on June 30 as MacMurray headed to China to assume his new position, and in their meeting he had noted that the Beiyang government did not have control of rural areas and would therefore be unable to completely abolish *likin*. He proposed limiting discussion at the conference to the 2.5% surtax and added that the conditions for the surtax and how the increased revenue from the tax would be spent should also be considered.⁸⁹ While Shidehara had initially believed that cooperation with Britain and the US would be the best way of dealing with China's treaty revision diplomacy, the unexpectedly favorable attitude shown by the participating countries (particularly the United States) meant that he needed to reconsider his plans. When Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kimura Eiichi met with Acting Minister to Japan Zhang Yuanjie on August 20, he told Zhang that Japan would not be opposed to China raising the issue of tariff autonomy at the conference.⁹⁰ And in his September 10 instructions to Yoshizawa, Shidehara stated that he intended to "weigh and discuss" Chinese tariff autonomy should the timing and conditions be reasonable.⁹¹

This in no way meant that Shidehara had decided to recognize such autonomy, however. According to a conversation between Ambassador Kopp and Karakhan following a September 21 meeting with Shidehara, Shidehara was pressuring the Beiyang government not to invite the Soviets to the conference and had shown "a clearly negative attitude" towards recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy.⁹²

The Katō Takaaki government laid out its basic policy for the conference in an October 13 cabinet decision. First, the government believed that it was impossible for the Beiyang government to effectively abolish *likin* as provinces in China were financially independent. Second, discussions at the conference should primarily focus on the tax increase. That increase should be limited to 2.5% out of consideration of "the likely blow to our nation's industries"; a differential tax rate would be a condition for anything higher. Third, 80% of the increased revenue from customs should be allocated to the repayment of unsecured debts. Fourth, should the conference recognize Chinese tariff autonomy, such recognition should be carried out in tandem with either the adoption of a differential tax rate or the conventional tariff should be accompanied by a statutory tariff for a period of ten to fifteen years. Following the transitional period, autonomy would be recognized on the conditions

that all export taxes were to be abolished and the Japanese right to possess land recognized. This cabinet decision was based on a tentative proposal made at the Shidehara-MacMurray meeting, and while it envisioned making concessions to China, it tried to do so based on conditions favorable to Japan such as a differential tax rate, the repayment of unsecured debts, and conventional tariffs. It should be noted that recognition of Chinese tariff autonomy had not been part of established Japanese policy.⁹³

While Shidehara recognized that concessions to China needed to be made, he was hesitant about taking the lead in recognizing tariff autonomy and delegated the conference's opening speech to the Japanese delegation.⁹⁴ That delegation was headed by Hioki Eki, with Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Saburi Sadao, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Horiuchi Tateki, and Hidaka Shinrokurō serving as the other members. According to Shigemitsu, "Plenipotentiary Hioki's famous speech at the opening of the customs conference was the idea of Secretary-General Saburi."⁹⁵ Saburi, Shigemitsu, Horiuchi, and Hidaka had consulted with Plenipotentiaries Huang Fu and Wang Zhengting and Conference Committee Member Liang Shitai on the speech in advance, confidentially informing them of Japan's plans.⁹⁶

The Special Conference on the Chinese Custom Tariff opened on October 26, 1925. The Chinese delegation included Shen Ruilin, Yan Huiqing, Wang Zhengting, Huang Fu, and Cai Tinggan as plenipotentiaries, 13 commissioners, 39 senior advisors, 15 councilors, and 73 expert commissioners.⁹⁷

The most noteworthy developments over the course of the conference were Chamberlain's shift closer to the American position and the isolation of Shidehara's diplomatic efforts. Following an opening address by Shen and a welcome from Chief Executive Duan, Wang called for the restoration of Chinese tariff autonomy and proposed a differential tax rate of five to thirty percent as an interim measure. Hioki then surprised the non-Chinese attendees by giving a speech in which he stated that Japan was prepared to recognize such autonomy in principle.⁹⁸ With agreement in principle to autonomy, the primary focus of the conference was on what interim measures were to be implemented until this autonomy was acquired.

While the Americans proposed an import tax of up to 12.5% and the abolition of *likin*, the British were initially distrustful of "the radical faction" represented by Wang Zhengting.⁹⁹ A month into the conference, Chamberlain had moved closer to Kellogg's position, agreeing to the abolition of *likin*.¹⁰⁰ But while Britain and the United States were in agreement on accepting high tariffs, Shidehara was still instructing the Japanese delegation in as late as January 1926 that a surtax on ordinary goods above 2.5% was "against the government's basic policy."¹⁰¹

After a compromise proposal by the US, Britain, and Japan putting forward a differential tax of 2.5 to 22.5% was adopted on March 25, the conference's focus turned to the issue of whether the increase revenue was to be applied to settling China's debts.¹⁰² Chamberlain proposed that the 2.5% surtax be unconditionally accepted, and there seemed to be a consensus at the

May 15 meeting of the delegations to proceed with the surtax without first resolving the usage issue.¹⁰³ But Shidehara rejected this plan on the grounds that it would delay implementation of “the issues we place the most importance on, the differential tax rate and settlement of China’s debts.”¹⁰⁴ British Minister to China and Plenipotentiary Macleay reported that the Japanese “will not agree to any increase in taxation.”¹⁰⁵

As a result, the conference was indefinitely postponed in July without having achieved any significant results. By the end of the conference, the Americans were showing irritation towards the British as well as the Japanese, noting that “the British delegation appeared reluctant to continue further negotiations at Peking.”¹⁰⁶ Hornbeck, an expert commissioner in the American delegation, met with Shidehara in Tokyo on October 4, 1926 while travelling back to the United States. During the meeting, he told Shidehara that “it is extremely regrettable that the British caused things to end as you know by taking advantage of the failure to obtain Japanese agreement.”¹⁰⁷ Hornbeck submitted a memorandum on this meeting to Johnson once back in Washington.¹⁰⁸ Wellesley told First Secretary of the US Embassy in London Atherton in November that “we should immediately accept the 2.5% surtax,” and this was also communicated to Johnson.¹⁰⁹

It is undeniable that Shidehara adopted a diplomatic approach at the Special Conference on the Chinese Custom Tariff that was fairly independent in economic areas or that he became so fixated on Japanese economic interests that he lost sight of his greater policy of flexible cooperation with the other powers. Prime Minister Katō is presumed to have been behind this. Katō had told British Ambassador Elliot with “astonishing frankness” at the beginning of the conference that its “result would be small. This he said would be to the advantage of Japan for she would be the chief loser if China received Tariff Autonomy.”¹¹⁰

THE DIVERGENCE OF THE WASHINGTON SYSTEM

Partly due to the failure of its conference treaty diplomacy to produce any results, the Beiyang government was not generally viewed very highly in China. However, the government did serve as an important cornerstone for the subsequent revision of the unequal treaties. That policy divergences were appearing between the United States, Britain, and Japan, and a favorable environment for China’s treaty revision diplomacy was falling into place was no mere coincidence. In past research, the formulation of a pro-Chinese policy line by Kellogg and Johnson has often been emphasized with regards to this point, but there are also many elements of it that should be considered results of China’s treaty revision diplomacy.

In particular, the formation of a pro-Chinese line within the State Department leadership was, to a considerable extent, a response to policies carried out by the Beiyang government. Foreign Minister Shen Ruilin had emphasized relations with the United States with the goal of obtaining the support

of the newly appointed Kellogg, and Minister to the US Shi Zhaoji had been acting in accordance with the expectations of the foreign ministry leadership. Recalling the Paris Peace Conference and Washington Conference, it is easy to understand that for the Beiyang foreign ministry leadership to act in such close coordination with its officials abroad was actually a fairly exceptional event for Chinese diplomacy.

The British had played an important role as a mediator between Japan and the United States at the Paris and Washington conferences, but they did not fulfill that function during this period. This was also, to an extent, the result of the Beiyang government's diplomacy. The Chinese took a different approach towards the British – who had initially taken the hardest line towards China – than they did with Japan and the United States. When Chamberlain changed his foreign policy to come closer to the United States, Shidehara and his rigid adherence to Japanese economic interests were left behind. In this sense, the isolation of Shidehara's foreign policy should be partly understood in the context of the consequences of the Beiyang government's foreign policy efforts towards Britain and America.

On December 24, after the conference had been indefinitely postponed, British Ambassador to Japan John A.C. Tilley showed Vice-Minister Debuchi Katsuji “a British memorandum that had been circulated in Beijing” and declared that “Britain has ignored the spirit of the Washington Treaty and even admits that it is not interested in cooperating with Japan.”¹¹¹

Additionally, it is not the case that the Beiyang government's treaty revision diplomacy produced absolutely no tangible results. On November 6, 1926, Premier and Foreign Minister Gu Weijun forcibly annulled the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Belgium and China (which had been concluded on November 2, 1865) through a provisional measure (*linshi bianfa*).¹¹² The revolutionary diplomacy of the Nationalists government that followed was, in part, inherited from the expired treaty revision diplomacy of the Beiyang government.

The Beiyang government also recovered the Tianjin concessions of Russia, Germany, and Austria in the early 1920s and reached an agreement over the return of the Belgian concession in 1927 during the negotiations over a new commercial treaty between the two countries. With this, the only countries still holding concessions were Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Castle, who would become Assistant Secretary of State in April 1927, was critical of this during a private meeting with Grew and wrote in his diary that “Belgium is trying to play a lone hand for the sake of its own material interests.”¹¹³ Despite “opposition from MacMurray and Johnson,” however, Kellogg felt that the United States “should also take innovative steps like Belgium.”¹¹⁴

And while there was a lack of collaborative diplomacy between Japan, Britain, and the United States at the Special Conference, that does not mean that we should regard 1926 as the death of the Washington System. Certainly, Kellogg was, at times, willing to favor China and act unilaterally in his foreign policy but that does not mean that he wanted the US to leave the

Washington System. He argued to President Coolidge on November 5, 1925 that the success of the Special Conference and the commission on extra-territoriality would “be to the benefit of not just the United States and the other powers, but to the Chinese as well.”¹¹⁵

In other words, Kellogg’s foreign policy was intended to incorporate China into the Washington System as a more equal partner, as part of what could be called a “pro-Chinese view of the Washington System.” By contrasting this with the views of Shidehara and MacMurray, who wanted to remain within the boundaries of the decisions made at the Washington Conference – what could be considered a “conventional view of the Washington System” – we can see a divergence in how the Washington System was regarded in the contemporary diplomacies of the powers. Shidehara and Kellogg should have calmly reaffirmed the importance of US-Japan collaboration during this period.

This trend of divergence was accelerated by the success of the Northern Expedition. Upon seeing the rapid progress being made by the expedition, Chamberlain, who had previously moved closer to Kellogg’s position, would attempt to work with Japan to maintain the status quo in what could be described as “using the Washington System as a means of maintaining order.” Thus, while Britain, Japan, and the United States all remained within the Washington System, their leaders held different visions for what that order should look like, visions that never converged.

II. The Chinese Civil Wars and Japan’s Response

As discussed in the previous section, the arrival of the Soviet Union as an actor in East Asian international politics and China’s treaty revision diplomacy occupied important places in the international environment for Shidehara’s first term as foreign minister. A third point of contention in East Asia was provided by China’s civil wars, from the Second Fengtian-Zhili War to the Guo Songling Incident and the Northern Expedition.¹¹⁶ It is well known that Shidehara pursued a policy of non-interference in response to the fighting, and this is commonly listed alongside his focus on economics and collaboration with Britain and America as one of the characteristics of Shidehara Diplomacy.¹¹⁷

Asian Affairs Bureau Director Debuchi Katsuji played an important role in providing support for Shidehara’s policy of non-interference within the foreign ministry. He not only took the lead as the foreign ministry’s representative in the three-ministry committee to determine Japan’s “basic policy of non-interference in China” with the war and naval ministries, but he also “forcibly argued in favor of non-interference” to the Seiyūkai and Seiyū Hontō.¹¹⁸ Debuchi was not Shidehara’s only supporter; according to the recollections of Wakatsuki Reijirō, he viewed the British request for a joint dispatch of troops as an act of selfish opportunism and joined Shidehara in opposing the action.¹¹⁹

But Shidehara also came under criticism from foreign ministry officials in China, from the army leadership, and from mid-ranking army officers. Below,

I would like to examine the place of Shidehara Diplomacy among the various trends in contemporary Japanese foreign policy over the Chinese civil wars by analyzing each of these group's criticism of Shidehara.

1. Criticism of Shidehara by Foreign Ministry Officials in China

In criticizing Shidehara, the diplomat Morishima Morito wrote that:

unlike Mutsu during the First Sino-Japanese War or Komura during the Russo-Japanese War, he is excessively disinterested in domestic affairs. Meanwhile, he is excessively concerned with formal logic [i.e., he is unwilling to modify his policies to take actual conditions into account] in terms of his personality.¹²⁰

The truth is, while Shidehara Diplomacy pursued policies of “absolute non-interference” and “no support of Zhang,” his neglect of domestic political concerns and failure to take measures to protect Japan's special interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia invited the Japanese army in China to carry out such interference.¹²¹ It was in his adherence to this inflexible, diplomacy of “formal logic” that made Shidehara most exceptional in his position and made him differ from contemporary foreign ministry officials in China and the Japanese army.

During the Second Fengtian-Zhili War and the Guo Songling Incident, Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Fengtian Consul-General Funatsu Tatsuchirō (and his successor Yoshida Shigeru), Tianjin Consul-General Arita Hachirō, and Kwantung Governor Kodama Hideo all advised Shidehara to take precautionary measures for the purpose of maintaining Zhang Zuolin's status in the Three Northeast Provinces. To give one specific example, during the Second Fengtian-Zhili War, Yoshizawa and Funatsu called for Japan to issue a “fairly strong warning” (Funatsu's words) in order to “protect our interests in Manchuria” (Yoshizawa's words).¹²² After Funatsu met Shidehara on December 27, 1924, he wrote in his diary that:

once, after I had telegraphed my opinion that we should provide aid to Zhang, the minister replied sarcastically and seemed very proud of the success of the policy of non-interference in China, that is, of the policy of doing nothing.¹²³

Similar criticism also began to surface within the cabinet. The Katō government was in power during the outbreak of the Second Fengtian-Zhili War, and Communications Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and the Seiyūkai faction – most notably Minister of Agriculture and Commerce Takahashi Korekiyo – called for aid to be provided to Zhang.¹²⁴ Unlike Shidehara, foreign ministry officials in China can be regarded as supporting the continuation of Hara's policies of “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang.” Put another way, it was not

Shidehara or Debuchi who were the inheritors of Hara’s political legacy but rather officials stationed abroad like Yoshizawa.

2. The Army Leadership’s Criticism of Shidehara

In addition to foreign ministry officials stationed in China, there were two additional sources of criticism for Shidehara Diplomacy.

The first of these were those who supported “nationwide interference” and “active support of Zhang.” This is blatantly apparent in Minister of War Ugaki’s April 7, 1927 opinion paper “Research on the Protection of the Empire’s Foothold in China.” According to Ugaki, Shidehara’s foreign policy of “patience and self-restraint” was incapable of dealing with the Northern Expedition (which was, in Ugaki’s mind, a communist effort) and defending Japan’s special interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. He argued that Japan should provide “military supplies and weapons to the moderate elements of both the Northern and Southern factions [i.e., Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kai-shek],” and carry out “the extermination and suppression of communist factions in central and southern China.” This, he held, would “forestall the danger that will otherwise spread to northern China and Manchuria.”¹²⁵ Ugaki’s proposed policy of cooperating with Britain for the suppression of communism was not far removed from British diplomatic thinking in its intent to deal with the Northern Expedition by militarizing the Washington System, but it was not something that would have been able to gain the support of American diplomatic leaders, most notably Secretary of State Kellogg.

Table 3.1 Patterns of China Policy (1924–1927)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria	Nation-wide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
			Shidehara, Debuchi	No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
		Foreign ministry officials in China (Hara Doctrine)		Limited Support of Zhang	
	Ugaki, Shirakawa			Active Support of Zhang	
Post-1903 mid-ranking army officers				Elimination of Zhang	

Source: Author

But while these were Ugaki's arguments towards the end of Shidehara's first term as foreign minister, he was inconsistent in his positions. In his October 11, 1925 diary entry looking back on the Second Fengtian-Zhili War (which had occurred in late 1924), he wrote that "the wisest policy for Japan would be to intercede and prevent any conflict" so as to maintain "the current balance of power." This was because Zhang "could not be permitted" to advance into the center and "escape Japan's grip," but it would likewise be troublesome to allow "the Zhili clique to be at the height of power."¹²⁶ Ugaki's views at this stage can be categorized as "non-interference with reservations" and "limited support of Zhang" as he supported interference and support for Zhang, but only within the scope of the Three Northeast Provinces. They were thus close to Hara Diplomacy and those held by foreign ministry officials stationed in China at the time. Then, at the December 4, 1925 cabinet meeting held during the Guo Songling Incident, Ugaki seemed to take a position close to that of Shidehara and his support for "absolute non-interference" and "no support for Zhang."¹²⁷ But he then pushed for troops to be sent to southern Manchuria at another meeting on the 15th. Ugaki's criticisms of Shidehara Diplomacy became more common following the beginning of the Northern Expedition, by which time – as shown by the aforementioned opinion paper – he had clearly adopted the positions of "nationwide interference" and "active support of Zhang."

The 3rd Army Commander Feng Yuxiang's coup d'état during the 1924 Second Fengtian-Zhili War (the Beijing Coup) was brought about by Japanese army officers in China who shared ideas similar to Ugaki's. Immediately after the outbreak of the war, reserve army officer Teranishi Hidetake, acting in accordance with the wishes of Gen. Tanaka Giichi, a member of the Supreme War Council, visited Zhang Zuolin and strongly urged him to ally with Duan Qirui. He then met with Duan in Tianjin and persuaded him to ask Zhang to provide Feng with operating funds. In early October, Maj. General Suzuki Hajime, a former commander of the China Garrison Army (also known as the Tianjin Garrison), discussed the funds with Duan and then met with Zhang's advisor Machino Takema in Tianjin and requested that he also persuade Zhang to provide them. Teranishi then met with Feng's confidante Sun Yue in Beijing to confirm that Feng intended to carry out the coup.¹²⁸ Once Zhang was persuaded by his advisor Col. Matsui Shichio and the others to provide the funds, they passed from the Tianjin branch of Mitsui Bank to China Garrison Army Commander Maj. General Yoshioka Kensaku to Duan Qirui before finally reaching Feng, who ultimately carried out the coup.¹²⁹

Major Doihara Kenji, an aide at the Sakanishi Office (Sakanishi Kōkan), also promoted the coup by having Education Minister Huang Fu persuade Feng to go through with it, having secretly informed Huang that the Zhili clique was attempting to obtain American assistance.¹³⁰ Minister Yoshizawa reported on October 15 that Huang was acting as "a go-between for Feng and Duan" and that "Feng has no will to fight [...] there is no longer any doubt that he is engaged in some kind of treacherous plan." Then, on the

20th, Yoshizawa said that he had received information that “discussions have been arranged between Feng Yuxiang and Duan Qirui [...] Feng had made preparations to enter Beijing on the 22nd” and “six or seven thousand of Feng’s soldiers have already secretly entered Beijing at this point.” The following day, he telegraphed that “Feng’s intention is to force Cao Kun’s abdication and establish a military government until Duan enters the capital.”¹³¹ Feng’s plans were in alignment with the goals of Kwantung Army Commander Lt. General Shirakawa Yoshinori, and Shirakawa argued that Japan should “abandon its current principle of non-interference, stop standing idle as opportunities pass us by, and steadily implement measures to truly deal with China.” In this case, that meant “assisting Duan Qirui in regaining control of the situation.”¹³²

Feng’s diary shows that Lt. Colonel Itagaki Seishirō, a military attaché at the Japanese legation in Beijing, and his aide Capt. Suzuki Teiichi had already approached him prior to the start of the war.¹³³ Suzuki later recalled that he had approached Feng through Huang “and fostered an anti-Wu Peifu atmosphere.”¹³⁴ Suzuki’s September 7 and 23 letters to Tanaka explain that the army officers attached to the legation and the Sakanishi Office kept in close contact with one another.¹³⁵ The Sakanishi Office was also in the advantageous position of having received requests from Wu’s military headquarters to provide military advisors.¹³⁶ The Japanese officers stationed in China were thus able to bring their clandestine operation to fruition and made use of the feud between Feng and Wu to support Zhang Zuolin.¹³⁷ The coup reduced the power of the Zhili clique, causing Zhang’s influence in Guannei to increase dramatically. This was also the first case of Japanese army officers in China engaging in “active support of Zhang,” i.e., support for Zhang without concern for whether the effects extended into Guannei. Mantetsu Director Matsuoka Yōsuke was also an advocate for “active support of Zhang,” albeit from the perspective of promoting the Taoang Railway and expanding Japanese influence in northern Manchuria to counter the Soviet Union.¹³⁸

Shirakawa, Kwantung Army Chief of Strategic Planning Maj. Ura Sumie, and Advisor to the Fengtian Army Maj. General Matsui, the men driving Japanese policy toward China during the December 1925 Guo Songling Incident held similar views. During the incident – an attempt to overthrow Zhang – the Kwantung Army was under the perception that Feng Yuxiang and the KMT, acting under the control of the Soviet Union, had approached Guo as part of a plan to turn the Three Northeast Provinces communist.¹³⁹ Acting unilaterally in Shirakawa’s name, the army notified Guo’s forces that it was prohibiting any forces from landing at Yingkou, which served as a gateway to the northeast, or engaging in any combat within 30 kilometers of Mantetsu territory.¹⁴⁰ The cabinet followed up by approving a plan from War Minister Ugaki to dispatch 2,500 men from the Japanese mainland (including the 12th Division’s 1st Mixed Brigade) and 1,000 men from the Korean Army’s 20th Division to Fengtian, nominally to “replenish” existing Japanese forces there.¹⁴¹

The Japanese foreign ministry attempted to conceal the truth of this interference, particularly from the Soviet Union with its strong interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. According to Chicherin, who met with Japanese ambassador Tanaka Tokichi on January 7, 1926, the Japanese were “attempting to convince us that Zhang Zuolin is in no way a Japanese pawn or puppet.”¹⁴² The CCP criticized Japan’s actions, stating that “with its deployment to Fengtian, Japan is no longer only making indirect use of Zhang Zuolin but in a direct confrontation with the Chinese people.”¹⁴³ As vice-minister, Debuchi Katsuji was overwhelmed by personnel matters and various conferences at this time and no longer able to coordinate the policy of non-interference with the military as he had previously done as director of the Asian Affairs Bureau.¹⁴⁴

At first glance, the Kwantung Army’s warning to Guo’s forces and the deployment of Japanese troops to southern Manchuria, while cases of military interference in China, would appear to have been interference within the limits of the Three Northeast Provinces. But it must be kept in mind that Zhang’s influence at the time had expanded to not just Beijing but also Tianjin and Shanghai, and that he was engaged in a confrontation with the anti-Fengtian cliques of Feng, Wu, and Sun Chuanfang in northern to central China. It was as these anti-Fengtian warlords were attempting to gain an advantage in their conflict with Zhang that the Guo Songling Incident occurred. As such, supporting Zhang via military interference had a strong effect on Guannei as well. Feng would be forced into exile in the Soviet Union, while Zhang would continue to strengthen his influence in Guannei, eventually coming to rule in Beijing as grand marshal. In other words, the policies advocated for by Ugaki and Shirakawa during the Guo Songling Incident represented “nationwide interference” and “active support of Zhang” that was not concerned about whether they effected Guannei as well as the Three Northeast Provinces.

The Japanese army’s policies towards China during the Guo Songling Incident can be placed in the larger context of its support of Zhang and expansion into northern Manchuria to counter the “Soviet threat.” This was also the first time when Japanese support of Zhang took on the character of opposing the Nationalist Revolution. Suo and Feng were backed by the KMT and its revolutionary diplomacy, and the army was aware that – had Suo been victorious – the Three Northeast Provinces would have come under KMT influence. The KMT had also come to be widely seen as communist by Japanese officers since the formation of the First United Front. In the face of the combined threats of the Soviets and the Nationalist Revolution, the army went beyond the clandestine operations it had undertaken during the Second Fengtian-Zhili War and overtly engaged in military interference in China.

The policies of the army leadership towards China clearly undermined Shidehara Diplomacy’s policy of non-interference. However, they can also be said to have effectively prolonged that diplomacy by preserving Zhang Zuolin’s status and Japan’s interests in Manchuria.

3. Criticism of Shidehara from Mid-level Army Officers

The third source of criticism for Shidehara was mid-level army officers like Kōmoto Daisaku (Imperial Japanese Army Academy class of 1903) and Sasaki Tōichi (1905). Many of these had served in the southern China by the mid-1920s, knew the strength of the KMT, and were critical of Japan's traditional emphasis on Beijing, Fengtian, and manipulating the Beiyang clique. Because of this, they settled on the hardline policies of occupying Manchuria and eliminating Zhang.¹⁴⁵ Which is to say, they had grasped early on that the Northern Expedition would be successful and were dissatisfied not only with "Shidehara Diplomacy and its lack of awareness" (Sasaki's words) but also with Ugaki and Shirakawa's support for "nationwide interference" and "active support of Zhang."¹⁴⁶

According to a statement by Imamura Hitoshi, the argument that a more direct response to the KMT was needed as the Nationalist Revolution would otherwise be successful was not initially very influential.¹⁴⁷ But Shidehara's adoption of a policy of non-interference during the Northern Expedition energized hardline opinions within the middle ranks of the officer corps. His response to the Nanjing Incident in particular was seen by these officers as "an extreme example of Shidehara's coquettish diplomacy."¹⁴⁸ That Shidehara's cooperation with Britain and the United States had begun to bear little fruit further accelerated this trend.

After Britain's Baldwin government failed in its effort to collaborate with Japan to use the Washington System as a means of maintaining order, its policies moved away from both Japan and United States, and it decided to unilaterally land troops in Shanghai. Secretary of State Kellogg also rejected the idea of issuing a second joint note with Japan, Britain, France, and Italy during the negotiations over the 1927 Nanjing Incident.¹⁴⁹ Grew could not hide his discomfort with French Ambassador to the US Paul L.C.M. Claudel's words that "the worst thing we could possibly do at this juncture would be to adopt a weak attitude."¹⁵⁰

Lt. Col. Ishiwara Kanji (class of 1907) had developed his own unique view of history and believed that there would be a final war between Japan and the United States. He saw Japan seizing control of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as a means of preparing for this war. He was also unique in taking "the hardline position that possession of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not only necessary for Japan's survival but for the happiness of the Chinese people," as China was likely "incapable of constructing a modern nation state."¹⁵¹ These figures as a whole will be referred to in this book as "post-1903 mid-ranking army officers." While their policy goals of occupying Manchuria and eliminating Zhang did not surface during Shidehara's first term as foreign minister, they would become central issues for the Futabakai and Mokuyōkai (two army officer study groups) during the era of Tanaka Diplomacy and ultimately led to the assassination of Zhang and the Manchurian Incident.

Not all of the post-1903 mid-ranking army officers were in agreement on these policies, however. As described earlier, Doihara Kenji (1904), Itagaki Seishirō (1904), and Suzuki Teiichi (1908) helped provide assistance to Zhang during the Second Fengtian-Zhili War. While Suzuki was critical of what he saw as an excessive reliance upon the policy of aiding Zhang, that did not stop him from recognizing the value that Zhang's status in the Three Northeast Provinces offered Japan.¹⁵²

But many mid-level officers who had been in favor of supporting Zhang would later shift to favoring his elimination and the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. To give one example, a letter from Kōmoto Daisaku to Isogai Rensuke postmarked April 18, 1928 shows that Doihara Kenji was beginning to favor getting rid of Zhang.¹⁵³ Zhang's advisor Machino Takema intended to have Son Chuanfang of the Zhili clique join the alliance between Zhang and Wu Peifu, but Sun's advisor Major Okamura Yasuji was not enthusiastic about the three-party alliance and was critical about the very practice of assigning military advisors.¹⁵⁴ And it is well known that Itagaki Seishirō would come to support the occupation of Manchuria under Ishiwara's influence.

As shown above, there were three groups who criticized Shidehara Diplomacy, each for their own reasons: foreign ministry officials stationed in China ("non-interference with reservations"/"limited support of Zhang"), the army leadership ("nationwide interference"/"active support of Zhang"), and the post-1903 mid-level army officers ("occupation of Manchuria"/"elimination of Zhang"). These are summarized in Table 3.1. After the formation of a solely Kenseikai government in August 1925, the Seiyūkai would also increase its criticism of Shidehara. The politician Itō Miyoji criticized him over the Nanjing Incident in the Privy Council on April 17, 1927.¹⁵⁵ Shidehara's inflexible "formal logic" foreign policy and its pursuit of "absolute non-interference" and "no support of Zhang" was thus becoming isolated. Given how starkly it stood apart among contemporary policy trends, this "formal logic" foreign policy can be regarded as the most distinctive element of Shidehara Diplomacy.

III. Summary: The Diffusion of Visions for China and Regression of Political Skill

The first period of Shidehara Diplomacy, which lasted from 1924 to 1927, saw the emergence of the "second wave of international change," characterized by the arrival of the Soviet Union and the rise of Chinese nationalism. It also exposed the flaws in the Washington System in three senses.

First, the United States, Britain, and Japan had failed to reach an agreement about policy towards the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, as Japan had prevented the management system for the CER from being reinforced at the Washington Conference, leadership of the railway – which was located in the center of northern Manchuria – effectively fell to the Soviets. After the Soviets became involved in the international politics of East Asia, entering

into negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with China, Japan began leaning towards a more independent foreign policy, pursuing a policy of expanding into northern Manchuria as a means of countering the Soviets as laid out in the “Outline of China Policy.” When the Guo Songling Incident occurred, the Japanese army’s perception of the situation was that defending Zhang Zuolin was essential to counter the Soviet Union’s use of Feng Yuxian and the KMT to turn China communist.

Second, the Washington System was premised on the idea that the powers’ interests in China would be essentially maintained. However, policy gaps between Britain, Japan, and the United States began to widen, the result of the Beiyang government differentiating in its approach to each country in its treaty revision diplomacy.

Third, Britain, Japan, and the United States had paid relatively little attention to trends in the south of China at the time of the Washington Treaty’s formation and did not anticipate the development of either the Nationalist Revolution or revolutionary diplomacy. Japan’s shift to a hardline approach during the Guo Songling Incident was due to increasing fears among both the army and foreign ministry officials in China that the influence of not just the Soviets but the KMT would extend to the Three Northeast Provinces.¹⁵⁶ And when the Northern Expedition resulted in the Nanjing Incident, it produced policy conflicts not only within Japan but internationally, making policy coordination difficult.

Generally speaking, the second wave of international change produced a divergence in how the participants of the Washington System viewed it. While Japan held to a “conventional” Washington System, the United States desired a “pro-Chinese” system that would incorporate China in a more equal role, and Britain wished to use it as a means of maintaining order.

For Japan, the emergence of this second wave meant the “three threats” – the threats of the Soviets, the anti-Japanese movement, and the Nationalist Revolution – were becoming a reality. Operating under the former “simplified” international environment, Hara Diplomacy had been able to skillfully differentiate between a policy of non-interference in Guannei in cooperation with Britain and the United States and one of interference in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia that disregarded such cooperation. But Hara’s policies offered no prescriptions for dealing with the three threats that the second wave had brought. In that sense, Hara Diplomacy could not escape the fate of ultimately being only provisional in nature. During the later period of Shidehara Diplomacy, the coming of the second wave and the emergence of the Soviet Union and rise of Chinese nationalism meant that collaborative diplomacy between the United States, Britain, and Japan steadily became more difficult. The result was Japanese views of China policy becoming scattered between four groups: the foreign ministry leadership, foreign ministry officials in China, the army leadership, and mid-level army officers who graduated from the army academy from 1903 on.

That meant that it was much more difficult for Shidehara to maintain control than it had been for Hara. That difficulty came from the international environment produced by the three threats and the second wave. Considering the transformation from the simplified international environment that Hara's government had enjoyed to the one containing the three threats that Shidehara Diplomacy faced, it was to an extent inevitable that Shidehara would be at a relative disadvantage when it came to maintaining stable collaboration with Britain and America, something that both leaders had advocated for. But Shidehara's attempt to carry on with principled diplomacy despite the loss of Hara's skilled methods meant that the level of political skill within the Japanese diplomatic leadership had also declined.¹⁵⁷

Source Acronyms

AS	Academia Sinica, Taipei
DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)
FRUS	Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., <i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
JANA	John Young, ed., <i>Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945</i> (Washington: Georgetown University, 1959)
JDC	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho</i> [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
JDR	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Bunsho</i> [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
NDL	Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
PRO	Public Records Office, London
SJR	Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., <i>Zhongri Guanxi Shiliao</i> [Records on Sino-Japanese Relations] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987–1996)

Notes

- 1 Daba Hiroshi, “Gotō-Yoffe Kōshō Zengo no Gen’yōsha-Kokuryūkai” [The Gen’yōsha and Black Dragon Society in the Period of the Gotō-Joffe Negotiations], *Takushoku Daigaku Hyakunenshi Kenkyū* No. 6 (2001), 30–45.
- 2 Asian Affairs Bureau Debuchi Katsuji, “Kiyoura Naikaku no Taishi Seisaku” [The Kiyoura Government and China Policy] (June 1924), *JDR* 1924 2, 764. On the “China Policy Outline” and the Taoqi (Taoang) Railway, see: Kaneko Fumio, *Kindai Nihon ni okeru Taimanshū Tōshi no Kenkyū* [Research on Modern Japanese Investment in Manchuria] (Tokyo: Kondō Shuppansha, 1991), 402–419; Sakai Tetsuya, *Taishō Demokurashī Taisei no Hōkai – Naisei to Gaikō* [The Destruction of the Taishō Democracy System: Domestic Politics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1992), 168–173; Shiraishi Masaaki, “Shiberia Shuppei-go ni okeru Nihon no Hokuman Shinshutsu Katei no Ikkōan – Tōgō Tetsudō Fusetsu Mondai o Chūshin ni” [Consideration of the Course of Japanese Expansion into Northern Manchuria After the Siberian Expedition: Focusing on the Issue of the Taoang Railway], *Gaikō Shiryōkanhō* No. 6 (1993), 41–56; Tsukase Susumu, *Chūgoku Kindai Tōhoku Keizaishi Kenkyū – Tetsudō Kensetsu to Chūgoku Tōhoku Keizai no Henka* [Research on the Modern Economic History of Northeast China: Railway Construction and Changes in Northeast China’s Economy] (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1993), 161–187; Yoshii Ken’ichi, *Kan-Nihonkai Chīki Shakai no Hen’yō – “Manmō” “Kandō” to “Ura Nihon”* [Changes in Pan-Sea of Japan Regional Society: “Manchuria/Inner Mongolia,” “Jiandao,” and “Japan Behind the Scenes”] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 2000), 112–139; Katō Kiyofumi, “Matsuoka Yōsuke to Mantetsu – Washinton Taisei e no Chōsen” [Matsuoka Yōsuke and Mantetsu: Challenging the Washington System], in Kobayashi Hideo, ed., *Kindai Nihon to Mantetsu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2000), 64–107.
- 3 Debuchi Katsuji, “Taishi Seisaku Kōryō” [Overview of China Policy] (February 28, 1924), *JDR* 1924 2, 767–771.
- 4 Debuchi Katsuji, “Manmō Chihō ni okeru Tetsudō Fusetsu Sokushin-an” [Plan for the Promotion of Railway Construction in the Manchuria/Inner Mongolia Region] (February 28, 1924), *JDR* 1924 2, 766–767.
- 5 As will be mentioned later, as the railway was shortened to run from Taonan to Ang’angxi, it is also called the Taoang Railway.
- 6 Diary of Debuchi Katsuji (January 14, 1924), in Takahashi Katsuhiko, ed., “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ (2) – 1923–1926,” *Kokugakuin Daigaku Nihon Bunka Kenkyūjo Kiyō* No. 85 (2000), 390.
- 7 Hata Eitarō, “Taishi Seisaku” [China Policy] (March 14, 1924), *JDR* 1924 2, 773–778.
- 8 War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau, “Taishi Seisaku Kōryō” [Overview of China Policy] (February 28, 1924), *JDR* 1924 2, 784–789.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 817–820. *JDC* 2:61–63.
- 10 Itō Takeo, Ogiwara Kiwamu, Fujii Masuo, eds., *Gendaishi Shiryō 32 Mantetsu 2* [Modern Historical Materials 32: Mantetsu II] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1966), 6, 9.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 403.
- 12 Matsuoka to Beiyang Finance Minister Zhang Yinghua, Transportation Minister Wu Yulin (May 31, 1923), Sitao Tieluju Dangan, JD7–115, Liaoning Provincial Archives. On Matsuoka during his time as a Mantetsu director (1921 to 1926), see: David J. Lu, *Matsuoka Yōsuke to Sono Jidai* [Matsuoka Yōsuke and His Era], trans. Hasegawa Shin’ichi (Tokyo: TBS Buritanika, 1981), 82–93.
- 13 Matsuoka Yōsuke Denki Kankōkai, ed., *Matsuoka Yōsuke* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974), 171–172.
- 14 *JDR* 1925 2, 2:1280–1281.

- 15 Fengtian Consul-General Funatsu Tatsuichirō to Foreign Ministry Shidehara (September 8, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1284.
- 16 Shidehara, Hamaguchi to Yasuhiro (September 18, 1924), JDR 1925 2, 2:1284–1285.
- 17 “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ (2) – 1923–1926,” 485.
- 18 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (April 23, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1307–1308. Shidehara to Yoshizawa (April 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1309–1310. Shidehara to Yoshizawa (May 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1326–1332.
- 19 Li to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (June 2, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.05.45.49.3, AS.
- 20 Ambassador to the Soviet Union Tanaka Tokichi to Shidehara (October 14, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1350–1351.
- 21 For the Soviet records of the Soviet-Japanese railway deliberations held in Moscow from October 1925, see: List 5–31, Delo 18, Papka 13, Opis 9, Fond 146, AVPRF.
- 22 Defense Agency, National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Office, *Senshi Sōsho Daihon’ei Rikugunbu 1* [War History Series: Imperial Headquarters Army Department I] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha, 1967), 288.
- 23 Debuchi-Kopp Meeting (March 5, 1926), JDR, 1926 1, 516–518. Soviet Charge d’affaires to Japan to Chicherin (October 5, 1926), DVPS 9:480.
- 24 Amō Eiji Nikki Shiryōshū Kankōkai, ed., *Amō Eiji Nikki Shiryōshū* [Diary and Compilation of Materials on Amō Eiji] (Tokyo: Amō Eiji Nikki Shiryōshū Kankōkai, 1984), 1:1525–1536.
- 25 January 22, 1926, DVPS 9:45–46.
- 26 Kopp to Shidehara (September 29, 1925), DVPS 8:541–544. Kopp to Shidehara (October 23, 1925), DVPS 8:636–638.
- 27 DVPS 8:453–455.
- 28 April 28, 1926, DVPS 9:258–259.
- 29 Gotō’s foreign policy views remained largely constant despite this change in the international environment. See: Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Gaikō Shidōsha to shite no Gotō Shinpei” [Gotō Shinpei as Diplomatic Leader], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* No. 2 (1980), 71–75, 83–88. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, *Gotō Shinpei – Gaikō to Vijiō* [Gotō Shinpei: Diplomacy and Vision] (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1988), 103–106, 202–207.
- 30 Jilin Provincial Governor’s Office Directive (November 5, 1926), Jihai Zhiluju Dangan, JD4–1, Liaoning Provincial Archives. The Fenghai Railway would later become the Shenyang-Hailong Railway.
- 31 Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Gaisha, ed., *Minami Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Gaisha Dai Niji Jūnen-shi* [2nd Ten Year History of the South Manchurian Railway] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974), 1:435–464 provides a summary of Mantetsu in this period. See also: Kaneko 410–417.
- 32 On the connection between the Taoang and Sitao Railways, see: Taoang Zhiluju Dangan, JD5–18, 20, 48, Liaoning Provincial Archive.
- 33 According to Kaneko 442–445, the two major causes of the “Mantetsu crisis” were the CER returning to service with the end of the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict and a decline in a demand for soybeans caused by the Great Depression; the “encirclement” of Mantetsu was a relatively minor factor. However, what I would like to emphasize here is that there was a *perception* that it was the cause of the crisis.
- 34 JDR 1925 2, 2:1281.
- 35 Immigration was already recognized as a hindrance to US-Japan relations even prior to the passage of the Immigration Act. Foreign Minister Ijūin Hikokichi told the 48th Diet in 1923 that “Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States remain in their traditional friendly state. It is a very gratifying state; the treatment of Japanese residents on the Pacific coast being the sole regrettable element.” Ijūin Hikokichi Bunsho, Vol. 46, NDL. Recent leading

- research on the Immigration Act includes Minohara Toshihiro, “1924-Nen Beikoku Iminhō no Seiritsu Katei – ‘Hanihara Shokan’ to ‘Hainichi Iminhō’” [The Passage of the 1924 US Immigration Law: The “Hanihara Letter” and the “Anti-Japanese Immigration Law”], *Kōbe Hōgaku Zasshi* 46:3 (1996), 551–608. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Washington Taiseiron no Bunka – Chūgoku Shūyaku Gaikō to Nichibeiei” [The Divergence of the Washington System: Chinese Treaty Revision Diplomacy and the US, Japan, and Britain], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 122 (1999), 54–68.
- 36 Tamai Reiichirō, ed., *Ishiwara Kanji Senshū 2 Berurin kara Tsuma e* [Selected Writings of Ishiwara Kanji 2: From Berlin to His Wife] (Tokyo: Tamairabo, 1985), 245.
 - 37 David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchin eds., *The Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 249.
 - 38 Minute by Wellesley on C. Eliot’s letter (June 24, 1924), F 1968/1968/23, FO 371/10319, PRO.
 - 39 Atherton to MacMurray (March 2, 1925), Box 26, John Van Antwerp MacMurray Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
 - 40 British Acting Shanghai Consul-General Pratt to British Minister to China Ronald Macleay (December 4, 1924), 11675/24/132, FO 228/3140, PRO. Schurman to Coolidge (January 28, 1925), Reel 4, Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Carl A. Kroch Library, Cornell University.
 - 41 Shanghai Consul-General Yada Shichitarō to Shidehara (February 14, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:1–2. Yada to Shidehara (February 26, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:25–26. On contemporary economic relations, see: Nakamura Takafusa, *Sengoki Nihon Keizai Seichō no Bunseki* [An Analysis of Wartime Japan’s Economic Growth] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1971), 289; Takamura Naosuke, *Kindai Nihon Mengyō to Chūgoku* [The Modern Japanese Cotton Industry and China] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1982), 97–132; Yanagisawa Asobu, “1920 Nendai Zenhanki no Seitō Kyoryūmin Shōkōgyō” [Early 1920s Japanese Resident Commerce and Industry in Qingdao], *Sangyō Keizai Kenkyū* 25:4 (1985), 111–152; Nishikawa Hiroshi, *Nihon Teikokushugi to Mengyō* [Japanese Imperialism and the Cotton Industry] (Tokyo: Minerva Shobō, 1987), 202–273.
 - 42 Qingdao Consul-General Horiuchi Kensuke to Shidehara (April 20, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:38. Horiuchi to Shidehara (April 21, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:42.
 - 43 Japanese Legation to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (April 27, 1925), SJR Pairi Wenti, 417–418. Zhang Zongchang to Shidehara (May 27, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:429. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (May 27, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:50. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (May 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:50–52. Horiuchi to Shidehara (May 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:52. Funatsu to Shidehara (May 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:53. Horiuchi Kensuke, *Horiuchi Kensuke Kaikoroku – Nihon Gaikō 50 Nen no Rimenshi* [The Memoirs of Horiuchi Kensuke: An Inside Account of 50 Years of Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun-sha, 1979), 40–41.
 - 44 Looking back on the signing of the treaty establishing relations with Germany, Yan Huiqing, the contemporary foreign minister, regarded it as significant as “the first time in our relations with foreign powers since the creation of the Republic that [we had concluded a treaty that] had strictly equal and reciprocal terms.” Autobiography by Yen (1946), 202, Folder: Chapters 6–11, Box 1, Yen Hui-ch’ing Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. See also: Bernd Martin, “Germany Between China and Japan: German Far Eastern Policy of the Interwar Period,” in Bernd Martin, ed., *Die Deutsche Beraterschaft in China, 1927–1938* (Dusseldorf, 1981), 289.
 - 45 Tang Qihua, “Ouzhanhou Deguo Duizhongguo Zhanshi Peichang Wenti zhi Chubu Yanjiu” [A Preliminary study on German War Reparations to China after the European War], in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed.,

- "20 Shiji de Zhongguo yu Shijie" *Yantaohui Lunwenji* (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2001) is very thought-provoking.
- 46 Tang Qihua, "Beifa Shiqi de Beiyang Waijiao – Beiyang Waijiaobu yu Fengxi Junfa Chuli Waijiao Shiwu de Hudong Guanxi Chutan" [Beiyang Diplomacy During the Northern Expedition: A Preliminary Study of the Interactions between the Beiyang Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Fengtian Clique over Foreign Affairs], in Zhonghua Minguoshi Zhuanti Taolunhui Mishuchu, ed., *Zhonghua Minguoshi Zhuanti Lunwenji Di Yijie Taolunhui* (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1992), 321–335. Tang Qihua, "Beijing Zhengfu yu Guomin Zhengfu Duiwai Jiaoshe de Hudong Guanxi – 1925–1928" [The Interaction between the Beijing and Nationalist Governments over Foreign Affairs, 1925–1928], *Xingda Lishi Xuebao* No. 4 (1994), 77–103. Tang Qihua, *Beijing Zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng (1919–1928)* [The Beijing Government and the League of Nations (1919–1928)] (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi, 1998), 109–111. Tong Qihua, "Minguo Chunian Beijing Zhengfu 'Xiuyue Waijiao' zhi Mengya" [The Rise of the Beijing Government's "Treaty Revision Diplomacy" During the Early Republic of China], *Wenshi Xuebao* No. 28 (1998), 117–143. Tang Qihua, "1919–Nian Beijing Zhengfu 'Xiuyue Waijiao' de Xingcheng yu Zhankai" [The Formation and Expansion of the Beijing Government's "Treaty Revision Diplomacy" in 1919], *Xingda Lishi Xuebao* No. 8 (1998), 167–196. Tang Qihua, "1921–Nian Zhongde Xieyu yu Beijing Zhengfu 'Xiuyue Waijiao' de Fazhan" [The 1921 Sino-German Treaty and the Development of the Beijing Government's "Treaty Revision Diplomacy"], *Xingda Lishi Xuebao* No. 11 (2000), 71–109. Other notable research includes: Xi Wuyi, "Lun Feizhi Zhongbi Buping-deng Tiaoyue – Jianping Beiyang Zhengfu de Xiuyue Waijiao" [On the Abolition of the Unequal Treaty between China and Belgium: Comments on the Treaty Revision Diplomacy of the Beiyang Government], *Jindaishi Yanjiu* (1986/2), 182–201; Li Enhua, *Beifa Qianhou de "Geming Waijiao" (1925–1931)* ["Revolutionary Diplomacy" During the Northern Expedition Period (1925–1931)] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1993), 87–111. For a review of China's unequal treaties, see: Rodney Gilbert, *The Unequal Treaties: China and the Foreigner* (London: J. Murray, 1929); Robert T. Pollard, *China's Foreign Relations, 1917–1931* (New York: Macmillan, 1933).
- 47 On the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff: Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Chicago, 1990), 71–87; Usui Katsumi, *Nihon to Chūgoku – Taishō Jidai* [Japan and China: The Taisho Period] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1972), 229–254; Banba Nobuya, "Pekin Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi ni Nozomu Nihon no Seisaku Kettei Katei" [Japan's Policymaking Process for the Beijing Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff], in Hosoya Chihiro, Watanuki Jōji, eds., *Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei no Nichibei Hikaku* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1977), 375–417; Chen Zhaojun, "Ribei yu Beijing Guanshui Tebie Huiyi" [Japan and the Beijing Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff], *Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan* No. 15, Vol. 2 (1986), 251–279; Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain's South China Policy, 1924–1931* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 70–80; Kose Hajime, "Chūgoku Kaikan to Pekin Tokubetsu Kanzei Kaigi" [Chinese Maritime Customs and the Beijing Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff], *Tōyōshi Kenkyū* 56:2 (1997), 152–175. For contemporary China issues discussed from the American viewpoint, see: Russell D. Buhite, *Nelson T. Johnson and American Policy Toward China, 1925–1941* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968), 19–54; L. Ethan Ellis, *Frank B. Kellogg and American Foreign Relations, 1925–1929* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974), 105–156; Janet Sue Collesler, "J.V.A.

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- 48 British Shanghai Consul-General Sidney Barton to British Charge d’Affaires to China Charles Michael Palairet (May 30, 1925), 4285/25/5, FO 228/3141, PRO. Yada to Shidehara (May 31, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:55–56. Extract from Mixed Court Register (June 9, 1925), FO 228/3145, PRO. On the May Thirtieth Movement, see: Usui Katsumi 191–228; Fujii Shōzō, “Chūgoku Kakumei to Teikokushugi Rekkō – ‘5/30’ kara ‘3/18’ made” [The Chinese Revolution and the Imperial Powers: From the May 30th Movement to the March 18th Massacre], in Nomura Kōichi, Kobayashi Kōji, eds., *Chūgoku Kakumei no Tenkai to Dōtai* (Tokyo: Aji Keizai Shuppankai, 1972), 3–50; Li Jianmin, *Wusa Cananhou de Fanying Yundong* [The Anti-British Movement after the May 30th Massacre] (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1986); Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–1931* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 13–41.
- 49 Qu Qiubai, “Diguozhuyi zhi Wusa Tush ayu Zhongguo de Guomin Geming” [The Imperialist May 30th Massacre and China’s Nationalist Revolution] (June 22, 1925), *Xiangdao Zhoubao* No. 119, in Mo Yongming, ed., *Wusa Yundong Shiliao* (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1981), 1:100–109.
- 50 Nanjing Consul Hayashide Kenjirō to Shidehara (June 4, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:464–465. Hayashide Kenjirō’s contemporary diary includes references to the anti-foreigner movement. For example, on June 9, 1925, he wrote, “Headed to Pukou to meet Secretary Shigemitsu as the anti-foreign movement was very active in the city and the Xiaguan area. The train arrived late, however, so I returned to Xiaguan. the crowds prevented me from boarding the train and was evacuated by the Xiaguan police. I was finally met by Mr. Kondō in a car and made it safely back to the consulate.” Hayashide Kenjirō Bunsho, 182, NDL.
- 51 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, *Gaikō 60 Nen* (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1990), 79.
- 52 FRUS 1925 1, 647–648, 654–655, 664–666. CSFR 214, 215–216, 223–224.
- 53 CSFR 230–31. US Charge d’Affaires to China Ferdinand L. Mayer to Kellogg (June 24, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 763–765.
- 54 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (July 10, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 1:170–171.
- 55 CCP Central Executive Committee, “Zhongguo Gongchandang wei Fankang Diguozhuyi Yeman Canbao Datasha gao Quanguo Minzhong” [The Chinese Communist Party Calls on the People to Revolt Against the Barbaric and Brutal Imperialist Massacre], (June 5, 1925), Shanghai Shi Danganguan, ed., *Wusa Yundong* (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 1:26.
- 56 Hu Han-min to Borah (July 29, 1925), Folder: China, Box 175, William Edgar Borah Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 57 For one example, see: *Dongfang Shibao* (June 6, 1925), SJR Pairi Wenti, 456–457.
- 58 Shen to Acting Minister to the UK Zhu Zhaoai (August 7, 1925), Waijiao Dangan, 03.23.101.101.2, AS.
- 59 Memorandum by Grew of a Conversation with Sao-Ke Alfred Sze (June 6, 1925), Vol. 29, LETTERS, Joseph Clark Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
- 60 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (June 12, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:78–79.
- 61 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (June 29, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:128–129. See also: Mayer to Kellogg (June 6, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 658–659.
- 62 Palairet to Chamberlain (July 1, 1925), 4620/25/92, FO 228/3143, PRO. Mayer to Kellogg (July 2, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 674–675; Yoshizawa to Shidehara (July 2, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:135–137.
- 63 British Charge d’Affaires to America Henry Getty Chilton to Kellogg (July 7, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 678–679. Yada to Shidehara (July 8, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:161–162.

- 64 US Ambassador to Britain Alanson B Hughton to Kellogg (July 17, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 684–686. Ambassador to Britain Hayashi Gonsuke to Shidehara (July 18, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:197–200. Chamberlain clearly stated his opposition to the dismissal of the police chief in late August. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (September 1, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:304.
- 65 Shidehara to Hayashi (July 20, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:207.
- 66 Xu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (July 13, 1925), Waijiao Dangan, 03.40.2.2.1, AS. Xu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (August 7, 1925), SJR Pairi Wenti, 555–557. Xu to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (August 13, 1925), SJR Pairi Wenti, 561–562. Yada to Shidehara (July 18, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:196. Yada to Shidehara (July 25, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:224–225. Yada to Shidehara (August 13, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:274–275. Yada to Shidehara (August 13, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:275–276. Yada to Shidehara (August 14, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:277–278.
- 67 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (June 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:127–128.
- 68 Kellogg to Coolidge (June 26, 1925), Reel 16, Frank B. Kellogg Papers, Minnesota Historical Society. Kellogg to Mayer (July 1, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 767–768.
- 69 Shi to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (July 1, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.19.19.2, AS. Shi to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (July 2, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.19.19.2, AS. Memorandum by Nelson Johnson (undated), FRUS 1925 1, 768–769.
- 70 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Shi (July 8, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.19.19.2, AS.
- 71 MacMurray to Kellogg (August 1, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 807–809.
- 72 Chamberlain to Chilton (July 19, 1925), 6531/25/89, FO 228/3146, PRO.
- 73 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (July 4, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 1:146–147. See also: Mayer to Kellogg (July 5, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 771–774.
- 74 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (August 11, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 1:269–271. Neville to Kellogg (August 11, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 818.
- 75 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Shi (July 23, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.19.19.3, AS.
- 76 Palairet to Shen (September 4, 1925), 6498/25/76, FO 228/2790, PRO. MacMurray to Shen (September 4, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 831–833. CSFR 233–235.
- 77 Eliot to Austen Chamberlain (July 31, 1925), AC 52/346, Austen Chamberlain Papers, Special Collections, Main Library, University of Birmingham. Eliot's letter was also forwarded to Wellesley and the British Foreign Office's Far Eastern Department.
- 78 JDR Washinton Kaigi Kyokutō Mondai, 372–394. CSFR 125–128.
- 79 CSFR 247–248. Sao-ke Alfred Sze to Kellogg (August 19, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 839–840.
- 80 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (August 18, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1023–1024. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (September 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1064.
- 81 Beiyang Foreign Ministry to Shi (August 7, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.19.19.4, AS.
- 82 Memorandum by Grew of a Conversation with Sze (August 27, 1925), Vol. 29, LETTERS, Grew Papers.
- 83 Grew to Kellogg (August 26, 1925), Vol. 31, LETTERS, Grew Papers.
- 84 Li to Foreign Ministry (July 18, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.23.103.103.2, AS.
- 85 Meeting between Shen and MacMurray (August 13, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.25.16.16.1, AS.
- 86 MacMurray to Hughes (November 17, 1925), Box 28, MacMurray Papers.
- 87 Grew Diary (July 14, 1925), Vol. 29, LETTERS, Grew Papers. Matsudaira to Shidehara (July 22, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1004–1005. Kellogg to MacMurray (July 30, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 804–805.
- 88 Matsudaira to Shidehara (August 20, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1027–1028.

- 89 US Ambassador to Japan Edgar A. Bancroft to Kellogg (July 1, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 836–838. Shidehara to Yoshizawa (July 3, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:997–1000.
- 90 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (August 20, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1028–1029. Zhang to Beiyang Foreign Ministry (August 21, 1925), Waijiao Dangan 03.25.15.15.3, AS.
- 91 Shidehara to Yoshizawa (September 10, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1048–1049.
- 92 Kopp to Karakhan (September 30, 1925), DVPS 8:549–551.
- 93 Shidehara to Prime Minister Katō (October 10, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1072–1081. Katō to Shidehara (October 13, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1083.
- 94 Shidehara to Delegation (October 22, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1089.
- 95 Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaikō Kaisōroku* [Diplomatic Memoirs] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun-sha, 1953), 54. According to page 39 of Shigemitsu Mamoru, “Saburi Kōshi no Shi” [The Death of Envoy Saburi], *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 42:11 (1988), Saburi had been largely reliant on Shigemitsu’s advice for his policies.
- 96 Hidaka Shinrokurō, “Mono ni Naranakatta Kokusai Kaigi” [The International Conference That Achieved Nothing], *Kokusai Mondai* No. 37 (1963), 58–61. Horiuchi Tateki, *Chūgoku no Arashi no Naka de* [Amidst the Storm in China] (Tokyo: Kangensha, 1950), 54–55.
- 97 Republic of China, List of Members of Delegation to the Special Conference on Chinese Customs (Beijing, 1925), Folder: China: Tariff, Special Conference on Chinese Custom Tariff, Pamphlets, Box 109, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- 98 CSFR 249–250; MacMurray to Kellogg (October 26, 1925), FRUS 1925 1, 861–866. Japanese Delegation to Shidehara (October 26, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1094–1096. Japanese Delegation to Shidehara (October 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:1105–1109.
- 99 Macleay to FO (October 27, 1925), 7952/25/1, FO 228/2791, PRO.
- 100 Chamberlain to Macleay (November 28, 1925), F 5662/190/10, FO 228/2791, PRO.
- 101 Shidehara to Delegation (January 9, 1926), JDR 1926 2, 2:720. For a comparison of each country’s plans, see: Ide Kiwata, *Shina Kanzei Tokubetsu Kaigi no Keika* [The Course of the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff] (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtoku Kanbō Chōsaka, 1927), 21–74.
- 102 Macleay to Chamberlain (April 12, 1926), F 1912/8/10, FO 262/1654, PRO.
- 103 Chamberlain to Macleay (April 27, 1926), Despatch no.31 (Conference), FO 262/1654, PRO. Macleay to Chamberlain (May 28, 1926), F 2525/8/10, FO 262/1655, PRO.
- 104 Shidehara to Delegation (May 19, 1926), JDR 1925 2, 2:784–786. See also: American Delegation to Kellogg (May 17, 1926), FRUS 1926 1, 753. Chinese records of the conference can be found at “Guanshui Tebie Huiyi Yishilu,” Waijiao Dangan 03.25.21.21.1–4, AS.
- 105 Macleay to FO (January 25, 1926), F 316/8/10, FO 371/11648, PRO.
- 106 John Thomas Pratt, “British Policy in China” (November 4, 1926), File 65, Box 15, John Thomas Pratt Papers, Special Collections Reading Room, School of Oriental and African Studies Library, University of London.
- 107 Meeting between Shidehara and Hornbeck (October 4, 1926), Shina Kanzei Nami Chigai Hōken Teppai Mondai Pekin Kaigi Ikken Kakkoku no Taido, 2.9.10.13–1, MOFA.
- 108 Memorandum by Hornbeck of a Conversation with Shidehara (October 4, 1926), Vol. 4, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 109 Atherton to Johnson (November 18, 1926), Vol. 4, Johnson Papers.
- 110 Eliot to FO (November 4, 1925), 10813/25/30, FO 228/2791, PRO.
- 111 “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ (2) – 1923–1926,” 529.
- 112 “Waijiaobu dui yu Jiaoshe Zhongzhi Zhongbi Tiaoyue zhi Xuanyan” [Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Termination of the Sino-Belgian

- Treaty] (November 6, 1926), Beiyang Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan 1039.141, Second Historical Archives of China.
- 113 Castle Diary (January 19, 1927), Vol. 11, William R. Castle, Jr. Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. See also: US Ambassador to Belgium William Phillips to Kellogg (August 18, 1926), FRUS 1926 1, 984–985; Phillips to Kellogg (August 25, 1926), FRUS 1926 1, 987–990; Mayer to Kellogg (January 25, 1927), FRUS 1927 2, 349; Belgium Ambassador to the US E De Cartier to Kellogg (March 23, 1927), FRUS 1927 2, 371. Grew wrote in a letter to Castle that “Your last batch of diary was immensely interesting and I am sincerely grateful to you for letting me have it.” See: Grew to Castle (November 23, 1927), Vol. 37, LETTERS, Grew Papers.
- 114 Castle Diary (January 24, 1927), Vol. 11, Castle Papers.
- 115 Kellogg to Coolidge (November 5, 1925), Reel 17, Kellogg Papers.
- 116 To give one example, the Second Fengtian-Zhili War was inter-warlord warfare on an unprecedented scale. Roughly 450,000 men participated, making it twice the scale of the First Fengtian-Zhili War. See: Hsi-sheng Ch’i, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916–1928* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 137. This section is based on Hattori Ryūji, “Hara Gaikō to Shidehara Gaikō – Nihon no Taichū Seisaku to Kokusai Kankyō: 1918–1927” [Hara Diplomacy and Shidehara Diplomacy: Japan’s China Policy and the International Environment, 1918–1927], *Kōbe Hōgaku Zasshi* 45:4 (1996), 763–807.
- 117 For previous research on the Second Fengtian-Zhili War, see: Ikei Masaru, “Dai Niji Hōchoku Sensō to Nihon” [The Second Fengtian-Zhili War and Japan], in Kurihara Ked, ed., *Taimanmō Seisakushi no Ichimen* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966), 193–224; Lai Xinxia, Guo Jianlin, Jiao Jingyi, eds., *Beiyang Junfa Shigao* [A Draft History of the Beiyang Clique] (Wuhan: Hubei Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), 296–307; Banno Junji, *Kindai Nihon no Gaikō to Seiji* [Modern Japan’s Diplomacy and Politics] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1985), 125–132; Qi Qingchang, Sun Zhisheng, *Zhifeng Dazhan* [The Fengtian-Zhili War] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1993); Lou Xiangzhe, *Beiyang Junfa yu Riben* [The Beiyang Clique and Japan] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1994), 102–125; Seki Shizuo, “Shidehara Gaikō to Dai Niji Hōchoku Sensō” [Shidehara Diplomacy and the Second Fengtian-Zhili War], *Tezukayama Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō* No. 44 (1995), 1–22; Hatano Masaru, “Kenseikai no Gaikō kara Shidehara Gaikō e – Kenseikai no Gaikō Hōshin to Dai Niji Hōchoku Sensō” [From Kenseikai Diplomacy to Shidehara Diplomacy: The Kenseikai’s Foreign Policy and the Second Fengtian-Zhili War], *Hōgaku Kenkyū* 73:1 (2000), 449–479. For research on the Guo Songling Incident, see: Usui Katsumi 255–269; Eguchi Keiichi, *Nihon Teikokushugi Shiron – Manshū Jihen Zengo* [Discussion of the History of Japanese Imperialism: The Period of the Manchurian Incident] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1975), 90–124; Hayashi Masakazu, “Kaku Shōrei Jiken to Ichi Nihonjin – Morita Fukumatsu Ishi no Shuki ‘Kaku o Isamete’ ni tsuite” [The Guo Songling Incident and One Japanese: The Personal Account of the Doctor Morita Fukumatsu], *Sundai Shigaku* No. 37 (1975), 22–141; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “Kaku Shōrei Jiken to Kokumin Kakumei” [The Guo Songling Incident and the Nationalist Revolution], *Chikaki ni Arite* No. 4 (1983), 11–28. On foreign relations and the Northern Expedition, see: Dorothy Borg, *American Policy and the Chinese Revolution, 1925–1928* (New York: Octagon Books, 1947), 227–384; Kishino Hiromitsu, “Nankin Jiken to Kankō Jiken” [The Nanjing Incident and the Hankou Incident], *Gunji Shigaku* 4:1 (1968), 101–111; Iriye 89–122; Etō Shinkichi, *Higashi Ajia Seijishi Kenkyū* [Research in the Political History of East Asia] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1968), 149–176; Ōyama Azusa, “Nankin Jiken to Shidehara Gaikō” [The Nanjing Incident and Shidehara Diplomacy], *Seikei Ronsō* 40:3/4 (1971), 1–10; Usui Katsumi, *Nicchū Gaikōshi – Hokubatsu*

- no Jidai* [A History of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy: The Northern Expedition Era] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shinsho, 1971), 8–60; William James Megginson, “Britain’s Response to Chinese Nationalism, 1925–1927: The Foreign Office Search for a New Policy,” Doctoral dissertation, George Washington University, 1973; Kawai Hidekazu, “Hokubatsu e no Igrisu no Taiō – ‘Kurisumasu Messēji’ o Chūshin to shite” [Britain’s Response to the Northern Expedition: Focusing on the “Christmas Message”], in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, eds., *Washington Taisei to Nichibei Kankei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1978), 157–189; Takiguchi Tarō, “Seiji Hendōki ni okeru Gaikō Kōshō – Kankō Eisokai Kaishū Jiken o Megutte” [Diplomatic Negotiations in a Period of Political Change: The British Hankou Concession Recovery Incident], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 66 (1980), 54–71; Yokoyama Hiroaki, *Son Chūzan no Kakumei to Seiji Shidō* [Sun Yat-sen’s Revolution and Political Leadership] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1983), 353–382; Edmund Fung, 81–152; Lee Enhau 49–84; Harumi Goto-Shibata 42–66; Lu Fangshan, “Beifa Shiqi Yingguo Zenbing Shanghai yu Duihua Waijiao de Yanbian” [The British Troop Reinforcement During the Northern Expedition and the Evolution of Its Diplomacy Towards China], *Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan* No. 27 (1997), 187–229; Richard S. Grayson, *Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe: British Foreign Policy, 1924–29* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 170–211.
- 118 “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ (2) – 1923–1926,” 421, 422.
- 119 Hirose Junko, ed., *Kenseishi Hensankai Kyūzō Seiji Danwa Sokkiroku* [Stenographic Record of the Political Discussions in the Possession of the Constitutional History Compilation Board] (Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 1999), 8:287–290.
- 120 Morito Morishima, *Inbō Ansatsu Guntō* [Conspiracy, Assassination, Katanas] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1950), 71.
- 121 For examples of Shidehara’s position on non-interference, see: US Chargé d’Affaires to Japan Jefferson Caffery to Hughes (September 10, 1924), FRUS 1924 2, 373; Shidehara to Kwantung Governor Kodama Hideo (September 16, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 357; Shidehara to Governor-General of Korea Saitō Makoto (September 17, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 358; Conversation with Asian Affairs Bureau Director Komura Eiichi (December 4, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:844–846; Shidehara to Matsui (February 4, 1927), JDR Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 438–440.
- 122 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (September 23, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 366–369. Funatsu to Shidehara (September 23, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 369–370. See also: Kodama to Shidehara (September 26, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 374–375; Kodama to Shidehara (November 28, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:813; Arita to Shidehara (November 29, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:818–819; Yoshida to Shidehara (November 27, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:805–806; Itō Takashi, “Taishō 14-Nen no Kodama Hideo-ate Yoshida Shigeru Shokan” [Yoshida Shigeru’s 1925 Letter to Kodama Hideo], *Nihon Rekishi* No. 608 (1999), 124–128.
- 123 Zaika Nippon Bōseki Dōgyōkai, ed., *Funatsu Tatsuchirō* (Tokyo: Tōhō Kenkyūkai, 1958), 158.
- 124 Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, “Shidehara-Dan Kaikodan ni tai suru Shokan” [Thoughts on Baron Shidehara’s Recollections] (February 11, 1945), Shidehara Heiwa Bunko, Vol. 38. Shidehara Kijūrō, *Gaikō 50 Nen* [50 Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1987), 107–109.
- 125 JDC 2:92–95.
- 126 Sumida Jun, ed., *Ugaki Kazushige* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1968), 1:487–488.
- 127 JDR 1925 2, 2:844–846.
- 128 In a September 23, 1924 letter to Tanaka Giichi from Suzuki Teichi, he mentioned that “I was informed of Your Excellency’s thinking by Mr. Teranishi yesterday.” Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 32, NDL. See also: Suzuki to Tanaka (October 3, 1924), Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 32, NDL; Suzuki to Tanaka

- (October 4, 1924), Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 32, NDL; Teranishi Hidetake, “Keizai o Shu to shita Shina Jikyokukan to Taishi Seisaku” [View of the Contemporary Situation in China (Mainly Economic) and Policy towards China], *Gaikō Jihō* No. 548 (1927), 66–92; Taishi Kōrōsha Denki Hensankai, ed., *Zoku Taishi Kaikoroku* [Recollections of China, Continued] (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Kyōka Tosho Kabushiki Gaisha, 1941), 2:807–808, 900–901.
- 129 Feng Yuxiang, *Wo de Shenghuo* [My Life] (Hong Kong: Bo Wenshuju, 1974), 506–508. Second Historical Archives of China, ed., *Feng Yuxiang Riji* [Diary of Feng Yuxiang] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1992), 1:635–636. China Garrison Army Commander Yoshioka Kensaku to Deputy Chief of Staff Mutō Nobuyoshi (October 12, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 397. Fengtian Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru to Shidehara (October 23, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 414. *Gendaishi Shiryō 32 Mantetsu 2*, 299.
- 130 Shen Yunlong, ed., *Huang Yingbai Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian* [Chronology of Huang Yingbai] (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshiye Gongsi, 1976), 192–193. *Zoku Taishi Kaikoroku*, 2:832.
- 131 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (October 15, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 402–403. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (October 20, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 407. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (October 21, 1924), JDR 1924 2, 409–410.
- 132 Letter from Shirakawa Yoshinori to Tanaka Giichi (October 21, 1924), Tanaka Giichi Bunsho Vol.32, NDL. See also: Feng Yuxiang to Duan Qirui (October 26, 1924), in Feng Yuxiang, *Feng Yuxiang Xuanji* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998), 2:200. However, as can be seen in a December 26, 1924 letter from Banzai Rihachirō to Tanaka, Duan Qirui’s appointment as Chief Executive did not stabilize the political situation. Yamamoto Shirō, ed., *Banzai Rihachirō Shokan! Hōkokushū* [The Letters and Reports of Banzai Rihachirō] (Tokyo: Tōsui Shobō, 1989), 246–247.
- 133 *Feng Yuxiang Xuanji*, 1:593.
- 134 Doihara Kenji Kankōkai, ed., *Hiroku Doihara Kenji* [Confidential Records of Doihara Kenji] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1972), 194.
- 135 Tanaka Giichi Bunsho, Vol. 32, NDL. See also: Nakamura Kikuo, ed., *Shōwa Rikugun Hishi* [Secret History of the Shōwa Army] (Tokyo: Banchō Shobō, 1968), 94; Kido Nikki Kenkyūkai/Nihon Kindai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, ed., *Suzuki Teiichi Danwa Sōkkirōku* [Stenographic Record of Conversations with Suzuki Teiichi] (Tokyo: Nihon Kindai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 1974), 2:259–260.
- 136 Bai Jianwu, “Di Erci Zhifeng Zhanzheng Riji” [Diary of the Second Zhili-Fengtian War], *Jindaishi Ziliao* No. 47 (1982), 101.
- 137 James E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), 137–139.
- 138 *Gendaishi Shiryō 32 Mantetsu 2*, 292.
- 139 Kwantung Army General Staff, “Kaku Shōrei to Ura Sanbō no Kaidan (Dai Ichiji 10-Gatsu 27-Nichi) (Dai Niji 12-Gatsu 10-Nichi Dō 11-Nichi) no Yōshi” [Summary of Discussions between Staff Officer Ura and Guo Songling (October 27 and December 10/11)] (December 20, 1925), JANA, Reel 102, Nos. 628, 10924–10957. Kwantung Army General Staff, “Taishō 14-Nen Shina Jikyoku Shōhō Sono Ichi – Ji 10-Gatsu 1-Nichi shi 12-Gatsu 15-Nichi” [1925 Detailed Report on the Situation in China (1): October 1–December 15], JANA, Reel 103, Nos. 627, 10980–11022. Guo Songling referred to his own forces as the “North-east Nationalist Army.” Guo Songling to Duan Qirui (November 30, 1925), Yan Xishan Yicun Dangan, 0372.42/7150.2, Academia Historica Office.
- 140 Yingkou Consul Deputy Clerk Tanatani Ryōzō to Shidehara (December 13, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:886–887. Shidehara to Yoshida (December 14, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:893. Saitō to Kanaya (December 14, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:896–897.

- Saitō to Vice-Minister Tsuno Kazusuke (December 21, 1925), JANA, Reel 103, No. 627, 10960–10966. JCD 2:83.
- 141 Kwantung Army General Staff, “Taishō 14-Nen Shina Jikyoku Shōhō Sono Ichi – Ji 11-Gatsu 1-Nichi shi 12-Gatsu 15-Nichi” [1925 Detailed Report on the Situation in China (1): November 1–December 15], JANA, Reel 103, No. 627, 10994–10998, 11004–11005, 11017–11018. Kanaya to Kwantung Army (December 8, 1925), JANA, Reel 103, No. 627, 11002. *Ugaki Kazushige Nikki* 1:496. Shidehara to Yoshida (December 15, 1925), JDR 1925 2, 2:898–899.
- 142 DVPS 9:12–13.
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- 144 “‘Debuchi Katsuji Nikki’ (2) – 1923–1926,” 488–489.
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- 157 For an opposite appraisal, Usui Katsumi has said that “It has to be recognized that Shidehara's policy of non-interference in China, when compared to the Hara government's and other non-interference policies touched on earlier, was significantly more flexible and mature.” Usui Katsumi, *Chūgoku o meguru Kindai Nihon no Gaikō* [Modern Japanese Diplomacy Towards China] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983), 89. Whether the transition from Hara to Shidehara should be seen as a maturation of Japan's non-interference policy or as a decline in political skill is a matter of debate.

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4 The Establishment of the Nationalist Government and Tanaka Diplomacy

April 1927 to July 1929 – The Tanaka Government

When the Seiyūkai government of Tanaka Giichi was formed on April 20, 1927, the Northern Expedition was progressing in a manner unfavorable for the Fengtian clique. In January of that year, the British concession in Hankou was occupied by the expedition and British citizens took shelter in the city's American consulate.¹ The question of how to ensure that order would be maintained in northern China was a concern common to Japan, the United States, Britain, France, and Italy.

I. Tanaka Diplomacy and China, Britain, and America

1. Tanaka's Initial Foreign Policy and China, Britain, and America

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Baldwin government in Britain had attempted to use cooperation with Japan as a means of maintaining order in China. But when Ambassador to Japan Tilley send a telegram on January 21, 1927 in which he stated that he did not believe that Japan would agree to a joint operation in Shanghai, the government immediately resolved to dispatch troops on its own.² Behind Britain's attempt to cooperate with Japan had been the goal of redefining the Washington System in military terms, to make it a means of preserving order. It can also be considered a response to former War Minister Ugaki's idea of acting with Britain to suppress communists.

However, just as Shidehara had previously rejected sending Japanese troops to Shanghai, Prime Minister Tanaka (who was also serving as foreign minister) failed to respond favorably to a British proposal for a joint dispatch of troops to northern China. Tanaka met with Tilley on May 3 and told him that "the events in China are something that should be resolved by the Chinese people."³ Despite this, British Foreign Secretary Chamberlain still viewed the formation of the Tanaka government as a favorable omen for Anglo-Japanese cooperation in maintaining order in northern China.⁴

On May 20, Tanaka issued instructions to Minister to China Yoshizawa. It was here that he first laid out his ideas for China policy, including towards Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The instructions also reveal his high regard for Chiang Kai-shek. He believed that a clash with the National

Revolutionary Army could be avoided by recognizing the rule of the capable and anti-communist Chiang over Guannei and encouraging Zhang to focus exclusively on the Three Northeast Provinces.⁵ While his policy thus incorporated a return to Hara's policy of geographically limiting Japan's support of Zhang, it also gave an entirely positive impression of Chiang's Nanjing government.

In that sense, Tanaka's vision for China was less focused on Manchurian policy than is sometimes portrayed. Instead, it was more characterized by support for the divided rule of China, a separation of the north and south between two hegemonies each with their own sphere of influence, with Japan maintaining an equal distance from each. This could be called "equidistant diplomacy." As Chamberlain had described Britain's basic policy towards China as being "strict neutrality towards the various contending parties," Britain and Japan's positions on China were drawing closer, at least to a certain degree.⁶

(1) The First Shandong Expedition and China, Britain, and the US

THE FIRST SHANDONG EXPEDITION

On May 27, 1927, the Tanaka government decided to carry out the Shandong Expedition to preserve order in northern China. As is well known, it was War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori who pushed this measure through the cabinet.⁷ Following this cabinet decision, the 33rd Infantry Brigade was dispatched on the 30th under the command of Maj. General Gōda Kaneyasu, arriving in the port of Qingdao the next day and disembarking on June 1.

The "historical lessons" of the late Shidehara Diplomacy period served as one of the triggers for Tanaka's decision to embark on the expedition. In his May 27 instructions to Qingdao Consul-General Yatabe Yasukichi, he explained that the measure was being taken out of concern over "the recurrence of disgraceful incidents in the Yangtze River area," and he released a public statement the following day with words to the same effect.⁸ There is no question that the Tanaka government's decision to send troops marked a move away from Shidehara's attempts to adhere to "absolute non-interference." Beiyang Foreign Minister Gu criticized Japan's actions, noting that "the Qingdao area has been completely Chinese territory ever since its return in accordance with the agreement reached at the Washington Conference."⁹

But what I would like to emphasize here, rather than the move away from non-interference, is the fact that the Tanaka government's dispatch of troops to maintain order in northern China would be followed by the United States and Britain both doing the same. Conferences of the foreign legations and local Japanese, British, American, French, and Italian military commanders were held in early April (the former in Beijing and the latter in Tianjin), with the issue of public order in those two cities serving as a repeated topic of discussion. Notably, it was decided at the April 6 meeting of the commanders that the size of the foreign garrisons in the city should be doubled; both

Minister to China MacMurray and Counsellor at the British Legation Owen O'Malley saw this decision as a natural one.¹⁰

At the June 4 commanders conference held in Tianjin, it was decided that Britain, America, and France would each increase their forces by 900, 1800, and 1000 men respectively. With this, the foreign contingent in the city would be brought to a total of 9600 men, a number believed to be capable of securing traffic between Beijing and Tanggu at least. Responsibilities were divided, with the British dispatching infantry to Tianjin and Weihaiwei, and the United States sending a land force to Dagou.¹¹

The British were the most understanding towards the First Shandong Expedition, with Chamberlain strengthening his cooperative stance towards Japan.¹² Minister Yoshizawa was quite close to Lampson, his British counterpart, and Lampson received the impression from their talks that the Tanaka government's basic policy would be one of Anglo-Japanese cooperation; this was one reason for the Baldwin government's heightened hopes for Tanaka.¹³ The Chinese demanded the dispatched American forces withdraw, and MacMurray discussed this with Kellogg in Washington. Afterwards, he told Yoshizawa that "the United States does not want the Japanese army withdrawn," as it would make "the American position extremely difficult to maintain should Japan withdraw its additional troops first."¹⁴ The United States thus also became a target of criticism from the Beiyang foreign ministry, which noted that the "recent ordering of additional troops to North China by your Government is not in accordance with the spirit of the Washington conference resolution."¹⁵

TANAKA'S INITIAL FOREIGN POLICY AND CHINA, BRITAIN, AND AMERICA

British and American acceptance of the First Shandong Expedition seemed to raise the possibility of military cooperation taking place within the Washington System. And this was not the only area in which Anglo-American relations with Japan showed improvement over their state under Shidehara Diplomacy. Ambassador to the US Matsudaira Tsuneo and San Francisco Consul-General Ida Morizō were working to raise awareness of the immigration issue and having some success in improving American popular opinion of Japan.¹⁶

The application of the Open Door to Manchuria had been, alongside the immigration and naval issues, a source of friction between Japan and the United States, but this period also saw an effort to seek American capital investment in Mantetsu. US-Japan negotiations to this end were held between Bank of Japan Inoue Junnosuke and Thomas Lamont of J.P. Morgan beginning in early October 1927, and Mantetsu President Yamamoto Jōtarō was enthusiastic about the prospect of American investment.¹⁷ When Emperor Hirohito invited Lamont to the Imperial Palace, Lamont told him that he wished to deepen the friendships he had made since his first visit to Japan.¹⁸ Prime Minister Tanaka also expressed a willingness to welcome such investment to American Ambassador Charles MacVeagh on October 3.¹⁹

American public opinion turned against the investment in the wake of Chinese protests, however, and the negotiations were ultimately indefinitely postponed in December 1927.²⁰ The Beiyang government had made great efforts to gather intelligence about the negotiations through Ambassador to the US Shi,²¹ and Under Secretary of State Johnson had been informed of former foreign minister Gu's belief that investment in Mantetsu would "endanger the traditional friendship held by the Chinese people towards the United States."²² Even so, Lamont continued to discuss the topic with the State Department after returning home.²³ A May 12, 1928 Comintern report on Japan raised the American plan to invest in Mantetsu and the "alliance" between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yuxiang as "signs of increasing US-Japan closeness."²⁴

As reported by Ambassador to Britain Matsui, a cooling of Anglo-American relations due to the Geneva Naval Conference (held from June to August 1927) also contributed to an increasing trend towards Anglo-Japanese cooperation in Britain. Chinese popular opinion during the same period also pushed back against what was seen as moves in both nations for closer cooperation.²⁵ As Ambassador to Japan Tilley alluded to Tanaka, the British were also willing, to a considerable extent, to accept Japanese leadership in Manchuria policy.²⁶

Japanese relations with Britain and the United States were thus generally good during the initial phase of Tanaka's foreign policy, with both countries demonstrating a willingness to make compromises even on Manchuria. The stymieing of the Nanjing government's plan to increase tariffs symbolizes these positive relationships. On July 9, Nanjing Deputy Finance Minister Qian Yongming informed the foreign consulates in Shanghai that a general duty of 12.5% would come into effect on September 1, with a higher duty of up to 30% applying to luxury goods. Tanaka unofficially met with representatives of the Nanjing government and other affected countries on July 26 to inform them that Japan would give tacit approval only to collection of the surtax agreed to at the Washington Conference. The Nanjing government asked Shanghai Consul-General Yada to mediate negotiations with each country and, following vigorous discussions between Yada, Foreign Minister Wu Chaoshu, and the British, American, and French consul-generals in Shanghai, Wu formally notified Yoshizawa on August 29 that the duty increase would be postponed.²⁷ The Nanjing government's plan to implement tariffs was thus avoided for the time being through Japanese leadership.

In addition to engaging in cooperation with the United States and Britain, another potential cornerstone for the Tanaka government's foreign policy was pursuing cooperation with China by going around the other powers and taking the initiation in forming closer relations with the KMT. And Tanaka did, in fact, intend to improve relations with the KMT due to his high regard for Chiang Kai-shek. While the Shandong Expedition had clearly been undertaken for the purpose of impeding the Northern Expedition, it needs to be recognized that Tanaka's aim was never to actually stop it. Having decided

that the success of the Expedition was inevitable, he tried his hardest to avoid frictions with the Nationalist government; he had no intention of attempting to maintain Zhang's status in Guannei despite knowing that Zhang would have to surrender Beijing.²⁸

But when the southern advance and feuding between Zhou Yinren, Zhang Zongchang, and Sun Chuanfang in the northern forces made conditions along the Jiaoji Railway unstable, the safety of local Japanese residents was thrown into question. Tanaka hardened his position and decided on July 6 to send troops to Jinan.²⁹ This naturally drew severe criticism from the south.³⁰ The Nationalist Revolutionary Army was gradually forced to withdraw from Shandong afterwards, with the Shandong Army capturing Xuzhou in late July. Then, on August 13, as a compromise between the Wuhan and Nanjing governments, Chiang stepped down and the First Northern Expedition was suspended. There is no question that the Shandong Army had made the most of the dispatch of troops to Jinan.³¹

During the period from the Qingdao Expedition in late 1927 to the Jinan Expedition in July, the Tanaka government had been in the position of being able to choose to its own advantage between cooperating with Britain and the US or working with China. But the Shandong Expedition was not undertaken in response to the British-led attempt at a joint expedition. Instead, the decision had been influenced by domestic political conditions and the views of foreign ministry officials stationed in China. Prime Minister Tanaka stands in stark contrast to former foreign minister Shidehara on this point, as the latter had not been particularly receptive to domestic and foreign opinions.

While Tanaka had intended to provide only limited support for Zhang Zuolin in the Three Northeast Provinces, vaguely hoping to bring about a compromise under which Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang each established their own spheres of influence in the north and south of China, the Shandong Expedition was not a move in that direction. Although the expedition had the effect of benefiting the Fengtian clique, unlike the "active support" previously advocated for by War Minister Ugaki and Kwantung Army Commander Shirakawa, maintaining Zhang's status in Guannei was not one of the expedition's purposes.³² That relations with the Nanjing government worsened under Tanaka's leadership despite his high esteem for Chiang was the result of a lack of consistency in his foreign policy. While the Tanaka government was in the position of being able to both take advantage of cooperation with Britain and America and work with the Chinese, it had not established a sufficient foundation for its foreign policy.

As shown by the Baldwin government's attempt to work with Japan and use the Washington System as a means of maintaining order in China, the two-year period from 1927 to 1928 represents the height of Britain's focus during the early interwar period on maintaining the old order. According to Minister to China Lampson, there were two strains in contemporary British policy towards China: one pursued by Counsellor O'Malley, who had led the negotiations with Foreign Minister Chen Youren over the return of the British

concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang; and another by Lampson, who had been critical of that compromise.³³ However, a private letter from O'Malley to Lampson makes clear that there were no definitive difference in the two men's positions. According to O'Malley, given that the British were "negotiating with the radicals backing Chen," "the best way to defend Shanghai is by safely reaching an agreement in Hankou".³⁴ O'Malley would go on a thorough inspection tour of northeastern China, Japan, and Southeast Asia from August to October 1927, during which Japan made a much better impression on him than China did.³⁵

(2) *The Eastern Conference and the Various Strains of Thought on China*

As described above, while Tanaka had high esteem for Chiang, he also embarked on the First Shandong Expedition, an example of "nationwide interference" in China. What needs to be remembered here is that Tanaka's ideas on China policy were by no means the result of integrating the views of the foreign ministry and army into a coherent whole. If anything, discussions in Japan over how to respond to the fluid situation in China were becoming increasingly diffuse. Below, I would like to turn an eye towards the various groups within Japan during the period leading to the Eastern Conference and examine how views on China were becoming ever more diverse at this time compared to the prior state under Shidehara.

THE VARIOUS STRAINS OF THOUGHT ON CHINA

"Considerations on Managing the Present Situation in China," a personal proposal put together by Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kimura Eiichi in June 1927 can be used to show the state of views on China among the foreign ministry leadership. This proposal, which was based on the presumptions that Zhang Zuolin would fall from power and the Northeast regime would then compromise with the KMT, envisioned a "policy of new Sino-Japanese economic cooperation focused on Nanjing."³⁶ In other words, Kimura's position can be seen as a continuation of that of Shidehara and Debuchi in that he supported "absolute non-interference" that completely rejected military interference and wanted no support for Zhang.

However, just as had been the case when Shidehara was foreign minister, the ministry leadership's moderate stance towards China – on display in Kimura's proposal – did not align with the views of its officials in China. In particular, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who continued to serve as Minister to China, differed from Kimura in his positions on both Manchuria and Zhang. In a June 10 telegram to Tanaka, Yoshizawa held that Japan should support Zhang's rule of the northeast and that – should the National Revolutionary Army's advance destabilize the security of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia – Japan should not hold back from engaging in military interference in the Three Northeast Provinces, such as by issuing warnings. The position

advocated for in Yoshizawa’s report can be described as being in accordance with Hara’s policies of “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang.”³⁷

These two policy lines in the foreign ministry – the leadership’s “absolute non-interference” and “no support of Zhang” vs. local officials’ support for “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang” – can be positioned as an extension of the arrangement that had existed during Shidehara’s first term as foreign minister. Fengtian Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru took a position different from both of these, however.³⁸ Yoshida abandoned the Manchuria policy of relying on powerful local figures (most notably Zhang) and began advocating for maintaining order and Japan’s railway policy through Japanese power directly.³⁹ His views were partially motivated by a belief that Zhang would eventually be defeated, but also because he believed that “in light of China’s recent history, domestic warfare will not be pacified without foreign intervention.”⁴⁰ Thus, while Yoshida’s position can be classified as “no support of Zhang” because he did not care whether Zhang’s position was threatened, he also believed in “non-intervention with reservations” as he felt that order should be maintained in the Three Northeast Provinces even if it required deploying the Japanese army. In adopting this position, he was pursuing an unprecedented approach to China policy (see Table 4.1).

Despite all belonging to the foreign ministry, Kimura, Yoshizawa, and Yoshida each had their own views on China policy. Similarly, in the army, War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori, the Kwantung Army leadership, and the mid-ranking army officers who had graduated from the army academy from

Table 4.1 Patterns of China Policy (1927–1928)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria	Nationwide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
	Mori	Yoshida	Kimura (Shidehara Doctrine)	No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
	Tanaka	Yoshizawa (Hara Doctrine)		Limited Support of Zhang	
	Shirakawa, Honjō (Ugaki Doctrine)			Active Support of Zhang	
Post-1903 mid-ranking army officers	Mutō			Elimination of Zhang	

Source: Author

1903 on were all mulling over their own unique views. Shirakawa, who had previously intervened in the Guo Songling Incident as Kwantung Army commander, held firm to the positions he had held at that time. As mentioned previously, he had been the strongest advocate within the cabinet for the First Shandong Expedition. In other words, Shirakawa argued for “active support of Zhang” to maintain his position in Guannei and for “nationwide interference” that included military intervention in Guannei. Shirakawa’s views were a continuation of those of former war minister Ugaki; the previous policy arguments between Shidehara and Ugaki had thus carried over to Kimura and Shirakawa.

Of the Japanese army officers stationed in China, Lt. General Honjō Shigeru, a military attaché at the Japanese legation, held views the closest to Shirakawa’s. The outline of China policy provided by a June 6, 1927 entry in Honjō’s diary called not only for active support of Zhang in his rule from Beijing, but for Japan to become involved with warlords in central China like Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang to spread anti-communist propaganda and promote unification.⁴¹

Shirakawa and Honjō’s positions were incompatible with those held by younger mid-ranking officers in China, however. As discussed in Chapter 3, by the latter period of Shidehara’s first term as foreign minister, Kōmoto Daisaku and Sasaki Tōichi had already become critical of Japan’s traditional approach of manipulating the Beiyang clique with an emphasis on Beijing and Tianjin. Under Tanaka Diplomacy, many of these mid-ranking officers, including those who had previously supported the effort to assist Zhang during the Second Fengtian-Zhili War like Doihara Kenji and Itagaki Seishirō, were moving towards supporting the occupation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and eliminating Zhang.

It was the Futabakai and Mokuyōkai, study groups composed of mid-level army officers, who made these hardline policies their central focus. Notably, Ishiwara Kanji argued at the January 19, 1928 meeting of the Mokuyōkai that Japan needed “to carry out thorough preparations to make use of all of China” in anticipation of the “final global war.” At another meeting of the group in March attended by Tōjō Hideki and Nemoto Hiroshi, Ishiwara came to the conclusion that “establishing political power in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is necessary to guarantee the survival of our nation.”⁴² This is not to suggest that these officers were entirely unified on China policy, however. As will be discussed later in this chapter, while Kōmoto Daisaku championed the elimination of Zhang Zuolin, it is believed that he did not go so far as to intend for Japan to occupy Manchuria.

This policy dispute over China between the army leadership and mid-level officers had existed since Ugaki’s time as war minister. There was also a third policy group within the army: the Kwantung Army leadership, centered on Mutō Nobuyoshi, its commander. Its views were clearly laid out in “Opinions on Manchuria Policy,” a June 1, 1927 report from the army’s headquarters that held that Japan should demand additional special privileges in the Three

Northeast Provinces and Rehe as well as the appointment of additional Japanese advisors. Should Zhang refuse these demands, Japan should “put forward a figure recognized as suitable by the Empire and have them carry out these demands as leader of the Three Northeast Provinces.” In Guannei, it should “coordinate with Britain to work to eliminate Soviet Russia’s Chinese revolutionary movement and, if necessary, support moderate elements in China.”⁴³ In other words, while the Kwantung Army advocated for “nationwide interference” against the Northern Expedition in cooperation with Britain, it also sought a subordinate leader with which Zhang could be replaced. The army thus discarded the “active support of Zhang” doctrine of Shirakawa, their former commander, in favor of a policy of “eliminating Zhang.”

Additionally, newly appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mori Kaku had been furious at former foreign minister Shidehara’s policy of non-interference and considered the withdrawal of troops from Shandong at the beginning of the Tanaka government to have been premature. What made Mori even more distinctive in his position was his call for the introduction of “active policies” towards Manchuria that did not rely upon Zhang.⁴⁴ Under this book’s framing, he would accordingly be classified as supporting “nationwide interference” and “no support for Zhang.” Mori bolstered his relationship with Suzuki Teiichi and Yoshida Shigeru.

TANAKA’S POLICIES AND THE EASTERN CONFERENCE

Amidst all of the conflicting opinions on China policy, Tanaka had a high regard for Chiang (mainly from an anti-communist perspective) and was personally inclined to accept the Northern Expedition. He was kept apprised of Chiang and his supporters’ attitudes by Suzuki Teiichi and others.⁴⁵ He had surprisingly little regard for Zhang in comparison and, in the period leading up to the Eastern Conference, was giving consideration to regaining control of the situation in China by relying on some other powerful figure in his place.⁴⁶

At the June 29 and 30 plenary sessions of the 1927 Eastern Conference, Shanghai Consul-General Yada Shichitarō, Hankou Consul-General Takao Tōru, Fengtian Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru, Imperial Army General Staff 2nd Department Director Maj. General Matsui Iwane, Kwantung Army Commander General Mutō Nobuyoshi, Naval Minister Political Affairs Bureau Director Rear Admiral Sakonji Seizō, Kwantung Governor Kodama Hideo, and Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi all gave their assessments of the situation in China. But Tanaka, the conference’s chairman, did not express any particular views himself. And while matters such as “stabilization of the political situation in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and the resolution of pending issues therein,” “policy for the economic development of China,” and “assistance to the residents of the Yangtze River region” were discussed at the July 1, 2, and 4 meetings of the conference’s special committee, Tanaka was frequently absent from these discussions, Vice-Minister Mori Kaku serving as chairman in his stead.

On July 7, the conference's final day, it adopted an "Overview of China Policy." However, the only parts of this document which are believed to reflect Tanaka's views are: Section 2, which stated that Japan had "whole-hearted sympathy for legitimate national demands based in the self-awareness of China's moderate elements and will cooperate in their rational and gradual realization"; Section 5, which asserted that "self-defense measures" would be taken to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals in China; and Section 7, which held that "the Imperial Government should provide assistance as appropriate to influential figures in the three provinces who respect our special status in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and earnestly pursue measures aimed at improving these regions' political stability." Given Mori Kaku's explanation that the language in Section 2 mentioning "moderate elements" in Guannei was a reference to "those within China's Guomindang whose positions are opposed to the communist faction and do not come into serious conflict with our nation's interests either economically or socially," this was a reaffirmation of Japan's acceptance of the unification of Guannei by Chiang Kai-shek's right-wing faction of the KMT.⁴⁷

As for the reference to "influential figures in the three provinces," according to the recollections of Arita Hachirō (who became Asian Affairs Bureau director shortly after the conference) and Saitō Ryōe (who had participated as director of the foreign ministry's Commercial Bureau), Tanaka had none other than Zhang Zuolin in mind here.⁴⁸ Tanaka's position here can be considered an attempt to return to Hara's "limited support of Zhang" in that he was attempting to pursue a Manchuria policy that contained Zhang within the Three Northeast Provinces. While he was willing to engage in "nationwide interference" – including military intervention in Guannei – he wanted to achieve stability in China through a system of regional administrations under which Zhang returned to the Three Northeast Provinces and Japan consented to Chiang Kai-shek's unification of Guannei. The essence of this policy – bringing about divided North-South rule while maintaining an equal distance from each of the two anti-communist leaders – was formalized in the "equi-distance diplomacy" on which Tanaka spent the first nearly three months of his government.

But Tanaka's policy was problematic from the beginning. First, Zhang had assumed the title of Grand Marshall in Beijing on June 18, 1927, and it was difficult to imagine that he would readily agree to returning to the Three Northeast Provinces. Tanaka had already dispatched Suzuki Teiichi and Yamanashi Hanzō in June to persuade him to return only for this to be rebuffed.⁴⁹ Second, Tanaka's policy in no way incorporated the policies desired by the army and foreign ministry. The "Overview of China Policy" was meant to be a final encapsulation of the Eastern Conference, but it instead contained a varied assortment of policy assertions. It held in the preamble that "in light of Japan's special status in the Far East, it has no choice but to differentiate between China proper and Manchuria/Inner Mongolia in the direction it takes," yet in Section 6, it stated that Japan should "promote

the economic activities of both Japanese and non-Japanese equally in northern and southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in accordance with the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity.” This is just one example of the contradictory elements found in the Overview.

2. *The Jinan Incident and the “Protection of Residents”*

Mantetsu President Yamamoto Jōtarō reached a railway agreement with Zhang Zuolin on October 15, 1927.⁵⁰ The six-month period extending from the signing of this agreement into the following spring can be regarded as the zenith of Tanaka Diplomacy. The Yamamoto-Zhang agreement essentially involved the construction of five rail lines which were to run from: Dunhua to Laotougou to Tumen; Chanchun to Dalai; Jilin to Wuchang; Taonan to Solon; and Yanji to Hailin. After working out the specifics, the Tanaka government concluded contracts for all of these (with the exception of the Jilin-Wuchang line) in May 1928.⁵¹

But this zenith of Tanaka Diplomacy was not long-lived. Tanaka’s foreign policy seemed to be on track, but it would be dealt major blows by the Jinan Incident and assassination of Zhang Zuolin in May and June 1928. Existing research on the Jinan Incident – a clash between the Japanese army and the National Revolutionary Army – has had a tendency to focus on the post-incident Sino-Japanese negotiations, and it is difficult to escape the feeling that not enough work has been put into clarifying the causes and course of the incident itself.⁵² Making use of both Japanese and Chinese historical resources, I will first trace the course of the incident below. I will then examine the major causes of the incident while focusing on differences between the policies enacted by the China Garrison Army and the 6th Infantry Division, both of which were deployed to Jinan as an emergency measure to protect local Japanese residents. Finally, I will consider the impact of the incident on the international politics of East Asia.

(1) The Course of the Incident

The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) launched the Second Northern Expedition on April 7, 1928, with Chiang Kai-shek serving as overall commander and commander of the 1st Group Army, Feng Yuxiang as commander of the 2nd Group Army, and Yan Xishan as commander of the 3rd Group Army. On May 1, the NRA made its triumphal entry into Jinan.⁵³ About 90 Japanese residents of Jinan (mainly women and children) had been evacuated to Qingdao in mid-April as the NRA approached the city, but 1,729 Japanese and 81 Koreans remained.⁵⁴ On April 19, the Tanaka government passed a cabinet resolution authorizing the Second Shandong Expedition for the purpose of protecting the local Japanese residents, and three infantry companies from the China Garrison Army in Fengtian arrived in the city as the Temporary Jinan Detachment. The 6th Division under Lt. General

Fukuda Hikosuke then completed its deployment to the city on May 2.⁵⁵ The Jinan Incident occurred the day after the 6th Division's arrival.

Chinese and Japanese historical sources contradict each other on the immediate trigger for the incident, meaning that comparative analysis of these must be undertaken. According to the first report that the Japanese army leadership received on the incident, the conflict was sparked by NRA soldiers "looting" Japanese homes and firing on Japanese troops in what the report held was very likely a planned military action.⁵⁶ While the after action report compiled by 6th Division headquarters later rejected the possibility that the incident had been planned by the NRA leadership, it did report that "at about 10 a.m., several Chinese soldiers trespassed on the house of Yoshifusa Chōhei on Linxiangmen Street (an agency for the Manshū Nippō newspaper) and began looting. Combat began after these soldiers began firing unwarrantedly on the unit of Captain Kumegawa of the Tianjin Detachment as he moved to intervene."⁵⁷ The investigative report compiled by Col. Katsuki Kiyoshi, director of the war ministry Military Affairs Bureau Military Service Section, 25 days after the incident held that about 20 soldiers of the Kumegawa Platoon of the China Garrison Army were dispatched after two police officers of the consular police were attacked as they responded to urgent reports of "looting" at the Yoshifusa home. The NRA soldiers fled to their barracks and fired on the Japanese soldiers, who had no choice but to return fire, resulting in a battle.⁵⁸

Views of the incident from foreign ministry sources and local residents differed only slightly from the army's reports. Qingdao Consul-General Fujita Eisuke's first report on May 3 stated that "there was looting of a Japanese home by Chinese soldiers [...] our forces had no choice but to fight back." The reports compiled by the Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section in September and by 1st Secretary at the Japanese Legation in China Amō Eiji in October also included no major differences from the factfinding of Col. Katsuki's report.⁵⁹ A report based on an investigation by the Japanese Qingdao Chamber of Commerce also contained essentially the same description of events.⁶⁰

Chinese reports of the incident differed significantly, however. According to a May 3 letter of protest sent to Tanaka by Foreign Minister Huang Fu, "Japanese soldiers stationed in Jinan abruptly became provocative on the morning of May 3, firing indiscriminately upon our garrison and the populace."⁶¹ And, a contemporary document prepared by the KMT Pingjin Garrison General Headquarters' Special Party Department held that:

an unarmed member of our army attempted to pass through a Japanese army warning area at around nine o'clock whereupon he was immediately shot and killed by Japanese soldiers. At around that same time, propagandists from the 4th Group Army were putting up posters in southern Weijiazhuang (a district of Jinan) when Japanese unjustly attempted to stop them, sparking an argument. A large number of Japanese soldiers rushed to the area and immediately opened fire, killing and

wounding several people. The Japanese are spreading the story that thirty members of the Southern Army invaded a dealer of the *Manshū Nippō* newspaper in Weijiazhuang at nine o'clock on the third of this month and looted the home of Yoshifusa Chōhei.⁶²

In other words, it held that the clash at the *Manshū Nippō* store, which the Japanese had claimed was the result of looting by the NRA, was actually caused by the Japanese army using force in response to a verbal argument over political propaganda posters.

While the looting explanation – which all the Japanese sources are agreed upon – cannot be completely denied, it seems highly likely that the start of the conflict at the store involved political propaganda posters. However, as all existing Chinese and Japanese sources condemn the other side for opening fire first, we have no choice but to reserve our conclusion with regards to the shooting at the store.

Furthermore, given the complete absence of any information in Japanese sources corresponding to the alleged shooting of an unarmed Chinese soldier, many questions remain. KMT reports are also inconsistent in their explanation for the start of the incident. According to a report by the Political Department of the NRA 40th Army's 1st Division, "at 11 a.m. on May 3, part of our 4th Corps were escorting prisoners from the Fengtian Army. As they attempted to pass through the commercial district of Jinan, Japanese soldiers opened fire to prevent this."⁶³ Considering the above historical sources, it would not seem unreasonable to conclude that multiple clashes occurred in the city simultaneously.

Chinese sources also give a different account of the claim from Japanese soldiers that NRA soldiers fled to their barracks and opened fire on Japanese soldiers. According to the recollection of He Yaozu, who held the heavy responsibility of being commander of both the 1st Group Army's 3rd Corps and the 40th Army at the time of the incident, "at nine a.m. on the 3rd, the Japanese army attacked two nearby barracks of the KMT 40th Army 3rd Division 7th Regiment."⁶⁴ With Japanese and Chinese sources thus giving different accounts of the initial fighting at the barracks, it is difficult to determine the facts.

(2) The Causes of the Incident

What should be noted in examining the origin of the Jinan Incident is that it occurred the day after the 6th Division, the main force of the Shandong Expeditionary Force, arrived on May 2; the three infantry companies of the China Garrison Army dispatched as the Temporary Jinan Detachment, which had arrived earlier, had not experienced any clashes with Chinese forces. Was there some causal relationship between the 6th Division's arrival and the outbreak of the incident? To give the conclusion from the outset: the 6th Division altered the method of area protection that had been employed in

Jinan by the advance force, and that change is likely one cause for the Sino-Japanese clash.⁶⁵

Following the Tanaka government's decision to send the Second Shandong Expedition, the 460 members of the Temporary Jinan Detachment arrived in Jinan on April 20, 1928. The "Security Plan for the Temporary Jinan Detachment," prepared by Lt. Colonel Koizumi Kyōji, the detachment commander, on the 21st shows the basic policies implemented by the unit. Section 1 of this plan established a policy of "protection through evacuation," stating that "if it is found that Imperial subjects in Jinan cannot be protected at their current locations, they will be gathered together and protected in that fashion." On the 24th, Koizumi specified the location to which they would be evacuated and the routes to be used in reaching it. Then, having obtained the agreement of Acting Jinan Consul-General Nishi Kōichi, he informed the residents of the evacuation plan.⁶⁶ Accordingly, as the policy was primarily concerned with guiding the evacuation of the local residents, this can be described as a plan for "collective protection through evacuation."

Afterwards, the 11th Mixed Brigade – composed of the Kumamoto 13th Infantry Regiment and the Oita 47th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division – arrived in Jinan on April 26, and Maj. General Saitō Ryū, the brigade commander, assumed overall command, including over the Temporary Jinan Detachment that had been providing security since the 20th. In stark contrast to that detachment's approach, the "Security Plan for the 11th Mixed Brigade" set forth by Saitō on April 27 called for protecting residents *in situ* and relegated evacuation to a secondary measure.⁶⁷

Despite noting that "Jinan fell into a state of lawlessness from the night of April 29, and there were occasions of looting by the poor," Saitō issued instructions that:

there is a need to make both sides [i.e., the NRA and Fengtian Army] march in column and pass outside of the commercial district as much as possible [...] By standing in the way of the defeated and victorious forces and blocking them entirely, the ravages of war that would otherwise reach the commercial district will be diverted onto a new path.⁶⁸

On May 1, Saitō "met with 41st Army Commander Fang Zhenwu of the Southern Army and discussed how it should avoid our warning area and camp within the old fortress and along the perimeter of the commercial district."⁶⁹ Thus, the 6th Division pursued a new policy that could be described as "protection in situ," seeking to remove the NRA from the area with Japanese residents and protect them where they were. Saitō's policy seems to have been motivated by a belief that Chiang Kai-shek possessed great "hostility" towards the Japanese.⁷⁰

This change in policy by Saitō may have been a cause of the Jinan Incident. This is implied in the words of Katsuki, who inspected the area in the aftermath of the incident. He reported to the army leadership that, despite

Koizumi's plan for "collective protection through evacuation" having been discarded in the wake of Saitō's arrival, Saitō had "failed to be thorough" in explaining his new policy of "protection in situ" to his subordinates.⁷¹

An additional problem came from the fact that Saitō, despite having set up a defensive perimeter around the commercial district for the purposes of "protection in situ," changed his policy on May 2. 6th Division Headquarters, led by Lt. General Fukuda Hikosuke, arrived in Jinan at 11 a.m. that morning. Around that same time, Chiang Kai-shek requested (via Lt. Colonel Sasaki Tōichi) that the barbed wire be removed on the grounds that it was provoking negative feelings among the NRA. Saitō responded to the request by ordering at 2 p.m. that the defensive perimeter around the commercial district be removed. The work of removing the barbed wire and sandbags would continue through the night until the early hours of the following day.⁷²

There are those who believe that the Jinan Incident was a Japanese plot, and its adherents interpret this measure as intended to provide an excuse for the full-scale use of force.⁷³ In my opinion, however, the historical evidence necessary for supporting the accusation that the Japanese actions were planned in advance – the key element of this theory – does not exist. The Jinan Incident seems to have been unintended by both Japan and China.⁷⁴ But it cannot be denied that Japan's changing of the plan for its protection of local residents twice in rapid succession invited confusion. Not only had the change from "collective protection through evacuation" to "protection in situ" not fully permeated, but the removal of the defensive perimeter around the commercial district inevitably increased the degree of contact between the NRA and local residents.

Saitō's decision to order the removal of the defensive perimeter without first obtaining permission from Fukuda would seem to make him particularly responsible.⁷⁵ If the removal of the defensive perimeter was one of the causes of the incident, then it may be the case that he should have held fast to his policy of "protection in situ" and refused Chiang's request that the perimeter be removed. Another factor behind the expansion of the fighting was exaggerated reports of deaths among the Japanese residents (which numbered about a dozen in reality) by Major Sakai Takashi, who was stationed in Jinan.⁷⁶

If the above-described process through which the fighting expanded could be described as "expansion by local officers," then the next stage that followed was "expansion by the army leadership." While active fighting had ceased by May 5, Chief of the Army General Staff Suzuki Sōroku laid out a hardline policy to Fukuda, instructing him that "a truce with China extolls the dignity of the Nationalist army; it is necessary to establish conditions that will eradicate the causes of the trouble."⁷⁷ Upon being informed of this policy on the 7th, Col. Kuroda Shūichi, Chief of Staff for the 6th Division, demanded that those responsible be punished and their units disarmed. Chiang did not comply, however. On May 9, the Tanaka government resolved to "dispatch the 3rd Division to Shandong for the purpose of providing ample protection to local

residents and secure the traffic of the Shandong Railway.”⁷⁸ On the 11th, central Jinan (the area within the city walls) was occupied by the Japanese army.⁷⁹ The Jinan Incident would thus serve as the starting point for Sino-Japanese conflict during the Shōwa Period and reportedly result in more than three thousand Chinese dead.⁸⁰ The synergistic relationship between “expansion by local officers” and “expansion by the army leadership” seen in the Jinan Incident would repeat in Japan’s later imperialist policies towards China.

(3) The Impact of the Incident

The Jinan Incident served as a turning point for diplomatic history in three ways. First, the anti-foreign movement in China had, prior to this point, regarded Britain as its primary enemy; it would now come to target Japan. The Shandong Expedition and Jinan Incident intensified the anti-Japanese movement in cities like Nanjing, Shanghai, Hankou, and Guangzhou, and Nanjing Consul Okamoto Issaku was forced to evacuate to outside of the city walls.⁸¹

Second, the incident severely damaged major Chinese figures like Chiang Kai-shek’s views of Japan. It weakened the position of the pro-Japanese Foreign Minister Huang Fu within the Nationalist government, and he would be replaced by the pro-American and British Wang Zhengting.⁸² Beiyang Foreign Minister Luo Bunkan also told Yoshizawa that “the continued dispatch of [Japanese] troops has caused an increased sense of distrust.”⁸³

Third, while the United States and Britain had been understanding of the First Shandong Expedition, their increasingly close relations with the KMT would lead them to become critical of Japan. America was likely the more sensitive of the two powers. Minister to China MacMurray wrote in his lengthy 1935 memorandum that, for American policymakers, the Jinan Incident was “evidence of antagonism toward the Nationalists, whom American public opinion continued to favor as though they were the champions of our own ideals.”⁸⁴ The KMT Central Executive Committee’s appeals to Senator Borah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, about the injustice of the Shandong Expedition in the period leading to the incident can be given as one element contributing to this perception.⁸⁵

And, as will be discussed later in this chapter, while Britain had previously repeatedly attempted to carry out joint expeditions with Japan, its economic interests began to separate from those of Japan as it turned towards the KMT. While Acting Ambassador to Japan Cecil Dormer communicated Tanaka’s desire for Anglo-Japanese cooperation to the Baldwin government,⁸⁶ the leadership of the British Foreign Office, most notably Foreign Secretary Chamberlain, were skeptical of Japan’s sincerity.⁸⁷ By the time that the Japanese belatedly began exploring cooperation with the British following the Jinan Incident, Britain had already given up on partnering with Japan. In addition to the damage caused to Sino-Japanese relations, the Jinan Incident also has to be regarded as having negatively influenced collaborative diplomacy within the Washington System.

The most unfortunate result of the incident for Prime Minister Tanaka, who had held Chiang in high regard due to his anti-communist views, was likely the deepening distrust of Japan by figures like Chiang who were knowledgeable about Japan. The lack of mutual understanding between the two men had already been evident when Chiang met with Tanaka at his private residence on November 5, 1927. While Tanaka told Chiang at the meeting that “we will not fail to provide full support to your efforts”⁸⁸ so long as it did not mean sacrificing Japanese interests, Chiang requested that Japan not interfere in the Nationalist Revolution and end its support of the “degenerate warlord cliques.”⁸⁹ The meeting actually increased Chiang’s suspicion of Tanaka, and he wrote in his diary that Tanaka “is absolutely lacking in sincerity; Sino-Japanese collaboration is impossible. There is no chance that he will permit our revolution to succeed.”⁹⁰ Which is to say, while Tanaka had intended to reconfirm his regard for Chiang and inform him that he had no desire to impede the Northern Expedition, he was unable to accurately convey this to Chiang.

Chiang would resume the Northern Expedition in April 1928. According to Lt. Colonel Sasaki Tōichi, who accompanied the Chinese army, the leadership of the NRA had not yet abandoned cooperation with Japan at that point.⁹¹ Following the Jinan Incident in May, however;

Huang Fu told me that ‘those of us who understand Japan no longer have a place.’ And Chiang Kai-shek, in a rare fit of rage, declared that ‘the National Revolutionary Army will, from now on, be utterly unable to shake hands with the Japanese army.’⁹²

Acting through Nanjing Consul Okamoto, Tanaka requested that Chiang and newly-appointed Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting act to suppress the anti-Japanese movement, but the Nationalist government made no firm commitment to do so.⁹³ And, on the first anniversary of the incident in 1929, Chiang gave a lecture at the NRA military academy in which he stated that “On May 3 of last year, Japanese imperialists massacred our comrades in Jinan and occupied our territory in an attempt to halt the Northern Expedition. This is a most humiliating anniversary for the Chinese people.”⁹⁴

The Nationalist government claimed that Cai Gongshi, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs for the War Zone Administration Committee, who was charged with overseeing the negotiations over the incident, was butchered by the Shandong Expeditionary Army.⁹⁵ Nationalist Government Chairman Tan Yankai also appealed to League of Nations Secretary-General Eric Drummond to “immediately convene the Council on the basis of Article 11, Section 2 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as Japan’s aggressive actions threaten international peace and endanger China’s territory and independence.”⁹⁶

The Sino-Japanese negotiations over the aftermath of the Jinan Incident did not go smoothly. Following negotiations between General Staff 2nd Department Director Matsui Iwane and Zhang Qun in Jinan, Shanghai

Consul-General Yada and Foreign Minister Wang in Nanjing, Minister Yoshizawa and Wang in Shanghai, and newly-appointed Shanghai Consul-General Shigemitsu Mamoru and Foreign Ministry 2nd Department Director Zhou Longguang, a formal document resolving the incident was finally signed by Yoshizawa and Wang on March 28, 1929. The agreement was accompanied by a joint statement holding that “we hope that, by erasing the unpleasant feelings accompanying this incident from our memories, future relations between our nations will become increasingly sincere and kind” and included a promise of compensation to those on both sides based on the findings of a joint investigatory commission, a guarantee from the Nationalist government to protect Japanese residents, and the withdrawal of the Shandong Expeditionary Army within two months of the signing.⁹⁷

The Tanaka government was inconsistent in its policy for the Jinan negotiations, and there were several times when an agreement had nearly been reached only for the foreign ministry leadership to intervene. The largest factor behind this was Vice-Minister Mori Kaku, who adopted a hardline position in concert with mid-level army officers. Yoshizawa recalled on this point that;

My negotiations on the evening of February 4 were completed in accordance with my instructions. This seems to have caused some discontent among the mid-level of the army, however, and Vice-Minister Mori Kaku joined with these officers and interfered. I thus received a telegram telling me to redo the negotiations.⁹⁸

This interference led Shigemitsu Mamoru, upon taking up his post as Shanghai consul-general, to “make arrangements to exclude Vice-Minister Mori Kaku and conclude the negotiations.”⁹⁹ After the local negotiations had been finished and he had consulted with Yoshizawa and Horiuchi Kensuke, Shigemitsu sent “a top secret telegram, to be read by the minister alone, asking for a response of only ‘yes’ or ‘no.’” According to Shigemitsu, “Prime Minister Tanaka was extremely happy to have the incident resolved and took the necessary steps to exclude Vice-Minister Mori.”¹⁰⁰ The excluded Mori was indignant at Tanaka’s compromise and resigned as vice-minister in late April 1929. The domestic support base for Tanaka’s increasingly internationally isolated foreign policy had also weakened.

The lesson of the Jinan Incident was that even the slightest friction could lead to catastrophe if the army leadership did not make concerted efforts to control the actions of its local officers in China. But, as implied by the assassination of Zhang Zuolin that would follow shortly thereafter, this is not a lesson that was adequately learned.

3. The Kwantung Army and the Assassination of Zhang Zuolin

The period following the Jinan Incident, from mid-May to the assassination of Zhang in early June 1928, saw Prime Minister Tanaka at his most active in his

pursuit of “equidistance diplomacy,” his concept for a system of divided rule in China that would see Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Zuolin each have their own sphere of influence, with Japan maintaining an equal distance from each.

Acting on the basis of the May 16, 1928 cabinet resolution emphasizing active involvement in maintaining order in the Three Northeast Provinces, Tanaka issued instructions to Yoshizawa to prevent the NRA from giving chase if the Fengtian Army carried out an early withdrawal to the northeast and to demand the disarmament of both sides should it be defeated in battle. In such an occasion, Tanaka instructed Yoshizawa to “have military officers attached to the legation or the legation’s personnel provide full explanations to Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Xueliang, Yang Yuting, etc., so that they take measures to prevent any problems such as disarmament as much as possible.” He thus intended to have the Fengtian Army carry out an early withdrawal and only envisioned their disarmament as a last resort.¹⁰¹

While the Nationalist government criticized the Tanaka government as interfering in domestic Chinese affairs, it also informed it of its intention not to pursue should the Fengtian Army withdraw, and that it would be appointing Yan Xishan to oversee the preservation of order in the Beijing-Tianjin region. Zhang Zuolin also informed his advisor Machino Takema that he would be leaving for Fengtian.¹⁰² Thus, while Tanaka’s plan was publicly subjected to criticism, it had been de facto accepted by both the Northern and Southern forces. Similarly, the British and Americans initially condemned the “memorandum” as domestic interference but became more understanding of Tanaka’s plan once they realized that the Japanese had no intention of establishing a protectorate.¹⁰³ Accordingly, Tanaka’s “equidistance diplomacy” was, to a considerable degree, being accepted by the parties involved.

The harshest criticism of Tanaka’s ideas actually came from the Japanese army. War Minister Shirakawa had shifted from the conventional policy of providing support for Zhang to calling for him to step down, and 1st Department Director Lt. General Araki Sadao enthusiastically advocated for Japanese troops be dispatched outside of Mantetsu-affiliated areas for the purpose of disarming the Fengtian Army.¹⁰⁴ The army leadership had moved from “active support of Zhang” to “elimination of Zhang” and was rapidly coming to share the views of the Kwantung Army and its commander, Lt. General Muraoka Chōtarō. Prime Minister Tanaka’s policy vision would be completely destroyed by the Kwantung Army conspiracy that resulted in the assassination of Zhang on June 4.

(1) Points of Contention Related to the Assassination of Zhang Zuolin

The following is the generally accepted explanation for the Kwantung Army’s movements leading up to the assassination of Zhang: the Kwantung Army received a confidential report from the General Staff Office stating that the imperial decree necessary for dispatching troops outside of Mantetsu-affiliated

areas would be issued on May 21. Seeing this as a good opportunity to demand that Zhang step down, it began the preparations necessary for disarming him. Indecisiveness on the part of Prime Minister Tanaka meant that this imperial decree was never issued, however. In response, Kwantung Army Commander Muraoka dispatched Maj. Takenaka Yoshiharu to Beijing on a secret mission to arrange Zhang's assassination. Col. Kōmoto Daisaku, a senior staff officer in the Kwantung Army, learned of the mission and convinced Takenaka to entrust him with the assassination. He then carried out the bombing of Zhang's train with Capt. Tōmiya Kaneo, commander of a company in the 2nd Infantry Battalion, Independent Garrison, and 1st Lt. Fujii Sadatoshi, who was attached to the Tatsuyama 20th Engineering Battalion.¹⁰⁵

However, this explanation leaves certain fundamental points in doubt. First, to what extent were members of the Kwantung Army leadership other than Kōmoto – men like Muraoka, Chief of Strategic Planning Lt. Colonel Yakuyama Hisayoshi, and Chief of Intelligence Capt. Sakurada Takeshi – involved in or aware of the assassination? While various explanations have been given, most of them hold that the assassination was carried out based on Kōmoto's own judgement. That is, that Kōmoto, having perceived Muraoka's intention to have Zhang assassinated, carried out the assassination independently without the involvement of any other staff officers from the Kwantung Army. This explanation has issues in terms of the historical evidence, however. As this kind of clandestine operation rarely leaves behind internal documentation, we are largely reliant on Kōmoto's own prewar testimony and uncertain biographical sources. These all emphasize that the bombing was Kōmoto's decision and that none of the Army's leadership was involved, but there is reason to doubt the reliability of Kōmoto's prewar account. It would not have been unnatural for Kōmoto to falsify his testimony so as to avoid reigniting debate over the army's responsibility for the assassination. Two letters written by Kōmoto in April 1928, prior to the assassination, also contain no detailed references to any moves on the part of the Kwantung Army leadership.¹⁰⁶

The second point in question is the political intentions behind the Kwantung Army's assassination of Zhang. An April 27, 1928 letter from Kōmoto to 1st Department Director Araki Sadao and 2nd Department Director Matsui Iwane mentions "the establishment of a new political administration" and "the fundamental resolution of the Manchurian question." However, it is not necessarily clear what he meant by these phrases.¹⁰⁷ He also attested in December 1942 that:

Araki Gorō, a former 2nd lieutenant in the artillery who went by the name Huang Mu, led Zhang Zuolin's bodyguard, which had been organized as a model unit of the Fengtian Army. He attempted to conspire against Zhang. We assembled a brigade in front of the Yamato Hotel so as launch an attack at the same time as the incident. Not even the army commander was aware of our plan, but there was some idiot on the general staff who forced us to disband, so it all came to naught.¹⁰⁸

Due to the state of the historical evidence, the common interpretation is that the assassination of Zhang was intended to serve as a breakthrough for the occupation of the Three Northeast Provinces, but that this plan failed as Fengtian Chief of Staff Zang Shiyi adopted a policy of non-resistance. If true, this would mean that the later Manchurian Incident can be regarded as a continuation of the assassination of Zhang. But was the assassination truly a prelude to the invasion of Manchuria? And did Kōmoto plan to establish a puppet government in Manchuria?

(2) The Kwantung Army Leadership and the Intentions Behind the Assassination

A written statement dictated by Kōmoto while he was detained in Taiyuan in China from April to August 1953 makes specific references to the involvement of other members of the Kwantung Army leadership in the assassination. It also provides a different motive than the occupation of the Three Northeast Provinces. In other words, in this statement, Kōmoto rejects his own prewar testimony.¹⁰⁹

First, in his prewar testimony, it was Kōmoto who realized that Maj. Takenaka had been dispatched as Muraoka's agent. According to his later statement, however, Takenaka visited the Kwantung Army general staff before leaving for Beijing and told them of his mission to facilitate the assassination of Zhang.

Second, in his prewar testimony, Kōmoto was the only member of the Kwantung Army general staff who was involved in the incident. But according to his postwar statement, the staff officers discussed the matter with Kōmoto, ultimately agreeing to the assassination and deciding that a bomb would be used.

Third, in his prewar testimony, Kōmoto, having realized that Muraoka wanted Zhang assassinated, planned the assassination independently. But according to his postwar statement, once Kōmoto had learned of Muraoka's intentions, the two men discussed the plan together. To summarize the above three points, while the prewar testimony has Kōmoto acting independently on his own initiative, the postwar written statement has the Kwantung Army leadership (with the exception of Chief of Staff Saitō Hisashi) being heavily involved.

Kōmoto's prewar and postwar accounts are also decisively different when it comes to the intentions behind the assassination. In the prewar testimony, the bombing was intended to cause domestic chaos for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the Three Northeast Provinces. But in the postwar statement, Kōmoto was merely acting in accordance with Muraoka's desire to avoid a clash with the Fengtian Army and maintain public order. Regarding the plan for the Northeast regime in the wake of the bombing, Kōmoto and the Kwantung Army general staff backed Yang Yuting, but Araki Gorō and Fengtian Secret Service Director Hata Shinji supported Zhang Xueliang; Muraoka is believed to have chosen the latter.¹¹⁰

Kōmoto's prewar testimony and postwar written statement are thus incompatible with one another. So, which should be credited as incorporating more of the truth? Under normal evidentiary research, the prewar testimony would likely be regarded as more credible as it was written when less time had passed from the bombing. Kōmoto's postwar written statement dates from nearly 25 years after the events described therein, and it includes several errors, such as the ranks of the various figures involved. It is, however, generally accurate when it comes to names and dates, and its statement that Chief of Staff Saitō Hisashi was unaware of the bombing is corroborated by Saitō's own diary.¹¹¹ It is also difficult to believe that Kōmoto would have misremembered whether the Kwantung Army leadership was involved in the plot.

For these reasons, it is only natural to presume that Kōmoto deliberately distorted the facts in one of his accounts. If this was the postwar written statement, it was likely because he felt the need to fabricate the involvement of the Kwantung Army leadership so as to minimize his own responsibility. But this clearly does not seem to have been his goal, as it concludes with the statement, "I bear full responsibility in the grave matter of the assassination of Zhang Zuolin."

This lends itself to the interpretation that Kōmoto's postwar written statement is more accurate, and that the prewar testimony likely distorted the truth. The most plausible explanation for Kōmoto's motive in writing his prewar testimony was to avoid reigniting the question of the army's responsibility in the bombing by asserting that it had been his own independent act. If true, then it would seem that he made the truth clear for the first time after the war because he judged there was no longer any reason to exclude the Kwantung Army leadership's involvement.

Kōmoto Daisaku died of illness on August 25, 1953 in the Taiyuan Detention Camp. The written statement was dictated immediately before his death, and there is no conclusive evidence that it is more or less accurate than his prewar testimony. However, the explanation that he only made the Kwantung Army leadership's involvement clear because he was writing at a time when he no longer had to take the issue of the army's responsibility into account seems persuasive. While it was Kōmoto who led the bombing that killed Zhang Zuolin, the staff officers of the Kwantung Army (with the exception of Saitō Hisashi) and its commander Muraoka were likely also involved in the incident to a considerable extent, and the assassination seems to have been carried out to maintain public order in the Three Northeast Provinces by throwing the Fengtian Army's chain of command into disorder. The assassination of Zhang was fundamentally different in nature from the Manchurian Incident, which was carried out with the goal of occupying Manchuria. Chief of Staff Zang Shiyi's policy of non-resistance¹¹² was thus actually compatible with the goals of the Kwantung Army, which wanted only to maintain public order.

4. The Arrival of Zhang Xueliang and the Nationalist Government's Revolutionary Diplomacy

The assassination of Zhang Zuolin in June 1928 raised two contentious questions for the international politics over China: how to respond to the Nationalist government's diplomatic efforts known as "revolutionary diplomacy" (*geming waijiao*) and to Zhang Xueliang's domestic and foreign policies.¹¹³ Regarding the former, much of the existing research either focuses on the archetypical case of the recovery of the British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang and the foreign response thereto or analyzes it from the perspective of economic history. It feels as if not enough empirical research has been done on the Nationalist government's diplomacy itself during the period contemporaneous with the assassination of Zhang.¹¹⁴ But while the term "revolutionary diplomacy" has become established in the literature, many aspects of the political process behind the Nationalist government's policies on trade, the seizure of important industries, and, of course, revision of the unequal treaties remain unexplained.

This is likely not unrelated to the state of understanding of Tanaka Diplomacy, which corresponds to the period in which the Nationalist government was establishing diplomatic relations with other countries. Generally speaking, when comparing Shidehara and Tanaka's foreign policies – a topic that has long fascinated scholars – economic aspects have been emphasized when discussing Shidehara Diplomacy, while militarist diplomatic aspects have been focused on in research on Tanaka Diplomacy. Even as the state of empirical research has improved in recent years, studies on Shidehara Diplomacy have continued to focus on economic diplomacy and his policy of non-interference in China, while research into Tanaka Diplomacy has largely been concerned with Manchuria policy and the Shandong Expedition. Perhaps for that reason, there has been a tendency for Japan's relations with the Nationalist government during the latter period of Tanaka's time as prime and foreign minister – particularly the economic aspects of that relationship – to be relatively neglected.

The truth, however, is that Tanaka was also forced to deal with the economic aspects of Japan's relationship with China, as he was prime minister when foreign countries began establishing diplomatic relations with the Nationalists. As shown by the United States' unilateral decision to simultaneously acknowledge Chinese tariff autonomy and grant recognition to the Nationalist government, economic diplomacy was an inseparable part of building a relationship with the Nationalist government. Tanaka therefore had to consider how to respond to these developments in an economic sense as well. And, in fact, many of the pending issues in economic policy towards China during the second period of Shidehara Diplomacy were things that he had inherited from the time of Tanaka Diplomacy.

This section will first trace the process through which the path of Tanaka's "equidistance diplomacy" was closed off by the arrival of Zhang Xueliang,

the Northeast Flag Replacement, and the transfer of diplomatic authority to the Nationalist government that followed. Next, China's revolutionary diplomacy during the period when the Nationalist government was establishing diplomatic relations with other countries will be broadly divided into three categories: revision of the unequal treaties, trade policy, and the seizure of important industries. I would like to undertake a comparative examination of the responses of Japan, Britain, and the United States to these policies while focusing on the diplomatic leadership of foreign ministers Huang Fu and Wang Zhengting.

(1) The Arrival of Zhang Xueliang and the Transfer of Diplomatic Authority

The Northeastern Question, particularly the internal negotiations between the Northeast regime and the central government over railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, had already been an ongoing issue while Zhang Zuolin was still alive. On May 4, 1927, Zhang had called the attention of the Beiyang government (which tended to overemphasize treaty revision diplomacy) to the issues of railways in the northeast, noting that "railways are the heart of the economy."¹¹⁵ The Beiyang foreign ministry paid close attention to Japan's actions towards railways in the northeast and, around the time of the Eastern Conference, worked with the transportation ministry to develop countermeasures.¹¹⁶

The assassination of Zhang brought an end to Tanaka's plan to rely on Zhang in his Manchuria policy. There were a number of figures within the contemporary Northeast regime with their own ideas for future policy, including Zhang Zuoxiang (who called for allying with the Nationalist government), Yang Yuting (who wanted to join with Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi of the Gungxi clique), Yuan Jinkai (who sought to maintain friendly relations with Japan and strengthen the regime's control of the Three Northeast Provinces), and Zhang Zongchang (who wanted to continue fighting the NRA, supported by the Japanese army).

Zhang Xueliang, who succeeded Zhang Zuolin as commander of the Three Northeast Provinces Peace Preservation Force, judged that compromising with the Nationalist government was inevitable. As early as July 1, 1928, he sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, Jiang Zuobin, and He Yingqin, stating that he had "absolutely no intention of preventing unification."¹¹⁷ He dispatched Xing Shilian to Chiang to negotiate the terms of the Northeast Flag Replacement – the recognition of the Nationalist government by the Northeast regime.¹¹⁸

On July 20, Zhang secretly met with Kwantung Army Commander Muraoka and bluntly told him that:

We are considerably committed to the compromise between Fengtian and the South. Were I to repudiate it at this point, I would not only lose

credibility with the South, but I would also be placing myself in a very precarious position by going against the opinion of the majority within Fengtian.¹¹⁹

Zhang summarized his view of Japan in a July 24 letter to Chiang: he maintained the status quo as a temporary compromise with Japan so as to not give the Tanaka government an excuse it could use to extend its life.¹²⁰

The Tanaka government, fearing Chinese unification, tried to carry on with its “equidistance diplomacy,” placing pressure on Zhang in an attempt to stop it.¹²¹ This gave Zhang a favorable position in his negotiations with the Nationalist government, which wanted to complete the country’s unification as quickly as possible. The Nationalists not only appointed Zhang to the National Government Council and as chairman of the Northeast Political Council, but it agreed to incorporate the Rehe Special Area into the Northeast regime as a fourth province. They also accepted the compromise that the KMT restrict its activities in the northeast and not become involved in the internal affairs of the Northeast regime. The Nationalist government had to be satisfied with formal unification and a commitment to having control over China’s foreign relations.¹²²

The December 29, 1928 Northeast Flag Replacement brought the dangerous issue of the transfer of diplomatic power over the northeastern region to the fore. Under pressure from Mantetsu, Zhang had already informed Chiang of his intention to avoid negotiations with Japan over railways and the right to lease property until the Flag Replacement had been completed, and Chiang also intended for these negotiations to be conducted with the central government.¹²³ Even so, the Tanaka government remained committed to only negotiating with the Northeast regime on Manchurian matters even after the Flag Replacement. The biggest points of contention were the Jihui and Zhangda Railways. While the Yamamoto-Zhang Railway Agreement gave the Japanese priority rights for the construction of these railways and contracts for their construction had already been concluded in May 1928, Zhang Xueliang did not consent to allowing construction to actually begin. And, despite the May 15, 1929 deadline for the railways’ construction approaching, Mantetsu’s efforts to negotiate with the Northeast regime had stalled.

Fengtian Consul-General Hayashi Hisaharu met with Zhang on January 23, 1929 and demanded that construction on the railways begin immediately.¹²⁴ With Zhang seeking to postpone the construction due to opposition from his subordinates and a lack of approval from the Nationalist government, Hayashi suggested to Tanaka on March 22 that construction should begin anyway.¹²⁵ This was opposed by Yoshizawa, who was concerned about Chinese “feelings towards Japan,” “relations with the Nationalist government,” and “misgivings towards us by the other powers.” He argued that “now is not the time to force the construction of the Manchurian railways.”¹²⁶ Tanaka sided with Yoshizawa and did not accept Hayashi’s proposal.

The railway negotiations having thus stalled, the Northeast regime continued with its policy of transferring authority over railway issues to the central government; this transfer was approved by the Nationalist government in late 1929. The Northeast regime also began taking stronger action against Mantetsu, beginning operations on all lines of the Jihai Railway on May 15 and reducing fares on the Beining and Shenhai Railways. While Tanaka told Zhang that there would be no change to the contracts despite the deadline having passed, he did not actually have any alternative to forcibly beginning construction. The Tanaka government's Manchurian railway policy thus ground to a halt despite the importance it placed on the matter.¹²⁷

(2) The Nationalist Government's Revolutionary Diplomacy

Next, I would like to analyze "revolutionary diplomacy," the Nationalist government's initial policy for recovering sovereignty, which potentially included the use of force (this diplomacy, and the Japanese government's response thereto are summarized in Table 4.2). In doing so, I will particularly focus on the period from 1928 to the first half of 1929 and the effects this diplomacy had on relations with Japan, Britain, and the United States.

REVISION OF THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

Immediately after its formation, the Nationalist government focused its diplomatic efforts on recovering tariff autonomy. It is largely due to the political skill of Huang Fu that this effort, something that the Chinese had been hoping to accomplish ever since the Qing Dynasty, made progress by focusing on the United States. When Huang was appointed foreign minister on February 21, 1928, he issued a declaration on the revision of the unequal treaties and appointed Jin Wensi, Yuan Liang, and Hei Jiecai as directors of the first, second, and third departments of the foreign ministry, respectively.¹²⁸ He then met with MacMurray in Shanghai on February 26. Along with showing enthusiasm for concluding the negotiations over the Nanjing Incident, he also expressed a desire to strengthen "the traditionally friendly relationship between China and the United States as shown at the Paris, Washington, and Peking conferences."¹²⁹ The American official most enthusiastic about quickly holding talks with China was Under Secretary of State Johnson rather than MacMurray.¹³⁰

Huang also attempted to link the Nanjing Incident negotiations to revision of the unequal treaties. This led to criticism from Tanaka, who noted that "the Nanjing Incident and unequal treaties are completely separate issues."¹³¹ Vice-Minister Debuchi Katsuji spoke with Acting British Ambassador Dormer on March 22, 1928 and told him of the Japanese policy of not taking up revision of the unequal treaties during the Nanjing Incident negotiations.¹³² As Foreign Secretary Chamberlain had expressed similar intentions,

when Minister to China Lampson went to Nanjing to enter into negotiations with Huang over the incident, the unequal treaties became a barrier to progress and the talks broke down.¹³³

Secretary of State Kellogg adopted a different position than his Japanese and British counterparts, however. Following up on his January 1927 statement, he was proactive in addressing the issue of Chinese tariff autonomy and concluded an agreement over the Nanjing Incident on March 30, 1928.¹³⁴ Huang's decision to link the two issues had disrupted the coordination between Japan, Britain, and the United States. In a private letter to Huang dated April 9, MacMurray praised the "rationality and frankness" that Huang had shown during the Nanjing Incident negotiations.¹³⁵

Kellogg also had Finance Minister Song Ziwen and MacMurray sign an agreement recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy on July 25 (to take effect in January), shortly after Wang Zhengting was appointed foreign minister in June.¹³⁶ Assistant Secretary of State Castle had told French Ambassador to the US Claudel on June 26 that America "saw no reason for falling over ourselves to accord recognition, that we rather preferred to see conditions a little stabilized." As such, it seems fair to say that Kellogg had taken the lead on bringing the Sino-American treaty to fruition.¹³⁷

Kellogg told President Coolidge that "the signing of the treaty on July twenty-fifth with the representatives of the Nationalist Government constitutes technically a recognition of that Government and that ratification by the Senate is not necessary to give effect to the recognition"¹³⁸ He next advised the president that "the Chinese treaty seems to have had a splendid reception throughout the United States" and warned that "we shall some time in the not distant future probably have to take up the question of negotiating on our extraterritorial matter and on our general commercial treaties."¹³⁹ In a letter to Chairman Borah of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Kellogg told him that Germany, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy had entered into negotiations with China that were "clearly modelled on our treaty."¹⁴⁰ Kellogg's diplomacy was thus a revival of the "pro-Chinese Washington System" under which China would be incorporated into the system on a more equal basis.

Wang had been emboldened by Borah and others in the United States pushing the government to act unilaterally towards China and had told Hornbeck (who would become chief of the State Department Division of Far Eastern Affairs) in January 1927 that Americans should "let John Hay live again in your foreign policy."¹⁴¹ Through the above treaty, the Nationalist government gained American recognition of its tariff autonomy and established formal diplomatic relations with the United States. It is unlikely that Wang was being at all false when he told MacMurray in July that "your government was the first to respond to the Nationalist government's treaty revision policy, and it did so with the greatest sincerity."¹⁴² Wang also expressed his gratitude to Hornbeck in a letter sent the following month.¹⁴³ Hornbeck calmly observed that the United States "stands on record with the

Chinese leaders as having been the first country to concede unequivocally and without condition the principle of China's right to tariff autonomy," noting that this would clearly be to America's "moral advantage."¹⁴⁴

On the Chinese side, the increasingly close Sino-American relationship was embodied by Wu Chaoshu. As foreign minister in the Nanjing government, he had dispatched Li Jinlun to Kellogg in June 1927 in an attempt to strengthen relations.¹⁴⁵ Wu would also personally visit America as foreign minister in January 1928 in an attempt to personally carry out treaty revision diplomacy.¹⁴⁶ Wu's actions complicated things for Minister to the US Shi Zhaoji, who was close to Hornbeck.¹⁴⁷ Wu would succeed Shi as minister in January 1929.

The Nationalist government next concluded agreements with Britain, France, and Italy over the Nanjing Incident in late 1928.¹⁴⁸ Leaving the matter of Chinese tariff autonomy to be decided by the next government, the Tanaka government dispatched Minister to China Yoshizawa and Horiuchi Kensuke to Shanghai and Nanjing to sign settlements for the Nanjing and Hankou Incidents on May 2, 1929.¹⁴⁹ The Chinese opposed Japanese demands for reparations over the Nanjing Incident, countering with a demand that language be included in which the Japanese government "shows suitable compassion for the damage caused to the Chinese people," a reference to the alleged stabbing of a Chinese rickshaw puller to death by a Japanese marine during the Hankou Incident.¹⁵⁰ The settlement documents signed on May 2 conformed to the Nationalist government's positions on these two points. Thus, after having been tossed around by the Chinese demands for revision of the unequal treaties, the Tanaka government was finally able to bring the negotiations over the Nanjing and Hankou Incidents to a close during its final months, albeit under conditions it was reluctant to accept.

TRADE POLICY

The trade policy of the Nationalist government was closely related to its efforts to recover tariff autonomy. The Sino-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1896, one of the unequal treaties, had expired for the third time in October 1926 and been extended every three months ever since. On July 7, 1928, the Nationalists announced that they would be annulling the treaty and seeking to replace it with a new treaty, leading to a difference in Chinese and Japanese views as to the validity of the 1896 treaty. Wang reiterated to Yoshizawa on July 19, 1928 that the treaty had been renounced and stated that provisional measures (*linshi bianfa*) would be put into place until Chinese tariff autonomy was restored in a new treaty.¹⁵¹

Prime Minister Tanaka told Yoshizawa that the Nationalist government's use of the former Beiyang governments diplomatic method of amending treaties through "expiration" was "an outrageous act that shows a disregard for international trust."¹⁵² While Nanjing Consul Okamoto Issaku and Shanghai Consul-General Yada Shichitarō entered into negotiations with

Wang over amending the commercial treaty, the disagreements between the two sides over the validity of the 1896 treaty and the new provisional measures were not easily resolved. Yoshizawa would take charge of the matter after concluding the negotiations over the Jinan Incident, and he agreed on April 13 to enter into negotiations over amending the treaty that would operate on the premise that that treaty was no longer valid.¹⁵³ Even so, the matter of recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy is something that would carry over into the following Hamaguchi government.

As the negotiations became drawn out, the Nationalist government attempted to increase tariffs, introducing a differential tax rate as a provisional measure in August 1928 that was based on the Chinese proposal at the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff. Tanaka attempted to respond by reaching out to the British.¹⁵⁴ The Baldwin government, however, responding to efforts by Wang, recognized Chinese tariff autonomy in a new Sino-British treaty on December 20 and adopted a differential tax rate as a provisional measure until said autonomy could be implemented.¹⁵⁵ According to Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Wellesley, “it is probably to our advantage that China should obtain tariff autonomy, for that is our only hope of securing the collection of all customs duties by the Customs Administration, as well as some mitigation of irregular inland taxation.”¹⁵⁶

Table 4.2 The Nationalist Government’s Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Tanaka Government’s Response (1928–1929)

<i>Three Types of Revolutionary Diplomacy</i>	<i>Detail</i>	<i>Tanaka Government Response</i>
Reform of the Unequal Treaties	Recovery of Tariff Autonomy	Left to next government
Commercial Policy	Conclusion of a new commercial treaty	Agreed to negotiations
	Provisional introduction of a variable tax rate	Accepted the variable tax rate; failed at having the additional income applied to foreign debt
	Surtax on foreign-owned exports	Failed to prevent surtax’s introduction
	Abolition of the preferential border custom	Delayed abolition through protest
Seizure of Important Industries	Seizure of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company	Caused Nationalist government to abandon idea by protesting
	Nationalization of the Nanxun Railway	Successful at maintaining Japanese claim

Source: Author

Deciding that the implementation of a differential tax rate was inevitable, Tanaka attempted a new policy under which, while the Japanese government would accept the tax rate, it would only do so under the conditions that the additional custom revenue was applied to settling China's debts and that internal transit duties were abolished.¹⁵⁷ Yada entered into negotiations with Finance Minister Song Ziwen following these instructions. On January 30, 1929, Acting Minister to China Hori Yoshitaka and Wang exchanged documents under which implementation of the new differential tax rate was accepted, and it was agreed that five million yuan of additional custom revenues would be applied to settling debts annually. The specifics of this debt settlement were to be left to a separate meeting of creditors.¹⁵⁸ Asian Affairs Bureau Director Arita Hachirō and Finance Minister Financial Bureau Director Tomita Yūtarō met on April 2, 1929 to work out a policy for this meeting with the goal of settling unsecured debts such as the Nishihara Loans.¹⁵⁹ However, as the Nationalist government's finance ministry was slow to hold the creditors meeting that Japan had demanded – and Foreign Minister Wang announced at a press conference that there would be no repayment of the Nishihara Loans – no progress was made on the issue of China's foreign debts.¹⁶⁰

The Nationalist government next moved to increase tax revenue by introducing a surtax on exports by foreign-owned companies. Customs Office Director Zhang Fuyun informed Shanghai Consul-General Yada on January 28, 1929 that this surtax would be levied on customs at Dalian and Qingdao in the near future.¹⁶¹ For the Japanese, who had yet to recognize China tariff autonomy, this tax was both a treaty violation and a potentially extremely severe economic blow.¹⁶² Arguing that “they have a great interest in preserving the existing maritime customs system” and that levying “unjust surtaxes such as this one would open the door to the destruction of [that] system,” Tanaka instructed Hori to try to work with the British to prevent the surtax's introduction.¹⁶³ The Baldwin government decided to accept the export surtax rather than work with Japan, however, and Tanaka was ultimately unable to prevent its introduction.

The Nationalist government also moved to abolish the preferential tax system along the Sino-Japanese border. Under this system, derived from a May 29, 1913 agreement between Minister to China Ijūin Hikokichi and Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service Francis Aglen, duties on land exports between the Three Northeast Provinces and Korea were reduced by a third.¹⁶⁴ On February 24, 1929, the Nationalist government directed the Andong and Jiandao custom offices to stop the preferential treatment. Zhang Xueliang immediately requested that the foreign ministry conduct negotiations on the issue with Japan and that, while the ministry should listen to the reports of the individual negotiators, these should take a moderate course; it seems that this series of measures had been undertaken at Nanjing's initiative.¹⁶⁵

Tanaka was “firmly resolved to prevent this treaty violation” and directed Nanjing Consul Okamoto to file a stiff protest on February 26.¹⁶⁶ Governor-

General of Korea Yamanashi Hanzō also advised in a March 11 letter to Tanaka that “it will be necessary to occupy the Tiantu Railway and the customs office on the opposite shore of the Tumen River” to stop the increased customs in the Andong and Jiandao regions by force. Government-General of Korea Superintendent-General of Political Affairs Ikegami Shirō also telegraphed Tokyo in support of this policy.¹⁶⁷ Jiandao Consul Suzuki Yōtarō opposed the use of force, however, so the Tanaka government instead only lodged a protest with the Nationalist government. While this protest resulted in the postponement of the preferential custom’s abolishment at the Andong customs office, France’s preferential custom on land traffic between China and French Indochina had already been abolished, and the Japanese custom would also be eliminated by the second annex to the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement signed on May 6, 1930.¹⁶⁸ The Ministry of Colonial Affairs and the Government-General of Korea were also concerned about the impact on smuggling between Andong and Sinuiju.¹⁶⁹

THE SEIZURE OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

Another element of the Nationalist government’s diplomacy alongside revision of the unequal treaties and trade policy was the seizure of important industries. The government’s decision to pursue self-sufficiency in steel and the nationalization of railways caused frictions with the major powers. In particular, the seizure of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company as part of this self-sufficiency policy was something that the Tanaka government could not let pass unchallenged. The company was headquartered in Shanghai and supplied iron ore from the Daye iron mine to some of Japan’s most important steel mills like Yahata Steel Works. The Japanese had steadily worked to expand their management rights in the company through the use of loans, Group III of the Twenty-One Demands, and the dispatch of senior advisors. Similarly, the Nationalist government’s attempt to nationalize the Nanxun Railway also demanded a response from the Japanese, who held a claim to the railway through the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company.

The Nationalist government’s plan to seize the Han-Yeh-Ping Company began to be put in motion in 1927, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Mining ordered the company’s seizure on March 1, 1929.¹⁷⁰ The Ministry of Railways was also moving forward with the nationalization of the Nanxun Railway at this time.¹⁷¹ The Tanaka government, at the request of the finance ministry, lodged a protest against the move to seize the Han-Yeh-Ping Company. Tanaka also directed Nanjing Consul Okamoto on January 16, 1929 to present the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company with a plan for being reimbursed by the Chinese on the grounds that “[the nationalization of the Nanxun Railway] is not something that can be ignored if we are to preserve the integrity of the Japanese financial claim.”¹⁷² The government also dispatched Kimimori Tarō, a financial agent from the finance ministry, in May to negotiate the Han-Yeh-Ping and Nanxun issues. The result was that the

Nationalist government de facto abandoned its plan to seize the Han-Yeh-Ping Company. The Japanese claim to the Nanxun Railway was also maintained, as financial difficulties prevented the Chinese from repaying the East Asian Industrial Promotion Company.¹⁷³ This major element of Japan's southern expansion strategy was thus protected, albeit just barely.

As such, pressure from the Tanaka government and the Nationalist government's own financial difficulties prevented it, for the time being, from achieving any major results in its attempt to seize important industries. Even so, it would continue to pursue its goal of self-sufficiency in steel, seeking German investment in China and moving forward with plans to construct additional steel mills.¹⁷⁴ The Nationalist government also laid out a policy in April 1929 of assuming authority from the Northeast regime over railways in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and imposing relatively high fares on the transportation of foreign-owned freight.

FORCED ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

The primary diplomatic success achieved by the Nationalist government early on was gaining recognition of its tariff autonomy from the Western powers. The government also began to secure gains on commercial issues such as the revision of the Sino-Japanese commercial treaty, the introduction of provisional measures such as a differential tax rate and a surtax on foreign-owned exports, and the abolition of the preferential rate on land duties. Wang Zhengting would later recall that "the American government, especially the American people, have always shown great friendship to China," and that Lampson was "intelligent and versatile as well as being sympathetic to China's desire for complete equality." He also said that it was "policy towards Japan that I paid the closest attention to."¹⁷⁵ Of course, credit for these diplomatic achievements cannot be reduced to the political leadership of Huang Fu and Wang Zhengting alone. The Beiyang government's late attempts to secure treaty revisions through conferences had already done a fair amount to prepare the favorable response the Nationalist government received from the United States. The Nationalist government's commercial policies had also largely been inherited from the Beiyang government's "expiration" treaty revision diplomacy.

As China's revolutionary diplomacy also demanded an economic response from Japan, the Tanaka government was forced to engage in economic diplomacy. Having lagged behind other countries in recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy, it had attempted to respond to China's introduction of a differential tax rate and export surtax by acting in concert with Britain. But the Baldwin government had abandoned cooperation with Tanaka by that point. Shigemitsu Mamoru wrote on this that "the change in Japan from Shidehara Diplomacy to Tanaka Militarist Diplomacy conversely resulted in increasingly divergent Anglo-Japanese policies towards China."¹⁷⁶ In that sense, the isolation of Tanaka Diplomacy was, in some ways, a byproduct of Chinese revolutionary diplomacy.

The diary of British Minister to China Lampson, who had a close relationship with Yoshizawa, is extremely interesting as it provides clues as to how the view of Japan within British diplomacy changed over time. In a July 1928 entry, he wrote in response to the Nationalist push to annul the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and the Japanese negative reaction that “it is time someone turned and showed these people that they really must behave in accordance with the rules of decent international intercourse,” showing that he still held a pro-Japanese view. But when Yoshizawa sounded him out in October about whether he could convince Finance Minister Song to use the increased income from tariffs to repay unsecured debts, he wrote that “I could not pretend to say how such a suggestion would be viewed by the [Foreign Office].”¹⁷⁷ During this later period, it was actually Inspector-General of the Chinese Maritime Custom Service Frederick Maze, with whom Lampson had a poor relationship, who showed more enthusiasm about cooperating with Japan.¹⁷⁸

Britain and the United States were thus breaking away from Japan (albeit not entirely simultaneously), but the nature of these two estrangements was subtly different. In the case of America, this was rooted in the friendly feelings towards China that had existed since the time of the Beiyang government and the strong domestic anti-Japanese sentiment that had followed the Jinan Incident. Li Jinlun, who was stationed in New York, requested that Huang Fu prepare a document aimed at Chinese residents of the United States, publicizing the Jinan Incident, on the grounds that “Hornbeck recognizes that Japan has made a major blunder and [America] should not come to its aid.”¹⁷⁹ US Jinan Consul Ernest Price, an American intelligence source on the incident, wrote in his report to MacMurray that one of the underlying causes of the incident was that “for the Japanese people as a whole, the preservation of China as a market for Japanese goods and as a source of supply for raw materials essential to Japan’s growing industrialism is absolutely essential.”¹⁸⁰

Conversely, the primary reasons that Britain, which had spent nearly two years pursuing Anglo-Japanese cooperation, had grown indifferent to such were, of course, the Jinan Incident but also, from a more utilitarian perspective, a divergence of interests between the two countries’ economic diplomacy towards China. This was symbolized by the difference in enthusiasm each showed towards tariff autonomy, differential tax rates, the export surtax, and negotiations with China over settling its foreign debt. Britain chose to partly abandon the legacy of the imperialist era and avoid the folly of adhering to cooperation with Japan and thereby increase frictions with China (and by extension, the United States). While this meant that Britain’s idea of using the Washington System as a means of maintaining order became a relic of the past, this transition was a natural one from their perspective. It also meant, however, that Britain’s role as a mediator between the United States and Japan was reduced.

Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan also carefully observed the difficult position that Tanaka Diplomacy found itself in towards the end. His interpretation, as related to Ambassador to Japan Aleksandr

Trojanovskii, was that Britain had been able to recover its position in trade with China thanks to Tanaka's militarist diplomacy "drawing the attention of the anti-imperialists to Japan," and that Foreign Secretary Chamberlain was becoming critical of Japan.¹⁸¹ While the Tanaka government had successfully prevented the Nationalist government's seizure of the Han-Yeh-Ping Company and Nanuxn Railway, it was clear that Japan's southern expansion strategy was on the defensive. And as the Northeast regime's transfer of diplomatic power to the Nationalist government had caused negotiations over railways in Manchuria – part of the northern expansion strategy – to break down, Tanaka Diplomacy had reached a dead end.

II. The Korean Question and Japan-Soviet Relations

1. Reignition of the Korean Question

Broadly speaking, the Korean independence movement of the mid-1920s had three lineages: the independence movement centered in the Three Northeast Provinces; the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai; and communist-affiliated forces. Which is not to say that all of these independent movements posed an equal threat to Japan.

According to the 1924 edition of the Government-General of Korea's Annual Administrative Report, the Provisional Government had already lost trust both at home and abroad and was only managing to survive by maintaining good relations with independence groups in the Three Northeast Provinces. And the communist independence movement was also not seen as an immediate threat. The independence movement judged to be the most dangerous was that based in western Jiandao in eastern Fengtian.¹⁸² Western Jiandao had become a new stronghold for the independence movement in the years since the 1920 Jiandao Expedition, and it was hoped that this could be dealt with in cooperation with the Northeast regime.

The Mitsuya Agreement, reached on June 11, 1925 between Government-General of Korea Police Affairs Bureau Director Mitsuya Miyamatsu and Director of the Fengtian Provincial Police Office Yu Zhen, had been meant to deal with the independence movement in western Jiandao by institutionalizing joint Sino-Japanese management.¹⁸³ And the 1925 Government-General of Korea's Annual Administrative Report, published immediately after the establishment of the Mitsuya Agreement System, speaks highly of its effectiveness.¹⁸⁴ But there are also Japanese accounts testifying to the agreement's unpopularity with the local authorities.¹⁸⁵

There was also a difference of opinion between China and Japan over how the large number of Koreans who had emigrated to Jilin and Fengtian were to be treated. The Japanese interpretation was that Japan had gained consular jurisdiction over Koreans in China in the 1915 Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and that Koreans with Japanese citizenship held the right to lease land. The Chinese tended to view the

validity of that treaty as being itself questionable, and the positions of the two sides were irreconcilable. That the joint management system for the Korean independence movement that the Mitsuya Agreement symbolized nevertheless continued to exist was largely due to the desires of Zhang Zuolin. Subsequent events in Manchuria, from the assassination of Zhang to the Northeast Flag Replacement, could not help but threaten this arrangement. After Zhang's death, the Northeast regime demanded the withdrawal of the Japanese police and placed pressure on Koreans, prohibiting them from owning land. The Nationalist government also began to consider the Korean question as part of the larger unequal treaties issue.¹⁸⁶

The Korean question was thus intimately related to the right to lease land. Along with the issue of consular jurisdiction in southern Manchuria, this had been left unresolved and now needed to be addressed by Tanaka Diplomacy. And, as Zhang Xueliang told Fengtian Consul-General Hayashi, while the post-assassination Northeast regime was willing to make concessions on leasing rights, the abolition of consular jurisdiction was considered a priority.¹⁸⁷ On August 6, 1928, Hayashi proposed to Tanaka that Japan agree in principle to the abolition of consular jurisdiction in exchange for an "agreement under which the land ownership of Japanese and Koreans is recognized, as well as the right of foreigners to reside outside of southern Manchuria."¹⁸⁸ As Tanaka chose to prioritize Mantetsu's negotiations over railways for the time being and the Northeast regime was actively attempting to avoid entering into negotiations with Japan, however, the frictions over the Korean question and land lease issues would remain unresolved.

Specific examples of the land lease issue in southern Manchuria include the disputes over army property in Shijianfang and the Sakakibara farm. The Shijianfang property was land that had been confiscated by the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War that Japan subsequently attempted to turn over to Mantetsu. The Northeast regime demanded the return of the land, holding that proper procedure had not been followed in its confiscation. This issue was finally resolved on May 22, 1929, after Mantetsu approached the area's landlord, Li Pinsan, with a payment of 55,000 yen. Even then, the status of the area remained ambiguous, however, as the Chinese authorities were reluctant to allow the land to be incorporated into Mantetsu's holdings.¹⁸⁹

The other incident arose during the same period after construction began on the Chinese Beiling Railway, as the railway's tracks were to run through the farm of Sakakibara Masao. After Sakakibara contacted Fengtian Consul-General Hayashi, proposing that he remove the tracks himself, Hayashi determined that Sakakibara held a definite lease to the land. He dispatched Japanese police officers to the farm on June 27, 1929, the day construction there was to begin.¹⁹⁰ Despite the incident resulting in increased anti-Japanese sentiment in places like Fengtian, Jilin, Changchun, and Nanjing, there was little discussion between China and Japan over the larger issue of land leasing rights itself.

When strong resistance from the Northeast regime brought the leasing of land in southern Manchuria to Japanese to a halt, the Japanese attempted to use Koreans to circumvent this. The East Asia Industrial Development Company (Dongya Quanye Gongsi) was formed in April 1927 as a Mantetsu affiliate. Mantetsu President Yamamoto Jōtarō attempted to use this company and local Koreans to purchase land in Jiandao after receiving approval from Tanaka, Governor-General of Korea Yamanashi Hanzō, Jiandao Consul-General Suzuki Yōtarō, and the Kwantung Leased Territory. As described by Hayashi, the method for purchasing the land was: “First, have a naturalized Korean living in Jiandao purchase land from the Chinese. Then, lease that land from the Korean, relying solely on the authorization of our officials at the East Asian Industrial Development Company.”¹⁹¹ The Japanese were attempting to use the land purchased in Jiandao through this method to expand its leasing of land along the border with Korea.¹⁹²

Following the assassination of Zhang Zuolin, the Northeast regime, which had earlier shown a willingness to be flexible on leasing rights in exchange for the abolition of consular jurisdiction, gradually hardened its position. In February 1929, Fengtian provincial authorities prohibited Korean tenant farmers from cultivating land held by the East Asian Industrial Development Company in the Liuhe region.¹⁹³ Jilin provincial authorities also implemented a new policy in April 1929 under which it was “henceforth strictly prohibited for land purchases financed by non-naturalized Koreans to be carried out under the name of naturalized Koreans.” This was because Koreans in Jiandao “have started acquiring land with behind-the-scenes assistance from the Japanese.”¹⁹⁴ The frictions between the Northeast regime and the Japanese over the Japanese attempts to use Koreans to expand their land holdings had thus grown more severe than they had been while Zhang Zuolin was alive.

2. The Tanaka Government and the Soviet Union

At the time of the Tanaka Giichi government’s formation in April 1927, Sino-Soviet relations were approaching a major turning point, triggered by the search of the Soviet embassy in Beijing and Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-communist coup d’état.¹⁹⁵ On April 6, the Beiyang government carried out a search of Soviet embassy and the administrative offices of the CER, arresting individuals affiliated with the Communist Party. On the 28th, it executed twenty of these, including Li Dazhao, one of the founders of the CCP. According to the recollections of Gu Weijun, who was premier and foreign minister at the time of the raid, these actions were carried out by the military, and the foreign ministry was not kept fully apprised of events. Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov sent a letter of protest in response and withdrew the embassy’s staff, including Minister to China Chernykh.¹⁹⁶ A week later, Chiang Kai-shek carried out an anti-communist coup on April 12. The Wuhan government, which had been dominated by the KMT’s left wing, merged with the Nanjing government in September.

Stalin's influence led to Trotsky's calls during this period for all CCP members to immediately leave the KMT to be rejected at the 7th and 8th Enlarged Plenums of the Comintern Executive Committee, the Comintern's highest body. While the Executive Committee called for CCP members to withdraw from the Wuhan government on July 13, 1927, it also called for the CCP to remain within the KMT and strengthen its ties to lower party members.¹⁹⁷ As shown by a letter he sent to Molotov and Bukharin, Stalin believed that the CCP leaving the KMT would be to the CCP's detriment.¹⁹⁸

After the CCP abandoned cooperation with the left-wing of the KMT and rose up on December 11, temporarily occupying Guangzhou, the KMT withdrew its recognition of the Soviet consulates in each province on the 14th.¹⁹⁹ The following day, Nationalist Foreign Minister Wu Chaoshu ordered the Soviet consul in Shanghai to leave the country within the week. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin objected strenuously, stating that "As the Government of the Soviet Union has not yet even recognized the so-called 'Nanjing government,' it naturally cannot assent to the notice issued to the Soviet consulate in Shanghai on the 15th of this month."²⁰⁰ This worsening Sino-Soviet relation is, after the Northern Expedition, the most noteworthy of the international changes that Tanaka Diplomacy found itself facing.

Soviet-Japanese relations also faced issues. While Japan had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in January 1925 during Shidehara's tenure as foreign minister, tensions remained over railways in northern Manchuria and political propaganda aimed at Japan. The Tanaka government's goals for its diplomacy towards the Soviet Union were to reduce these tensions and steadily achieve results in their economic relationship, particularly on fishing issues and oil rights. It seems fair to suggest that, in light of declining Soviet influence in China, that there was an opportunity here to fundamentally improve relations by resolving issues to Japan's advantage, thereby minimizing the influence of the "Soviet threat" argument that had originated with Japanese army officers in China while Shidehara was in office.

The primary focus of the existing research on Soviet-Japanese relations under the Tanaka government has been on analyzing actions by individuals and economic aspects, such as the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Agreement and the visits to the USSR by Kuhara Fusanosuke and Gotō Shinpei.²⁰¹ However, as made clear by the Japanese army's expansion into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets and the course of the two countries' normalization of relations, political issues such as national security and communist propaganda targeting Japan were also important concerns for Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union. The following sections will therefore examine Soviet-Japanese relations during the Tanaka government from the perspective of political factors such as the proposals for a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact and a prohibition on communist propaganda targeting Japan. In addition to trying to determine the Soviet Union's place in Tanaka's foreign policy views, I would also like to reconsider the degree to which his ideas were consistent with those of Shidehara Diplomacy.

(1) The Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact Issue

The Soviet government had repeatedly proposed a non-aggression pact in the years since it had established relations with Japan. But this had been rejected by Shidehara, who chose to instead prioritize the economist diplomatic policy objectives of a fishing agreement and a commercial treaty.²⁰²

Prime Minister Tanaka's initial policy towards the Soviets can be seen in his May 24, 1927 meeting with Soviet Ambassador Valerian Dovgalevsky. During the meeting, he called for Soviet restraint in China and emphasized the influence the Soviets had over communist propaganda towards Japan, the Northern Expedition, and the rights recovery movement. Dovgalevsky replied that the Soviet government had no control over the actions of Russians in China and expressed a strong desire to conclude a non-aggression pact with Japan.²⁰³

Tanaka further clarified his Soviet policy when he met the ambassador again on June 16. While he emphasized the importance of "holding discussions on an agreement over the Chinese Eastern Railway's fares in Manchuria and the various standing issues related to facilitating the economic relationship between our countries," he was not enthusiastic about a non-aggression pact and took a harsher stance towards restraining Soviet political activities in China and anti-Japanese communist propaganda.²⁰⁴ Dovgalevsky told Tanaka on July 1 that "it would regrettably be premature to enter into consultations on a political treaty."²⁰⁵

Tanaka's diplomacy towards the Soviet Union was a de facto continuation of Shidehara's policies in that he postponed consideration of a non-aggression pact for economist reasons. In doing so, he was supported by Vice-Minister Debuchi Katsuji, a member of Shidehara's political lineage. There had been efforts within the finance ministry to establish the fundamentals of Japan's Soviet policy ever since the Eastern Conference, and a lecture given by Debuchi on September 30, 1927 provides a representative look at the foreign ministry mainstream's view of the Soviet Union. According to Debuchi, while Japan and the Soviet Union should seek a closer economic relationship that included the development of Siberia, political cooperation would lead to "various speculation" from the other powers "without providing any real benefit."²⁰⁶

In short, Shidehara, Tanaka, and Debuchi all adopted a principle of separating political and economic matters in their relations with the Soviet Union, and this was done out of consideration for prioritizing cooperation with America and Britain within the Washington System. There was a sharp contrast in some respects, however, in that Tanaka was sensitive to Soviet influence in China while Shidehara was not particularly alarmed about the possibility of China becoming communist. Shidehara had once argued with British Ambassador Tilley on April 2, 1927 that, while he did not believe that China proper would turn communist, the precedent of the Soviet Union showed that it would still be quite possible to live and carry out trade there even if it did. At another meeting on the 4th, he also sought to avoid any sanctions being placed on China in response to Chiang Kai-shek refusing the

powers' demands, stating that it would be difficult for Japan to bear any impediments on its trade with China.²⁰⁷ Shidehara emphasized economics, and he felt that Japan's national interests were protected so long as it remained possible to obtain economic benefits from China, even if it became communist. This same perspective led him to believe that "interference" from boycotts and severing economic ties were a greater concern for Japan.

Even after the Soviet-Japanese Fishing Agreement was concluded in Moscow on January 23, 1928, no major changes were made to Tanaka's Soviet policy.²⁰⁸ When Alexander Troyanovsky, the new Soviet ambassador, raised the possibility on March 8 of a non-aggression pact as a way to improve the relationship between the CER and Mantetsu, Tanaka replied that "a non-aggression pact should only be given consideration once a commercial and other treaties have been concluded."²⁰⁹ The Tanaka government also increased pressure on the USSR to enforce the prohibition on exporting weapons to China.²¹⁰ But the Soviet government held to its position that the export and import of arms was a matter for domestic law, and that it was not bound by the powers' agreement to ban the exports of arms to China.²¹¹

(2) The Communist Propaganda Issue

While the Tanaka government may not have been enthusiastic about signing a non-aggression pact, it was nervous about how to prevent the Comintern's communist propaganda targeting Japan. The Comintern Executive Committee's Special Committee on the Japanese Question, chaired by Bukharin, adopted its "Thesis on Japan" (also known as the "Thesis of 1927") on July 15, 1927. Its goals included the "abolition of the monarchy" and the "quantitative and qualitative development of the Communist Party."²¹² During this same period, the Japanese Communist Party dispatched several members of the party leadership like Watanabe Masanosuke, Nabeyama Sadachika, and Fukumoto Kazuo to the Comintern. It also adopted the Thesis of 1927 as its platform and made it the guideline for its revolutionary movement.²¹³ In late March 1928, there was an incident in which a political group critical of communist propaganda dropped explosives on the Soviet embassy in Tokyo.²¹⁴

Vladivostok served as the base for the Comintern's communist propaganda aimed at Japan. Prime Minister Tanaka and Home Minister Suzuki Kisaburō received numerous reports during this period from prefectural governors and the police that Japanese fishing boats received propaganda while docking there. Government-General of Korea Police Affairs Bureau Director Asari Saburō also reported in May 1928 that propaganda was being broadcast over the radio from Vladivostok.²¹⁵

Tanaka met with Troyanovsky, demanding restrictions be placed on communist propaganda aimed at Japan, and also sent instructions to that effect to Ambassador Tanaka Tokichi in Moscow. When the Soviet embassy requested a TASS correspondent be allowed to pass through Japan, the foreign ministry placed strict conditions after consulting with the Home Ministry.²¹⁶ But

Karakhan responded to these efforts by repeating the boilerplate statement that “as the Soviet government is unaffiliated with the Third International, it is unable to take any measures concerning its resolutions or statements.”²¹⁷ Given the parallel nature of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Comintern, it was difficult for Japan to expect any results to come from its efforts to end propaganda aimed at Japan.

The Army General Staff 2nd Department, frustrated on this point, went so far as to propose a Soviet policy that contemplated severing diplomatic relations, noting that “there is no question that the Soviet Union, through the Third International, is aiding revolution within the Empire through communist propaganda” and that “the actions of the Third International, carried out in harmony with the Russian Communist Party, are clearly in violation of the spirit of Soviet-Japanese treaties.”²¹⁸ For their part, the Soviets repeatedly lodged protests that Soviet citizens were being unjustly refused entry at Yokohama and Kobe.²¹⁹ Ultimately, the Tanaka government was consistently at cross-purposes with the Soviet Union in that it wanted a prohibition on propaganda targeted at Japan while the Soviets were more interested in a non-aggression pact. One cause of the discord between the two nations was the Tanaka government’s suppression of the Japanese Communist Party, such as in the March 15th Incident.

The major achievements in Soviet policy under the Tanaka government concerned economic aspects, such as the Soviet-Japanese Fishing Agreement, and acts by individuals, such as Gotō Shinpei’s visit to the USSR. However, the signing of a fishing agreement in no way meant that disputes between the countries over fishing had come to an end; their views over how to handle claims arising from the designation of fishing areas were different.²²⁰ At the same time, the Tanaka government’s demand for an end to communist propaganda aimed at Japan and the Soviet desire for a non-aggression pact meant that the two governments were consistently working at cross-purposes on the political aspects of their relationship. That Prime Minister Tanaka was effectively continuing Shidehara’s economist take on foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was the major cause of this. Tanaka also agreed with Vice-Minister Debuchi, who feared that closer relations with the Soviet Union on political matters would invite the suspicion of the United States and Britain. Here we can see that the idea of collaboration with America and Britain was, in some ways, rooted in Tanaka’s foreign policy as it had been for Shidehara. In that sense, it seems fair to state that contemporary Japanese foreign policy adhered to a principle of separating economics and politics in approaching the Soviet Union.

Conversely, Tanaka’s excessive response to the USSR’s political activities in China and propaganda aimed at Japan stands in stark contrast to Shidehara’s lack of concern about the communist movement. Under normal circumstances, one would have expected Japan, having noticed the rapid decline in

Soviet influence in China, to have worked to ease tensions. Instead, Japan repeatedly made unrealistic demands that the Soviets restrain the communist movement and, by the time of the Manchurian Incident, the USSR had ceased proposing a non-aggression pact. Tanaka was at the mercy of the paradoxical nature of Soviet diplomacy, which, even as it proposed a non-aggression pact, did not hesitate to continue political propaganda intended to destabilize the Japanese government.

III. Conclusion: The Choices for Tanaka Diplomacy

The “second wave of international change” – the new movements in China and the Soviet Union that had been gradually progressing since approximately 1923 – reached a turning point around the time of the formation of the Tanaka government. As the Nationalist Revolution swept through China, the Soviet Union rapidly lost influence.

Given these circumstances, Tanaka engaged in a policy of “nationwide interference,” not hesitating to dispatch troops into Guannei when he deemed it necessary. But he also recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s hegemony over Guannei and attempted a policy of “limited support of Zhang” by trying to return Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian clique to the Three Northeast Provinces. The central axis of Tanaka’s ideas was “equidistance diplomacy”: bringing about divided North-South rule in China between two leaders with anti-communist tendencies, with Japan maintaining equal distance from both. When Zhang returned to the northeast, Tanaka’s policy seemed to have succeeded.

The first phase of Tanaka Diplomacy, which saw the First Shandong Expedition, was also the period with the most potential for Anglo-Japanese cooperation; the expedition was welcomed by the Baldwin government. However, Tanaka initially had no intention of cooperating with Britain, and no system for Anglo-Japanese cooperation ever came about. Instead, Tanaka’s personal intention was to strengthen relations with the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek. He was unable to properly convey this to members of the KMT leadership like Chiang, however; that the Jinan Incident occurred before this communication gap could be resolved was a tragedy for Tanaka Diplomacy.

The Jinan Incident of May 1928 severely limited the possibilities for Sino-Japanese cooperation. The anti-foreign movement in China, which had previously seen Britain as its primary enemy, turned its focus to Japan, and it became incredibly difficult to restore the relationship between Japan and the KMT. Britain and America had been sympathetic to the First Shandong Expedition, but they now pulled away from Japan; the latter period of Tanaka Diplomacy saw Japan becoming increasingly isolated. Of particular note, Britain – which had, for nearly two years, pursued cooperation with Japan in anticipation of joint operations to maintain public order – lost interest in such cooperation as the countries’ interests in China (and the economic diplomacy needed to realize those interests) diverged from a utilitarian perspective.

At the same time, the Tanaka government continued the economism of Shidehara Diplomacy in its relations with the Soviet Union, obtaining agreements on economic issues such as the Soviet-Japanese Fishing Agreement. Conversely, Tanaka was extremely nervous about the Soviet Union's political activities in China and its propaganda aimed at Japan, and he failed to take advantage of the opportunity to ease tensions provided by the decline in Soviet influence in China and its proposal of a non-aggression pact.

Generally speaking, there is little about Tanaka Diplomacy to be praised enthusiastically. Even if a certain amount of validity can be found in the core idea behind this foreign policy – “equidistance diplomacy” – the Jinan Incident and assassination of Zhang Zuolin prevented this from becoming a reality. The assassination in particular struck a blow to the cooperative structure that existed with the Fengtian clique for the management of Koreans in China. While neither incident could have been predicted, Tanaka himself must take responsibility for them, even given the structural issues caused by having four Manchuria policies being simultaneously carried out by the foreign ministry, Kwantung Leased Territory, Mantetsu, and the Kwantung Army.

Tanaka continued to adhere to “equidistance diplomacy” even after Zhang Zuolin was assassinated, hoping to persuade Zhang Xueliang and bring about a North-South division. In doing so, Tanaka Diplomacy not only damaged relations with China but also invited Japanese isolation from Britain and the United States. This shows the difficulty of the multi-layered multilateral diplomacy demanded by the second wave of international change.

What alternate policies could have potentially avoided this worst outcome of simultaneously worsening Japan's relations with both China and the West? The first possibility would have been for Tanaka to have continued Shidehara's policies, avoiding all interference in China and prioritizing cooperation with Britain and America within the Washington System. This was the policy advocated for by Vice-Minister Debuchi Katsuji and Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kimura Eiichi, and it would have likely resulted in what was effectively a policy of cooperating with the United States over non-interference in China. It would have been incompatible with Britain's desire for Japan to engage in “nationwide interference.” The second possibility would have been attempting to turn the collaborative diplomacy of the Washington System into policies of “nationwide interference” and “active support of Zhang” under a system of Anglo-Japanese cooperation. This was the policy of former war minister Ugaki Kazushige and the initial policy of War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori. The third possibility would have been a policy of Sino-Japanese cooperation through improved relations with the KMT and the total elimination of any Japanese interference in China. This was advocated for by Arita Hachirō, Kimura's successor as Asian Affairs Bureau Director, and Shigemitsu Mamoru, who was Shanghai consul-general at the end of Tanaka's time as prime minister.

All of these possibilities have serious flaws, however. The first would very likely have been seen as a lack of policy that jeopardized Japanese special

interests in Manchuria. Not only would it have been unable to avoid the domestic criticism that had previously targeted Shidehara Diplomacy, but it could have actually invited increasingly strong interference in China by those who disagreed with it. The second possibility would have meant engaging in blatant interference. It would have been difficult to restore relations with the KMT following the completion of the Northern Expedition; this course would also damage relations with the United States. And the third would have meant withdrawing from the Washington System's framework of collaborative diplomacy. It also would not have been easy for Japan to find a suitable stable force in China that would have been interested in Sino-Japanese cooperation.

A fourth possibility that comes to mind is a system of policies under which Japan built a relationship with the KMT in collaboration with the United States while also pursuing "non-interference with reservations." That is, Japan would seek the Fengtian clique's rapid return to the Three Northeast Provinces and to expand its special interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia while not intervening in Guannei. This would have been a further development of Hara Diplomacy, the postwar model for Japanese foreign policy. This was advocated for by Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi during the Tanaka government. As Britain was interested in joint expeditions, Japan would likely not have gained their approval had this Hara-Yoshizawa policy been adopted, but it would likely have been able to maintain friendly relations with the United States, which favored the KMT. And, in any case, the British ultimately changed policy direction and sought better relations with the KMT during the latter period of Tanaka's time in office. As this policy would have protected Japan's special interests in Manchuria, it would also have likely been able to secure domestic acceptance.

Source Acronyms

AH	Academia Historica, Taipei
AVPRF	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow
CFR	Guoli Bianyiguan, ed., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Huibian</i> [Compilation of the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China], Vol. 1–15 (Taipei: Bohaitang Wenhua Gongsi, 1996)
CSFR	Cheng Daode, Zheng Yueming, Rao Geping, eds., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Ziliao Xuanbian, 1919–1931</i> [Selected Materials on the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China, 1919–1931] (Beijing: Peking University, 1985)
CSR	Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jindaishi Ziliao Bianjishi, ed., <i>Miji Lucun</i> [Secret Book Records] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1984)

DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vmeshney politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)
FRUS	Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., <i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
JDC	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho</i> [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
JDR	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Bunsho</i> [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
MOFA	Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
NDL	Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
NIDS	Military Archives, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo
PRO	Public Records Office, London
RD	Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Shiliao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., <i>Geming Wenxian</i> [Revolutionary Diplomacy], Vol. 1–117 (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1957–1989)
RTsKhIDNI	Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Contemporary History, Moscow

Notes

- 1 For recollections from the US consulate-general, see: Richard Butrick Oral History Papers, *A China Reader: Extracts from Oral History Transcripts from the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program*, Foreign Service Institute and Georgetown University, compiled by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 1995, Special Collections Division, Joseph Mark Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University.
- 2 January 21, 1927, CAB 23/54, PRO.
- 3 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 920–922.
- 4 Chamberlain to Lampson (May 27, 1927), AC 54/322, Austen Chamberlain Papers, Special Collections, Main Library, University of Birmingham.
- 5 “Tōhō Kaigi Kankei Ikken” [Matters Related to the Eastern Conference], Matsumoto Kiroku, A.1.1.0.22, MOFA.
- 6 Parliamentary Question (May 23, 1928), F 2675/7/10, FO 228/3732, PRO. For research on the relationship between Britain and Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian clique, see: Chi-hua Tang, “Britain and Warlordism in China: Relations with Chang Tso-lin, 1926–1928,” *Xingda Lishi Xuebao* No. 2 (1992), 207–229.

- 7 For research on the First Shandong Expedition and the Eastern Conference, see: Baba Akira, *Chūnichi Kankei to Gaimu Kikō no Kenkyū – Taishō/Shōwa-ki* [Research on Sino-Japanese Relations and the Foreign Policy Machinery: The Taisho and Shōwa Periods] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1983), 135–167; Satō Motohide, *Shōwa Shoki Taichūgoku Seisaku no Kenkyū – Tanaka Naikaku no Taimanmō Seisaku* [Research on China Policy in the Early Shōwa Period: The Tanaka Government's Manchuria/Inner Mongolia Policy] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1992), 46–164.
- 8 JDR Shōwa-ki I, Part I, Vol. 1, 688–690.
- 9 Gu to Acting Minister to Japan Zhang Yuanjie (June 1, 1927), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0705.50/6050.02–01, AH.
- 10 Yoshizawa to Shidehara (April 2, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 491. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (April 7, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 491–492. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (April 8, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 492–493. General Staff Office, “Zaishi Rekkoku Heiryoku Ichiranhyō” [Table of the Powers' Forces in China] (July 19, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 486–489. MacMurray to Kellogg (April 8, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 106. Minute by Counsellor at the British Legation in China Owen O'Malley (May 19, 1927), 8935/27/6, FO 228/3629A, PRO.
- 11 American Legation to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (June 2, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 126–127. “Rekkokugun Shireikan Kaigi Gijiroku” [Record of the Meeting of the Powers' Military Commanders] (June 4, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 502–505. Parliamentary Question (July 25, 1927), F 6530/156/10, FO 371/12455, PRO.
- 12 Chamberlain to Tilley (June 2, 1927), F 5202/201/23, FO 371/12518, PRO.
- 13 For one example, see: Lampson Diary (August 27, 1927), vol. 1, Miles Lampson Papers, Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, University of Oxford.
- 14 Yoshizawa to Tanaka (September 27, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 511–512. See also: MacMurray to Kellogg (July 30, 1927), Box 32, John Van Antwerp MacMurray Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University; Kellogg to MacMurray (August 1), Box 32, MacMurray Papers.
- 15 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation (June 7, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 130–131. See also: Yoshizawa to Tanaka (June 9, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 506–507; Acting Minister to China Hori Yoshitaka to Tanaka (June 14, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 507–508; Tianjin Consul-General Katō Sotomatsu to Tanaka (June 14, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 508–509.
- 16 Chicago Consul Tamura Sadahiro to Tanaka (May 5, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 6–8. Ita to Tanaka (August 8, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 15–19.
- 17 Lamont to J.P. Morgan & Co. (October 5, 1927), Folder 28, Box 189, Thomas William Lamont Papers, Barker Library, Harvard University. On the topic of American investment in Mantetsu, see: Mitani Taichirō, “Wōru Sutorito to Mantetsu – Gaisai Hakkō Keikaku o Meguru Nichibeī Kankei” [Wall Street and Mantetsu: US-Japan Relations over the Plan to Issue Foreign Bonds], in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, eds., *Washington Taisei to Nichibeī Kankei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1978), 321–350; Satō Motohide 211–227.
- 18 Lamont Memo (October 5, 1927), Folder 11, Box 189, Lamont Papers.
- 19 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 261–264.
- 20 Kellogg to MacVeagh (December 10, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 492.
- 21 Memorandum by Johnson of a Conversation with Alfred Sze (November 22, 1927), Vol. 48, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 22 Howard E. Cole to Johnson (December 16, 1927), Vol. 5, Johnson Papers.
- 23 Johnson to MacMurray (February 6, 1928), Box 34, MacMurray Papers.
- 24 List 75, Delo 27, Opis 1, Fond 493, Comintern Archive, RTsKhIDNI.

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- 25 Matsui to Tanaka (June 9, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 12–13. Matsui to Tanaka (July 25, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 19. *The Times* (July 20, 1927), 16; (July 21), 14; (July 27), 14; (July 30), 10.
- 26 See also: JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 264–267; John Tilley, *London to Tokyo* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1942), 162.
- 27 Acting Shanghai Consul-General Shimizu Yoshitsugu to Tanaka (July 9, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 859–860. Tanaka to Yada (July 26, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 864–865. Yada to Tanaka (August 3, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 870–871. Yada to Tanaka (August 30, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 888–889. MacMurray to Kellogg (July 11, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 395–396. American Chargé d’Affaires to China Ferdinand L. Mayer to Kellogg (September 1, 1927), FRUS, 1927 2, 407.
- 28 Tanka to Yada and Guangzhou Consul-General Morita Kanzō (May 27, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 693–694. Tanaka to Yoshizawa (May 28, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 926–928.
- 29 Tanaka to Fujita (July 6, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 731. The Qingdao Expeditionary Army left Qingdao on July 7, 1927, with the final train carrying the army arriving in Jinan on the morning of the 8th and stationing 1600 men under Brigade Commander Gōda.
- 30 Shimizu to Tanaka (July 7, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 740–741. Himizu to Tanaka (July 20, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 744–745.
- 31 There are other views on this. According to Sasaki Tōichi, who accompanied the Northern Expedition, there were those within the NRA who attributed the stalling of the Northern Expedition to the Shandong Expedition. However, the actual cause was the major defeat in the Battle of Xuzhou in late July 1927. Sasaki Tōichi, *Watashi wa Shina o Kaku Miru* [This is How I See China] (Tokyo: Shōbunkaku, 1942), 19, 179. The Tanaka government decided in an August 24, 1927 cabinet resolution to withdraw the Shandong Expeditionary Army (this was completed by mid-September).
- 32 There are those who see Tanaka as sharing the same ideas on this as Ugaki. Satō Motohide, 99. But, while Tanaka intended “limited support for Zhang” and rejected cooperation with Britain, Ugaki advocated for “active support for Zhang” that included possible cooperation with Britain. The two men seem to have been at odds on this point.
- 33 Lampson Diary (December 31, 1927), Vol. 1, Lampson Papers.
- 34 O’Malley to Lampson (February 2, 1927), Folder 7, Owen O’Malley Papers, St. Antony’s College Library, University of Oxford. O’Malley to Lampson (February 10, 1927), Folder 7, O’Malley Papers.
- 35 O’Malley, “Account of a Journey from Peking: August to October, 1927,” Folder 10, O’Malley Papers.
- 36 JDC 2:97–101.
- 37 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 168–171.
- 38 Yoshida became Fengtian consul-general in October 1925 and had held to the same “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang” views as Yoshizawa. During the Guo Songling Incident, he had suggested to Shidehara that Zhang Zuolin’s status should be preserved and public order in the Three Northeastern Provinces maintained. See: Yoshida to Shidehara (November 27, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 2:805–806.
- 39 Yoshida to Kimura (April 21, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 149–150.
- 40 Yoshida to Tanaka (June 10, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 171–173.
- 41 “Araki Sadao Bunsho,” 366, NDL.
- 42 “Mokuyōkai Kiji” [Records of the Mokuyōkai], in Kido Nikki Kenkyūkai, Nihon Kindai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, eds., *Suzuki Teiichi-shi Danwa Sokkiroku* (Tokyo: Nihon Kindai Shiryō Kenkyūkai, 1974), 2:379.
- 43 “Mitsudai Nikki,” 1927 Vol. 4, NIDS.

- 44 Yamaura Kan'ichi, ed., *Mori Kaku* (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1982), 535–539, 552–553, 580–581, 599–601, 602–603.
- 45 *Suzuki Teiichi-shi Danwa Sokkiroku* 1:12–13.
- 46 Tanaka to Yoshizawa (June 2, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 164–165. Yoshizawa to Tanaka (June 10, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 168–171.
- 47 *Ibid.*, 23–29, 34–38.
- 48 Arita Hachirō, *Baka Hachi to Hito wa Iu – Ichi Gaikōkan no Kaisō* [People Called Me “Baka Hachi”: One Diplomat’s Memoirs] (Tokyo: Kōwadō, 1959), 39. Saitō Ryōe, “Chō Sakurin no Shi” [The Death of Zhang Zuolin], *Aizu Tanki Daigaku Gakuhō* No. 5 (1955), 140.
- 49 *Suzuki Teiichi-shi Danwa Sokkiroku* 1:13–14. Suzuki Teiichi, “Hokubatsu to Shō-Tanaka Mitsuyaku” [The Northern Expedition and the Secret Agreement between Chiang and Tanaka], *Bessatsu Chisei* (February, 1956), 24–25. Nakamura Kikuo, ed., *Shōwa Rikugun Shishi* [Secret History of the Shōwa Army] (Tokyo: Banchō Shobō, 1968), 101. Doihara Kenji Kankōkai, ed., *Hiroku Doihara Kenji* [Confidential Records of Doihara Kenji] (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1972), 197–198.
- 50 Honjō to Vice-Minister of War Hata Eitarō (October 12, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 279–80. Yoshizawa to Tanaka (October 13, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 281–284. Honjō to Shirakawa (October 15, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 292–293. Tanaka had little regard for the foreign ministry when it came to Manchurian railway policy, acting through Mantetsu and Machino Takema instead. Foreign ministry officials like Minister to China Yoshizawa were naturally critical of this and advocated for a unified foreign policy. However, remembering that Mantetsu Director Matsuoka had previously acted against the intentions of the Katō Takaaki government by pursuing a policy of advancing into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets, there was still relatively more control of Mantetsu under Tanaka than had existed under Shidehara.
- 51 Of course, not everything went according to plan. While construction finally began on the Dunhua-Tumen Line (part of the Jihui Railway) in September 1933, the Yamamoto-Zhang Railway Agreement produced no other results. Accordingly, the Sitao and Taoang Railways were the only feeder lines in Manchuria and Inner Mongolian constructed in the 1920s. The Northeastern regime, ignoring Japanese protests that it would be a parallel line to the Mantetsu lines, opened the Dahushan-Tongliao Railway in October 1927. And while the construction rights for the Jilin-Hailong Railway had been granted to Japan under the September 1918 Manchuria-Mongolia Four Railway Agreement and recognized as one of Japan’s “delineated” special interests by the Second China Consortium, Jilin authorities began construction on it in June 1927. The construction of this “rail network encircling Mantetsu” was seen by the Japanese as something threatening their special interests in Manchuria. On this point, see: Ma Liqian, Lu Yizhi, Wang Kaiji, eds., *Zhongguo Zhilu Jianzu Bian Nianjianshi* [100 Years of Chinese Railway Construction] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zhilu Chubanshe, 1983), 45–47; Ogata Yōichi, “Tōhoku Kōtsū linkai to Iwayuru Mantetsu Hōi Tetsudomō Keikaku” [The Northeast Transportation Committee and the “Mantetsu-Encircling Rail Network Plan”], *Shigaku Zasshi* 86:8 (1977), 39–72; Shao Jianguo, “Manmō Tetsudō Kōshō to Tōsanshō Seiken – Kichikai Tetsudō Fusetsu Ukeoi Keiyaku no Jisshi Kōshō o Megutte” [Manchurian/Inner Mongolian Railway Negotiations and the Three Northeast Provinces Regime: The Negotiations for Carrying Out the Construction Contract for the Jihui Railway], *Kyūshū Shigaku* No. 103 (1992), 41–58.

On April 27, 1928, Vice-Minister Yoshida Shigeru argued that “with Japan adopting a stance of currying favor with the Zhang Zuolin gang, [...] the Chinese have become increasingly arrogant towards us, acting as they please. The extension and new construction of railways in violation of the stipulations of the

Sino-Japanese treaty, the result of this attitude, is not only harmful to the interests of Mantetsu, but also continues to have a tremendous impact on our national defense.” Yoshida Shigeru, “Taimanmō Seisaku Shiken” (April 27, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 12–16. Meanwhile, the Beiyang government began demanding the collection of an additional surtax as a condition for the opening of a Maoershan branch of the Andong consulate, a demand by the Japanese. Despite First Secretary at the Japanese Legation Amō Eiji telling Yang Yuting in January 1928 that “the establishment of a consulate has nothing to do with the surtax; to say that one will not be recognized without the other, is to effectively say that the construction of the consulate will absolutely not be recognized,” no resolution was found. Yoshizawa to Tanaka (January 17, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 5.

- 52 For prior research on the Jinan Incident, see: Seki Hiroharu, “Manshū Jihen Zenshi (1927-Nen – 1931-Nen)” [The History Preceding the Manchurian Incident (1927–1931)], in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Sensō Gen’in Kenkyū-bu, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1963), 1:299–324; Jiang Yongjin, ed., *Jinan Wusan Canan* [The Jinan May 3rd Massacre] (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1978); Jing Xingying, “Shōwa Shonen ni okeru Santō Shuppei no Mondaiten” [Issues with the Shandong Expedition of the Early Shōwa Period], *Geirin* 28:3, 4, 29:1, 2 (1979–80), 2–23, 25–48, 22–42, 2–29; William Fitch Morton, *Tanaka Giichi and Japan’s China Policy* (Kent: Folkestone, 1980), 117–122, 142–146, 155–156; Lu Xijun, “Jinan Canan Qianhou Jiang Jeshi de Duri Jiaoshe” [Chiang Kai-shek’s Negotiations with Japan Before and After the Jinan Massacre], *Shixue Yuekan* No. 2 (1988), 59–65; Shao Jianguo, “Sainan Jiken no Saikentō,” *Kyūshū Shigaku* No. 93 (1988), 59–80; Shao Jianguo, “‘Sainan Jiken’ Kōshō to Shō Kaiseki” [The “Jinan Incident” and Chiang Kai-shek], *Kokusasi Seiji* No. 104 (1993), 168–182; Shao Jianguo, “‘Sainan Jiken’ o Meguru Chūnichī Gaikō Kōshō” [The Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations over the “Jinan Incident”], *NUCB Journal of Economics and Management* 44:2 (2000), 145–156; Tsuchiya Mitsuyoshi, “Sainan Jiken Zengo no Chūgoku Kokumin Seifu no Tainichi Seisaku – ‘Hankyō-Shinnichi’ kara ‘Futeikō’ e” [The Chinese Nationalist Government’s Japan Policy during the Period of the Jinan Incident: From “Anti-Communist, Pro-Japan” to “Non-Resistance”], in Zaidan Hōjin Sakuradakai, ed., *Sōshi Rikken Minseitō Rironhen* (Tokyo: Gakuyō Shobō, 1989), 760–786; Satō Motohide 242–249; Harumi Goto-Shibata, *Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 1925–1931* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 71–79, 88–91; Tochigi Toshio, Banno Ryōkichi, *Chūgoku Kokumin Kakumei – Senkanki Higashi Ajia no Chikaku Hendō* [The Chinese Nationalist Revolution: The Realignment of Interwar East Asia] (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppanyoku, 1997), 2–9; Yang Tianshi, *Haiwai Fangshi-lu* [Record of Foreign Visits] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1998), 252–269; Usui Katsumi, *Nihon to Chūgoku – Shōwa Zenki* [Japan and China: The Early Shōwa Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbundō, 1998), 1–17; Huang Wende, “Meiguo yu Zhongri Jinan Shijian Jiaoshe (1928–1929)” [The US and the Sino-Japanese Jinan Incident Negotiations (1928–1929)], *Jindai Zhongguo* No. 138 (2000), 87–108. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Sainan Jiken no Keii to Gen’in” [The Course and Causes of the Jinan Incident], *Gunji Shigaku* 34:2 (1998), 19–30.
- 53 For more on the makeup of the contemporary NRA, see: Han Shufang, ed., *Jinan Wusan Canan Qinliji* [A Personal History of the Jinan May 3rd Massacre] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, 1987), 170–172; Chen Xunzheng, “Jiang Zongsilang Fuzhi ji Junlue zhi Ceding” [The Reinstatement of Commander-in-chief Chiang and the Formulation of Military Strategy], *Geming Wenxian* No. 18, 4–5.

- 54 Katsuki Seiji, “Sainan Jiken ni Kan suru Chōsa Hōkoku” [Report of the Investigation into the Jinan Incident] (May 28, 1928), “Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki,” 1928, Vol. 7, NIDS.
- 55 Japanese Government Statement (April 20, 1928), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gaimushō Kōhyō-shū* No. 9 (1928). According to the recollections of Arita Hachirō, director of the Asian Affairs Bureau at the time, Railway Minister Ogawa Heikichi supported the expedition while Military Affairs Bureau Director Abe Nobuyuki and 2nd Department Director Matsui Iwane were opposed. See: Arita Hachirō 43–44.
- 56 Deputy Chief of Staff Minami Jirō to Vice-Minister of War Hata Eitarō (May 4, 1928), in “Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki,” 1928, Vol.1.
- 57 Shandong Expeditionary Army 6th Division Headquarters, “Ji 5-Gatsu 3-Ka shi 5-Gatsu 4-Ka Sentō Saihō (Sainan Shigai-sen)” [Detailed Report on the Combat from May 3 to May 4 (Fighting in Jinan City)], (undated), “Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki,” 1928, Vol. 5.
- 58 “Sainan Jiken ni Kan suru Chōsa Hōkoku.”
- 59 Fujita to Tankaa (May 3, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 344. “Shōwa 3-Nen 9-Gatsu Gaimushō Ajia-kyoku Dai Ichi-ka Chōsa ni Yoru Sainan Jiken” [The Jinan Incident According to the September 1928 Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section Investigation] (undated), “Zaisainan Sōryōjikan oyobi Dō Hiroyama, Chōten Shucchōjo,” Vol. 1, *Gaimushō Keisatsushi*, 5–15, MOFA. Japanese Legation 1st Secretary Amō Eiji, “Sainan ni Okeru Nisshihei Shōtotsu Jiken” [The Sino-Japanese Armed Clash in Jinan Incident] (October 14, 1928), in Amō Eiji *Nikki-Shiryōshū Kankōkai*, ed., *Amō Eiji Nikki-Shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Amō Eiji *Nikki-Shiryōshū Kankōkai*, 1989), 2:159–186.
- 60 Chintao Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho, *Sainan Jiken Chōsasho* [Report on the Jinan Incident] (Qingdao: Chintao Nihon Shōkō Kaigisho, 1928), 8–24.
- 61 Folder: Documents Associated with the Career of Huang Fu, Vol. 1, Part 1, Box 19, Huang Fu Office Files and Related Papers, Chinese Oral History Project, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
- 62 Yang Congli, Zhang Lili, eds., “Jinan Canan Jishi he Beijing Gejie Shengyuan Jian Huodong you Guanshiliao” [Records of the Jinan Tragedy and Historical Materials Related to Support Activities by the Communities of Beijing] (undated), *Beijing Dangan Shiliao* No. 1 (1988), 24. The author visited the Beijing Municipal Archives but was not allowed to adequately look through them.
- 63 Guomin Gemingjun Di Siling Jun Di Yi Shi Zhengzhibu Baogaoshu [Report of the Political Department of the First Division of the 40th Army of the National Revolutionary Army] (May 10, 1928), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan 0705.53/1010.01-01, AH.
- 64 *Jinan Wusan Canan Qinliji*, 5. It is unknown when the recollections were written.
- 65 The policy adopted by then-foreign minister Shidehara Kijūrō in April 1927, as the NRA approached Shandong Province during the First Northern Expedition, should be regarded as one of “protection through evacuation.” On the advice of Jinan Consul-General Fujita Eisuke, Shidehara looked into evacuating the Japanese residents of Jinan to Qingdao where they could be “protected by naval power” “should the worst occur.” discussing the possibility with the navy. Shidehara to Qingdao Consul-General Yatabe (April 16, 1927), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 1, 680. Shidehara never put this policy into actual practice, however, as the situation near Jinan stabilized.
- 66 General Staff Office, *Shōwa 3-Nen Shina Jihen Shuppei-shi* [History of the 1928 China Incident Expedition] (Tokyo: Gennandō Shoten, 1971), 169–175.
- 67 11th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, “Konsei Dai Jūichi Ryodan Keibi Keikaku” [Security Plan of the 11th Mixed Brigade] (April 27, 1928), in “Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki” 1928, Vol. 7.

- 68 *Shōwa 3-Nen Shina Jihen Shuppei-shi*, 190, 191.
- 69 “Ji 5-Gatsu 3-Ka shi 5-Gatsu 4-Ka Sentō Saihō (Sainan Shigai-sen).”
- 70 Saitō Ryū, *Gokuchū no Ki* [An Account of Jail] (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō, 1940), 226–227.
- 71 “Sainan Jiken no Shinsō ni tsuite Katsuki Taisa no Danwa” [Conversation with Colonel Katsuki on the Truth of the Jinan Incident] (June 6, 1928), “Rikushi Shindai Nikki,” 1928, Vol. 1, NIDS.
- 72 “Ji 5-Gatsu 3-Ka shi 5-Gatsu 4-Ka Sentō Saihō (Sainan Shigai-sen);” “Sainan Jiken ni Kan suru Chōsa Hōkoku.” Even scholarship which argues the defense line was removed to create an excuse for military action acknowledges that the removal itself was done in response to a demand from Chiang Kai-shek. See: Chen Xunzheng, “Wusan Shibian” [May 3rd Incident], RD No. 19, 1251–1252.
- 73 Chen Xunzheng 1251–1252. Sankei Shinbun-sha, *Shō Kaiseki Hiroku* [Confidential Records of Chiang Kai-shek] (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun-sha Shuppankyoku, 1976), 8:16. Le Bingnan, *Riben Chubing Shandong yu Zhongguo Pairi Yudong – 1927–1929* [Japan’s Shandong Expedition and the Chinese Anti-Japanese Movement, 1927–1929] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1988), 178–179.
- 74 The Japanese, particularly Chief of Staff Suzuki Sōroku, had intended to withdraw the China Garrison Army following the arrival of the 6th Division. Suzuki to 6th Division Commander Fukuda, China Garrison Army Commander Arai Kametarō (April 30, 1928), Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki, 1928 Vol. 1. Suzuki to War Minister Shirakawa (May 1, 1928), Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki, 1928 Vol. 1. On May 2, 1928, shortly after his arrival in Jinan, Division Commander Fukuda also directed Brigade Commander Saitō to begin preparations for the China Garrison Army to withdraw on the 3rd. “Sainan Jiken ni Kan suru Chōsa Hōkoku.” Judging from these facts, it is difficult to believe that the Japanese military leadership at least was preparing for full-scale military action.
- 75 “Sainan Jiken ni Kan suru Chōsa Hōkoku.”
- 76 According to “Shōwa 3-Nen 9-Gatsu Gaimushō Ajia-kyoku Dai Ichi-ka Chōsa ni Yoru Sainan Jiken,” there were 15 deaths, 15 injuries, and 31 looted homes among the Japanese residents and 60 deaths and over 100 injuries among the Japanese soldiers. For a rough sketch of the fighting on the day of the incident, see: Shandong Expeditionary 6th Division Headquarters, “5-Gatsu 3-Ka Santō Haken Dai 6 Shidan Sainan Fukin Sentō Yōzu” [Rough Sketch of the Shandong Expedition 6th Division’s Combat near Jinan on May 3], Shandong Expeditionary 6th Division Commander Kuroda Shūichi to Col. Matsuura Junrokurō (August 20, 1928), Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki, 1928 Vol. 5. See also: Seki Hiroharu 300–303.
- 77 Suzuki to Fukuda (May 4, 1928), “Fukuda Hikosuke Bunsho,” 24, NDL.
- 78 Japanese Government Statement, “Santō Zōha ni Kan suru Seimei” [Statement on the Shandong Reinforcements] (May 9, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 353.
- 79 6th Division Headquarters, “Ji 4-Gatsu 19-Nichi shi 5-Gatsu 14-Nichi Santō Haken Dai 6 Shidan Kōdō Keika no Gaiyō” [Overview of the Shandong Expedition 6th Division’s Actions from April 19 to May 14] (undated), “Fukuda Hikosuke Bunsho,” 26. The withdrawal was completed on May 20, 1929.
- 80 According to the report by the Chinese team investigating the Jinan Incident, the Chinese suffered 3,254 dead and 1,450 injured. RD No. 19, 1265–1266.
- 81 Okada to Tanaka (May 9, 1928), JDR Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 294–295.
- 82 CFR 5:2328.
- 83 Meeting between Luo and Yoshizawa (May 10, 1928), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan 0705.50/6050.02–09, AH.
- 84 John Van Antwerp MacMurray, “Developments Affecting American Policy in the Far East” (November 1, 1935), in Arthur Waldron, ed., *How the Peace Was Lost* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 108.

- 85 Y.R. Yui to Borah (April 27, 1928), Folder: China, Box 244, William Edgar Borah Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 86 Dormer to FO (August 14, 1928), F 4396/7/10, FO 371/13171, PRO.
- 87 Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs McNeill Ronald John Cushendun to Lampson (August 21, 1928), 59/3, FO 228/3733, PRO.
- 88 Vice-Minister Debuchi Katsuji to Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Shanghai Consul-General Yada Shichitarō, Fengtian Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru, Hankou Consul-General Takao Tōru (November 14, 1927), JDC 2:102–106.
- 89 Meeting between Chiang Kai-shek and Tanaka (November 5, 1927), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Geming Wenxian, Beifa Shiqi, Vol. 20, AH.
- 90 Zhang Qun, *Wo yu Riben Qishi Nian* [70 Years with Japan] (Taipei: Zhongri Guanxi Yanjiuhui, 1980), 25.
- 91 Sasaki Tōichi, *Shina Naisō Senjū Gunki* [War Record of the Chinese Civil Wars] (Tokyo: Buyōdō Shoten, 1931), 67–71.
- 92 Sasaki Tōichi, *Watashi wa Shina o Kaku Miru*, 20.
- 93 Okamoto to Tanaka (October 23, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 878–880.
- 94 Zhongguo Wenhua Diaxue Zhonghua Xueshuyuan Xianzongtong Jiang Gong QuANJI Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., *Xianzongtong Jiang Gong QuANJI* [Complete Works of Former President Chiang Kai-shek] (Taipei: Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue Chubanshe, 1984), 1:588.
- 95 According to an investigation by the War Zone Administration Committee, ten members of the committee's diplomats, including Cai Gongshi, were killed. See: War Zone Administration Committee Chairman Jiang Zuobin to the Nationalist Government (May 16, 1928), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan 0705.53/1010.01–01, AH.
- 96 Tan Yankai to Lamont (May 10, 1928), CFR 5:2316–2317.
- 97 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 501–507.
- 98 Yoshizawa Kenkichi, *Gaikō 60-Nen* [60 Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1990), 89. See also: Horiuchi Kensuke, *Horiuchi Kensuke Kaikoroku – Nihon Gaikō 50-Nen no Rimenshi* [The Memoirs of Horiuchi Kensuke: An Inside History of 50 Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbunsha, 1979), 51–54.
- 99 Uemura Shin'ichi, *Kaimetsu e no Michi* [The Path to Destruction] (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyūjo Shuppankai, 1966), 23. Uemura was a Shanghai consul at the time.
- 100 Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaikō Kaikoroku* [Diplomatic Memoirs] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1953), 65, 67. See also: Shigemitsu Mamoru, “Sainan Jiken Kaiketsu” [Resolution of the Jinan Incident], *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 42:10 (1988), 41–46.
- 101 May 16, 1928 Cabinet Decision, JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 75. Tanaka to Yoshizawa (May 16, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 79–80.
- 102 Yada to Tanaka (May 29, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 115–116. Yoshizawa to Tanaka (June 2, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 125.
- 103 Asian Affairs Bureau, “Manshū Chian Iji no Oboegaki ni tai suru Beiei no Taido” [Anglo-American Attitudes Towards the Memo on Maintaining Order in Manchuria] (January 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 118–119.
- 104 Arita Hachirō 45.
- 105 Kiri-hara Sadatoshi later changed his name to Fujii. For research on the assassination of Zhang Zuolin, see: Saitō Ryōe 1–156; Usui Katsumi, “Chō Sakurin Bakushi no Shinsō” [The Truth of Zhang Zuolin's Bombing], *Bessatsu Chisei Himerareta Shōwashi* (December 1956), 26–38; Shimada Toshihiko, “Chō Sakurin Bakusatsu Jiken” [The Zhang Zuolin Bombing Incident], *Gunji Shigaku* 1:2 (1965), 82–95; Inaba Masao, “Chō Sakurin Bakusatsu Jiken” [The Zhang Zuolin Bombing Incident], in *Shōwa 3-Nen Shina Jihen Shuppeishi*, 1–45; Sagara Shunsuke, *Akai Yūyō no Manshū ga Hara ni – Kisai Kōmoto Daisaku no Shōgai* [The Fields of Manchuria Under a Red Setting Sun: The Life of the Wizard Kōmoto Daisaku] (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 1978), 132–195; Jing Xingying, “Chō

Sakurin Bakusatsu Jiken no Shinsō” [The Truth of the Zhang Zuolin Bombing Incident], *Geirin* 31:1,2,3,4, 32:1 (1982–83), 2–43, 29–62, 24–66, 27–62, 32–48; Ōe Shinobu, *Chō Sakurin Bakusatsu – Shōwa Tennō no Tōsui* [The Bombing of Zhang Zuolin: The Shōwa Emperor’s Supreme Command] (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1989), Satō Motohide 276–287; Hata Ikuhiko, *Shōwashi no Nazo o Ou* [Pursuing the Riddles of the Shōwa Period] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1993), 1:25–42; Baba Akira, *Nichiro Sensōgo no Nicchū Kankei – Kyōzon Kyōei Shugi no Hatan* [Sino-Japanese Relations after the Russo-Japanese War: The Failure of Coexistence and Coprosperity] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1993), 271–287. For an outline of Kōmoto’s life using the later discussed written statement, see: Zhang Zhi, “Ribei Junguo Zhuyi Fenzi Heben Dazuo” [The Japanese Militarist Kōmoto Daisaku], *Lishi Dangan* No. 1 (1987), 115–121. This account is somewhat problematic, however, as it mistakenly claims that Chief of Staff Saitō was present at the staff meeting where the planning for Zhang’s assassination took place, and it does not include comparative research with Kōmoto’s prewar testimony. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Chō Sakurin Bakusatsu Jiken ni Okeru Kantōgun Jōsōbu – ‘Kōmoto Daisaku Kyōjutsusho’ (1953-Nen 4-Gatsu 11-Nichi) o Chūshin to shite” [The Kwantung Army Leadership in the Bombing of Zhang Zuolin: Focusing on the “Kōmoto Daisaku Written Statement” on April 11, 1953], *Rokkōdai Ronshū Hōgaku Seijigaku-hen* 43:2 (1996), 65–71.

- 106 There are at least four prewar historical sources for this. First, a letter from Isogai Rensuke to Kōmoto Daisaku postmarked April 18, 1928 (Sagara 148–150). While this contains perceptible loathing towards Zhang Zuolin, it makes no reference to the leadership of the Kwantung Army. Second, there is Kōmoto’s April 27, 1928 letter to 1st Department Director Araki Sadao and 2nd Department Directors Matsui Iwane (“Araki Sadao Kenkei Bunsho,” 6–81, Center for Modern Japanese Legal and Political Documents, Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo). For more on this letter, see: Mitani Taiichirō, *Kindai Nihon no Sensō to Seiji* [Modern Japanese War and Politics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 111–112; Kitaoka Shin’ichi, *Seitō kara Gumbū e 1924–1941* [From Parties to Militarists, 1924–1941] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōron Shinsha, 1999), 80–81. Third, there are the historical sources which Hirano Reiji had Kōmoto relate in interviews in 1937 and 1938, copies of which I was able to read thanks to the kindness of Kōmoto Kiyoko, Kōmoto Daisaku’s daughter. However, these were reconstructed for the writing of Kōmoto’s biography and, judging from the way in which they mix first and third person perspectives, it is difficult to believe that they faithfully recreate Kōmoto’s testimony. The article “Kōmoto Daisaku - Watashi ga Chō Sakurin o Koroshita” [Kōmoto Daisaku: I Killed Zhang Zuolin] which ran in *Bungei Shunjū* (December 1954, 194–201) is partially derived from these biographical resources and is falsified to make it seem as if Kōmoto himself had written it. Hirano Reiji, *Manshū no Inbōsha - Kōmoto Daisaku no Shōgai* [Conspiracist of Manchuria: The Life of Kōmoto Daisaku] (Tokyo: Jiyū Kokumin-sha, 1959) is a biography written by the same author, but it contains many fabrications and also does not match with the biographical resources. Fourth, there is the Kōmoto testimony recorded by Mori Katsumi in Dalian on December 1, 1942. This is held by the National Institute for Defense Studies as “Manshū Jiken Kankeisha Shichishi no Danwa Hikki” [Notes on Conversations with Seven Men Involved in the Manchurian Incident] and was also included as “Kōmoto Daisaku Taisa Dan” [Conversation with Colonel Kōmoto Daisaku] in Mori Katsumi, *Manshū Jihen no Rimenshi* (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1976), 262–276. There is also Minister of Justice’s Secretariat, Judicial System and Research Department, “Ji Shōwa 33-Nen 5-Gatsu 20-Ka shi Shōwa 34-Nen 5-Gatsu 20-Ka - O Araki-tei Rikugun Taishō Danshaku Araki Sadao yori no Chōshusho (Dai Ikkai - Dai Gokai)” [Report of the Questioning of Baron General Araki Sadao at His

- Home (1st through 5th Sessions, May 20, 1958 – May 20, 1959)], Dai Gokai Chōshusho (May 20, 1959), Yasukuni Kaikō Bunko, No. 65399, 393.4, Yasukuni Shrine. While Araki Sadao references the aftermath of Zhang Zuolin's assassination in this, he does not touch upon the process leading to the assassination itself.
- 107 See the previous footnote. The letter from Isaogai mainly argued for the “elimination of Zhang,” and it is difficult to think that concrete plans were being made for the “occupation of Manchuria.”
- 108 “Kōmoto Daisaku Taisa Dan,” 269–270.
- 109 The Kōmoto statement appeared in Chinese translation in Central Archives, Second Historical Archives of China, Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, eds., *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – 9/18 Shibian* [Selected Archives of the Japanese Imperialist Invasion of China: The September 18th Incident] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988), 23–31, 44–50, 95–100 and Central Archives, Second Historical Archives of China, Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, eds., *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – Heben Dazuo yo Rijun ‘Canliu’* [Selected Archives of the Japanese Imperialist Invasion of China: Kōmoto Daisaku and the “Remnants” of the Japanese Army], (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1995), 3–5, 12–43, 45–68, 80–83, 96–99, 109–110, 117–121, 147–149, 157–161. While I was able to determine where the original copy of the written statement is being held in China and request to see it, permission was denied. After the release of “Chō Sakurin Bakusatsu Jiken ni okeru Kantōgun Jōsobu” [The Kwantung Army Leadership in the Bombing of Zhang Zuolin], a partial translation of *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – Heben Dazuo yo Rijun ‘Canliu’* appeared in *This is Yomirui* (November 1997, 47–58). For the recollections of the person who took down the statement, see: Ishihara Takeshi, “Ishiwara Kanji-Sensei no Omoide” [Memories of Ishiwara Kanji], in Ishiwara Kanji Heiwa Shisō Kenkyūkai Tsurugaoka/Tagawa Shibu, ed., *Ishiwara Shōgun no Omoide* (Tokyo: Ishiwara Kanji Heiwa Shisō Kenkyūkai, 1993).
- 110 Kōmoto Written Statement (April 6, 1953), *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – Heben Dazuo yo Rijun ‘Canliu’*, 37. Ibid. (August 2, 1953), 40–41. Kōmoto Written Statement (April 11, 1953), *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – 9/18 Shibian*, 46–50.
- 111 Saitō Hisashi's diary is held by the National Institute of Defense Studies, but the sections concerning the assassination of Zhang can be found in Usami Katsumi, “Chō Sakurin Bakushi no Shinsō,” 31–34.
- 112 Zang Shiyi Affidavit (January 1951), *Riben Diguozhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian – 9/18 Shibian*, 55–56.
- 113 For research on the Northeast Flag Replacement, see: Akira Iriye, “Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Japanese,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 20:1 (1960), 33–43; Fu Honglin, *Zhang Xueliang de Zhengzhi Shengya – Yiwei Minzu Yingxiong de Beiju* [The Political Life of Zhang Xueliang: The Tragedy of a National Hero] (Shenyang: Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe, 1988), 35–53; Lujun, Du Liangqing, *Zhang Xueliang yu Dongbeijun* [Zhang Xueliang and the Northeast Army] (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 17–41; Liu Peizhi, Ren Zhenhe, “Dongbei Yizhi shi Zhang Xueliang de Aiguo zhi Ju,” in Mo Di, ed., *Zhang Xueliang Shengya Lunji – Hai Neiwai Zhuanjia Lunwen Jingxuan* [Selected Writings of Zhang Xueliang: Essays Chosen by Domestic and Foreign Experts] (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chuban, 1991), 13–16; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “Tōsanshō Ekishi no Seiji Katei (1928-Nen)” [The Political Process of the Northeast Flag Replacement], *Tōkyō Gakugei Daigaku Kiyō (Shakai Kagaku)* No. 44 (1992), 71–108; Satō Motohide 289–326; Shao Jianguo, “Manmō Tetsudō Kōshō to Tosanshō Seiken – Kichikai Tetsudō Fusetsu Ukeoi Keiyaku no Jisshi Katei o Megutte,” 41–58; Iechika Ryōko, “Nankin Kokumin Seifu no Hoppō e no Kenryoku Shintō ni tsuite” [The Permeation of the Nanking Nationalist Government's Authority in the North], *Tōhōgaku*

- No. 87 (1994), 103–118; Nishimura Shigeo, “Nihon Seifu no Chūka Minkoku Ninshiki to Chō Kakuryō Seiken – Minzokushugi-teki Gyōshūsei no Saihyōka” [The Japanese Government’s Perception of the Republic of China and the Zhang Xueliang Regime: A Reevaluation of Nationalist Cohesiveness], in Yamamoto Yūzō, ed., “*Manshūkoku*” no Kenkyū (Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1995), 1–37; Koike Seiichi, “Teikei” no Seiritsu – Nicchū Kanzei Kyōtei Seiritsu no Jōken” [Establishing “Partnership”: The Requirements of the Sino-Japanese Customs Agreement], in Soda Saburō, ed., *Kindai Chūgoku to Nihon – Teikei to Tekitai no Hanseki* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 2001), 229–258. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Chūgoku Kakumei Gaikō to Nichibeiei – 1928–1929” [Chinese Revolutionary Diplomacy and Japan, Britain, and the US], *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 54:7 (2000), 39–49.
- 114 Of the existing research, Kubo Tōru, *Senkanki Chūgoku “Jiritsu e no Mosaku” – Kanzei Tsūka Seisaku to Keizai Hakken* [Interwar China’s “Search for Independence”: Customs and Financial Policy and Economic Development] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1999), 23–49, 175–193 has produced outstanding results. For other existing research, see: Usui Katsumi, *Nicchū Gaikōshi – Hokubatsu no Jidai* [A History of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy: The Northern Expedition Period] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shinsho, 1971), 168–179; Takiguchi Tarō, “Seiji Hendōki ni okeru Gaikō Kōshō – Hankō Eisokai Kaishū Jiken o Megutte” [Diplomatic Negotiations in a Period of Political Change: The Recovery of the British Concession in Hankou], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 66 (1980), 54–71; Yokoyama Hiroaki, *Son Chūzan no Kakumei to Seiji Shidō* [Sun Yat-sen’s Revolution and Political Leadership] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1983), 353–382; Soejima Shōichi, “Chūgoku no Fubyōdō Jōyaku Teppai to ‘Manshū Jihen’” [China’s Revocation of the Unequal Treaties and the “Manchurian Incident”], in Furuya Tetsuo, ed., *Nicchū Sensō-shi Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbundō, 1984), 179–235; Ōhata Tokushirō, “Chūgoku Kokumin Kakumei to Nihon no Taiō – Fubyōdō Jōyaku Kaisei Teigi o Chūshin ni” [The Chinese Nationalist Revolution and the Japanese Response: Focusing on the Proposed Revision of the Unequal Treaties], in Irie Akira, Aruga Tadashi, eds., *Senkanki no Nihon Gaikō* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1984), 125–153; Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), 227–253; Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain’s South China Policy, 1924–1931* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 170–180; Li Enhan, *Beifa Qianhou de “Geming Waijiao” (1925–1931)* [The “Revolutionary Diplomacy” of the Northern Expedition Period (1925–1931)] (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1993), 85–146; Hanzawa Junta, *Kindai Nicchū Kankei no Kihon Kōzō – Nicchū Masatsu no Kigen to Makkē Jōyaku* [The Basic Structure of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations: The Origin of Sino-Japanese Frictions and the Mackay Treaty] (Tokyo: Ronsōsha, 1997), 334–355. The Tanaka government officially recognized the Nationalist government on June 3, 1929. See: Okamoto to Tanaka (June 3, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 978–979.
- 115 Zhang Zuolin to Foreign Minister Gu Weijun, Transportation Minister Pan Fu (May 4, 1927), Jiaotongbu Dangan 1212.41/6050, AH.
- 116 Foreign Ministry to Transportation Minister Pan Fu (September 3, 1927), Jiaotongbu Dangan 1212.41/6050, AH.
- 117 Bi Wanwen, ed., *Zhang Xueliang Wenji* [Writings of Zhang Xueliang] (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1992), 1:98–99.
- 118 *Guowen Zhoubao* 5:29 (July 29, 1928), RD No. 21, 1648–1685.
- 119 Muraoka to Shirakawa (July 21, 1928), “Rikushi Mitsudai Nikki,” 1928 Vol. 1, NIDS.
- 120 *Zhang Xueliang Wenji* 1:103–104.
- 121 Tanaka to Hayashi (July 18, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 212–214.

- 122 Chinese Nationalist Party Central Executive Committee Political Congress to Nationalist Government (January 26, 1929), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan 0724.40/5011.01, AH.
- 123 Zhang Xuliang to Chiang Kai-shek (October 15, 1928), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Geming Wenxian, Beifa Shiqi, Vol. 24, AH.
- 124 Hayashi to Tanaka (January 23, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 14–16.
- 125 Hayashi to Tanaka (March 22, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 38–39.
- 126 Shanghai Consul-General Shigemitsu Mamoru to Tanaka (April 3, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 44–47.
- 127 Tanaka to Acting Fengtian Consul-General Morishima Morito (May 9, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 69–70.
- 128 Shen Yunlong, ed., *Huang Yingbai Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian* [Chronology of Huang Yingbai] (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1976), 322–323.
- 129 H. Bucknell, Jr., Memorandum for the Minister (February 26, 1928), Box 34, MacMurray Papers.
- 130 Johnson to MacMurray (February 6, 1928), Vol. 9, Johnson Papers.
- 131 Yada to Tanaka (March 7, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 536–537. Tanaka to Yada (March 14, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 546–547.
- 132 *Ibid.*, 565–566.
- 133 Okamoto to Tanaka (March 24, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 570–571. Yoshizawa to Tanaka (March 31, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 576. Chamberlain to Lampson (July 26, 1928), F 3881/7/10, FO 371/13170, PRO.
- 134 MacMurray to Kellogg (March 30, 1928), FRUS, 1928 2, 331–333. Kellogg to MacMurray (July 11, 1928), FRUS, 1928 2, 453–454. CSFR 416–420.
- 135 MacMurray to Huang Fu (April 9, 1928), Folder: Documents Associated with the Career of Huang Fu, Vol. 1, Part 1, Box 19, Huang Fu Office Files and Related Papers.
- 136 Treaty Regulating Tariff Relation between the United States of America and the Republic of China (July 25, 1928), FRUS, 1928 2, 475–477. Kellogg to MacMurray (September 11, 1928), FRUS, 1928 2, 198–199; CSFR 475–476.
- 137 Castle Diary (June 26, 1928), Vol. 12, William R. Castle, Jr. Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
- 138 Kellogg to Coolidge (August 10, 1928), Reel 33, Kellogg Papers.
- 139 Kellogg to Coolidge (August 17, 1928), Reel 34, Kellogg Papers.
- 140 Kellogg to Borah (December 11, 1928), Folder: China, Box 267, Borah Papers.
- 141 Wang to Hornbeck (January 14, 1927), Folder: Wang, Chengting T, Box 432, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- 142 Wang Zhengting to MacMurray (July 28, 1928), Waijiaobu Dangan 0641.50/5080.01–01, AH.
- 143 Wang to Hornbeck (August 17, 1928), Folder: Wang, Chengting T, Box 432, Hornbeck Papers.
- 144 Hornbeck to MacMurray (September 10, 1928), Box 36, MacMurray Papers.
- 145 Wu Chao-shu to Kellogg (July 29, 1927), Guomin Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan 18.996, Second Historical Archives of China. Wu to Alfred Sze (July 30, 1927), Guomin Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan 18.996, Second Historical Archives of China.
- 146 Memorandum by Johnson of a Conversation with Wu (July 6, 1928), Vol. 48, Johnson Papers.
- 147 Memorandum by Hornbeck of a Telephone Conversation with Sze (July 20, 1928), Folder: China: Sino-American Tariff Treaty of 1928, Chinese Interpretation of, Box 103, Hornbeck Papers.
- 148 Wang Zhengting to Lampson (August 9, 1928), Waijiaobu Dangan 0635.10/4000.01–07, AH. Wang Zhengting to Acting French Minister to China (October 1, 1928), Waijiaobu Dangan 0635.10/4000.01–22, AH. CSFR 420–430.

- 149 Yoshizawa Kenkichi 90–91; Horiuchi Kensuke 50–51. JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 532–537. CSFR 430–431.
- 150 Shigemitsu to Tanaka (April 16, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 520–523. Shigemitsu to Tanaka (April 8, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 515–516. CSFR 456, 462.
- 152 Tanaka to Yoshizawa (July 21, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 2, 616–618.
- 153 Shigemitsu to Tanaka (April 13, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 756–759.
- 154 Tanaka to Acting Ambassador to Britain Saburi Sadao (September 20, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 745–746.
- 155 Wang Zhengting to Lampson (October 12, 1928), Waijiaobu Dangan 0641.50/5044.02–01, AH. Lampson to Chamberlain (December 29, 1928), F 1002/11/10, FO 371/13893, PRO. CSFR 480–481.
- 156 Victor Wellesley, “Memorandum on British Policy in China” (August 3, 1928), F 4155/7/10, FO 371/13170, PRO. For recent research on customs in this period, see: Kose Hajime, “Nanking Kokumin Seifu Seiritsu-ki no Chūgoku Kaizei – Aguren Jidai no Kaizei Un’ei o Megutte” [Chinese Maritime Customs at the Time of the Establishment of the Nanjing Nationalist Government: The Operation of Maritime Customs under Aglen], in Ryūkoku Daigaku, *Keizaigaku Ronshū* 34:2 (1994), 21–53; Martyn Atkins, *Informal Empire in Crisis: British Diplomacy and the Chinese Customs Succession, 1927–1929* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1995), 23–110; Tang Qihua, “Beiyang Zhengfu Shiqi Haiguan Zongshui Wusi Ange Lian zhi Chubu Yanjiu” [A Preliminary Study on Aglen and the Office of Customs and Taxation during the Beiyang Government], *Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo Jikan* No. 24:2 (1995), 575–601.
- 157 Tanaka to Yada (October 2, 1928), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 756–758.
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5 The Second Era of Shidehara Diplomacy and the Third Wave of International Change

July 1929 to December 1931 – The
Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki Governments

With the formation of the Hamaguchi Osachi government in July 1929, Shidehara Kijūrō returned to the position of foreign minister.

In discussing this second period of Shidehara Diplomacy, special note has to be taken of the return to a foreign policy of cooperation with Britain and the United States, something that is most symbolized by the January to April 1930 London Naval Conference. The Japanese delegation to the conference was led by Wakatsuki Reijirō and included Naval Minister Takarabe Takeshi, Ambassador to Britain Matsudaira Tsuneo, and Ambassador to Belgium Nagai Matsuzō as plenipotentiaries. They carried out tenacious negotiations with British Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald and US Secretary of State Stimson. In addition to reducing the number of auxiliary ships permitted to each power, the London Naval Treaty signed on April 22 also extended the moratorium on the construction of capital ships to 1936 and held that Japan, the United States, and Britain would have to discard one, two, and five ships respectively to reach limitations on capital ships established in the naval arms limitations treaty agreed to at the Washington Conference.¹ Under the Hamaguchi government, Shidehara's policy of cooperation with Britain and America was closely tied to the fiscal austerity of Finance Minister Inoue Junnosuke. The London Conference was viewed as important for both of these goals by the government.²

The appointment of Assistant Secretary of State Castle, a member of the State Department's pro-Japanese faction, as ambassador to Japan during the London Conference was one of the notable signs pointing at a restoration of US-Japan cooperation. But while Castle himself held that "the Japanese are our natural friends in the Far East," he also felt that "while our Far Eastern policy is directed by people whose only interest is in China, this friendship can never be developed."³ Those with pro-Japanese foreign policy views were a minority within the US government and, in Castle's eyes, even MacMurray "was and is purely a Chinese expert."⁴ While that may have been true, Castle would resume his post of Assistant Secretary of State after returning to Washington and was promoted to Under Secretary of State in April 1931.

The London Naval Conference was the not the only area in which there were improvements in the relations between Japan, Britain, and the United

States. Notably, there were moves in both Japan and the US aimed at revision of the US anti-Japanese immigration law, one of the causes of discord between the two countries. On May 23, 1930, at the end of Castle's time as ambassador, he was approached by former Ambassador to the US Hanihara Masanao about having the law amended.⁵ In his response, Castle praised Hanihara as having been "one of the most popular ambassadors who had ever been in Washington."⁶

There were moves on the American side as well. Stimson referenced the law in a conversation with Ambassador Matsudaira Tsuneo on March 15, 1930, telling Matsudaira that he wanted to "somehow see it dealt with properly while I am in office."⁷ A resolution calling for amendment of the law was passed at the National Foreign Trade Convention held in Los Angeles that May in the hopes of promoting US-Japan trade, and Albert Johnson, chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, submitted an amendment to the 71st Congress in June. This was widely covered by newspapers in both Japan and the US.⁸ The competitive relationship between Japan and Britain over the Chinese market for cotton goods also showed signs of improvement, with an economic mission from the British spinning industry visiting Japan in November 1930 to promote mutual understanding between the countries.⁹

This does not mean that there had been an immediate return to a state where collaborative diplomacy towards China had become possible, however. This is because Japan had become isolated diplomatically over the issue of recognition of the Nationalist government (now the central force in Chinese politics) since the late Tanaka government period. Combined with the fact that Sino-Soviet relations had worsened drastically since the KMT's adoption of anti-communist policies, the situation was completely different from the one that had existed under the first period of Shidehara diplomacy, during which the First Northern Expedition had been carried out with Soviet support. And this difference was clearly demonstrated by the Fengtian-Soviet War of 1929.

I. Conflict in Visions for East Asia

1. The Fengtian-Soviet War and International Politics

There are two points of contention surrounding the 1929 Sino-Soviet conflict known as the Fengtian-Soviet War.¹⁰ The first concerns the causes of the conflict. The Soviet victory in the conflict meant a setback (albeit a temporary one) for the Nationalist government's revolutionary diplomacy and its efforts to recover sovereignty. The immediate cause of this setback was Soviet military power. But a more fundamental issue was that China had gone too far in aggressively attempting to regain control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and lost the ability to check itself. The second point of contention concerns the responses of the powers to the war, particularly those of Japan and the United States. Notably, American diplomatic efforts under Secretary of State Stimson

failed to mediate the conflict. This was due to a number of problems in the internal processes of the State Department as well as Stimson's vision of the international order differing from that of not just Japan but Britain as well.

Below, I would like to carry out a comparative evaluation of each nation's vision for East Asia while also looking for the causes of this setback for revolutionary diplomacy by analyzing the complicated Chinese political process that led to the conflict.

(1) The Sino-Soviet Conflict and Japan

There had been incessant clashes between China and the Soviet Union over jurisdictional and personnel matters at the CER ever since it had been placed under their joint operation in 1924. From about January 1927, the Eastern Provinces Special District Road Police had increasingly been on the watch for storefronts in stations under Russian management being used for the distribution of communist propaganda.¹¹ On May 27, 1929, the Eastern Provinces Special District Police General Administration Office carried out a search of the Soviet consulate in Harbin on the grounds that it was being used to host meetings by members of the Soviet Communist Party. According to Japanese Harbin Consul Yagi Motohachi, "Lü Ronghuan, who had returned from Fengtian at the beginning of the month," opened negotiations over the return of railway rights to China, but "the Soviets would not easily yield, and the talks are at a standstill."¹²

At the same time, Beijing Consul-General Slivaneck reported to the Far East Bureau of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in a June 18 telegram that Chinese press coverage of the issue was moderate, with the general tone supporting better relations with the Soviet Union.¹³ But Harbin authorities, claiming to have obtained evidence from their May search that the USSR had been using the CER as a vehicle for communist propaganda, ousted CER General Manager M. Emshanov in mid-July, thereby recovering Chinese control of the railway.¹⁴

The Northeastern Political Council sent detailed reports on documents seized from the Soviet consulate in Harbin to Nanjing, and these were also communicated to Tan Yankai, President of the Executive Yuan, by the foreign ministry.¹⁵

On July 13, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan met with Acting Chinese Ambassador Xia Weisong and demanded that negotiations be opened over the CER situation and that the Soviet citizens being held be released. When the Nationalist government refused, the Soviet government announced on the 17th that it was breaking off relations.¹⁶ Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting informed Karakhan (through Xia) that the root of the problem was communist propaganda against the Chinese system.¹⁷ As this was going on, the Nationalist foreign ministry requested that Yan Xishan and Zhang Xueliang provide continual reports on the state of the Soviet troops on the border.¹⁸ The Northeast regime had generally been the leading advocate for a hardline policy

against the Soviets rather than the central government; this can be seen in Chiang Kai-shek's July 20 message to Zhang that "relations with the Soviets may have been severed, but we should still try to avoid war."¹⁹ At this point, Zhang had already sent a strongly worded letter to Karakhan stating that, until the Soviets delivered those responsible in good faith, China "will bear no responsibility for incurring further conflict."²⁰ We can see here that the assassination of Zhang Zuolin and the Northeast Flag Replacement had not eliminated the tradition of independent warlord diplomacy that had existed since the time of the Beiyang government.²¹

Cai had the arrested Soviet citizens released on July 22 and, after presenting a flexible proposal under which the Soviet government would be allowed to appoint the CER general and deputy managers, stated that "if this is acceptable to the Soviet government, then Zhang Xueliang will seek the Nanjing government's approval for the proposal." Karakhan responded positively to this development, taking the position that "the post-dispute state of the Chinese Eastern Railway should conform to the 1924 Beijing and Fengtian agreements."²² Coming under pressure from Nanjing, however, Zhang sent a letter to Karakhan a week later in which he stated that he was removing the clause allowing the Soviet government appointments from the proposed settlement.²³ Karakhan condemned this in a telegram to Zhang, stating that "your message is clearly in violation of the Beijing and Fengtian agreements as it seeks to legalize the current situation surrounding the Chinese Eastern Railway, one which is the result of your looting of the railway."²⁴ Sino-Soviet relations were thus in a very dangerous state.

This worsening situation is believed to have resulted from a difference of opinion between Zhang and Chiang over Soviet policy. In a July 23 telegram to Chiang, Zhang stated that:

The Soviets lack the courage to declare war. But there is clear evidence that someone is persistently fanning the flames, hoping to profit from the sidelines. There is no question that – should war unfortunately break out – their meddling will intensify. Given the current lack of solidarity, we should do all we can to avoid conflict.

Given the contemporary context, it is likely that the "someone" mentioned by Zhang was Japan. Chiang wrote on this telegram that "Regarding the CER issue, China is working to avoid war, but the Soviets also lack the ability [to fight one]."²⁵ Both men underestimated the Soviets, believing that they were incapable of fighting China. But while Zhang had begun to become wary of the Japanese response, Chiang was not particularly concerned, and this difference made him take a harder line towards the Soviets.

Taking an even harsher stance than Chiang was Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting, an expert on the Soviet Union. In a July 29 telegram to Zhang, he wrote that:

“We are already ready for the situation and our opponent’s power is ebbing; we merely need to wait for him to submit. For us to permit [the Soviets to] dispatch managers without meeting with us first would not only show weakness, it would be tantamount to admitting that we acted inappropriately and expose the lack of unity between the central and local governments.” “Last year, when Japan occupied Jiaoji with a large force, I was unfazed and was able to recover Shandong through diplomatic negotiations.”²⁶

Railways Minister Sun Ke and President of the Legislative Yuan Hu Hanmin also openly criticized the Soviet Union during this period.²⁷

Shidehara, who returned to the position of foreign minister on July 2, initially attempted to mediate negotiations between China and the Soviet Union. He met with Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky and Minister to Japan Wang Rongbao separately on the 19th, telling them, “We may consider mediating negotiations between Russia and China and playing the role of messenger for the views of each, depending on the contents.”²⁸ His view was that so long as the Soviet demand was for a return to the status quo ante, this had to be accepted by the Chinese. At another meeting with Wang on August 9, he pressed him by noting that:

it is clearly stated in the 1924 Sino-Soviet agreement that Soviet citizens would be appointed to the positions of general and deputy manager. If there is some reason why China should hesitate to immediately accept that, you need to state it.²⁹

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Stimson was also proactively seeking a resolution to the dispute, albeit one that differed greatly from Shidehara’s in terms of specific policy. Since the dispute had arisen immediately after the ratification of the Kellogg–Briand Pact, Stimson envisioned the formation of a committee composed of ratifiers of that treaty to arbitrate. On July 25, he invited the Japanese, British, French, and Italian ambassadors and the German acting ambassador to a meeting and sounded them out on the idea.³⁰ The United States had yet to recognize the Soviet Union, and Stimson’s plan was also an attempt to overcome the problem of being unable to directly mediate between China and the USSR.

Importantly, this first Stimson proposal did not reflect a consensus within the State Department. According to Castle, despite Stimson asking him for a draft, he ultimately drafted the proposal personally. “The Secretary likes to take a clear position of leadership and, as to Russia, he says we shall have to recognize it in time.” Castle saw this as being unnecessarily forward. He was “guarding carefully against Russian recognition” and thought that the United States should not take the lead in resolving the dispute as “I do not want people to say that the Kellogg Pact is projecting us unnecessarily into international affairs.”³¹ Division of Far Eastern Affairs Chief Hornbeck was skeptical of the effectiveness of the plan and compared it to former Secretary

of State Philander Knox's idea of making Manchurian railways neutral.³² Hornbeck was well-versed in East Asian international politics and believed that "the probability is that China would also view with dismay an investigation by a commission," to say nothing of the Japanese and the Soviets.³³

Japanese Ambassador Debuchi Katsuji was "almost openly sarcastic" towards the proposal, and Shidehara continued his own efforts to pursue mediation between China and the Soviet Union rather than accept the plan.³⁴ When French Minister to China Damien de Martel put forward the idea of Japan, America, Britain, and France making a joint proposal maintaining the status quo on the CER, this was also rejected by Shidehara.³⁵ Shidehara was concerned about increasing Western influence in Manchuria and worked for a rapid resolution of the situation through direct negotiations between China and the USSR so as to avoid this. Debuchi and Acting Minister to China Horiuchi Kensuke were in agreement with him on this point.³⁶

(2) *Clash and Compromise*

In mid-August, the Soviet army crossed the Heilongjiang River and began fighting Chinese forces, and Soviet government statements, including detailed reporting on the clashes, appeared in *Izvestia*.³⁷ It had become very clear that the Chinese, including Wang Zhengting (supposedly an expert on the USSR), had erred in their judgment of the situation with the Soviets. Shidehara continually met with Troyanovsky and Wang, still hoping to mediate Sino-Soviet negotiations. But the Chinese were wary that "the Japanese may be trying to take advantage of the situation" (Minister to Germany Jiang Zuobin's words), and Shidehara's efforts only put them more on guard against Japanese ambitions.³⁸ Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Chief Zhou Longguang reportedly received information that Japan was planning to take advantage of the conflict to complete the Jihui Railway and deploy troops to Hunchun. Shidehara had to tell Nanjing Consul Okamoto Issaku that these reports were "absolutely groundless."³⁹ In September, Japanese railway garrison troops clashed with Chinese public security forces in Tieling (along the Mantetsu line), disconcerting Zhang Xueliang.⁴⁰

For this reason, the Nationalist government (in accordance with Chiang's wishes) entrusted Germany with mediating the negotiations with the Soviets.⁴¹ The Chinese foreign ministry also requested that Germany protect Chinese nationals in the USSR.⁴² Minister to the US Wu Chaoshu claimed to Assistant Secretary of State Johnson that:

the reason for the rupture in the conversations which had been going on between Chinese and Russian representatives at Manchuli was due to the fact that the Russians had demanded the appointment of a Russian manager and a Russian assistant manager before negotiations could be commenced.⁴³

In a September 17, 1929 verbal note transmitted to the Nationalist government via the German embassy in the Soviet Union, the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs accused the Nationalist government of attempting to "substitute the issue of the selection of the deputy manager" for that of both the general and deputy managers.⁴⁴ Troyanovsky also pushed back when Shidehara suggested at an October 7 meeting that the treatment of the Soviet arrestees had improved and expressed a reluctance to enter into direct negotiations with China.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the Soviet foreign ministry continued to exchange information with the Japanese embassy under Karakhan's direction and tried to maintain good relations with Japan.⁴⁶

As shown by the October 3 meeting between Shidehara and German Ambassador Ernst Vorezsch, the German mediation on which the Chinese had pinned their hopes had also stalled.⁴⁷ In mid-October, the Soviet army began their offensive in northern Manchuria, occupying Manzhouli. During this time, Stalin sounded out Politburo Member Molotov about "forming a brigade of two regiments composed mainly of Chinese, and [...] sending it into Manchuria [...] to stir up rebellion within the Manchurian army [...] and occupy Harbin [before] forcing Zhang Xueliang to abdicate and establishing a revolutionary government."⁴⁸ This shows that Stalin was not constraining himself to the framework of "socialism in one country."

Telegrams between the Northeastern Political Committee and the Nationalist foreign ministry during this period are extremely interesting as they show the responses of Zhang and Wang. On October 19, Zhang – acting as chairman of the Northeastern Political Committee – stated that "the lives and property of Chinese living in Vladivostok are being severely infringed upon" and called on foreign ministry to take countermeasures. Specific proposals for these measures included the confiscation of the private property of Soviets in Harbin as necessary, nonpayment of loans from the Far Eastern Bank, and the partial seizure of Soviet income from the CER. But while Wang acknowledged that damage to overseas Chinese was not limited to Vladivostok, he called for caution. Zhang, who was under internal pressure from Jilin province, continued to demand action.⁴⁹ With Wang pulling back from his prior hardline stance towards the Soviets, his and Zhang's positions had now become reversed.

The Nationalist government also decided to appeal to the League of Nations in late November, and Wang requested assistance from Germany and Japan.⁵⁰ During the same period, Stimson, with the approval of President Herbert Hoover, proposed that Japan, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States issue a joint statement on the basis of the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.⁵¹ This second Stimson proposal once again did not reflect a consensus within the State Department, however. Castle was cool on the idea after talking with Under Secretary of State Joseph P. Cotton and Johnson, writing that "the Secretary is eager to be the Great Peacemaker." In his view, the US had "no reason to pull other people's chestnuts out of the fire."⁵²

While Stimson received agreements in principle from British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson and French Foreign Minister Briand on his

proposal, they believed that Japanese participation in the statement was necessary in light of “the importance of Japan’s position in Far Eastern questions” (Briand).⁵³ But Shidehara was unenthusiastic about both the Chinese appeal to the League of Nations and Stimson’s idea, telling Acting US Ambassador Neville that he continued to believe that direct negotiations between China and the Soviet Union were needed.⁵⁴ According to Hornbeck’s report to President Hoover, Belgium, Germany, Turkey, and Denmark were reluctant to participate in Stimson’s proposed joint statement, to say nothing of Japan and the Soviets.⁵⁵

When Sino-Soviet negotiations were held in Khabarovsk, they rapidly reached an agreement as Zhang had conveyed his intention to essentially completely agree to the Soviet demands for the restitution of the CER and the immediate release of those arrested during this period (something that Litvinov praised him for).⁵⁶ The agreement signed on December 3 by the Soviet government and Northeast regime returned the CER to its previous status quo. When the Nationalist government signed an agreement on the same lines on December 22, the Fengtian Soviet War finally came to an end.⁵⁷

As summarized by Shidehara in later years, the Fengtian-Soviet War caused the differences in the American and Japanese policy visions of China to resurface once again.⁵⁸ Shidehara had worked to bring about direct Sino-Soviet negotiations in the belief that the prior Sino-Soviet-Japanese power balance in Manchuria needed to be rapidly restored so as to prevent Western involvement. Ambassador Debuchi and Acting Minister to China Horiuchi were also largely of the same view, and the Japanese foreign ministry wanted to limit the countries involved in Manchuria to China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.

As such, Shidehara was generally successful in achieving his policy objectives: Western involvement was prevented, and the status quo ante was restored through direct Sino-Soviet negotiations. That British Foreign Secretary Henderson largely adopted a position of wait-and-see towards the conflict acted to Shidehara’s benefit, not Stimson’s.⁵⁹ There are very few references to the war in British Minister to China Lampson’s diary from the time, with contemporary British interest instead being focused on the issue of extraterritoriality.⁶⁰ This series of events also shows the dual nature of Shidehara Diplomacy. While Shidehara had made cooperation with Britain and the United States the foundation for his positions at the London Naval Conference and the negotiations over China’s foreign debts, when it came to the Fengtian-Soviet War, he tried to avoid any Western involvement in Manchuria.

The end of the war did not just mean a return to the status quo for the Japanese army, however. That the war had ended in a Soviet victory meant that Soviet influence, which had been declining in the wake of the dissolution of the First United Front and Chiang’s anti-communist coup, increased dramatically. The Japanese army had no choice but to take renewed interest in the military strength of the Soviet Union.⁶¹

Stimson, on the other hand, had envisioned the existing order in Manchuria being replaced by a new multilateral one in which the Western powers, the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, were involved alongside Japan, China, and the USSR. Stimson's attempt at a new diplomacy was not seen as effective even by the pro-American Wang Zhengting, however, and the ultimate resolution of the conflict took the form of China offering concessions in direct Sino-Soviet negotiations.⁶² Stimson had only just assumed office as Secretary of State, and he impetuously pursued a foreign policy achievement without adequately sounding out his experts on East Asian policy like Castle and Hornbeck first. His efforts ultimately ended in failure, but Stimson continued to hold out hope for the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact until the end.⁶³ Also, US Minister to China MacMurray had been unable to play a prominent role, as his resignation had been accepted in October 1929.⁶⁴

The biggest diplomatic problem for China was that once Zhang Xueliang, who had initially played the central role in the dispute, began compromising with the Soviet Union due to his wariness of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Zhengting (particularly the latter) became increasingly involved and pushed a hardline position against the Soviets. One suspects that the success that revolutionary diplomacy had achieved with the West may have perhaps fueled the efforts of Wang, who prided himself on being a Soviet expert. Nevertheless, Zhang, Chiang, and Wang had all shared a desire to avoid conflict and an underestimation of Soviet capabilities. The tragedy for Chinese diplomacy was that a military conflict arose before the question of who held leadership over foreign policy issues involving the northeast had been settled. Even as late as 1930, Wang would punish Cai Yunsheng for exceeding his authority by promoting better relations with the Soviets, wanting this to instead be done through direct negotiations in Nanjing.⁶⁵ Ironically, it would take the Manchurian Incident to make the KMT's leadership over northeastern issues clear. The delay in the restoration of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union would also have important significance for the international environment that existed at the time of the Manchurian Incident.

To summarize the above, the course of the diplomatic negotiations over the Fengtian-Soviet War highlighted the conflicting visions for East Asia held by Japan, China, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. These differences did not begin in 1929, of course. The fundamental conflict over the Japanese and American visions for East Asia had existed from at least the beginning of the Washington Conference. But it was China's treaty revision and revolutionary diplomacy that served as a driving force for increasing the policy divergence between them in the mid-1920s. And, as an unexpected result of its poor policy towards the Soviet Union, China also furthered this through the Fengtian-Soviet War. Despite the arrival of Stimson and the return of Shidehara, the "divergence of the Washington System" continued, as did the role of sphere of influence thinking in Japanese foreign policy. The American attempt at pursuing a new order failed, and the Washington System's continuing status as part of the old order was confirmed. I wrote at the

end of the section of Chapter 2 covering the Washington Conference that, “Had the United States and Japan each taken a small step closer to one another and reached a higher level of mutual understanding, subsequent developments in East Asia may have been very different.” This was even more relevant in 1929, in that British diplomacy had ceased acting as a mediator between the two other powers.

2. Economic Diplomacy and the Shigemitsu Initiative

The two years from the conclusion of the Fengtian-Soviet War to the end of 1931 saw both the restoration of Japanese collaboration with Britain and the United States (most notably at the London Naval Conference) and the rise of the Japanese army in the Manchurian Incident. This has led Japanese diplomacy during this period to be interpreted from two perspectives.

The first focuses on the qualitative shift from Tanaka Diplomacy to the second period of Shidehara Diplomacy. It holds that Shidehara’s return was accompanied by a restoration of cooperation with foreign countries, particularly Britain and America. The success of the London Conference is usually heavily emphasized by this interpretation. This is held to apply to Japanese policy towards China as well, as Japanese, British, and American positions in the negotiations over extraterritoriality came closer to one another after Japan recognized Chinese tariff autonomy in the Sino-Japanese customs agreement signed in March 1930.⁶⁶ The second interpretation primarily views the second period of Shidehara Diplomacy in relation to the Manchurian Incident. It emphasizes the Nakamura and Wanpaoshan incidents and the May 30th Uprising in Jiandao, positioning them as a prelude to the Manchurian Incident.⁶⁷ While the first interpretation emphasizes the role of the foreign ministry, the second naturally focuses on the army.

The problem with this is that, while the policy differences within the army during this period are fairly well-known, examination of the various foreign policy courses advocated for within the foreign ministry has been relatively neglected. The pioneering research of Usui Katsumi on this point indicates that, at the time that Arita Hachirō was appointed Asian Affairs Bureau director in September 1927, there were two major groups within the ministry: an “Asian faction” that included Arita, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Tani Masayuki, and Shiratori Toshio, and the “Western faction” of Shidehara Kijūrō, Debuchi Katsuji, Satō Naotake, and Hirota Kōki.⁶⁸ In recent years, Sakai Tetsuya and Koike Seiichi have also attempted to intrinsically grasp the foreign policy views of the foreign ministry.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, it is rare for scholars to discuss these policy conflicts by focusing on the trends within the ministry during research on specific examples. The analytic perspective of Shidehara versus Tanaka diplomacy has become so entrenched that the differences in Shidehara Diplomacy between his two times as foreign minister tends to be overlooked.

As I conduct an analysis of the Sino-Japanese Customs Agreement and the negotiations over Chinese foreign debt in the following section, I would like to reconsider the vision that each of the participating countries held for East Asia. I will also describe the policy conflict within the foreign ministry embodied by Foreign Minister Shidehara and Acting Minister to China Shigemitsu and make clear the process through which Shidehara's foreign policy changed between his two terms.

(1) The Completion of the Sino-Japanese Customs Agreement

When the Hamaguchi government was formed in July 1929, Japan's economic relations with China had been damaged by the previous Tanaka government's Shandong Expedition and the Jinan Incident. There was an ongoing major labor dispute at Japanese spinning mills in Qingdao and – while the mills had responded by locking out and firing workers – they were having difficult regaining control of the situation.⁷⁰ Already facing an economic recession, improving relations with China and promoting economic expansion were seen by the new government as being among its most important tasks.

The Chinese welcomed the new government and the October 1929 appointment of Saburi Sadao as Minister to China as an opportunity for improving relations with Japan. Shidehara also used this chance to informally work on his idea for a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact, sounding out Vice President of the Judicial Yuan Zhang Ji about having “both countries mutually promise in some form to respect the inviolability of the other's territory” while he was visiting Japan.⁷¹

But Asian Affairs Bureau Director Arita Hachirō and Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section Director Tani Masayuki were unexpectedly unenthusiastic about the idea. According to “Comments on Several Ideas for Improving Sino-Japanese Relations,” a contemporary opinion paper put together by Arita, it was unthinkable that China would relinquish boycotts, its “only weapon,” given the great difference between Sino-Japanese views on Japan's special interests in Manchuria. Therefore, even if a non-aggression pact were signed, Japan could not expect much to come from reconciling the bitter feelings between China and Japan. Tani's opinion paper “Regarding Plans for Improving Sino-Japanese Relations” similarly argued that signing a non-aggression pact would not lead to improved relations.⁷² Arita and Tani shared the view that Sino-Japanese relations would not be easily improved, and Shidehara did not long pursue his plan for a non-aggression pact.

Furthermore, while Saburi's appointment had been welcomed by the Chinese, he died under mysterious circumstances in Hakone in November 1929, casting doubt on the future of Sino-Japanese relations.⁷³ Shidehara appointed Obata Yūkichi, who had “previously devoted himself to improving Sino-Japanese relations as Minister to China,” as Saburi's successor.⁷⁴ But as Obata had served as First Secretary at the Japanese legation at the time of the Twenty-One Demands, his appointment was opposed by the Chinese public.⁷⁵ Foreign Minister Wang

also told Nanjing Consul Uemura Shin'ichi that he "proposed deciding the issue of the elevation of the legations to the status of embassies at this time as a sign of good will," stating that it would alleviate Chinese criticism of Japan.⁷⁶ As Shidehara responded by urging the Chinese to seriously reconsider such a condition, Wang informed the Japanese on December 17 that he was refusing agrément for Obata.⁷⁷

In January 1930, Shidehara chose Shigemitsu Mamoru to serve as acting Minister to China and oversee the negotiations over tariff autonomy.⁷⁸ As the Nationalist government had already had its tariff autonomy recognized by the Western powers and was preparing to implement a national tax rate from February 1, Shidehara needed to treat the negotiations as a priority.⁷⁹ Side-stepping Wang, who was more interested in holding negotiations over extra-territoriality, Shigemitsu worked with Finance Minister Song Ziwen in Shanghai. As Song was also under pressure to secure additional financial resources by increasing tariff revenue, he and Shigemitsu shared the goal of rapidly coming to an agreement on tariff autonomy.

But while Shidehara and Shigemitsu both saw the negotiations as a priority, they differed in their views on what the conditions for recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy should be. Shidehara instructed Shigemitsu on January 24 to incorporate language into the Sino-Japanese agreement preserving the existing tax rate on as many goods as possible for the first five years.⁸⁰ He also instructed Shigemitsu that the preferential land tariff between Korea and the Three Northeastern Provinces was to be left unchanged for at least three years, and all transit duties within China were to be abolished. Shigemitsu criticized Shidehara's instructions as not only delaying the course of the negotiations but potentially "causing Song Ziwen to withdraw from [them]." He requested that Shidehara provide him with "a final plan on which a compromise can be reached."⁸¹

Wang and Foreign Ministry Western Bureau Director Xu Mo believed that the agreement should include a clause abolishing extraterritoriality, and Song was becoming isolated within the government. In early February, Shidehara stated that he was willing to promise in writing that he was prepared to hold talks on the extraterritoriality issue following the conclusion of the tariff agreement.⁸² Shigemitsu then travelled from Shanghai to Nanjing and entered into vigorous negotiations with Song and Wang, working hard to obtain Chiang Kai-shek's support through Song. In late February, Shidehara decided that reducing the term for which the current tax rates were to remain in place to three years was unavoidable and agreed to the Nationalist government's demand for a tax increase on imported cotton thread.⁸³ Following these concessions, the Hamaguchi government approved the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement in a March 11 cabinet decision, and the agreement was provisionally signed on the following day. In addition to recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy, this agreement held that the existing tax rates would remain in effect on cotton and marine products for three years and that the preferential land tariff would be abolished four months after the agreement took effect.⁸⁴

The Sino-Japanese tariff agreement thus required Japan to make significant concessions to China.

The Sino-Japanese tariff agreement was provisionally signed a mere two months after Shigemitsu's appointment as acting Minister to China. Afterwards, the Legislative Yuan demanded an explanation from Foreign Minister Wang and Vice Minister Li Jinlun on the grounds that Article 5 of the agreement, which stated that it would take effect ten days after signing, could be in violation of Section 2 of Article 25 of the Organic Law of the Republic of China.⁸⁵ There was deeply-rooted distrust of the Nationalist government in Japan as well, with the Deliberative Committee of the Privy Council calling for a clause requiring a creditors' meeting be held on settling China's foreign debt by October 1, 1930.

But with the Western governments having already recognized the Nationalist government's tariff autonomy during the Tanaka government, Japan was in no position to take a tough stance and had had to make major concessions to quickly reach a compromise. Of the Chinese, it had been Finance Minister Song who had been the most enthusiastic about moving the agreement forward, hoping to stabilize the government's finances. Wang had been more interested in the extraterritoriality issue. It was under these circumstances that Shigemitsu, securing the support of Song and Chiang, asked Shidehara to provide major compromises. Shigemitsu's initiative here played a major role in securing the agreement.

Therefore, while Shidehara had sought to secure as much preferential economic treatment as possible, Shigemitsu had attempting to reach compromises with Song and Chiang while avoiding Wang, who, with popular support behind him, was inclined to take a harsher stance.

On March 19, after the negotiations had concluded, Shigemitsu provided a report on the internal state of the Nationalist government, writing that "there are still power struggles ongoing within the Nanjing government; the Song family faction, led by Chiang Kai-shek, is decisively clamping down on the members of the party's theory faction like Hu Hanmin" and that "the foreign ministry, led by Wang and with no actual power in the party or government, always follows the trends of public opinion and puts forward the most radical policies." He told Shidehara that, in future negotiations with China:

Once negotiations have started, all matters other than the general outline should be left to the local official as much as possible. It is necessary for all involved officials and particularly the leadership to publicly maintain a consistent, unified attitude.⁸⁶

In other words, Shigemitsu did not only hold different views from Shidehara in the negotiations over the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement; he also showed a strong desire to hold leadership over China policy itself.

With the focus of China policy turning to the foreign debt and extra-territorial issues now that an agreement had been reached on tariffs, this

relationship between Shigemitsu and Shidehara would further manifest as a clear disagreement over policy.

(2) Negotiations over China's Foreign Debt and the Abolition of Extraterritoriality

Once the tariff negotiations had ended, the focus turned not just to extra-territoriality, but also to the question of how China was going to repay its foreign debts.⁸⁷ At the time of the formation of the Nationalist government, the Chinese owed 743 million yuan in unsecured debts to foreign countries, 362 million of which was owed to Japan.⁸⁸

Being owed so much in insecure debts, including the Nishihara Loans, Japan had been conducting diplomatic negotiations over settling China's foreign debts since Shidehara's first term as foreign minister. At the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff held from October 1925 to July 1926 by the Beiyang government, Shidehara had held firm to his position that, if China raised tariffs, the new income should be applied to repaying its foreign debts. The conference had made little progress as a result and was indefinitely postponed in July 1926, partly due to the effects of the Chinese civil war. This was previously discussed in Chapter 3.

The Nationalist foreign ministry later informed the ministers from Britain, America, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland on January 18, 1929 that five million yuan of the increased tariff income would be applied to settling domestic and foreign debts, and that a committee would be formed to oversee the settlement of debts.⁸⁹ And when the Tanaka Giichi government accepted the Nationalist government's increase of import duties on January 30, it had included a clause stating that "the Nationalist government will summon a meeting of creditors in the near future" to discuss the specifics of repayment of its foreign debts.⁹⁰ As the Tanaka government collapsed without such a meeting being held, the issue of China's foreign debts remained to be tackled by Shidehara in his second term.

THE NISHIHARA LOANS ISSUE AND THE INITIAL POLICIES OF SHIDEHARA AND SHIGEMITSU

Foreign Minister Shidehara and Acting Minister to China Shigemitsu were the Japanese officials who handled the negotiations on the foreign debt issue. The issue went almost entirely unmentioned in Prime Minister Hamaguchi's diary and speeches; his interest in foreign policy seems to have been entirely devoted to the London Naval Conference.⁹¹

Both men had been involved in the aforementioned Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff, Shidehara as foreign minister and Shigemitsu as first secretary at the Japanese legation. They were thus well versed in the history of the foreign debt issue. Shigemitsu had been enthusiastic about the issue since being appointed acting Minister to China in January 1930, and he

had worked to include clauses concerning foreign debt during the negotiations over a tariff agreement.⁹² As the Hamaguchi government had approved Shigemitsu's policy approach, it was agreed in the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement provisionally signed on March 12, 1930 that a meeting of creditors would be held by October 1.⁹³ For its part, the Nationalist government had already begun discussing revenue sources for managing its foreign debt, holding the first meeting of the Committee on the Management of Domestic and Foreign Debt on July 26, 1929.⁹⁴

However, the truth of the situation is that no one had the slightest clue how to make progress in the negotiations over the management of China's foreign debts given the contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship. The primary cause for this was the vastly different views the two countries had of the Nishihara Loans. In October 1929, Foreign Minister Wang told a group of reporters that he intended to reject any Chinese responsibility to repay the Nishihara Loans.⁹⁵ Wang's position became widely known in both China and Japan and would become an impediment to the negotiations.⁹⁶ But Wang was not necessarily acting arbitrarily in adopting this stance. The declaration released at the KMT's 1st National Congress on January 23, 1924 had already stated in its section on foreign policy that "positions within the Beiyang government were stolen via elections run through bribery" and that the foreign loans of that government "were misappropriated for bribes to preserve the status of the warlords, and the Chinese people bear no responsibility to repay such loans."⁹⁷

Previously, in a May 28, 1925 letter to Seiyūkai President Tanaka Giichi, Beiyang President Duan Qirui had told him that the platform of the government was to "strive to manage our domestic and foreign debts and reform the tax system, establishing a foundation for the national finances."⁹⁸ Wang's policy line attempted to change this drastically. In "Revolutionary Diplomacy," a lengthy December 1931 report, Shigemitsu provided the following analysis on this point:

Due to its political dispute with the Beiyang government, the KMT declared a policy of rejecting certain loans provided to that government. The Nationalist government, which has opposed repayment of the 'Nishihara Loans,' is affected by that policy and is hesitant to implement the debt consolidation plan put forward by Japan and the other powers.⁹⁹

Behind this Chinese response was criticism of the Nishihara Loans from local KMT party leadership committees. The party leadership committees in Beijing, Shanxi, Suyuan, Zhejiang, and elsewhere were pushing the KMT Central Executive Committee to refuse to repay the Nishihara Loans.¹⁰⁰ The KMT Hebei Province Shen Prefecture Party Leadership Committee, having decided that Song Ziwen was going to agree to repayment of the Nishihara Loans in exchange for Japanese recognition of Chinese tariff autonomy, pressed to have Chiang Kai-shek stop him.¹⁰¹ The Chinese business community was also opposed to repayment on the grounds that they had been used

in the struggle between warlords and that the details of the loans were unclear.¹⁰² As such, while full negotiations over China's foreign debt began after the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement was provisionally signed on March 12, 1930, the Nishihara Loans continued to be an issue that could potentially sink them.

On April 9, Shidehara criticized the Nationalist government as "attempting to exclude or apply discriminatory treatment to the Nishihara Loans" and instructed Shigemitsu that he did not want "there to be any commitment towards any exclusion of or discriminatory arrangements towards the Nishihara Loans."¹⁰³ Shigemitsu responded by adopting the position in his discussions with Finance Minister Song that all Chinese foreign debt should be dealt with as a whole so as to "effectively settle this without becoming embroiled in the issue of the approval of the Nishihara Loans."¹⁰⁴

While Shidehara and Shigemitsu were both in agreement that Japan should attempt to substantially collect on debts without making approval of the Nishihara Loans into a prominent issue, their intentions were very different. Shidehara's support for a lump-sum settlement of Chinese debt was motivated by widespread domestic pressure from the Association of Chinese Creditors (Taishi Saikensha Kumiai; this included Industrial Bank of Japan, Yokohama Specie Bank, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi among others), the finance ministry, and the Privy Council Deliberative Council.¹⁰⁵ Shigemitsu told Song on May 24 that:

Should the Chinese solicit funds from foreign countries for true reconstruction, I believe there is no reason why Japan could not find a way to provide such funds by drawing from the payments it receives from this debt settlement and providing appropriate assistance to China for such reconstruction.¹⁰⁶

By tying the repayment of debts with reinvestment in China, Shigemitsu was attempting to put forward a plan to provide active support for the Nationalist government's nation building.

This difference between the two men would gradually become apparent in their responses to the Nationalist government finance ministry's proposal of a thirty-year term for the repayment of its debts. Shidehara's distrust of the Nationalist government is obvious in his June 18, 1930 instructions to Shigemitsu: "The current Chinese proposal specifies a term of thirty years, but the annual payment is largely left unspecified; there is a risk that they will put forward a figure that will leave debts like the Nishihara Loans effectively unpaid." Shigemitsu took a different view, however. On August 1, he reported to Shidehara that "I will request that they make the annual payment clear at the outset of the negotiations, but this should not serve as a shortcut for getting results." "It is not necessarily required to discuss the annual payment amount with each general creditor one by one."¹⁰⁷ In other words, Shigemitsu was criticizing Shidehara's prioritization of domestic concerns and saying that foreign debt negotiations should be actively advanced based on the

Nationalist government's finance ministry's proposal. As Shidehara ultimately agreed with Shigemitsu in late August, the negotiations between Shigemitsu and Song seemed to be on track.

THE HOLDING OF THE CREDITORS MEETING AND TRENDS IN BRITAIN,
AMERICA, AND CHINA

But Shidehara was unable to leave the Chinese foreign debt negotiations entirely to Shigemitsu. This is because he had made a pledge to the Privy Council Deliberation Committee that a creditors meeting would be held by October 1930. This was intended to include representatives from each involved country. He thus instructed Shigemitsu on September 26 that "if a creditors meeting cannot be held during this time period, it will likely cause problems with relations with the Privy Council. I would thus like for at least the first meeting to be held during this time." "We will make arrangement for Japan and China to meet alone first and for the other powers to be invited afterwards."¹⁰⁸ Shidehara was experiencing friction with the Privy Council over accusations that he had violated the supreme command authority of the Emperor at the time, and he was worried that the foreign debt payment issue might become a new source of controversy. But Shigemitsu prioritized the Chinese position that the holding of a creditors meeting could lead to a popular backlash that would derail the negotiations. He thus pursued a policy of postponing the creditors meeting and carrying out negotiations with China with himself as the representative of the creditors.¹⁰⁹

While Shidehara effectively accepted the postponement of the meeting, he was also forced to resort to desperate measures. On September 30, he instructed Shigemitsu that his meeting with Song the day before would be considered the first creditors meeting.¹¹⁰ In response, Shigemitsu (with Song's agreement) postponed the holding of an actual meeting of all involved countries and unofficially continued the Sino-Japanese negotiations.¹¹¹ As this meant that Japan got a head start to the exclusion of the other qualified countries, this action drew foreign criticism of Japan.¹¹²

The creditors conference involving all the relevant countries was officially opened in Nanjing on November 15, 1930. Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot at Tokyo Station on the following day. President of the Judicial Yuan Wang Chonghui served as conference chair, and Song, Wang, Sun Ke, Kong Xiangxi, and Zhang Xueliang also attended for China. Shigemitsu, US Minister to China Johnson, and representatives from Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium attended for the creditor nations. The countries frequently had difficulty forming a consensus, however, causing the conference to have a tendency to deadlock.¹¹³ Shidehara attempted to work with Britain (which, like Japan, held large claims against China) to overcome this; Ambassador to Britain Matsudaira Tsuneo requested cooperation from the MacDonald government on the basis that making progress on managing China's foreign debt was "in the interests of all countries seeking a stable China."¹¹⁴

The British, which largely held secured debts to railways and the like, was unenthusiastic about the Japanese-led conference, however.¹¹⁵ Perhaps symbolizing this, Minister to China Lampson – who had referred to the conference as “mysterious”¹¹⁶ – only arrived in Nanjing on November 16.¹¹⁷ Taking care not to give the impression that they supported repayment of the Nishihara Loans, the MacDonalld government considered using a committee separate from the conference to manage China’s debts.¹¹⁸ According to Shigemitsu, the British “seem to have a fundamental objection to putting unsecured debts like the Nishihara Loans on the same level as Britain’s loans.”¹¹⁹

In addition, President Hoover was considering a \$200 million reconstruction loan to the Nationalist government, which was exhausted from the Central Plains War.¹²⁰ There was also a movement among American banks to make their own loans to China, something which greatly raised the expectations of President of the Legislative Yuan Hu Hanmin and other Chinese leaders. However, Lamont of J.P. Morgan and others opposed this on the grounds that such loans would be premature, and the plan was called off.¹²¹ At the same time, Wang and Kong Xiangxi remained opposed to the inclusion of the Nishihara Loans in any settlement of foreign debt.¹²² For these reasons, the negotiations over China’s foreign debt were slow and showed no progress. During this same time, Song sounded out the French about loans through the old loan consortium, and this was secretly communicated to Assistant Secretary of State Castle by French Ambassador to the US Claudel.¹²³

BREAKTHROUGH IN THE SINO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS

While the multinational creditors conference bore no fruit, Shidehara held firm to his basic policy of working in concert with the West, including on extraterritoriality and the moving of the legations to Nanjing. On this latter issue, he instructed Shigemitsu that:

It would be undesirable for us to invite any misunderstandings by moving ahead of the other countries on this matter in light of the future of the debt and extraterritoriality issues. For the time being, I would like you to seek the cooperation of the other involved countries.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, Shigemitsu continued to focus all of his efforts on the negotiations with China. In the hopes of securing a breakthrough, he moved the negotiations with Song in the direction of reducing the amount of the Nishihara Loans. In December 1930, he advised Shidehara that “it is necessary to show great generosity with regards to reducing the amount of the debt, interest, etc.”¹²⁵ Furthermore, Shigemitsu – without receiving full approval from Shidehara – had Legation First Secretary Horiuchi Tateki begin discussions with Ceng Zongjian over reducing the Nishihara Loans.

But Shidehara opposed Shigemitsu going beyond his instructions, and the finance ministry took the view that any reduction of the amount of the Nishihara Loans would require Diet approval. Shigemitsu responded by urging Shidehara to change the government's policy. In late December, he argued that both Britain and the United States were acting independently on the extraterritoriality issue and that "in short, foreign policy towards China has lost its old simplicity, where everything could be solved advantageously through cooperation with other countries." He advised Shidehara that, "moving forward, we should seek a more economically and financially profitable relationship with China."¹²⁶ According to Shigemitsu, the Washington System's ability to function as an international order was deteriorating and Shidehara's style of collaborating with Britain and America was an anachronism. Japan should instead move to strengthening its cooperation with China.

Shigemitsu showed a willingness to make further concessions to the Chinese afterwards. Without consulting with Shidehara, he told Song on February 4, 1931 that he was considering reducing the Nishihara Loans by more than 120 million yuan.¹²⁷ Shigemitsu's willingness to make excessive concessions largely stemmed from his personal observations of the conflicts within the Nationalist government.

According to Shigemitsu, the "topic of loans with the United States" was being pushed by an "idealist faction led by Hu Hanmin" that was "working to isolate Song Ziwen, the backer of Chiang Kai-shek's authority, and eliminate his power." This faction "always entrenches itself in theory" and "plots the radical defense and recovery of China's national rights." It was also "manipulating" Wang Chonghui and Sun Ke. He described the Japanese as "mainly relying upon the realist faction to obtain advantages and working to encourage their moderate policies. I am also striving to build goodwill with the idealist faction and to have them show us the same."¹²⁸

Which is to say, Shigemitsu intended to get closer to the "realist faction" of Chiang Kai-shek and Song Ziwen and thereby check the radical "idealist faction" and the rights recovery movement. His intention was to take the lead in offering major concessions to the "realists" and, by supporting them in establishing their leadership, establish a cooperative Sino-Japanese relationship and preserve Japan's central interests in China.

While Shidehara instructed Ambassador to Britain Matsudaira and Ambassador to the US Debuchi that Japan "hopes for the cooperation of the other powers" regarding indications at this time that the Nationalist government would be requesting new loans from the Second China Consortium, he left the negotiations over China's foreign debt to Shigemitsu.¹²⁹ As Shidehara would also serve as acting prime minister from November 1930 to March 1931 due to the shooting of Prime Minister Hamaguchi, he was under tremendous pressure. This was made worse by a gaffe he made concerning the London Naval Treaty. While he was uneasy about Shigemitsu's negotiations, he did not go so far as to step in.

The Chinese foreign debt negotiations continued, operating on the premise that the amount of the Nishihara Loans that needed to be repaid would be reduced, but Shidehara and Shigemitsu's overall policies towards China still failed to align with one another. Shigemitsu believed that Shidehara's insistence on coordination with Britain and America was allowing an opportune chance for cooperation with China to pass by, leading to dissatisfaction to build up in both China and Japan. He was particularly concerned that hardline arguments towards extraterritoriality had begun to spread within Japanese popular opinion. He warned Shidehara on March 23 that, should the Japanese government adopt an uncompromising policy, there was a danger that:

Japan and China will founder and become deadlocked over the extra-territoriality issue, and the military clique will take advantage of the situation for their machinations [...] in short, now is not the time to be throwing around fireworks in Sino-Japanese relations.¹³⁰

The fifth meeting of the Committee for the Adjustment of Domestic and Foreign Debts had been held by the Nationalist government finance ministry a few days earlier, on March 18. After Ceng Zongjian presented an investigative report on the Nishihara Loans, the committee adopted the position that, "as the matter of debts towards Japan is a complicated one, we should set it aside for the moment and discuss means of settling debts with the creditors and creditor nations of Britain, the United States, Italy, and France."¹³¹ Foreign Minister Wang then shocked Shigemitsu on March 27 by informing him that not only would extraterritoriality be abolished, but that the government would gradually carry out the return of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the removal of foreign troops from China.¹³² He also increased pressure on France to return the Guangzhouwan Leased Territory.¹³³

For Shigemitsu, the situation in China showed that Japanese diplomacy had hit a dead end. He returned to Japan in late April 1931 and discussed plans for China with not only Shidehara but also Wakatsuki Reijirō, who had returned to the position of prime minister.¹³⁴ He laid out a bold policy under which Japan would call for a partial return of the leased territories and take the lead in abolishing extraterritoriality, arguing forcefully for "making concessions in China proper to resolve the Manchurian Question and preemptively prevent further clashes between China and Japan." Shidehara and Wakatsuki believed that the extraterritoriality issue was one that should be resolved in concert with the West and that Shigemitsu's proposal was overly sympathetic towards China, however. Shidehara in particular was convinced that cooperation with Britain and the United States within the Washington System remained the best policy, and Shigemitsu's vision was fundamentally incompatible with his beliefs. Shigemitsu's plan thus found no support within the government leadership.¹³⁵

Shigemitsu thus returned to his post in early May in disappointment. The foreign debt negotiations he was overseeing were making progress, however, thanks to the detailed negotiations being carried out between Horiuchi and Ceng, and an unofficial agreement was finally reached. Under the agreement, all foreign debts would be consolidated and repaid over a lengthy period of 25 years at a low 4% interest rate. This repayment plan was not just for debts held by Japan; it would be applied to the repayment of debts held by all concerned countries. Song invited the representatives of these countries to an unofficial conference in June 1931. The representatives accepted repayment on the basis of the Sino-Japanese agreement, and it was decided to conclude a debt payment agreement with each country.¹³⁶ Song also told Shigemitsu that he had instructed Shandong provincial authorities that the loans that the China-Japan Industrial Development Co. (a Sino-Japanese joint venture) had made to China during World War I to acquire interests in Shandong should also be repaid.¹³⁷ The actions by the “realist” Song reflected not only the desires of the KMT Central Executive Committee Political Conference (which wanted a rapid resolution of the foreign debt issue) but also the opinions of Arthur Young, an American financial advisor to the government.¹³⁸

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 would bring the foreign debt negotiations to a halt, however.¹³⁹ Foreign Minister Hirota Kōki would later instruct Minister to China Ariyoshi Akira on April 7, 1934 to officially propose the resumption of the negotiations, but this did not receive a response from the Nationalist government. The Japanese pressed for a response on September 14, 1934, but the Chinese did not do so. The Japanese foreign ministry thus adopted a policy of backing negotiations by individual creditors.¹⁴⁰

THE MATURING OF SHIDEHARA DIPLOMACY AND THE SHIGEMITSU INITIATIVE

The course of the diplomatic negotiations over the Chinese foreign debt issue highlighted the policy conflicts within the Nationalist government and the policy differences between the creditor nations. While Finance Minister Song Ziwen sought to regain foreign trust and revitalize investment in China, Foreign Minister Wang Zhingteng prioritized the recovery of national rights for domestic reasons and did not hesitate to publicly reject any repayment of the Nishihara Loans. Wang’s approach to diplomacy was characterized by a strong awareness of domestic politics and popular opinion, something that would also hold true when he served as ambassador to the United States during the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War. According to Wang, “as the American government is sensitive to public opinion, I focused on securing the goodwill of the American people [...] giving many public speeches” as ambassador.¹⁴¹ While Wang described Hu Hanmin as “a far-sighted politician,” he also noted that “Chiang Kai-shek and Hu Hanmin were more at odds over domestic policy than foreign affairs.”¹⁴² His longtime rival Gu Weijun described Wang as “more of a politician than a diplomat.”¹⁴³

In the United States, there was a plan for more loans to be issued to China, backed largely by industrial bankers. A group within the Nationalist government that included Hu Hanmin, Wang Chonghui, and Sun Ke were aware of this and tried to act in concert with the effort. As shown in the negotiations over extraterritoriality, there was a rift within the State Department between Castle and Hornbeck. Shidehara was concerned about the negotiations between Chief of Division for Far Eastern Affairs Hornbeck and Ambassador to the US Wu Chaoshu because he believed that Japan, Britain, and America should cooperate in addressing extraterritoriality, and Ambassador to Japan Castle echoed this in an April 26, 1930 letter to Stimson: “acting in concert with Japan and Britain is absolutely a better policy than pursuing an independent course.”¹⁴⁴ After returning home and becoming Under Secretary of State, Castle told Japanese Ambassador Debuchi that he had privately instructed Minister to China Johnson that he was to “maintain frank cooperation with Japan and Britain on Chinese questions” and that he was “convincing” Hornbeck that the negotiations should be held in China.¹⁴⁵

That same day, Castle expressed distrust of Wu in a private letter sent to Johnson and, arguing that “the Americans, Japanese, and British should keep in close contact over their policies,” said that the extraterritoriality negotiations should be held in China.¹⁴⁶ Castle’s policy could have helped restore the functionality of the Washington System, and it is regrettable that MacMurray was no longer serving as Minister to China at this time. Even Hornbeck had a low opinion of Wu as a negotiating partner, seeing him as “rash, self-confident, and somewhat immature.”¹⁴⁷ Wang and Wu’s diplomatic skills seem to have paled in comparison to that of Gu Weijun, Shi Zhaoji, and Huang Fu.

Meanwhile, the MacDonald government was unenthusiastic about the Japanese-led negotiations over foreign debt and had its own independent plan for settling China’s debts. Shigemitsu was also wary of Minister to China Lampson’s extraterritoriality negotiations and told Shidehara that:

I received a clear feeling from my discussions with the minister that Britain had a scheme in mind to preempt Japan and the United States and show the Chinese that Britain was in a position of leadership while convincing other countries to agree to similar proposals.¹⁴⁸

Amidst this chaotic situation, Shidehara – while showing consideration for the domestic pressure he was under from the Association of Chinese Creditors, finance ministry, and Privy Council Deliberation Council – basically worked to cooperate with the West. He had previously caused problems during the discussions over China’s foreign debts at the Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff held from October 1925 to July 1926 by fixating on economic benefits and losing sight of flexible cooperation with the West. But he changed gears significantly during the foreign debt negotiations during his second term as foreign minister. Shidehara made every effort to act in concert with the West and reined in Shigemitsu’s unauthorized attempts to get

a head start with Song and advance the negotiations with China. This is because, looking at the situation from a broader perspective that included the issues of extraterritoriality and moving the foreign legations to Nanjing, Shidehara judged that maintaining cooperation with Britain and the United States was the best policy. Accordingly, the Shidehara Diplomacy of this period can be said to have overcome the rigid economism of its past and developed into a more mature policy of cooperation with Britain and America.

For his part, Shigemitsu worked to cooperate with the moderate “realist faction” of Song and Chiang and avoided the radical “idealist faction centered around Hu Hanmin” and Wang Zhengting and its interest in promoting the recovery of China’s sovereignty.¹⁴⁹ Shigemitsu’s idea was to support the Nationalist government’s nation-building economically and take the lead in offering the “realists” substantial concessions, thereby helping to establish their leadership. The core of Shigemitsu’s idea was protecting Japan’s central interests in China while establishing a cooperative Sino-Japanese relationship, both politically and economically, and preemptively preventing any conflict between the two countries. The positions Shigemitsu advocated following the negotiations over the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement and his efforts at promoting Sino-Japanese cooperation based on his own independent observations can be referred to as the “Shigemitsu Initiative” and was a healthy form of Pan-Asianism in the period immediately preceding the Manchurian Incident. According to Shigemitsu, Shidehara-style cooperation with Britain and the United States had clear limits, and the Washington System was no longer capable of adequately functioning as an international order. Instead, Japan should escape by pursuing a path of cooperation with China. Shigemitsu did not merely differ from Shidehara in his position over the negotiations over China’s foreign debts; he was also unique in his belief that the traditional place of cooperation with the West as an axis of Japanese foreign policy should change and in his efforts to make that happen.

Ironically, it was during the Sino-Japanese direct negotiations of the Manchurian Incident period that Shigemitsu and Shidehara’s positions would come closest to one another.

II. The Manchurian Incident as the “Third Wave of International Change” – The Possibilities to Restore the International Order Through Diplomacy

While negotiations over China’s foreign debts and extraterritoriality remained after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement, the new movements by China and the Soviet Union – what this book has called the second wave of international change – had largely settled down. As Jiang Zuobin, appointed Minister to Japan in September 1931, travelled to take up his new position, he wrote to the foreign ministry from Shenyang that “Deputy Commander Zhang and Chairman Zang are both in agreement that a committee should be formed to resolve the pending Sino-Japanese issues.” Efforts

were thus being made in both countries to resolve the issues between them.¹⁵⁰ But it did not take long for the next great international change to arrive, this time sparked by the Japanese. The machinations of the Japanese army in the Manchurian Incident and the Japanese government's ensuing attempt to catch up delivered a shock to East Asia that can be called the "third wave of international change."

As is widely known, the September 18, 1931 Liutiaohu Incident, the trigger for the Manchurian Incident, was a Kwantung Army plot spearheaded by Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishirō.¹⁵¹ Ishiwara triggered the incident in accordance with his belief in a "final war" between America and Japan (the idea that "a battle for supremacy between the United States, the representative of the West, and Japan, the representative of the East," was inevitable) and his "foreign first, home later" (*gaisen naigo*) theory. This was the idea that Japan should be first "driven into foreign expansionism and then boldly rebuilt in accordance with the ensuing situation."¹⁵²

According to Kōmoto Daisaku's postwar written statement, he provided confidential funds to Maj. Hanaya Tadashi of the Fengtian Secret Service at the request of Col. Shigetō Chiaki, director of the Kwantung Army's China Section. He then went to Dalian at the request of Itagaki and Ishiwara to meet with Mantetsu Director Sogō Shinji early on the morning of the incident to convince him to cooperate with the Kwantung Army in the event of an emergency. This was followed by a visit to Seoul the following day, where he urged Korean Army staff officer Col. Nakayama Shigeru to convince Korean Army Commander Lt. General Hayashi Senjūrō to send the army across the border into Manchuria.¹⁵³

Would it have been possible to peacefully restore the international order in East Asia even amidst the Japanese army's scheme to destroy the status quo? Much of the existing research on this point focuses on the diplomatic negotiations that took place at the League of Nations. But what I would like to instead focus on in this book is the fact that essentially no direct negotiations took place between China and Japan, the parties to the conflict. Given that Foreign Minister Shidehara wanted direct negotiations with China that excluded any intervention by the West and that Emperor Hirohito was also largely critical of the army,¹⁵⁴ it seems fair to say that, depending on the situation, such negotiations could have possibly restored order. Below, I would like to extract the Chinese and Japanese movements over this issue and trace the course through which this possibility was closed off.

1. The Issue of Sino-Japanese Direct Negotiations

The first proposal for direct negotiations between China and Japan came from Finance Minister Song Ziwen, who had been building a relationship of trust with Minister to China Shigemitsu. When the two men met on September 19, Song proposed "choosing three influential committee members or so and having them then investigate and deal with this matter."¹⁵⁵ While both

Shidehara and Shigemitsu expressed support for the formation of such a joint committee, Song soon withdrew the proposal as:

the Japanese army has begun deploying on a large scale, as if for war, and the invasion of Chinese territory undeniably continues even now. With the situation having changed so suddenly, it is no longer possible to consider the establishment of such a committee.¹⁵⁶

Despite Song's withdrawal of his proposal, there was no change in the basic Japanese position that the issue should be resolved through direct negotiations with China. Shidehara supported Shigemitsu's advocacy of direct Sino-Japanese negotiations that excluded any third party and rejected Representative to the League of Nations Yoshizawa Kenkichi's request of approval for the dispatch of observers after it became a topic of discussion at the League of Nations in late September.¹⁵⁷ This prevented observers from being sent immediately. The Wakatsuki government unveiled a new policy in an October 9 cabinet decision. This held that troops would be withdrawn once a general agreement had been concluded that included a ban on boycotts of Japanese goods and a Sino-Japanese railways agreement.¹⁵⁸ While the Chinese demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops as a precondition for direct negotiations, the Japanese insisted that several conditions be met through such negotiations before any such withdrawal would happen. When Under Secretary of State Castle told Ambassador to the US Debuchi that "if Japan withdrew its troops in Manchuria within the railroad zone and then asked China to stop the boycott the world would sympathize, but that to reverse the order would turn the world against Japan," Debuchi was unable to refute him.¹⁵⁹

Chinese officials were divided over direct negotiations with Japan. As Gu Weijun told British Minister to China Lampson, "there were two schools in Nanking, one of which favoured negotiations with Japan forthwith."¹⁶⁰ In other words, while the KMT leadership rejected direct negotiations with Japan, this view was not universal. The most notable of those who supported negotiations was Gu Weijun (who would become foreign minister in late November),¹⁶¹ but others included member of the Special Committee on Foreign Affairs created by the KMT Central Executive Committee Luo Wengan, Industrial Minister Kong Xiangxi,¹⁶² Minister to Japan Jiang Zuobin, Jilin Provincial Chairman Zhang Zuoxiang,¹⁶³ Guangzhou Nationalist Government Foreign Minister Chen Youren,¹⁶⁴ and Hu Hanmin.

Gu Weijun told Zhang Xueliang that he and Luo Wengan had told Lampson that "In the end, it will be hard to avoid direct negotiations. The best thing would be having third parties participate as observers, as had been done with the Shandong Question at the Washington Conference."¹⁶⁵ Minister to Japan Jiang Zuobin was also "aiming to make use of the diplomatic system to resolve things through meetings with Shidehara."¹⁶⁶ And Shanghai Special Mayor Zhang Qun told the KMT Central Executive Committee that

“negotiations between China and Japan should be simultaneously held in Nanjing and Tokyo.”¹⁶⁷

Chen Youren of the Guangzhou Nationalist Government and Hu Hanmin argued strongly for direct negotiations with Japan from a different angle. Chen’s true motive was bringing about “de facto recognition of [his] government on an at least equal basis as the one in Nanjing.”¹⁶⁸ In “Outline of Countermeasures for the Manchurian Situation,” a rough draft dated November 21, 1931, Guangdong Consul-General Suma Yakichirō proposed “giving de facto encouragement to the political factions moving to oppose, or rather to defeat, Chiang.”¹⁶⁹ During his previous late July visit to Japan, prior to the Manchurian Incident, Chen Youren had even gone so far as to propose an “offensive and defensive alliance” with Japan.¹⁷⁰

Meanwhile, as shown by a December 15, 1931 letter to the representatives of the Guangzhou Nationalist Government Peace Conference, Hu Hanmin intended to resolve the “diplomatic problems” by stopping Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship and entrusting the presidency to Wang Jingwei or Sun Ke.¹⁷¹ He believed that:

if the Nanjing government, incapable of resisting Japan, does not even consent to negotiations, they will not only be letting the invasion stand, they will be driving their own country into a corner,

but that

we can use the disunity of the Japanese military and government to push the Japanese government to negotiate with us. For us to encourage the government to suppress the military would also be in accordance with the wishes of the Minseitō government.¹⁷²

And had external pressure from China actually been applied early on via Sino-Japanese direct negotiations, it would have strengthened Foreign Minister Shidehara’s position and may have acted as a brake against those who wanted to destroy the status quo (primarily the Japanese military). But the KMT leadership adopted a policy of rejecting such negotiations. Immediately following the Liutiaohu Incident, Chiang instructed Zhang Xueliang not to open negotiations with the Japanese.¹⁷³ Foreign Minister Wang and League of Nations Representative Shi were also critical of direct negotiations, placing their hopes in the League instead.¹⁷⁴ On October 1, Examination Yuan Head Dai Jitao, Finance Minister Song, He Yaozu, and Shao Yuanchong attended a meeting of the Special Committee on Foreign Affairs, which resolved not to enter into negotiations with Japan until the Japanese army withdrew.¹⁷⁵ As shown by a December 4 letter to Chiang, Huang Fu was also of the view that “pursuing diplomacy without fighting would inevitably lead to concessions, possibly worsening the civil war as the reactionaries attempt to take advantage of finger-pointing by the public.”¹⁷⁶ The KMT and Nationalist

government had repeatedly issued public statements to stir up public opinion, making direct negotiations with Japan difficult in that sense as well.¹⁷⁷

But it should also be noted that Chiang Kai-shek did not see resolution of the Manchurian Incident as a matter of the highest priority in the first place. On November 30, he spoke to Gu Weijun and others on his position of “first pacifying the interior, then resisting the external” (*rangwai bixian annei*), arguing that “success, whether through diplomacy or arms, is doubtful, unless it is preceded by national unification.”¹⁷⁸ That it was through Chiang’s leadership that direct negotiations with Japan were rejected also demonstrates the authority of the KMT in the foreign policy making process. While the foreign ministry had previously taken the lead on foreign policy under the Beiyang government, it was now clearly under the control of the KMT.

2. *The Jinzhou Issue*

The KMT’s policy would begin to change in late November following the proposal of the establishment of a neutral zone in Jinzhou.

As seen in a September 24 telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, Zhang Xueliang had established the headquarters of the Northeast Border Defense Army and temporary offices for the Liaoning provincial government in Jinzhou following the Liutiaohu Incident.¹⁷⁹ The provincial government took great care to protect local Japanese residents, not wanting to give the Japanese any excuse to take action.¹⁸⁰

Gu Weijun received word that the Japanese army had been gathering in the southwest Shenyang area for several days in preparation for an attack on Jinzhou, and on November 24 (the day after his appointment as acting foreign minister), he sounded out the American, British, and French legations in China about a scheme under which Chinese forces would withdraw to Guanei and a neutral zone would be established in Jinzhou under American, British, and French supervision.¹⁸¹ Word of this naturally reached Shidehara as well.¹⁸² Gu’s plan for a neutral zone was intended to prevent a Sino-Japanese clash by demilitarizing the Zhang Xueliang regime’s stronghold of Jinzhou and placing it under the supervision of the powers. It could also be seen as a signal that Sino-Japanese direct negotiations could begin. Gu had high expectations of his old acquaintance Shidehara and told Minister Shigemitsu that “it is difficult for me to believe that what has happened in Manchuria over the past two months has had Baron Shidehara’s approval.”¹⁸³ As shown in a November 25 telegram to Chiang, Dai Jitao, Song, and Gu, Zhang Xueliang was also kept informed on Japanese movements over the Jinzhou issue through secret messages from Tokyo.¹⁸⁴

While the report by Special Committee on Foreign Affairs Chairman Dai Jitao (which held that “if the Japanese army invades the Jinzhou area, all we can do is to resist”) was approved at the KMT Central Executive Committee Political Meeting on December 2,¹⁸⁵ Chiang had been convinced by Zhang Gongquan’s arguments for a Chinese withdrawal from Jinzhou and expressed

the opinion that "I think it will be possible to demarcate a neutral zone if the neutral nations can provide adequate assurances that a clash will be avoided."¹⁸⁶ Gu Weijun had been officially named foreign minister on November 28 and, despite public opinion being opposed to making Jinzhou neutral, it seemed increasingly likely that direct negotiations between China and Japan would be held.¹⁸⁷

Of the Western powers, it was the MacDonald government in Britain that was most in favor of direct negotiations. After the bombing of Jinzhou on October 8, Foreign Secretary Lord Reading told Lampson to "press on the Chinese Government the desirability of their reaching an understanding with the Japanese without making the evacuation of points outside of the railway zone a preliminary condition." Lampson and Reading's successor as foreign secretary, John Simon, also basically agreed with Gu's proposal for a Jinzhou neutral zone.¹⁸⁸ During this same period, Lampson confused Gu, who was busily engaged in managing the Manchurian Incident, by telling him that he hoped that the Chinese would not force the abolition of extraterritoriality.¹⁸⁹

In the United States, Castle and Hornbeck had high expectations for direct negotiations between China and Japan.¹⁹⁰ But Secretary of State Stimson, who had been shocked by the bombing of Jinzhou, went so far as to urge President Hoover in late November to consider placing economic sanctions on Japan, arguing that "militaristic elements in Japan could learn only through suffering and not by the sanctions of public opinion."¹⁹¹ Even so, when he was approached with Gu's neutral zone proposal, he predicted that "if a neutral zone can be established, the Chinese army will withdraw."¹⁹²

In Tianjin at this time, the machinations of Fengtian Secret Service Director Colonel Doihara Kenji brought about a clash between the China Garrison Army and the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps. While the Kwantung Army took advantage of this Second Tianjin Incident to launch an invasion of Jinzhou, the Japanese army leadership immediately ordered a withdrawal from Jinzhou, creating favorable conditions for direct negotiations. Shigemitsu also continued to work hard to convince Gu to bring about the neutral zone and a Chinese withdrawal from Jinzhou.¹⁹³

Shidehara seized the opportunity, directing Beiping attaché Yano Makoto to open negotiations with Zhang Xueliang on the neutralization of Jinzhou on December 3. He intended to use the negotiations over the Jinzhou Issue to "take decisive action on the regional issues involving Xueliang" and adopted a position far removed from that of Gu, however. He not only wanted the Chinese army to withdraw west of Shanhai Pass, but for Zhang's Jinzhou regime to do the same.¹⁹⁴ He also informed Zhang Xueliang (who had absolutely no intention of withdrawing his regime) that "for China and Japan to argue over [conditions] is contrary to the whole idea of a voluntary withdrawal."¹⁹⁵ In his zeal for a Chinese withdrawal from Jinzhou, Shidehara was attempting to forcibly create a political vacuum in the city and had effectively abandoned any diplomatic negotiations with Zhang, let alone the Nationalist government.

This led to a hardening of Chinese attitudes. Song and Gu instructed Zhang in a December 5 telegram that “if the Japanese invade Jinzhou, you are to resist at all costs for the sake of both the nation’s plans and your own future.”¹⁹⁶ Chiang also telegraphed instructions that he “absolutely must not allow the Jinzhou Army to withdraw.”¹⁹⁷ And Zhang himself announced in the newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* that “the Japanese will bear full responsibility for any and all serious incidents occurring near Jinzhou.”¹⁹⁸ Industrial Minister Kong Xiangxi told Gu on December 9 that there should be no compromising with the Japanese on Northeastern issues.¹⁹⁹ Minister to Japan Jiang Zuobin reported to the Chinese foreign ministry that he had informed members of the Japanese army leadership like Lt. General Ninomiya Harushige, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff, that China had decided on a “policy of thorough protection of our rights and interests” in Jinzhou.²⁰⁰ Thus, when the Wakatsuki government fell in December and Shidehara departed the foreign ministry, even an agreement over a withdrawal from Jinzhou was unlikely, despite the early efforts by Gu.

Afterwards, the Sun Ke administration came to power in China, and Chen Youren, now foreign minister, expressed interest in direct negotiations with Japan over Manchurian issues. But the government of Inukai Tsuyoshi effectively rejected this idea. All of Manchuria had fallen into Japanese hands with the occupation of Jinzhou in January 1932, and Japan begin to shift focus to “negotiations” with its forthcoming puppet state.²⁰¹ During the Shanghai Incident, Stimson, who had issued a declaration not recognizing the Japanese occupation of Jinzhou, argued forcefully to Senator Borah that the principles of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact actually needed to be applied more actively moving forward and that:

the delays in [China’s] progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles that which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet.²⁰²

In February 1932, Supreme War Council Councilor Cao Wanshun’s “Opinions on the War Against Japan and Severing Relations” was discussed by Chairman Lin Sen, Supreme War Council Chairman Tang Shengzhi, Premier Wang Jingwei, and the foreign ministry.²⁰³

Shidehara may have been able to reverse the gears of history had he compromised in the negotiations with Gu on the establishment of a neutral zone in Jinzhou and thereby cooperated with the United States and Britain to prevent an invasion of Zhang Xueliang’s stronghold. Instead, he personally closed off this possibility.

On November 20, 1931, Zhang Jinghui, director of the Special Administrative Region of the Eastern Provinces in Harbin, responded to the Kwantung Army’s invasion of Qiqihar by declaring the independence of Heilongjiang Province. This was done in accordance with a consensus reached

between Shidehara, Wakatsuki, War Minister Minami Jirō, the Kwantung Army, and Harbin Consul Ōhashi Chūichi. Following heated debate on November 16 and 17, Shidehara and Wakatsuki – who had been critical of Minami’s call for a Japanese invasion of Qiqihar – agreed to the establishment of a puppet regime there to be followed by a withdrawal of Japanese troops.²⁰⁴ It was at this point that Shidehara compromised with the army’s plan to create puppet governments in China. The gradual shift of leadership in China policy from the Japanese government to the army is a situation that Shidehara himself was partially responsible for. And with the degeneration and collapse of Shidehara Diplomacy, the Japanese brought an end to the Washington System.

III. Conclusion: The Possibility of Order Restoration through Military Power

During the course of the Fengtian-Soviet War, Shidehara had stood sharply at odds with Stimson’s vision for the creation of an order in Manchuria that included the West. This shows that even prior to the Manchurian Incident, he had already been opposed to any involvement by third party nations in the region. However, analysis of the negotiations over managing China’s foreign debt also shows that Shidehara Diplomacy had also become increasingly mature in its policy of cooperation with Britain and the United States prior to the incident. Shidehara’s policies stood in stark contrast with those of Shigemitsu, who sought to cooperate with China.

Following the Manchurian Incident, however, Shidehara effectively renounced direct negotiations with China over Jinzhou in cooperation with Britain and America, closing the door on the possibility of restoring order through diplomatic negotiations. This deterioration of Shidehara Diplomacy has to be regarded as a Japanese declaration that the Washington System was at its effective end. While diplomatic negotiations over the Manchurian Incident would continue through the League of Nations, the limits of the collaborative diplomacy that Shidehara had previously championed had been exposed and direct negotiations between China and Japan remained deadlocked. In Japan, the Japanese army’s political position improved dramatically, and the basis for party politics was weakened. With Japan now a force working to destroy the status quo, the Soviet Union strengthened its defenses in the Far East and worked to restore diplomatic relations with China.

As such, the drastic changes brought about by the Manchurian Incident can be considered a “third wave” of international change for the interwar period, following the prior waves caused by the end of World War I and the new movements made by the Soviets and Chinese in the mid-1920s. This incident was the greatest shock of the interwar period and can be used to divide it into “early” and “late” halves.

The policy adopted by the Nationalist government in response to the Manchurian Incident is frequently criticized as one of non-resistance, carried out in the futile hope of a League of Nations ceasefire.²⁰⁵

But while it is true that the Chiang Kai-shek regime did not initially resist militarily, it held firm diplomatically to a policy of no direct negotiations with the Japanese (as demanded by the enraged Chinese public). And Chiang had plans to dispatch the well-known Gu Weijun as China's representative to the League.²⁰⁶ The issue is the structural factors that caused the Chiang regime to adopt a military policy of non-resistance even as it took a hardline diplomatically.

If we assume that the Japanese army did not enjoy an overwhelming force superiority, there is a possibility that order could have been restored militarily, depending on the policies adopted by the Northeast regime (which should have been at the forefront of resisting the Japanese) and the Nationalist government.²⁰⁷ Had the Northeastern Army engaged in all-out resistance from the very beginning, the Wakatsuki government may have hesitated to approve the expenses for dispatching troops. But there was no full-scale resistance to Japan during the period leading up to the Shanghai Incident. Why not?

The first reason that can be raised is the weakness of the KMT party organization in the Northeast. The primary engine for the rights recovery movement in the Northeast had been a non-KMT group, the National Diplomatic Association (Guomin Waijiao Xiehui). The KMT had essentially no support base within the Northeastern Army. This provides the background to Chiang's August 16, 1931 instructions to Zhang (who was in Beijing with the Army's main force) to "avoid a confrontation and not resist even should the Japanese army stir up trouble in the Northeast." Zhang telegraphed orders to that effect to the various commanders of the army that same day. As such, the policy of non-resistance implemented in the wake of the Manchurian Incident was effectively already standing policy.²⁰⁸

A second factor was the existence of the anti-Chiang faction of Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Feng Yuxian, Yan Xishan, and Li Zongren. As discussed previously, Chen Youren, foreign minister in the Guangzhou government headed by Wang, had told Guangdong Consul-General Suma Yakichirō that he was prepared to enter into direct negotiations if Japan recognized his government.²⁰⁹ Wang had sought Japanese understanding for the Guangzhou government through Chen prior to the Manchurian Incident, and he advocated for negotiations with Japan afterwards. In a draft of a speech written immediately before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Wang criticized the conventional wisdom that "weak nations are diplomatically underprivileged," noting that "after China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, Japan was forced to return it in the Triple Intervention."²¹⁰ On December 15, Chiang stepped down, the result of repeated meetings aimed at having the Guangzhou and Nationalist governments merge, and the Sun Ke administration was born with Chen Youren as foreign minister.

Third, the East Asia policies of the Soviet Union and Comintern produced an environment unfavorable to resistance to the Japanese for the Nationalist government. In stark contrast to the Chiang regime's policy towards Japan of non-resistance militarily and no compromise diplomatically, the Soviet Union

adopted a policy in the wake of the Manchurian Incident of appeasing Japan diplomatically as it urgently worked to strengthen its military defenses. After Japanese Ambassador to the USSR Hirota Kōki conveyed a Japanese government statement that “if the Soviet army were to be dispatched to the Chinese Eastern Railway [...] the Japanese government would have no choice but to take necessary defensive measures” on October 28, 1931, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Karakhan replied the following day that, from the position of “respecting the sovereignty and autonomy of other states,” the Soviet Union would “firmly adhere to its policy of non-interference.”²¹¹ While the Soviets again proposed a non-aggression pact, Japan did not respond.²¹²

The fact that diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union (which had been cut off since the Fengtian-Soviet War) were not restored until December 1932 also greatly restricted Soviet Far Eastern policy.²¹³ The adherence of the Chinese Communist Party (under the influence of the Comintern) to a far-left policy line also strengthened Chiang’s perception that “Japan is not worthy of being our enemy; the red bandits remain the immediate enemy.”²¹⁴ Therefore, while the KMT’s war against the communists paused briefly during the Manchurian Incident, it soon resumed.

The existence of Chinese collaborators must also be noted as a fourth factor.²¹⁵ Deposed emperor Puyi, who entered the Northeast through Doihara’s machinations following the First Tianjin Incident, can be given as one example. Puyi not only responded favorably to the Kwantung Army general staff’s goal of nominally making him “leader” of the Northeast, but he also “attempted to break up Ma Zhanshan’s patriotic resistance to Japan” at Itagaki’s request.²¹⁶ Director of the Special Administrative Region of the Eastern Provinces Zhang Jinghui would be another. Zhang imagined the Kwantung Army serving as “guardians” in Manchuria, “maintaining regional order.”²¹⁷ Following the Kwantung Army invasion of Qiqihar, he declared the independence of Heilongjiang Province on November 20, 1931 on the grounds that “Fengtian and Jilin had already been occupied by the Japanese army, and they would have inevitably invaded northern Manchuria as well if I had not made my position clear.”²¹⁸

To summarize the above, the environments within and surrounding China – the weakness of the KMT party organization in the Northeast region, the existence of an anti-Chiang faction, the Soviet Union’s East Asia policy, and the actions of Chinese collaborators – all pushed the Nationalist government to adopt a policy of non-resistance militarily. This is why the Chiang-Wang joint administration, formed with the appointment of Wang Jingwei as premier on January 28, 1932, settled on a policy of “first pacify the interior, then resist the external.” The possibility of restoring order in the Northeast through military action was thus lost; the military success of the Japanese army was in no small part due to the above-described trends in China and the Soviet Union.

But just because the balance of power between Japan, China, and the USSR in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, something which the Washington

System had relied upon, had collapsed did not mean that a consensus existed among the Japanese as to what the new order there should look like. Japan's de facto annexation of Manchuria came first and the direction for its new order there was only sought afterwards.

Source Acronyms

AH	Academia Historica, Taipei
AVPRF	Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Moscow
CFR	Guoli Bianyiguan, ed., <i>Zhonghua Minguo Waijiaoshi Huibian</i> [Compilation of the Diplomatic History of the Republic of China], Vol. 1–15 (Taipei: Bohaitang Wenhua Gongsì, 1996)
DBFP	E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., <i>Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939</i> , Series 1–2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1946–1947)
DVPS	Ministerstvo inostrannykh del SSSR, ed., <i>Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR</i> [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 1–14 (Moscow: Izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959–1968)
FRUS	Office of the Historian, Department of State, ed., <i>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1930–1946)
JDC	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Nenpyō Nami Shuyō Bunsho</i> [Chronology and Major Papers on Japanese Diplomacy], Vol. 1–2 (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1965)
JDR	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Bunsho</i> [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
MOFA	Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
NDL	Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo
PRO	Public Records Office, London
RD	Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Shiliao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., <i>Geming Wenxian</i> [Revolutionary Diplomacy], Vol. 1–117 (Taipei: Zhongyang Wenwu Gongyingshe, 1957–1989)

Notes

- 1 FRUS, 1930 1, 107–125. JDC 2:159–161.

- 2 The London Naval Conference undeniably had a negative legacy for Japan, leading to accusations that the government had violated “the supreme command authority of the Emperor,” Shidehara’s gaffe, and internal conflicts in the navy. For more on Japanese efforts at the conference, see: Itō Takashi, *Shōwa Shoki Seijishi Kenkyū – Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai o Meguru Shoseiji Shūdan no Taikō to Teikei* [Research on the Political History of the Early Shōwa Period: Resistance and Collaboration by Various Political Groups on the London Naval Disarmament Issue] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1969); Katō Yōko, “Rondon Kaigun Gunshuku Mondai no Ronri – Jōbi Heigaku to Shoyō Heiryokuryō no Aida” [The Logic of the London Naval Disarmament Issue: Between Standing Costs and Force Requirements], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* No. 10 (1998), 153–174; Kurono Taeru, *Teikoku Kokubō Hōshin no Kenkyū – Rikukaigun Kokubō Shisō no Tenkai to Tokuchō* [Research on Imperial National Defense Policy: The Development and Characteristics of the Army and Navy’s Thoughts on National Defense] (Tokyo: Sōwasha, 2000), 275–295.
- 3 Castle Diary (March 16, 1929), Vol. 14, William R. Castle, Jr. Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. See also: Alfred L. Castle, *Diplomatic Realism: William R. Castle, Jr., and American Foreign Policy, 1919–1953* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1998), 37–49.
- 4 Castle Diary (March 25, 1929), Vol. 14, Castle Papers.
- 5 *Tōkyō Asahi Shimbun* (May 8, 1930), 2, (May 24, 1930), 2, (May 27, 1930), 3. See also: Takahashi Katsuhiko, “‘Beikoku Hainichi Imin Hō Shūsei Mondai’ to Chūbei Taishi Debuchi Katsujī” [The “Revision of the American Anti-Japanese Immigration Law” Issue and US Ambassador Debuchi Katsujī], *Nihon Rekishi* No. 523 (1991), 59–75.
- 6 Castle Diary (May 28, 1930), Vol. 16, Castle Papers.
- 7 Matsudaira to Shidehara (March 17, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 122.
- 8 Los Angeles Consul Satō Toshihito to Shidehara (May 24, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 135–136. Ambassador to the US Debuchi Katsujī to Shidehara (June 24, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 2, Vol. 4, 157–158. *New York Times* (May 24, 1930), 6. *Tokyo Asahi Shimbun* (May 25, 1930), 2, (May 26, 1930), 2, (May 27, 1930), 2, (June 25, 1930), 3. For more on the negotiations between Debuchi, Castle, and Stimson, Debuchi’s conversation records can be found in: Hirose Yoshihiro, *Kindai Gaikō Kaikoroku* [Memoirs of Modern Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2000), 4:225–275
- 9 See also: *Manchester Guardian* (January 12, 1931), 13.
- 10 For prior research on the Fengtian-Soviet War, see: Peter S.H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, 1911–1931* (Durham: Duke University, 1959), 193–241; Shimada Toshihiko, “Tōshi Tetsudō o Meguru Chūso Funsō – Ryūjōko Jiken Chokuzen no Manshū Jōsei” [The Sino-Soviet Conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway: The Situation in Manchuria Immediately Prior to the Liutiaohu Incident] *Kokusai Seiji* No. 43 (1970), 25–50; Zakir Sharifovich Yanguzov, *Osobaya Krasnoznamenaya Dal’nevostochnaya armiya na strazhe mira i bezopasnosti SSSR, 1929–1938 gg* [The Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army, Guard of Peace and Security for the USSR, 1929–1938] (Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1970), 46–102; Wang Zhangling, “Feidang yu ‘Zhongdonglu Shijian’” [The Bandits and the “CER Incident”], *Feiqing Yuebao* 17:2 (1974), 73–80; George Alexander Lensen, *The Damned Inheritance: The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises, 1924–1935* (Tallahassee: Diplomatic Press, 1974), 30–124; Xu Qingchang, Luo Zhanyuan, “1929-Nian Zhongdonglu Shijian yu Dangde Celue Wenti” [The 1929 CER Incident and the Party’s Tactics], *Dangshi Yanjiu* No. 1 (1983), 66–74; Sun Zihe, “Zhongdonglu Shijian Jingwei” [The Course of the CER Incident], in

- Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, ed., *Kangzhan Shinian Guojia Jianshe Yantaohui Lunwenji* (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Jindaishi Yanjiusuo, 1984), 311–351; He Jun, “Lun Zhongdonglu Shijian yu Guomin Zhengfu dui Su Zhengce” [On the CER Incident and the Nationalist Government’s Policy Towards the Soviet Union], *Nanjing Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue, Yanjiusheng Zhuankan)* No. 1 (1986), 98–124; Du Lianqing, Lu Jun, “Zhang Xueliang yu Zhongdonglu Shijian” [Zhang Xueliang and the CER Incident], *Beifang Luncong* No. 2 (1987), 99–104; Mizuno Akira, *Tōhoku Gumbatsu Seiken no Kenkyū – Chō Sakurin/Chō Gakuryō no Taigai Teikō to Tainai Tōitsu no Kiseki* [Research on the Northeast Warlord Regime: Zhang Zuolin/Xueliang’s Foreign Resistance and the Trail of Domestic Unification] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1992), 239–285; Rao Lianglun, Zhang Xiulan, Duan Guangda, “Chūtō Tetsudō Jiken no Gen’in to Kekka” [The Origins and Effects of the CER Incident], trans. Furumaya Tadao, *Higashi Ajia – Rekishi to Bunka* No. 2 (1993), 1–8; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “1929-Nen no Chūso Funsō to ‘Chihō Gaikō’” [The 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict and “Regional Diplomacy”], *Tōkyō Gakugei Daigaku Kiyō Dai San Bumon Shakai Kagaku* No. 48 (1996), 173–207; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “Zhongdonglu Shijian yu Riben de Fanying” [The CER Incident and the Japanese Response], *Zhang Xueliang Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Baogaoshu* (August 8, 1999), Tai’an County, Liaoning Province; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “1929-Nen no Chūso Funsō to Nihon” [The 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict and Japan], *Chūō Daigaku Ronshū* No. 22 (2001), 17–27; Usui Katsumi, *Nicchū Gaikōshi Kenkyū – Shōwa Zenki* [Research on the History of Sino-Japanese Relations: The Early Shōwa Period] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1998), 18–44. Of recent research, the articles by Tsuchida Tetsuo are particularly notable for their analytical perspective of “regional diplomacy” and hypothesis concerning the Japanese army’s manipulation of information towards the Soviets. Portions of this section appeared earlier as Hattori Ryūji, “Higashi Ajia Kōsō no Sōkoku – Chūso Funsō to Kokusai Seiji: 1929” [The Clash of East Asian Visions: The International Politics of the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict], *Takushoku Daigaku Ronshū Seiji Keizai-Hōritsu Kenkyū* 3:1 (2000), 149–159 and Hattori Ryūji, “Zhongguo Geming Waijiao de Cuozhe – Dongzhong Zhilu Shijian yu Guoji Zhengzhi (1929-Nian)” [Setback for Chinese Revolutionary Diplomacy: The CER Incident and International Politics], ed. Mi Qingyu, trans. Lei Ming, in Mi Qingyu, Song Zhiyong, Zang Peihong, eds., *Guoji Guanxi yu Dongya Anquan* (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 2001), 294–308. Related to the latter, see: Hattori Ryūji, “Nankai Daigaku Nihon Kenkyū Sentā Shusai Kokusai Kaigi ‘Kokusai Kankei to Higashi Ajia no Anzen Hoshō’ no Kiyō” [Conference Hosted by the Japan Institute of Nankai University: “International Relations and East Asian Security”], *Takushoku Daigaku Ronshū Seiji-Keizai-Hōritsu Kenkyū* 3:2 (2000), 87–92.
- 11 Dongsheng Tebiequ Lujingchu Mishushi, ed., “Dongsheng Tebiequ Lujingchu Tongji Baogaoshu” [Statistical Report of the Road Police Department of the Eastern Province Special District] (December 1927), Dongzhi Dangan, 275, Harbin Municipal Archives.
 - 12 Yagi Motohachi to Tanaka (May 27, 1929), “Shina Seifu no So Renpō Kyōsan-shugi Senden Bōshi Kankei Jiken Zakken Zai-Harubin So Sōryōjikan Sōsaku Jiken Fu Zai-Manshūri oyobi ‘Pogeranīchinaya’ Ryōjikan Kanshi nami Sōsa no Ikken,” Vol. 1, A.2.2.0.C/R 3–3, MOFA.
 - 13 List 28–29, Delo 9, Papka 19, Opis 13, Fond 100, AVPRF.
 - 14 Emshanov to Karakhan (July 10, 1929), DVPS, 12:378.
 - 15 Nationalist Foreign Ministry to President of the Executive Yuan Tan Yankai (August 30, 1929), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.01–01, AH.
 - 16 Karakhan to Xia Weisong (July 13, 1929), DVPS, 12:380–386. Karakhan to Xia (July 17, 1929), DVPS, 12:388–390.

- 17 Xia to Karakhan (July 21, 1929), List 51–52, Delo 8, Papka 19, Opis 13, Fond 100, AVPRF.
- 18 Nationalist Foreign Ministry to Yan Xishan, Zhang Xueliang (July 19, 1929), Yan Xishan Yicun Dangan, 0372.42/5050, AH.
- 19 Chiang to Zhang (July 20, 1929), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 7, AH.
- 20 Zhang to Karakhan (July 21, 1929), List 43–46, Delo 8, Papka 19, Opis 13, Fond 100, AVPRF.
- 21 For more on the concept of warlord diplomacy, see Chapter 1 of this book. What differentiates this from Tsuchida Tetsuo’s “regional diplomacy” is that “regional diplomacy” is concerned with regions (most specifically the Northeast), while “warlord diplomacy” also includes de facto diplomatic negotiations within the central government during the Beiyang government period that did not pass through the foreign ministry. See also Chapter 1 of this book on this point.
- 22 Karakhan to Zhang Xueliang (August 1, 1929), Narodnyi komissariat inostrannykh del, ed., *Sovetsko-kitayskiy konflikt 1929 g.: Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow, 1930), 36–37.
- 23 Zhang to Karakhan (July 29, 1929), *Sovetsko-kitayskiy konflikt 1929 g.: Sbornik dokumentov*, 35.
- 24 Karakhan to Zhang (August 1, 1929), *Sovetsko-kitayskiy konflikt 1929 g.: Sbornik dokumentov*, 36–37.
- 25 Zhang Xueliang to Chiang Kai-shek (July 23, 1929), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 5, AH.
- 26 Wang Zhengting to Zhang Xueliang (July 29, 1929), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 5, AH.
- 27 KMT Publicity Department, ed., *Zhongdonglu Wenti Zhongyao Lunwen Huikan* [Journal of Important Documents on the CER Issue] (Nanjing: Zhongguo Guomintang Xuanyunbu, 1930), 29–31, 40–50. Material from the collection of the Kuomintang Party History Museum (Catalog 471/6).
- 28 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 315–320. The quoted language was told to Minister Wang.
- 29 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 346–347.
- 30 Debuchi to Shidehara (July 25, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 328–329. Stimson to French Ambassador to the US Paul Claudel (July 25, 1929), FRUS 1929 2, 242–244. Stimson to MacMurray, (July 26, 1929), FRUS, 1929 2, 247.
- 31 Castle Diary (July 26, 1929), Vol. 15, Castle Papers.
- 32 Memorandum by Hornbeck (August 14, 1929), Folder: Department of State, Memos from S.K. Hornbeck to Secretary and Undersecretary, 1928–1929, Box 146, Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
- 33 Memorandum by Hornbeck (August 16, 1929), Box 146, Hornbeck Papers.
- 34 Castle Diary (July 26, 1929), Vol. 15, Castle Papers.
- 35 Shidehara to Acting Minister to China Horiuchi Kensuke (August 7, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 341–342.
- 36 Debuchi to Shidehara (July 28, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 334–335. Horiuchi to Shidehara (August 7, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 342–344.
- 37 Yagi to Shidehara (August 13, 1929), “Tōshi Tetsudō Kankei Ikken Shina-gawa no Tōshi Tetsudō Kyōsei Shūyō ni Gen’in suru Ro, Shi Funsō Mondai (1929-Nen) Ro, Shi Ryōkoku no Gunji Kōdō,” Vol. 1, F.1.9.2.5–4-3, MOFA. *Izvestiya*, (August 20, September 10, 26, October 13, 1929).
- 38 Jiang Zuobin, *Jiang Zuobin Huiyilu* [The Memoirs of Jiang Zuobin] (Taipei: Yunji Wenxue Chubanshe, 1967), 50.
- 39 Shidehara to Okamoto (August 21, 1929), “Kikkai Tetsudō Kankei Ikken,” Vol. 6, F.1.9.2.7, MOFA.

- 40 Liaoning Provincial Government to Northeastern Political Committee (September 30, 1929), Liaoningsheng Dangangan, ed., *Fengxi Junfa Dangan Shiliao Huibian* [A Compilation of Archival and Historical Materials on the Fengtian Warlords] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1990), 9:139–140. Fengtian Consul-General Hayashi Kyūjirō to Tieling Consul Kondō Shin'ichi (October 21, 1929), Ōsaka Keizai Hōka Daigaku Kantō-shi Kenkyūkai, ed., *Manshū Jihen Zen'ya ni okeru Zai-Kantō Sōryōjikan Bunsho* [Documents of the Jiandao Consulate-General Immediately Before the Manchurian Incident] (Osaka: Ōsaka Keizai Hōka Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1999), 1:684–685.
- 41 British Chargé d'Affaires to Germany Harold George Nicolson to Arther Henderson (July 19, 1929), 186/107A, FO 228/4098, PRO. Chiang Kai-shek to He Chengjun (July 27, 1929), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 7, AH. *Izvestiya* (August 31, 1929).
- 42 Xia Weisong to Wang Zhengting (August 1, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH. Minister to Germany to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (August 6, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH.
- 43 Conversation Memo by Johnson (August 19, 1929), Vol. 49, Nelson T. Johnson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
- 44 Narodnyi komissariat inostrannykh del ed., op. cit., 54–55.
- 45 DVPS, 12:548–549.
- 46 List 14, Delo 354, Papka 93, Opis 12, Fond 08, AVPRF.
- 47 “Tōshi Tetsudō Kankei Ikken Shina-gawa no Tōshi Tetsudō Kyōsei Shūyō ni Gen'in suru Ro, Shi Funsō Mondai (1929-Nen) Teikoku no Taido,” F.1.9.2.5–6–4, MOFA.
- 48 Lars T. Lih, Oleg V. Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925–1936* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 182.
- 49 Zhang Xueliang to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (October 19, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH. Wang Zhengting to Northeastern Political Committee (November 11, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH. Zhang to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (November 11, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH.
- 50 Beijing Shifan Daxue, Shanghai Shidangangan, eds., *Jiang Zuobin Riji* [The Diary of Jiang Zuobin] (Hangzhou: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1990), 97, 103, 113–114, 116. British Acting Harbin Consul-General Lionel Henry Lamb to Lampton (October 3, 1929), 219/107A, FO 228/4099, PRO. Meeting between Shidehara and Wang (November 27, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 388–390.
- 51 Stimson to American Chargé d'Affaires to Japan Edwin L. Neville (November 26, 1929), FRUS, 1929 2, 350–352. Debuchi to Shidehara (November 26, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 382–383. Meeting between Shidehara and Wang (November 27, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 388–390.
- 52 Castle Diary (November 27, 1929), Vol. 15, Castle Papers.
- 53 US Ambassador to Britain Charles G. Dawes to Stimson (November 27, 1929), FRUS, 1929 2, 356. American Chargé d'Affaires to France Armour to Stimson (November 28, 1929), FRUS, 1929 2, 357. US Ambassador to Italy John W. Garrett to Stimson (November 28, 1929), FRUS, 1929 2, 359.
- 54 Meeting between Shidehara and Neville (November 27, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 390–391. Debuchi also told Johnson that “Japan is continuing to carefully watch the situation.” Memorandum by Johnson (November 29, 1929), Vol. 49, Johnson Papers.
- 55 Hornbeck to George Akerson (Secretary to Hoover) (December 9, 1929), Folder: COUNTRIES – China Correspondence, 1929 Oct–Dec, Box 981, Herbert Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

- 56 Statements by Litvinov (November 28, December 15, 1929), DVPS, 12:594–596, 656. Litvinov Diary (November 29, 1929), List 23–24, Delo 354, Papka 93, Opis 12, Fond 08, AVPRF.
- 57 DVPS, 12:601–602, 673–676. CFR 6:2514–2517.
- 58 Shidehara Kijūrō, “Washington Kaigi no Rimenkan Sono Hoka” [An Inside View of the Washington Conference, etc.] (February 1939), Shidehara Heiwa Bunko, Vol. 11, NDL.
- 59 Henderson to Lampson (August 29, 1929), 175/107A, FO 228/4098, PRO.
- 60 Lampson Diary (November 8, 1929), Vol. 2, Miles Lampson Papers, Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. For more on Lampson and the extraterritoriality issue at the time, see: Li Shide, *Yingguo yu Zhongguo de Wajiai Guanxi (1929–1937)* [Britain and Chinese Foreign Relations (1929–1937)] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1999), 81–142.
- 61 Intelligence on the Sino-Soviet conflict steadily reached the General Staff Office from Fengtian, Harbin, and Moscow. Fengtian Secret Service Director Maj. General Suzuki Yoshiyuki to Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. General Okamoto Ren’ichirō (September 19, 1929), “Tōshi Tetsudō Kankei Ikken Shina-gawa no Tōshi Tetsudō Kyōsei Shūyō ni Gen’in suru Ro, Shi Funsō Mondai (1929–Nen) Ro, Shi Ryōkoku no Gunji Kōdō,” Vol. 2; Military Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow Col. Komatsubara Michitarō (October 14, 1929), *Ibid.*; Harbin Secret Service Director Lt. Colonel Sawada Shigeru to Okada (October 16, 1929), *Ibid.* Numerous articles on military movements also appeared in the *Kaikōsha Kiji* during this period. See No. 663 (1929), 181–187; No. 664 (1930), 184–197; No. 666 (1930), 249–258; No. 668 (1930), 179–195.
- 62 Nationalist Foreign Ministry to Wu Chaoshu (November 29, 1929), Waijiaobu Dangan, 0624.20/5050.02–01, AH.
- 63 Statements by Stimson (December 2, 4, 1929), Vol. 11, Reel 2, Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, Yale University Library.
- 64 Stimson to MacMurray (October 29, 1929), Box 39, John Van Antwerp MacMurray Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
- 65 Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Zhengzhahui Yimishuchu, “Zhengzhi Huiyi Gongzuo Baogao” [Report on the Work of the Political Committee] (March 1, 1930), Zhongguo Guomindang Dangan, 00.1/8, Kuomintang Party History Museum, 41–42.
- 66 Akira Iriye, *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990), 271–277. Koike Seiichi has proven through analysis of the various issues during the course of the implementation of the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement that compromise with China through diplomatic negotiations was possible, correcting the view of prior research which saw this period as a prelude to the Manchurian Incident. See: Koike Seiichi, “‘Kōshō’ to ‘Chikuseki’ – Nicchū Kanzei Kyōtei Jikkō Katei ni okeru Nihon-gawa Taiō” [“Negotiations” and “Accumulation”: The Japanese Responses over the Course of the Implementation of the Sino-Japanese Customs Agreement], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* No. 17 (1995), 171–193.
- 67 For a representative example of this, see: Seki Hiroharu, “Manshū Jihen Zenshi (1927–Nen – 1931–Nen)” [History Preceding the Manchurian Incident (1927–1931)], *Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Sensō Gen’in Kenkyūbu*, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-sha, 1963), 1:327–440.
- 68 Usui Katsumi, *Chūgoku o Meguru Kindai Nihon no Gaikō* [Modern Japanese Diplomacy Over China] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1983), 128–129.
- 69 Sakai Tetsuya, “‘Eibei Kyōchō’ to ‘Nicchū Teikei’” [“Anglo-American Collaboration” and “Sino-Japanese Partnership”], *Nenpō Kindai Nihon Kenkyū* No. 11 (1989), 61–92. Koike Seiichi, “‘Kokka’ toshite no Chūgoku, ‘Ba’ toshite no Chūgoku – Manshū Jihen mae, Gaikōkan no Taichūgoku Ninshiki” [China as

- “State,” China as “Place”: Diplomats’ Perception of China Prior to the Manchurian Incident], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 108 (1995), 148–160.
- 70 Qingdao Consul-General Fujita to Shidehara (July 19, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 918.
- 71 Meeting between Shidehara and Zhang Ji (September 5, 1929), “Teikoku no Taishi Gaikō Seisaku Kankei Ikken,” Vol. 1, A.1.1.0.10, MOFA.
- 72 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 824–832. These are believed to have been written in about September 1929.
- 73 For one example of Chiang Kai-shek’s welcoming of Saburi’s appointment to China, see: Chiang to Shanghai Special Mayor Zhang Qun (October 2, 1929), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 10, AH.
- 74 Shidehara to Shanghai Consul-General Shigemitsu, Nanjing Consul Uemura (December 7, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 987–988.
- 75 To see a portion of contemporary Chinese popular opinion, see the editorial “Xiaoban Laihua” [Obata Comes to China] in *Central Daily News* (Nanjing edition) (December 14, 1929).
- 76 Uemura to Shidehara (December 14, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 990–993.
- 77 Uemura to Shidehara (December 18, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 996.
- 78 For more on the negotiations over tariff autonomy, see: Kubo Tōru, *Senkanki Chūgoku ‘Jiritsu e no Mosaku’ – Kanzei Tsūka Seisaku to Keizai Hatten* [Inter-war China’s “Search for Independence”: Customs and Financial Policy and Economic Development] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1999), 51–71.
- 79 KMT Central Executive Committee Secretariat to Nationalist Government (January 10, 1930), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0820.10/7728.01–01, AH.
- 80 Shidehara to Shigemitsu (January 24, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 362–363.
- 81 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (January 25, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 366–367.
- 82 Shidehara to Uemura (February 1, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 390–392.
- 83 Shidehara to Shigemitsu (February 22, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 410–413.
- 84 JDC 2:161–168. The provisional signing was on March 11, but the official signing was on May 6.
- 85 President of the Legislative Yuan Hu Hanmin to the Nationalist Government (May 13, 1930), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0641.50/5060.01–01, AH.
- 86 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (March 19, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 427–429.
- 87 For research on the negotiations over China’s foreign debt, see: Hikita Yasuyuki, “1930 Nendai Zenhan no Nihon no Taichū Keizai Seisaku no Issokumen – Saiken Seiri Mondai o Chūshin ni” [An Aspect of Early 1930s Japanese Economic Policy towards China: The Settlement of China’s Debt Issue], in Nozawa Yutaka, ed., *Chūgoku no Heisei Kaikaku to Kokusai Kankei* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1981), 335–365; Edmund S.K. Fung, *The Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat: Britain’s South China Policy, 1924–1931* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 184–189; Xu Rui, “Luelun Kangzhan Qian Nanjing Guomin Zhengfu de Waizhai Wenti” [Summary of the Pre-War of Resistance Nanjing Nationalist Government’s Foreign Debt Issue], *Guomin Dangan* No. 33 (1993), 80–88; Koike Seiichi, “Keizai Teikei no Satetsu – Manshū Jihen Mae no Saimu Seiri Mondai o Megutte” [A Failure of Economic Cooperation: The Debt Settlement Issue Prior to the Manchurian Incident], *Shigaku Kenkyū* No. 216 (1997), 20–39. On the extraterritoriality issue, see: Soejima Shōichi, “Chūgoku ni okeru Chigai Hōken Teppai Mondai” [The Extraterritoriality Issue in China],

- Wakayama Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu Kiyō No. 29 (1960), 31–40; Soejima Shōichi, “‘Manshūkoku’ Tōchi to Chigai Hōken Teppai” [The Administration of “Manchukuo” and the Revocation of Extraterritoriality], in Yamamoto Yūzō, ed., “*Manshūkoku no Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Rokuin Shobō, 1995), 131–155; Koike Seiichi, “‘Chigai Hōken no Teppai’ to ‘Chian Iji’ – Manshū Jihen Zengo no ‘Renzokusei’ ni Kan suru Ikkōsatsu” [The “Revocation of Extraterritoriality” and “Maintaining Order”: Considerations on “Continuity” Before and After the Manchurian Incident], *Hiroshima Heiwa Kagaku* No. 18 (1995), 87–111. An earlier version of this section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Chūgoku Gaisai Seiri Kōshō ni okeru Shidehara Gaikō to Shigemitsu Rinji Chūka Dairi Kōshi – Washinton Taisei-ka no Futatsu no Taigai Rosen to Manshū Jihen: 1929–1931” [Shidehara Diplomacy and Acting Minister to China Shigemitsu During the Negotiations over the Settlement of Chinese Foreign Debt: Two Foreign Policies under the Washington System and the Manchurian Incident: 1929–1931], *Kokusai Seiji* No. 113 (1996), 167–180.
- 88 For the details of Japan’s loans to China, see: Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau, “Taishi Shakkan Ichiranhyō Shōwa Gannen 12-Gatsu 31-Nichi Genzai” [List of Loans to China as of December 31, 1926], Gaimushō Chōshorui, Ajia-kyoku, 13, MOFA.
- 89 Caizheng Kexue Yanjiusuo, Second Historical Archives of China, eds., *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao* [Historical Materials on Foreign Debt from the Republic of China’s Archives] (Nanjing: Dangan Chubanshe, 1991), 2:33.
- 90 Acting Minister to China Hori Yoshitaka to Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting (January 30, 1929), JDC 2:124–125.
- 91 Ikei Masaru, Hatano Masaru, Kurosawa Fumitaka, eds., *Hamaguchi Osachi Nikki-Zuikanroku* [Notes and Diary of Hamaguchi Osachi] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1991). Kawada Minoru, ed., *Hamaguchi Osachi-shū – Ronjutsu-Kōen-hen* [Works of Hamaguchi Osachi: Essays and Lectures] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 2000).
- 92 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (January 21, 1930), “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 1, E.1.6.0.J5, MOFA.
- 93 January 24, 1930 Cabinet Decision, JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 357–358. March 11, 1930 Cabinet Decision, JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 423–424. Shidehara to Legations in China (March 13, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 425–426. When the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement was officially signed on May 6, 1930, Attached Document 4, “Saimu Seiri ni Kan suru Kōkan Kōbun” [Notes Exchanged on the Settlement of Debt], included the holding of a creditors’ conference. See: JDC 2:165–166.
- 94 The committee met seven times through February 1937. See: *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao*, 2:35–41.
- 95 Nanjing Consul Uemura to Shidehara (October 4, 1929), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 834–835.
- 96 For an example of Chinese newspaper reporting on Foreign Minister Wang Zhengting’s refusal to repay the Nishihara Loans, see: *Minguo Ribao* (Shanghai edition) (May 26, 1930). RD 8:126.
- 97 “Tanaka Giichi Bunsho,” Vol. 37, NDL.
- 98 “Shina no Taigai Seisaku Kankei Zassan” [Miscellaneous Articles Related to China’s Foreign Policy: On “Revolutionary Diplomacy”], Shigemitsu Mamoru Chūshi Kōshi Hōkokusho, Matsumoto Kiroku, A.2.1.0.C1–1, MOFA, Vol. 2. Shigemitsu’s report is reproduced in Hattori Ryūji, ed., *Manshū Jihen to Shigemitsu Mamoru Chūka Kōshi Hōkokusho – Gaimushō Kiroku “Shina no Taigai Seisaku Kankei Zassan ‘Kakumei Gaikō’ ni Yosete”* [The Manchurian Incident and Minister to China Shigemitsu Mamoru’s Reports: The Foreign Ministry

- Document “Miscellaneous Articles Related to China’s Foreign Policy: On ‘Revolutionary Diplomacy’” (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Sentā, 2002).
- 100 *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao*, 2:154–157.
- 101 Nationalist Government Civil Service Director Gu Yingfen to the Foreign Ministry (December 29, 1928), *Waijiaobu Dangan*, 0883.30/3460.01–01, AH.
- 102 As an example, see: National Chamber of Commerce to the Nationalist Government (December 10, 1929), *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao*, 2:83.
- 103 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 503–504.
- 104 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (April 17, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 505–506.
- 105 Association of Chinese Creditors to Shidehara (February 13, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 497–498. Vice-Minister of Finance Kawada Isao to Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshida Shigeru (March 4, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 500–501. In an April 16, 1930 telegram to Asian Affairs Bureau Director Arita, Shigemitsu wrote, “there was a question from Advisor Arai at the Privy Council’s Deliberative Committee on the Sino-Japanese Tariff Agreement on April 12 concerning the arrangements for the Nishihara Loans. Minister Shidehara responded with the attached statement, which I am sending for your reference.” According to that “attachment,” Shidehara answered that, based on the January 18, 1929 exchanged documents and the Sino-Japanese tariff agreement, “I am prepared to make every possible effort to see that all of the debt owed to us by China is settled.” “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 1. The records for this committee were confiscated and are not held by the National Archives.
- 106 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (June 5, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 515–516.
- 107 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 521–524, 526–528.
- 108 JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 541.
- 109 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (September 21, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 539–541.
- 110 Shidehara to Shigemitsu (September 30, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 3, 544–545.
- 111 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (October 7, 1930), “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 2.
- 112 Lampson to FO (October 28, 1930), F 5782/596/10, FO 371/14723, PRO.
- 113 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (November 15, 1930), “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 3. Lampson to FO (November 16, 1930), F 6563/596/10, FO 371/14723, PRO.
- 114 Shidehara to Matsudaira (November 29, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 574–575.
- 115 FO to Lampson (October 29, 1930), F 5782/596/10, FO 371/14723, PRO.
- 116 Lampson Diary (November 10, 1930), Vol. 3, Lampson Papers.
- 117 Lampson to Henderson (December 16, 1930), F 477/477/10, FO 371/15486, PRO.
- 118 Arthur Henderson to T.M. Snow (December 19, 1930), DBFP, Second Series, 8:449–450.
- 119 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (December 6, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 576.
- 120 Castle Diary (August 15, 1930), Vol. 17, Castle Papers.
- 121 Horiuchi to Shidehara (January 13, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 654.
- 122 Castle Diary (February 21, 1931), Vol. 18, Castle Papers.
- 122 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (November 14, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 562.
- 123 Castle Diary (January 8, 1931), Vol. 18, Castle Papers.

- 124 Shidehara to Shigemitsu (November 18, 1930), “Zaishi Teikoku Kōkan Kankei Zakken Iten Kankei Zai-Pekin Kōshikan Kankei (Watanabe ni Yori Kakkoku Kōshikan no Nansen Mondai o Fukumu),” Vol. 1, M.1.3.0.2–2-1, MOFA.
- 125 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (December 15, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 580–581.
- 126 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (December 30, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 594–598.
- 127 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (February 5, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 673–674.
- 128 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (February 8, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 676–678.
- 129 Shidehara to Matsudaira, Debuchi (February 4, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 668–670. See also: Memorandum by John Pratt (March 25, 1931), F 1740/89/10, FO 371/15476, PRO.
- 130 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (March 23, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 407–409.
- 131 *Minguo Waizhai Dangan Shiliao*, 2:38.
- 132 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (March 28, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 413–416; Shigemitsu Shuki “Nihon” [Shigemitsu’s Memo “Japan”], Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, 1B.54.14, NDL, 37. Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaikō Kaisōroku* (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1953), 86–87.
- 133 Meeting between Wang Zhengting and French Minister Wilden (November 19, 1930), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0645.20/2760.4, AH. Wang to Wilden (July 11, 1931), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0645.20/2760.4, AH.
- 134 According to the diary of Hayashide Kenjirō, then-Second Secretary at the Japanese Legation, Shigemitsu left Shanghai on April 21, 1931. He also wrote on May 6th that Shigemitsu had met with Wang Zhengting and Lampson that same day. We can thus deduce that Shigemitsu’s return to Japan occurred between these dates. “Hayashide Kenjirō Bunsho,” 148, NDL.
- 135 Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Shōwa no Dōran* [The Shōwa Uprising] (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1952), 1:50–51. Shigemitsu Shuki “Nihon,” 39 says the same. Shigemitsu argued for a partial return of the leased territory in a November 13, 1930 telegram to Shidehara. See: JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 1002.
- 136 Horiuchi Tateki, *Chūgoku no Arashi no Naka de* [From Within the Chinese Storm] (Tokyo: Kangensha, 1950), 69–70. However, historical materials in Japanese foreign ministry records and the “Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho” do not adequately show this.
- 137 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (September 18, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 717–718. Those funds were borne by the Bank of Chosen, the Bank of Taiwan, and the Industrial Bank of Japan, among others.
- 138 Memorandum by Young for T.V. Soong (December 12, 1930), Folder: Debts, Basic Date, Japan, Box 18, Arthur Nichols Young Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. KMT Central Executive Committee Political Meeting to Nationalist Government (April 2, 1931), Guomin Zhengfu Dangan, 0882/2325.01–01, AH.
- 139 Foreign Ministry Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section, “Taishi Saimu Seiri Mondai” [The Chinese Debt Settlement Issue], “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 4.
- 140 For more on this process, see: “Fukakujitsu oyobi Mutanpo Saiken Seiri Hō Kōshō Kankei Zakken,” Vol. 5.
- 141 Julie Lien-ying How’s interview with C.T. Wang (November 29, 1960), Folder: Wang, Cheng-t’ing, Box 7, Academia Sinica Miscellaneous Related Manuscripts, Chinese Oral History Collections, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

- 142 Julie Lien-ying How's interview with C.T. Wang (November 25, 1960), Folder: Wang, Cheng-t'ing, Box 7, Academia Sinica Miscellaneous Related Manuscripts.
- 143 Madeleine Chi's interview with Wellington Koo (March 20, 1973), Folder: Interviews and Correspondence with Wellington Koo Concerning the First Decades of his Diplomatic Career: 1912–1932 (Vols. 2 and 3), Box 3, Wellington Koo Loose Material, Chinese Oral History Collection, Rare and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
- 144 Castle to Stimson (April 26, 1930), Vol. 13, Johnson Papers.
- 145 Debuchi to Shidehara (October 13, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 939–940.
- 146 Castle to Johnson (October 13, 1930), Folder 18, Box 2, William R. Castle, Jr. Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.
- 147 Autobiography by Hornbeck (Undated), Folder: Autobiography: 1910–1930, Box 496, Hornbeck Papers.
- 148 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (October 2, 1930), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 4, 938–939.
- 149 In his memo “Sainan Jiken Kaiketsu” [The Resolution of the Jinan Incident], Shigemitsu wrote that Hu Hanmin was the “center of the anti-Japanese movement” and that Wang Zhenting's position was unstable because he came from the former Feng Yuxiang faction. See: *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 42:10 (1988), 45–46.
- 150 Jiang Zuobin to Foreign Ministry (September 17, 1931), “Zuzhi Jiejue Zhongri Xuanan Weiyuanhui,” Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyangsi, File No. 012, Original File No. 373/57, Republic of China Foreign Ministry Archives. See also: Hattori Ryūji, “Chūka Minkoku Gaikōbu Tōanko no Shozō Kōkai Jōkyō – Tainichi Kankei o Chūshin to shite” [The State of the Opening of the Archives of the Republic of China Foreign Ministry: Focusing on Relations with Japan], *Tōhoku Aija Chūikishi Kenkyūkai Nyūzu Retā* No. 12 (2000), 46–73.
- 151 For Chinese testimony on the Liutiaohu Incident, see: Han Yongtai, “Bu Wang 9/18 Dadao Fuhou de Riben Junguo Zhuayi” [Don't Forget September 18th, Overthrow the Resurgent Japanese Militarism], *Shenyang Ribao* (September 18, 1971). For notable research on the Manchurian Incident, see: Shimada Toshihiko, “Manshū Jihen no Tenkai (1931–1932-Nen)” [The Development of the Manchurian Incident (1931–1932)], *Nihon kokusai Seiji Gakkai Taiheiyō Sensō Gen'in Kenkyūbu*, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* [The Road to the Pacific War] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1962), 2:1–188; Saitō Takashi, “Bei-Ei-Kokusai Renmei no Dōkō (1931–1933-Nen)” [The Movements of the US, Britain, and the League of Nations (1931–1933)], *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi*, 2:341–386; Liang Jingchun, *Jiuyiba Shibian Shishu* [History of the September 18th Incident] (Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 1964); Ogata Sadako, *Manshū Jihen to Seisaku no Kettei Katei* [The Manchurian Incident and The Policymaking Process] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1966); Christopher Thorne, *The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933* (London: Red Globe Press, 1972); Usui Katsumi, *Manshū Jihen – Sensō to Gaikō to* [The Manchurian Incident: War and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1974); Mark R. Peattie, *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 87–139; Yi Xianshi, et. al., *9/18 Shibianshi* [History of the 9/18 Incident] (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1982); Jin Xintun, *Manshū Jihen-ki no Chūnichū Gaikōshi Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōhō Shoten, 1986), 123–166; Ian Nish, *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931–1933* (London: Kegan Paul, 1993); Jiang Yongjing, *Kangzhan Shilun* [History of the War of Resistance Against Japan] (Taipei: Dongda Tushu Gongsi, 1995), 79–151. For prior research on the later-discussed Jinzhou Issue, see: Guo Fengming, “Jiuyiba Shibian Hou Jinzhou Diqu Zhonglihua Jiaoshe” [Negotiations over the Neutrality of Jinzhou After the September 18th Incident], *Guoshiguan Guan Kan* No. 1 (1987), 71–86; Kobayashi

- Motohiro, “Tenshin Jiken Saikō – Tenshin Sōryōjikan-Shina Chūton Gun-Nihonjin Kyoryūmin” [Reconsidering the Tianjin Incident: The Tianjin Consulate-General, the China Garrison Army, and Resident Japanese], *Nihon Shokuminchi Kenkyū* No. 8 (1996), 1–17; Qiu Shi, “Ribei Waiwusheng yu Rijun Qinzhan Jinzhou de Waijiao Huodong” [The Japanese Foreign Ministry and its Diplomatic Activities Concerning the Japanese Army Occupation of Jinzhou], *Dongbei Lunxianshi Yanjiu* No. 1 (1997), 17–21; Usui Katsumi, *Nicchū Gaikōshi Kenkyū*, 45–62; Lu Xijun, *Chūgoku Kokumin Seifu no Tainichi Seisaku 1931–1933* [The Chinese Nationalist Government’s Policy Towards Japan, 1931–1933] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2001), 31–66. An earlier version of this and the following section appeared as Hattori Ryūji, “Manshū Jihen ni Okeru Chitsujō Kaifuku no Kanōsei” [The Possibility of Restoring Order During the Manchurian Incident], *Seiji Keizai Shigaku* No. 410 (2000), 17–34.
- 152 Ishiwara Kanji, “Manmo Mondai Shiken” [Private Views on Manchurian/Inner Mongolian Issues] (May 22, 1931), Tsunota Jun, ed., *Ishiwara Kanji Shiryō Kokubō Ronsaku-hen* [Ishiwara Kanji Materials: Essays on National Defense] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1994), 76–79.
- 153 Kōmoto Daisaku Kyōjutsusho (April 1950), Zhongyang Danganguan, Second Historical Archives of China, Jilin Sheng Shehui Kexueyuan, eds., *Riben Diguo Zhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian 9/18 Shibian* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988), 98–100. However, according to Hayashi Senjūrō, “Manshū Jiken Nisshi” [Manchurian Incident Journal], Hayashi was making preparations in Yuejing from the beginning of the incident. See: Takahashi Masae, *Hayashi Senjūrō Manshū Jiken Nisshi* [Hayashi Senjūrō’s Manchurian Incident Journal] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1996), 7–8.
- 154 Hatano Sumio, Kurosawa Fumitaka, eds., *Jijū Bukan Nara Takeji Nikki/Kaikoroku* [The Diary and Memoirs of Aide-de-Camp Nara Takeji] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2000), 3:366.
- 155 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (September 19, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 288.
- 156 Sao-ke Alfred Sze (Geneva) to James Eric Drummond (Secretary General, the League of Nations), September 22, 1931, Folder: Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Box 33, Schedule A, T.V. Soong Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Li Yunhan, ed., *Guomin Zhengfu Chuli Jiuyiba Shibian zhi Zhongyao Wenxian* [Important Documents on the Nationalist Government’s Handling of the September 18th Incident] (Taipei: Jindai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1992), 178, says the same.
- 157 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (September 24, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 316–317. Yoshizawa to Shidehara (September 24, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 3, 172–173. Shidehara to Yoshizawa (September 25, 1931), *Ibid.*, 184–185.
- 158 JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 334–336.
- 159 Castle Diary (October 8, 1931), Vol. 19, Castle Papers.
- 160 Lampson Diary (October 10, 1931), Vol. 4, Lampson Papers.
- 161 Wang Zhengtime was attacked by a mob in Nanjing on September 28, 1931 and severely injured. He resigned as foreign minister on September 30. As League of Nations Representative Shi Zhaoji was unable to serve as his successor despite being appointed, Foreign Ministry Deputy Chief of Political Affairs Li Jinlun served in his stead. Gu Weijun became acting foreign minister on November 23 and was officially appointed to the position on November 28.
- 162 Shigemitsu to Shidehara (October 13, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 342.
- 163 *Jiang Zuobin Riji*, 363.
- 164 Nationalist foreign minister from December 30, 1931.
- 165 Gu Weijun to Zhang Xueliang (October 15, 1931), Guoming Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan, 18.2922, Second Historical Archives of China. See also: Wellington

- Koo, "The Wellington Koo Memoir," Chinese Oral History Project of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1976, Vol. 3: chapter J.
- 166 Jiang Zuobin *Huiyilu*, 53. See also: Jiang Zuobin *Riji*, 359–360, 361–362, 367, 369.
- 167 *Guomin Zhengfu Chuli Jiuyiba Shibian zhi Zhongyao Wenxian*, 35.
- 168 Acting Guangdong Consul-General Suma Yakichirō to Shidehara (November 18, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 399–401.
- 169 Suma Michiaki, ed., *Suma Yakichirō Gaikō Hiroku* [Confidential Diplomatic Records of Suma Yakichirō] (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 1988), 147.
- 170 Stenographic Record of Statement by Asian Affairs Bureau Director Tani, "Shidehara Daijin Chin Yūjin Kaidanroku (Dai Nikai)" [Record of Meeting Between Minister Shidehara and Chen Youren (2nd Meeting)], (July 31, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 1004–1006. See also: Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaikō Kaisōroku*, 91; Shidehara Kijūrō, *Gaikō Gojū Nen* [50 Years of Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūkō Bunko, 1987), 151–156; Suma Michiaki 219–236. Relevant documents are also scattered throughout "Shidehara Heiwa Bunko," Vol. 43.
- 171 Vol. 22, Hu Hanmin Papers, Yenching Institute Library, Harvard University.
- 172 Hu Hanmin, *Nanjing de Duiri Waijiao* [Nanjing's Diplomacy Towards Japan] (Guangzhou: Zhongxing Xuehui, 1935), 76, 80–81.
- 173 Zhang Youkun, Qian Jin, *Zhang Xueliang Nianpu* [Chronicle of Zhang Xueliang] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 1996), 578. Chiang to Zhang (October 6), Qin Xiaoyi, ed., *Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliao Chubian Duiri Kangzhan Shiqi* [Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China: The War of Resistance Against Japan] (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, 1981), 1:291.
- 174 Wang Zhengting to Zhang Xueliang (September 23, 1931), Waijiaobu Dangan, Mulu Tongyi Bianhao 172–1, Anjuan Bianhao 1066–1, AH.
- 175 *Guomin Zhengfu Chuli Jiuyiba Shibian zhi Zhongyao Wenxian*, 10.
- 176 Shen Yunlong, ed., *Huang Yingbai Xiansheng Nianpu Changbian* [Chronicle of Huang Yingbai] (Taipei: Lianjing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1976), 458–460.
- 177 Zhonghua Minguo Waijiao Wenti Yanjiuhui, ed., *Jiuyiba Shibian* [The September 18th Incident] (Taipei: Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, 1995), 40–47.
- 178 Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue Zhonghua Xueshuyuan Xianzongtong Sou Gong Quanji Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, ed., *Xianzongtong Sou Gong Quanji* [Complete Works of Former President Chiang] (Taipei: Zhongguo Wenhua Daxue Chubanshu, 1984), 1:625–626.
- 179 Zhang Xueliang to Chiang Kai-shek (September 24, 1931), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi Vol. 12, AH.
- 180 Liaoning Provincial Government to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (November 13, 1931), Waijiaobu Dangan, Tongyi Bianhao 172–1, Anjuan Bianhao 1057–1, AH.
- 181 Chinese Legation in Japan to Shidehara (November 26, 1931), Tongyi Bianhao 172–1, Anjuan Bianhao 1065, AH.
- 182 Johnson to Stimson (November 24, 1931), FRUS, 1931 3, 558. Lampson to Foreign Secretary John Simon (November 25, 1931), DBFP, Second series, 8:954–955. Shidehara to Shigemitsu (November 25, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 190–191. Shidehara to Sawada (November 26, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 434–435. Shigemitsu to Shidehara (November 30, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 445–448. Beijing Intelligence Office to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (November 28, 1931), RD No. 34, 1115–1117.
- 183 Memorandum by Koo of a Conversation with Shigemitsu (November 30, 1931), Folder 1: Notes of Conversation, 1931, Box 4, Wellington Koo Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.
- 184 Zhang to Chiang, Dai, Song, Gu (November 25, 1931), Guomin Zhengfu Waijiaobu Dangan, 18.2923, Second Historical Archives of China.

- 185 Box 40, Schedule A, Soong Papers. Nishimura Shigeo, *Chō Gakuryō – Nicchū no Haken to “Manshū”* [Zhang Xueliang: Sino-Japanese Hegemony and “Manchuria”] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 85, already introduced this document.
- 186 *Guomin Zhengfu Chuli Jiuyiba Shibian zhi Zhongyao Wenxian*, 201–202. See also: Shigemitsu to Shidehara (November 26, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 191–192.
- 187 Jiangsu National Disaster Relief Association to KMT, Nationalist Government, Foreign Ministry, Hu Hanmin (December 3, 1931), Guoshiguan Shiliaochu, ed., *Dongbei Yiyongjun* [The Northeast Volunteer Army] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1981), 61–62.
- 188 Reading to Lampson (October 9, 1931), DBFP, Second Series, 8:733; Simon to Lampson (November 27, 1931), DBFP, Second Series, 8:966; Lampson Diary (November 24, 1931), Vol. 4, Lampson Papers. However, there are few references to the Manchurian Incident in contemporary letters from Reading to Simon and MacDonald (Mss Eur F 118/101, F 118/116B, Lord Reading Papers, Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library). While there are scattered signs that Simon was unable to understand Japan’s intentions in his November 1931 diary entries, it was only with the Shanghai Incident that he showed a strong interest in East Asia. See: Simon Diary (November 1931), Box 6, John Allsebrook Simon Papers, Modern Papers and John Johnson Reading Room, New Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; Simon to MacDonald (January 29, 1932), Box 70, Simon Papers.
- 189 Memorandum by Koo of a Conversation with Lampson (November 25, 1931), Folder 1: Notes of Conversation, 1931, Box 4, Koo Papers.
- 190 Castle Diary (October 14, 1931), Vol. 19, Castle Papers; Stanley Hornbeck, “Manchuria Situation,” (December 3, 1931), in Justus D. Doenecke ed., *The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 88–91.
- 191 Stimson to Johnson (October 11, 1931), FRUS, 1931 3, 157. Stimson Diary (November 27, 1931), Microfilm Edition, Yale University. Hoover rejected the suggestions of Stimson, who feared the situation could develop into war.
- 192 Castle Diary (December 10, 1931), Vol. 19, Castle Papers.
- 193 Memorandum by Koo of a Conversation with Shigemitsu (December 3, 1931), Folder 1: Notes of Conversation, 1931, Box 4, Koo Papers.
- 194 Shidehara to Yano (December 3, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 205–206.
- 195 Shidehara to Yano (December 9, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 223–224.
- 196 *Guomin Zhengfu Chuli Jiuyiba Shibian zhi Zhongyao Wenxian*, 315.
- 197 Chiang to Zhang (December 8, 1931), *Zhonghua Minguo Zhongyao Shiliaochubian Dui Kangzhan Shiqi*, 1:312.
- 198 *Ta Kung Pao* (December 14, 1931), Bi Wanwen, ed., *Zhang Xueliang Wenji* (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 1992), 1:555.
- 199 H.H. Kung to Koo (December 9, 1931), “Gefang Jianyi Guanyu Zhongri Wenti Jiejue zhi Yijian,” Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyang Si, Danghao 012/1, Yuanbian Danghao 373/77, Archives of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 200 Chiang to Nationalist Foreign Ministry (December 7, 1931), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 12, AH.
- 201 Inukai Tsuyoshi to Suma (December 24, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 479–480.
- 202 Stimson to Borah (February 23, 1932), Folder: Nine Power Treaty, Box 278, William Edgar Borah Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

- 203 Executive Yuan to Foreign Ministry (February 26, 1932), “Zhongri Duanjue Waijiao Guanxi,” Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyang Si, Danghao 012/1, Yuanbian Danghao 0088, Archives of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 204 Harada Kumao, *Saionji-kō to Seikyoku* [Prince Saionji and Politics] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1950), 2:132–135. On Harbin Consul-General Ōhashi, see: Ōhashi to Shidehara (November 19, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 1, 573–575.
- 205 For one example, see: Guo Dajun, “Cong Jiuyiba dao Bayisan Guomintang Zhengfu Suiri Zhengce de Yanbian” [The Evolution of the KMT Government’s Policy Towards Japan from September 18 to August 13], *Lishi Yanjiu* No. 6 (1984), 128–130. For more on the Chinese response to the Manchurian Incident, in addition to footnote 151, see: Uno Shigeaki, “Chūgoku no Dōkō (1926–1932-Nen)” [China’s Movements (1926–1932)], *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi*, 2:273–288; Chuan Honglin, *Zhang Xueliang de Zhengzhi Shengya – Yiwei Minzu Yingxiong de Beiju* [The Political Career of Zhang Xueliang: The Tragedy of a National Hero] (Shenyang: Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe, 1988), 76–105; Lu Jun, Du Lianqing, *Zhang Xueliang yu Dongbeijun* [Zhang Xueliang and the Northeast Army] (Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe, 1991), 83–123; Tsuchida Tetsuo, “Zhang Xueliang yu Budikang Zhengce” [Zhang Xueliang and the Policy of Non-Resistance], in Mo Di, ed., *Zhang Xueliang Shengya Lunji – Haineiwai Zhuanjia Lunwen Jingxuan* (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chubanshe, 1991), 57–75; Tsuchiya Mitsuyoshi, “Shō-Ō Gassaku Seiken no Tainichi Seisaku – Futeikō Seisaku kara ‘Ichimen Teikō – Ichimen Kōshō’ e” [The Chiang-Jiang Joint Administration’s Japan Policy: From Non-Resistance to “Resistance and Negotiation”], *Seikei Ronsō* 662:1 (1993), 123–160; Nishimura Shigeo, *Chō Gakuryō*, 82–117; Kinaka Tsuyoshi, “Nankin Kokumin Seifu Tōchi no Seidoka to Ideogōi no Keigaika – Shō Kaiseki no Dokusai Tōchi Kakuritsu to Annai Jōgai no Seisaku Katei (1931–1937) [The Systematization and Ideology of the Nanjing Nationalist Government: The Establishment of Chiang Kai-shek’s Dictatorship and the Policymaking Process of “First Domestic Threats, Then Foreign Ones”], *Hōgaku Seijigaku Kenkyū* No. 31 (1996), 247–284; Nomura Kōichi, *Shō Kaiseki to Mō Takutō – Sekai Sensō no Naka no Kakumei* [Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong: Revolution during a World War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997), 148–175; Imai Shun, *Chūgoku Kakumei to Tainichi Kōsen – Kōnichi Minzoku Tōitsu Sensenshi Kenkyū Josetsu* [The Chinese Revolution and the War of Resistance Against Japan: Introduction to Historical Studies of the Nationalist United Front Against Japan] (Tokyo: Kyūko Shoin, 1997), 87–182.
- 206 Chiang to Zhang Xueliang (October 4, 1931), Jiang Zhongzheng Zongtong Dangan, Jiang Zongtong Choubi, Tongyi Shiqi, Vol. 58, AH.
- 207 Defense Agency, National Institute for Defense Studies, War History Office, *Senshi Sōsho Daihon’ei Rikugunbu 1* [War History Series: Imperial Headquarters Army Department I] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbun-sha, 1967), 307. Kōmoto Daisaku, who played an important, albeit indirect, role in the Manchurian Incident, stated that “had the Fengtian Army boldly and openly resisted at the time, there is no question that the Japanese would have failed in their night attack; there was a major difference in the number of troops on the two sides.” See: Kōmoto Daisaku Kyōjutsusho (July 25, 1953), *Riben Diguō Zhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian 9/18 Shibian*, 96.
- 208 Zhang Xueliang to the commanders of the Northeastern Army (August 16, 1931), *Zhang Xueliang Wenji*, 1:473. See also: Ogata Yōichi, “Ekishi-go no Tōhoku ni Okeru Kokumintō no Katsudō ni tsuite,” *Shikan* No. 91 (1975), 64.
- 209 Suma to Shidehara (November 18, 1931), JDR, Manshū Jihen, Part 1, Vol. 2, 399–401.

- 210 Lin Baisheng, ed., *Wang Jingwei Xiansheng Zuijin Yanlunji Xubian* [Collection of the Latest Remarks by Wang Jingwei (Continued)] (Hong Kong: Xianggang Nanhua Ribaoshe, 1938), 17–19. For more on Wang Jingwei at this time, see: Andō Tokuki, ed., *Ō Seiei Jijoden* [The Autobiography of Wang Jingwei] (Tokyo: Dai Nippon Yūben Kaigi Dansha, 1941), 127–138; Tsuchiya Mitsuyoshi, “Ō Seiei wa Naze ni ‘Hanshō Undō’ kara Shō-Ō Gassaku ni Tenkan shita no ka?” [Why Did Wang Jingwei Switch from the “Anti-Chiang Movement” to the Chiang-Wang United Front?], *Seikei Ronsō* 61:1 (1992), 97–122; Xu Yuming, *Wang Zhaoming yu Guomin Zhengfu – 1931 zhi 1936-Nian Duiqi Wentixia de Zhengzhi Biandong* [Wang Jingwei and the Nationalist Government: Political Changes in the Japanese Issue from 1931 to 1936] (Xindian: Guoshiguan, 1999), 11–118.
- 211 DVPS, 14:625–627. For more on Soviet East Asia policy and military industry during the Manchurian Incident, see: Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–1941: Moscow, Tokyo and the Prelude to the Pacific War* (London, 1992), 1–30; R.W. Davis, “Soviet Military Expenditure and the Armaments Industry, 1929–33: A Reconsideration,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 45:4 (1993), 577–608.
- 212 List 1–6, Delo 7, Papka 35, Opis 16, Fond 146, AVPRF.
- 213 CFR 7:3196–3208. On the restoration of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations, see: Li Jiagu, “Jiuyiba Shibian Hou Zhongsu Guanxi de Tiaozheng” [Realignment of Sino-Soviet Relations Following the September 18th Incident], *Kangri Zhanzheng Yanjiu* No. 2 (1992), 108–123; Li Jiagu, *Hezuo yu Chongtu – 1931–1945-Nian de Zhongsu Guanxi* [Cooperation and Conflict: Sino-Soviet Relations, 1931–1945] (Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe, 1996), 1–17; Lu Xijun 107–140.
- 214 Chiang Kai-shek, “Xiuming Neizheng yu Zheng Xuan Lizhi” [Revising Internal Affairs and Correcting the Administration of Officials] (December 14, 1932), *Xianzongtong Sou Gong Quanji*, Vol. 1, 658.
- 215 There is a large amount of research on the participation of Chinese collaborators in Manchukuo, including: Jiang Niandong, et. al., *Wei Manzhouguo Shi* [History of Manchukuo] (Changchun: Jilin Renmin Chubanshe, 1980); Matsuzawa Tetsunari, *Nihon Fashizumu no Taigai Shinryaku – Ishiwara Kanji to “Minzoku Kyōwa” Undō* [The Foreign Invasion of Japanese Fascism: Ishiwara Kanji and the “Ethnic Harmony” Movement] (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobō, 1983), 145–284; Furuya Tetsuo, “‘Manshūkoku’ no Sōshutsu” [The Creation of “Manchukuo”], in Yamamoto Yūzō, 39–82; Yamamuro Shin’ichi, *Kimera – Manshūkoku no Shōzō* [Chimera: Portrait of Manchukuo] (Tokyo: Chūkō Shinsho, 1993); Shibutani Yuri, “‘9/18’ Jihen Chokugo ni okeru Shin’yō no Seiji Jōkyō – Hōten Chihō Iji Iinkai o Chūshin to shite” [The Political Situation in Shenyang Immediately After the “September 18th” Incident: Focusing on the Fengtian Regional Maintenance Committee], *Shirin* 78:1 (1995), 138–158; Hamaguchi Yuko, *Nihon Tōchi to Higashi Ajia Shakai – Shokuminchi-ki Chōsen to Manshū no Hikaku Kenkyū* [Japanese Rule and East Asian Society: A Comparative Study of Korea and Manchuria in the Colonial Period] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 1996), 54–142.
- 216 Kwantung Army General Staff, “Manmo Mondai Kaiketsu Sakuan” [Plan for the Resolution of the Manchurian/Inner Mongolian Issue] (September 22, 1931), Katakura Tadashi, “Manshū Jihen Kimitsu Seiryaku Nisshi Sono Ichi” [Detailed Strategy Journal of the Manchurian Incident (1)] (September 22, 1931), Kobayashi Tetsuo, Shimada Toshihiko, eds., *Gendaishi Shiryō 7 Manshū Jihen* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1964), 189. Under this plan for a puppet regime, Xi Qia, Zhang Haipeng, Tang Yulin, and Zhang Jinghui would be charged with “maintaining regional public order” as “guardians” in addition to Pu Yi being made the “head.”
- 217 Pu Yi Affidavit (June 1, 1954), *Riben Diguō Zhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian 9/18 Shibian*, 370. Ma Zhanshan opposed the Kwantung Army-controlled

- Zhang Haipeng clique near the Nen River. On this point, see: Ma Zhanshan, "Heilongjiang Sheng Kangri Zhandou Xiangbao" [Detailed Report of Anti-Japanese Warfare in Heilongjiang Province] (April 1934), *Riben Diguó Zhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian 9/18 Shibian*, 220–236.
- 218 Zhang Jinghui Affidavit (June 11, 1954), *Riben Diguó Zhuyi Qinhua Dangan Ziliao Xuanbian 9/18 Shibian*, 278.

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Conclusion

International Changes and Policy Trends

If the approximately 20 years stretching from the conclusion of World War I to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident are treated as East Asia's interwar period, then the Manchurian Incident can be used to further divide that period into "early" and "late" halves. For a little over a decade following World War I, Japan maintained – however imperfectly – a cooperative relationship with Britain and the United States, but with the Manchurian Incident, it would transform from a force working to maintain the status quo to one seeking to destroy it.

The massive impact of the Manchurian Incident on both Japan and the world has sometimes led to the Japanese diplomacy of the interwar period being seen as merely a prelude to that event. This trend becomes even more pronounced when dealing with the period from Tanaka's time as foreign minister on, and it is likely impossible to view the Japanese foreign policy of the "early" interwar period as anything other than a form of imperialism.

But another characteristic of the Japanese diplomacy of the early interwar period is that it was an earnest attempt to adapt to several conditions that should be seen as the dawn of modern politics. Several elements that made up the international politics of the modern era – the rise of the United States as a superpower, the exhaustion of Europe, the appearance of the communist Soviet Union, Chinese anti-foreign nationalism, and an independence movement within and outside of Korea – had appeared at this point, if not earlier. And, looking at things from the perspective of Japanese political history, party politics were becoming entrenched during this period for the first time ever. Foreign policy had hitherto been monopolized by the bureaucracy, but now party leaders were seeking to exert leadership in this area. The individual qualities of men like Hara Takashi, Tanaka Giichi, and Hamaguchi Osachi played a significant role in this, however, and even during the height of Taishō Democracy, the political parties had not managed to secure a firm grasp over diplomatic power.

Particularly noteworthy in the East Asian international politics of the early interwar period was the unfolding of new forms of foreign policy that went beyond the existing conventional wisdom. In other words, the period saw the interaction of three new approaches to diplomacy: the ideological diplomacies

of the United States and the Soviet Union, and China's revolutionary diplomacy. Faced with the new American form of diplomacy and its bold pursuit of multilateral diplomacy grounded in ideology, Japan endorsed the principle of the Open Door. Belief in sphere-of-influence diplomacy remained strong in Japan, however, and it succeeded in making it through America's diplomatic offensive by securing reservations for its existing interests in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia within the collaborative diplomacy of the Washington System.

The anti-communist ideology that arose in reaction to the arrival of Soviet diplomacy also began to take on important meaning as a determinant factor in Japanese foreign policy. The Nationalist government's revolutionary diplomacy also represented a new kind of diplomacy from China. Unlike the ideological diplomacy of the Soviet Union, which tended to be covert, Chinese revolutionary diplomacy openly sought the recovery of China's rights and was willing to use force to this end with the support of the anti-foreign movement. These new diplomatic efforts from China and the Soviet Union opened up new dimensions in East Asia that could not be managed through normal diplomatic negotiations. To see American diplomacy as the sole new diplomatic force in this period is to lose sight of several aspects of the era.

I. The International Changes of the Early Interwar Period and Japanese Diplomacy

This book has correlated the aforementioned changes in the international environment and Japan's responses to three waves of international change in the early interwar period.

The first wave of international change came immediately after the end of World War I. Even though the war had ended, Russia, with whom Japan had previously divided its rights and interests in Manchuria, remained subject to intervention by the great powers. In China, the rifts between various forces had deepened, making the prospects for reunification bleak. In Korea, the independence movement was gaining energy and now reached outside of the country as well. And, in the change that likely needs to be most emphasized, the United States had begun to show a willingness and ability to operate as a superpower, taking the place of the Western European powers who were exhausted from the world war.

The meaning of this first wave to Japanese diplomacy was clear. For Japan, the postwar international environment was a "simplified" one in which the United States and Britain were the only other great powers able to exert considerable influence in East Asia. Consequently, it was unable to hypothesize anything other than cooperation with these two countries as a foundation for its foreign policy. It was under these circumstances that the Hara government skillfully carried out what could be called a foreign policy of "expansionism within collaboration" – a policy of engaging in sphere-of-influence diplomacy, expanding Japan's interests in China and seeking to acquire the former German interests, while still holding to cooperation with Britain and

America as a policy foundation. Hara Diplomacy also served as the prototype for Japanese postwar diplomacy in its willingness to interfere with China political leadership by providing “limited support of Zhang,” but only within the scope of the Three Northeast Provinces.

The final aspect of the first wave was the Washington Conference held from 1921 to 1922. Japan was able to manage Far Eastern questions at the conference by applying Hara’s approach of engaging in cooperation with Britain and the US so long as reservations were obtained for Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As Japan was able to resolve a number of pending issues including the Shandong Question, the Twenty-One Demands, and the withdrawal of troops from Siberia to its advantage at the Washington Conference, such cooperation came to be seen as both necessary and profitable.

In the years following the conference, Japanese troops were withdrawn from Siberia and northern Manchuria, and there was increased criticism of the military in the country. There were no cases of “interference through military force” comparable to the Jiandao Expedition that had been carried out under Hara. Additionally, contemporary Japanese foreign policy saw economic expansion in China as a means of improving relations and also incorporated cultural diplomatic aspects carried out through “cultural activities in China.” In that sense, there are aspects of the Japanese diplomacy that followed the Washington Conference that should be seen as reflecting an increased commitment to a policy of non-interference.

While Japan had basically finished dealing with wartime issues with the Washington Conference and the withdrawal of troops from Siberia and northern Manchuria, policy towards China was as important as ever. For Japan, Chinese issues were not important merely due to the short-term problem of how to do away with the negative legacies of wartime diplomacy. In a more fundamental sense, their significance was deeply connected to the modern diplomatic challenge facing Japan of how to continue to expand Japanese influence on the Asian mainland and counter Russia’s southward expansion while remaining within a framework of cooperation with the other powers.

The second wave of international changes that arrived in 1923 placed Japan under pressure from three directions to develop new policies towards China. The first of these was the rise of the Soviet Union, an actor who existed outside of the Washington System. That the Soviets had established diplomatic relations with China and been able to secure a leadership position over Chinese Eastern Railway policy caused a number of groups, most significantly the Japanese army, to perceive the existence of a “Soviet threat.” The appearance of the Soviet Union as a force in international politics meant both the return of a former great power and the arrival of communist ideological diplomacy. The ideological aspects of Soviet diplomacy were taken much more seriously by the Japanese than America’s ideological diplomacy was. Second, the rights recovery movement in China (the various movements seeking the return of Dalian, the various concessions, railway rights, and control over education, and to carry out boycotts of Japanese goods)

represented the “threat of the anti-Japanese movement” to the Japanese. Third, the formation of the First United Front under Soviet influence and China’s Nationalist Revolution were seen by the Japanese as the “threat of the Nationalist Revolution.” These Chinese nationalistic trends would have great significance for the international politics of the mid-1920s on, albeit in a different context than the arrival of the Soviet Union had had. And because it was difficult to manage these trends through normal diplomatic negotiations, they caused great consternation for the powers.

The rise of these “three threats” – the Soviet threat, the threat of the anti-Japanese movement, and the threat of Nationalist Revolution – could not have been even imagined during the time of the Hara government, and it was not possible to respond to these changes in the international environment using Japan’s existing diplomatic policies. The limits of Hara’s foreign policy doctrine were thus exposed. The “simplified international environment” of a divided China and a Soviet Union subject to intervention by the great powers was only transitional; Hara’s policies were not able to deal with the new Chinese and Soviet trends that followed afterwards. It was the local officials in China from the Japanese army and Mantetsu who lead the way in advocating for drastic changes to Japan’s foreign policies at this time. Both began advocating for aiding Zhang Zuolin as a means of countering the Soviet threat.

This aid became an established part of Japanese foreign policy through the mediation of the army leadership. The “Outline of China Policy” adopted during the Kiyoura government included a policy of advancing into northern Manchuria to counter the Soviets and providing Zhang with “guidance.” Notably, the Taoqi Line had not been included in Japan’s “delineated” special interests in southern Manchuria during the negotiations over the Second China Consortium, and Japan had shown an increasing tendency to act independently in foreign affairs since shortly before Shidehara assumed the position of foreign minister. As the Washington System lacked a prescription for dealing with the Soviet Union, the efforts of men like Asian Affairs Bureau Director Debuchi Katsuji to continue to argue for collaborative diplomacy within that system lacked persuasiveness. The Japanese army’s China policy during the Second Fengtian-Zhili War and the Guo Songling Incident was one of “active support” for Zhang that went beyond the scope of the Three Northeast Provinces, extending to Zhang’s moves on the central government. The Hara Doctrine of “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support” for Zhang was dealt a blow, and “nationwide interference” and “active support” were adopted to counter the threats of the Soviets and the Chinese nationalist revolution.

As such, Shidehara Diplomacy had no choice but to attempt the difficult task of rebuilding collaboration with Britain and the United States while also dealing with the three threats brought about by the second wave. While Shidehara held to his beliefs in “absolute non-interference” and “no support” for Zhang in cooperation with the West, he failed as his inflexible “formal logic” diplomacy did not adequately take domestic considerations into account.

Additionally, Shidehara's foreign policy envisioned Japanese economic expansion on the continent, and he was overly willing to sacrifice cooperation with the other powers in his pursuit of economic benefits. Shidehara, foreign ministry officials in China, the army leadership, and mid-ranking army officers were divided in their foreign policy ideas, and Japanese diplomacy as a whole would lose consistency even as it shifted away from multilateral cooperation to a more independent foreign policy.

Both Tanaka and Shidehara made responding to the second wave of international changes a priority. Tanaka was most concerned about the threat of the Nationalist Revolution. The basic premise for Tanaka Diplomacy was "equidistant diplomacy"; the establishment of a north-south political division in China, where Chiang Kai-shek's hegemony in Guannei was recognized by Japan and Zhang Zuolin returned to the Three Northeast Provinces. Japan would then maintain an equal distance from both of these anti-communist leaders. However, the Jinan Incident and assassination of Zhang severely limited the feasibility of this idea. Even if both incidents were unexpected for Tanaka, he still has to bear the majority of the responsibility for them. Afterwards, Tanaka Diplomacy would become increasingly isolated over the Nationalist government in its relations with the United States and Britain. At the same time, Tanaka inherited the economism of Shidehara Diplomacy in his relations with the Soviet Union, and he was able to conclude a treaty with the Soviets over fishing rights. However, Tanaka was extremely sensitive to Soviet policy towards China and its use of communist propaganda, and he let the opportunity presented by declining Soviet influence within China pass by, failing to respond to offers of a non-aggression pact and ease tensions between the countries.

Later, during his second time as foreign minister, Shidehara would strongly oppose Stimson's ideas on China during the Fengtian-Soviet War, but he also worked to restore cooperation with Britain and the United States at the London Naval Conference and in the negotiations over managing China's foreign debt. Shidehara developed a more mature policy of cooperation with Britain and America, overcoming the economism that had led him to disregard such cooperative diplomacy in his first term. However, the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 not only aroused wariness in other countries, it also brought about a deterioration of Shidehara Diplomacy. He drew closer to the army's plan for the establishment of puppet administrations and effectively abandoned direct negotiations with China in cooperation with Britain and the United States over the Jinzhou question, personally closing the door on any possibility of restoring order through diplomatic negotiations. The third wave of international changes – the Manchurian Incident – was brought about by Japan and triggered the "later interwar period" for the international politics of East Asia, a time characterized by the "founding" of Manchukuo by Japan, Japan's departure from the League of Nations, and the North China Buffer State Strategy.

II. Trends in Japanese Foreign Policy

1. Patterns of China Policy

Next, I would like to categorize the Japanese diplomacy of the early interwar period, mainly from the perspective of comparing Hara, Shidehara, and Tanaka. As cooperation with Britain and the United States served as a foundation for the foreign policies of all three, we need to look at their China policies instead to find the differences between them (these are summarized in Table 6.1).

First, as made clear through the analysis of the reorganization of the Siberian-North Manchurian Expedition and the Jiandao Expedition, Hara pursued “non-interference with reservations” in his Manchurian policy and was willing to engage in “interference through military force.” And, motivated by CER and Jiandao policy, he also began “interfering with political leaders” by supporting Zhang Zuolin. The policy formalized through the Eastern Conference was one of “limited support of Zhang” under which he was only aided within the scope of the Three Northeast Provinces. The Hara government sought to balance this support with its policy of cooperation with the West by refusing to assist the Fengtian clique in its goal of advancing on

Table 6.1 Patterns of China Policy (1918–1928)

Degree of Military Interference					
Occupation of Manchuria	Nationwide Interference	Non-Interference with Reservations	Absolute Non-Interference		
	Mori	Yoshida	Takahashi, Shidehara, Debuchi, Kimura	No Support of Zhang	Degree of Political Interference
	Tanaka (as prime minister)	Hara, Tanaka (as war minister), Uchida,* Yoshizawa		Limited Support of Zhang	
	Ugaki, Shirakawa, ** Honjō			Active Support of Zhang	
Post-1903 mid-ranking army officers	Mutō, Muraoka			Elimination of Zhang	

Source: Author

* This only applies to Uchida from 1918 to 1921. From 1922 on, he would move to “absolute non-intervention” and “limited support of Zhang.”

** This only applies to Shirakawa from 1925 to 1927. From 1928 on, he would move closer to Muraoka and call for eliminating Zhang.

the central government. While this Hara Doctrine was criticized by Finance Minister Takahashi and local army officers in China (albeit for different reasons), Hara was able to create an unwavering prototype for postwar Japanese diplomacy with the support of Foreign Minister Uchida and War Minister Tanaka.

Shidehara Diplomacy, on the other hand, pursued policies of “absolute non-interference” and “no support of Zhang.” In Shidehara’s mind, so long as Japan’s economic benefits were maintained, even Zhang falling from power and the Three Northeast Provinces becoming communist was acceptable. In that sense, Shidehara was in no way a successor to Hara Diplomacy. Minister to China Yoshizawa Kenkichi and other foreign ministry officials in China were critical of Shidehara and attempted to continue with the policies laid down by Hara: “non-interference with reservations” and “limited support of Zhang.” This was War Minister Ugaki’s original position as well, although he gradually moved closer to the positions of army officers stationed in China who wanted “active support of Zhang” and “nationwide interference.” Also, mid-ranking army officers who had graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy from 1903 on began forming the most hardline arguments – “occupation of Manchuria” and the “elimination of Zhang” – ultimately leading to the assassination of Zhang and the Liutiahu Incident. Compared to local foreign ministry officials, the army leadership, and the mid-ranking army officers, Shidehara’s policies were exceptional for the time. Because of the extreme policy positions and lack of consideration for domestic politics in his “formal logic” diplomacy, Shidehara was unable to serve as a unifying force.

In comparison, while Tanaka carried out the Shandong Expedition, an example of “nationwide interference,” he also attempted to limit support of Zhang Zuolin to the Three Northeast Provinces. In that sense, he was trying to return to the policy of “limited support of Zhang” that Hara had established. However, his policy differed from that of Asian Affairs Bureau Director Kimura Eiichi, Fengtian Consul-General Yoshida Shigeru, Minister to China Yoshizawa, War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori, Japanese Legation Military Attaché Honjō Shigeru, the post-1903 mid-ranking army officers, Kwantung Army Commander Mutō Nobuyoshi, Kwantung Army Commander Muraoka Chōtarō, and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Mori Kaku, and there never was a unified vision for China policy. Tanaka’s positions would not be carried on by Shidehara during his second term as foreign minister.

2. Three Policy Trends

Finally, I would like to reexamine the various trends in Japanese foreign policy from a more macroscopic perspective.

As discussed above, each of the foremost Japanese diplomatic leaders of the early interwar period – Hara Takashi, Shidehara Kijūrō, and Tanaka Giichi – had their own ideas for China policy. Of course, both Hara and Shidehara made cooperation with the United States and Britain a cornerstone of their

foreign policies, and even Tanaka did not envision anyone else serving as a partner to Japan. In that sense, at least, it is possible to speak of the three men collectively as members of the faction that believed in cooperating with the United States and Britain. Belief in such cooperation was the mainstream view during the early interwar period, but there was also a minority advocating Pan-Asianism. These advocates can be divided into two camps: those who sought an equal partnership with China, and those who sought Japanese hegemony in Asia, beginning with Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

The negotiations over managing China's foreign debt during Shidehara's second term as foreign minister clearly reflected the disagreements between those who supported cooperation with Britain and the US and those who wanted a partnership with China. In other words, Shidehara made every effort to act in concert with the Western powers while Minister to China Shigemitsu Mamoru sought to work with the "realist faction" of Song Ziwen and Chiang Kai-shek to support the Nationalist government's nation-building.

The origin of this policy disagreement between Shidehara and Shigemitsu can be found in the debate over recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy at the 1925 Special Conference on the Chinese Customs Tariff.¹ During the preliminary negotiations for the conference, Shidehara instructed Ambassador to the US Matsudaira Tsuneo to try to restrain US Secretary of State Kellogg, who was showing a desire to recognize Chinese tariff autonomy, telling him that "it is essential that the three nations of Japan, Britain, and America act cautiously and maintain cooperation at all times."² In other words, Shidehara had decided that the best course of action against the Chinese rights recovery movement, which was seeking to secure tariff autonomy, was for Japan, Britain, and America to cooperate in its suppression. In line with Shidehara's desires, when the Katō Takaaki government laid out its positions for the conference in an October 13, 1925 cabinet decision, it only adopted a passive position on the tariff autonomy issue, saying that "there is no need to reject consideration, so long as the proposal is reasonable."³

Shidehara had entrusted Saburi Sadao, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Horiuchi Tateki, and Hidaka Shinrokurō – the mid-ranking members of the delegation – with writing the speech given at the opening of the conference, and they decided to recognize Chinese tariff autonomy in principle. Thus, when the conference opened on October 26, 1925, Japanese Chief Plenipotentiary Hioki Eki gave a speech recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy. According to Shigemitsu's recollections, he had been the one to advocate for recognizing Chinese tariff autonomy, and he had received Saburi's backing for this.⁴ He would later write on the purpose behind this policy that "at the Beijing conference, the Japanese delegation always took the lead in adopting sympathetic positions on the return of tariff autonomy and the abolition of extra-territoriality, supporting China's cry for national liberation."⁵ Saburi and Shigemitsu's policy line was to attempt to have Japan assume a leadership position diplomatically while building good relations with China by taking the lead in offering concessions. Accordingly, their position was different from

Shidehara's policy of suppressing the Chinese rights recovery movement through cooperation with Britain and the United States.

While Shidehara's belief in cooperation was the traditional foreign policy doctrine, Shigemitsu's call for partnering with China basically never went beyond being a subordinate position. However, while a minority, there were those arguing positions close to that of Shigemitsu even before the conference in Beijing. One example would be Takahashi Korekiyo, finance minister in the Hara government, who wrote "Opinions on the Establishment of an East Asian Economic Power" in May 1921. In this paper, Takahashi called for establishing a partnership with China and forming a "third global force" comparable in power to the United States and Britain. But Prime Minister Hara rejected this out of hand as an "academic argument."⁶ In that sense, the conflict between those advocating for cooperation with the United States and Britain and those calling for partnering with China already existed during the Hara government.

For an example of an argument for partnering with China made by a member of the foreign ministry leadership during Shidehara's second term as foreign minister, we can look to "Regarding China Policy," an opinion paper drafted by Tani Masayuki following his promotion from East Asian Affairs Bureau 1st Section director to East Asian Affairs Bureau director in October 1930. Judging that "the restoration of great power cooperation towards China, particularly Anglo-Japanese cooperation, is not proceeding as planned," Tani argued in this paper for the "gradual abandonment" of the concessions in Suzhou, Hangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Shashi, and Chongqing, "maintaining the general state of economic relations between China and Japan and adapting our people's economic activities to the new environment." Tani's views seen here were clearly closer to Shigemitsu than Shidehara. According to Tani, former Bureau Director Arita "agreed with [the paper's] arguments in general" and "the members of the bureau also performed their duties with a similar understanding."⁷ Thus, we can infer that arguments for partnering with China were actually within the mainstream in the Asian Affairs Bureau during Shidehara's second term.

While there is a tendency to overlook the non-mainstream advocacy for partnership with China from Takahashi, Shigemitsu, Arita, and Tani in favor of the two-dimensional schemes of Shidehara versus Tanaka Diplomacy or the foreign ministry versus the army, it was another type of policy trend under the Washington System. In general, the Chinese partnership faction was sensitive to the trend towards decolonization following the Paris Peace Conference. From the appointment of Arita Hachirō as Asian Affairs Bureau director in September 1927, there was a quiet conversion in the aftermath of the Eastern Conference from the arguments for cooperation with Britain and the United States made by his predecessors Yoshizawa Kenkichi, Debuchi Katsuji, and Kimura Eiichi. Also, Minister to China Shigemitsu's argument for partnership with China was the most systematic example of a foreign policy vision advanced by a foreign ministry official stationed in China

capable of taking the place of the conventional foundations of Japanese foreign policy. It can be evaluated as a “healthy” form of Pan-Asianism.

In addition to the two foreign policy doctrines within the foreign ministry symbolized by Shidehara and Shigemitsu, the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident late in Shidehara’s second term represents the emergence of a third foreign policy doctrine by the mid-ranking army officers who had graduated from the Imperial Army Academy from 1903 on. While this third policy doctrine was by no means straightforward, it could perhaps be summarized as an argument for Japanese hegemony in Asia, an attempt to establish a Japan-centered international order in Asia in which China occupied a subordinate position.

While Shidehara would leave the foreign ministry following the fall of the 2nd Wakatsuki government, his views on cooperation with Britain and the United States would be carried on by men like Debuchi Katsuji, Yoshida Shigeru, Satō Naotake, and Tōgō Shigenori. And Shigemitsu, the advocate for Chinese partnership, would become vice-minister in May 1933, providing support to foreign ministers Uchida Kōsai and Hirota Kōki. In that sense, the two policy doctrines within the foreign ministry that this book has examined in its look at the negotiations over managing China’s foreign debt can be considered to have continued even after the Manchurian Incident.

However, the fact that the Japanese army gradually expanded its territorial control in China following the Manchurian Incident not only hindered Shidehara-style cooperation but also dealt a major blow to a Shigemitsu-style partnership with China. This is because it would be difficult for China to accept any call for partnership that did not include restraining the army’s control on the continent. For this reason, as succinctly shown by Song Ziwen’s adoption of a hardline stance towards Japan following the Manchurian Incident, it became difficult to expect Nationalist government officials to respond to Shigemitsu-style arguments for partnership.

The appeasement policy of the “Chiang-Wang” joint administration formed in 1932 was adopted for the purpose of prioritizing domestic affairs, easing tensions with Japan and allowing the fight against communism to take the lead. It thus existed on a different dimension than what Shigemitsu had envisioned earlier. The Legislative Yuan under Sun Ke secretly passed a bill breaking off relations with Japan in February 1933 and then worked to have the foreign ministry and KMT accept this.⁸ There were also movements in both China and Japan in 1934 and 1935 towards joint efforts in agricultural development and railway construction as a means of economic cooperation, including by Song Ziwen, who was seen as the leader of the pro-Western faction. But this argument was only barely viable and, even then, only by setting aside the serious political problem of Manchukuo. As the North China Buffer State Strategy proceeded, the Chinese gradually abandoned its policy of appeasement towards Japan and would turn to full-fledged resistance.⁹

As such, the possibility of implementing the argument for partnership with China, which had once been just a branch of the Western cooperation

argument of Hara and Shidehara, was even further limited following the Manchurian Incident. And with both of the policy doctrines within the foreign ministry having thus reached dead ends and become unable to put forward ideas capable of competing against the army, the final chance for a return to the collaborative diplomacy of the Washington System was lost.

Looking back on the path that led to catastrophe with the benefit of historical hindsight, Shidehara should have held firm to his belief in non-interference and cooperation with Britain and the United States during the Manchurian Incident. Had he gained the support of party politicians and managed to roll back the Manchurian Incident, party politics might have continued as something stronger and the limits of cooperation in foreign policy may not have been exposed.

Harmonizing domestic and international demands during ongoing democratization was a task that demanded great political skill. And yet, the passing of diplomatic leadership from Hara to Shidehara meant that Japan actually experienced a decline in such skill. The greatest tragedy of Taishō Democracy is that the Manchurian Incident occurred before the leadership of the political parties over foreign policy had been sufficiently systematized. A strong conservative politician like Hara Takashi was needed in the tumultuous period leading to the Manchurian Incident.

Source Acronyms

JDR	Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., <i>Nihon Gaikō Bunsho</i> [Japanese Diplomatic Records] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975–1992)
NDL	Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room, National Diet Library, Tokyo

Notes

- 1 As argued in Chapter 3, Shidehara was excessively fixated on economic benefits for Japan and lost sight of engaging in flexible cooperation with the other powers while engaging with the issue of the management of Chinese foreign debt at the Special Conference on the Chinese Custom Tariff. As this was thus a deviation from his basic policy of cooperating with Britain and the US, it is not a suitable origin point for the confrontation between Shidehara and Shigemitsu's policy doctrines.
- 2 Shidehara to Matsudaira (July 29, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 2:1012–1013.
- 3 Shidehara to Prime Minister Katō Takaaki (October 10, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 2:1072–1081. Katō to Shidehara (October 13, 1925), JDR, 1925 2, 2:1083.
- 4 Shigemitsu Mamoru, *Gaikō Kaisōroku* [Diplomatic Memoirs] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1953), 53–54. Shigemitsu Mamoru, “Saburi-Kōshi no Shi” [The Death of Envoy Saburi], *Chūgoku Kenkyū Geppō* 42:11 (1988), 39. See also: Horiuchi Tateki, *Chūgoku no Arashi no Naka de* [Amidst the Chinese Storm] (Tokyo: Kangensha, 1950), 54–55; Hidaka Shinrokurō, “Mono ni Naranakatta Kokusai Kaigi” [The International Conference That Achieved Nothing], *Kokusai Mondai* No. 37 (1963), 58–61.
- 5 Shigemitsu Shuki “Nihon,” “Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho,” 1B.54.14, NDL, 16.
- 6 Ogawa Heikichi Bunsho Kenkyūkai, ed., *Ogawa Heikichi Kankei Bunsho* [Documents Related to Ogawa Heikichi] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1973), 2:144–149. Hara

- Keiichirō, ed., *Hara Takashi Nikki* [The Diary of Hara Takashi] (Tokyo: Fukumura Shuppan, 1981), 5:400.
- 7 Tani to Shigemitsu (January 15, 1931), JDR, Shōwa-ki I, Part 1, Vol. 5, 388–393.
- 8 “Zhongri Juejiao Wenti” [The Sino-Japanese Severing of Relations Issue], Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyangsi, Danghao 012/1, Yuanbian Danghao 369/95, Archives of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 9 Jiang Zuobin to Foreign Ministry (May 24, 1934), “Guanyu Gaishan Zhongri Guanxi,” Vol. 1, Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyangsi, Danghao 012, Yuanbian Danghao 46/2, Archives of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Discussion with Wang Chonghui (February 21, 1935), “Guangtian Sanyuanze zhi Jiaoshe,” Waijiaobu Dangan, Yadong Taipingyangsi, Danghao 011/2, Yuanbian Danghao 39/10, Archives of the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For more on the arguments for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation and the process of the changes in China’s appeasement of Japan, see: Sakai Tetsuya, *Taishō Demokurashī Taisei no Hōkai – Naisei to Gaikō* [The Destruction of Taishō Democracy: Domestic Politics and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1992), 56–58; Inoue Toshikazu, *Kiki no Naka no Kyōchō Gaikō – Nichū Sensō ni Itaru Taigai Seisaku no Keisei to Tenkai* [Collaborative Diplomacy Amidst Crisis: The Formulation and Development of Foreign Policy Leading into the Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1994), 120–124, 201–205, 216–227.

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Afterword

Most historical events are transient and do not, in the strictest sense, repeat.

But at the same time, we can often find commonalities with the not-so-distant past in events considered to be extremely modern. Even as it establishes itself as an economic superpower, modern-day Japan still agonizes over the formation of an order in East Asia and frictions with various countries. By superimposing modern Japan over the Japan of the 1920s, which was faced with similar tasks, it might be possible to find interesting observations.

Having said that, this book was written for the purpose of research in international political history, and I have restrained myself from impetuously attempting to extract historical lessons or make predictions for the future. But at the same time, the position of the 1920s as the origin of modern international politics was always on my mind as I analyzed the United States' growth into a superpower, Japanese collaborative diplomacy during the Taishō Democracy period, China's unique diplomatic approaches, the Soviet Union's ideological diplomacy, and the Korean independent movement inside and outside of Korea.

What I also had in mind in the sense of undertaking historical research from a modern perspective was the divergence of perceptions of history. Of course, differences in historical perceptions are not always a problem. Interpretations can diverge even when the same historical materials are rigorously examined. As researchers are called upon to be original both in terms of the historical materials used and their analysis of those materials, it could even be said that divergence in historical perspectives is necessary.

If such divergence in the above context could be called "divergence of historical perceptions as a result," then what I had in mind writing this book was something of a different nature that could be called the "constructed divergence of historical perception." While the former pays respect to differing views to some extent, the latter denies the validity of other views as using impermissible interpretations and historical bases. This "constructed divergence of historical perception" can sometimes even take on the aspect of a national confrontation.

In Japan and the other countries involved, there exists a deep-rooted distrust of each other's views of history, and one of our responsibilities as researchers is to steadily work to fill in this gap. But the reality is that this gap

sometimes actually seems to be widening, and I cannot help but feel that the attitudes of researchers is itself one cause. In this book, I have tried not to allow myself the shortcut of relying on the historical materials of only one country and writing as if the “riots” and “looting” attributed to other countries were historical fact.

There is no way to overcome this kind of problem except to investigate the historical materials of all the involved countries and diligently compare them. In that sense, the fact that the diplomatic records of the Soviet Union are not completely available to use is the largest remaining problem. At the same time, my inability to rid myself of suspicions that this method was possibly a way of disregarding my own lack of ability meant that it took me ten years to complete this book.

I cannot help but be overwhelmed with emotion as images of the people who helped me during this period or the cityscapes of the various places I visited cross my mind. First, I would like to thank Iokibe Makoto, Itō Mitsutoshi, and Tsukimura Tarō of Kobe University, who reviewed the doctoral thesis on which this book is based. Professor Iokibe, in particular, warmly welcomed me with his natural generosity and enthusiasm as I began this unfamiliar research, serving as my doctoral supervisor. He was also the one who went to great pains to get it published. Gotō Harumi of Chiba University also provided valuable comments on the draft manuscript of this book. In addition to the above, as is made clear in the notes to each chapter, I owe an extreme amount to those who undertook prior research. I will be extremely grateful if this clumsy maiden work repays even a fraction of the debt I owe for the learning I have received.

Last, but not least, Seikai Yasushi of Yūhikaku continued to encourage me with his inner passion and attention to detail in the two years leading up to publication. In addition, the original publication of this book was supported by a 2001 grant from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone involved.

Hattori Ryūji
September 2001

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